

**THE REPRESENTATION OF GREAT MORAVIA
AND ITS FALL IN HUNGARIAN/MAGYAR HISTORIOGRAPHY
DURING THE PERIOD OF DUALISM¹**

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Rezumat: Reprezentarea Moraviei Mari și a decăderii sale în istoriografia maghiară din perioada dualismului.

Interpretarea problemei Moraviei Mari de către istoriografia maghiară din secolul al XIX-lea ridică întrebări. Întâi de toate este problema interesului față de subiectul care a devenit o parte integrantă și statornică a narațiunii naționale slovace de la începutul formării naționalismului modern. Prezentarea Moraviei Mari ca stat suveran al slovacilor, existent înainte de perioada maghiară, precum și cultivarea acestei tradiții sub forma mitului despre „Epoca de Aur” a slovacilor au demonstrat vechimea, autohtonía, continuitatea istorică și statutul egal al națiunii slovace în interiorul granițelor Ungariei. Aceste fapte ar fi putut să indice mai degrabă o lipsă de interes decât o oarecare preocupare a istoricilor maghiari față de interpretarea amintitului fenomen. Cu toate acestea, lucrările lor referitoare la istoria timpurie a națiunii maghiare arată contrariul. Articolul este centrat pe întrebarea cum este înțeleasă reprezentarea istorică a Moraviei Mari și decăderea acesteia de către istoricii maghiari din perioada dualismului.

Abstract: *The interpretation of the issue of Great Moravia by Hungarian/Magyar historiography in the 19th century raises questions. First of all is the question of interest in the topic that became an integral and fixed part of the Slovak national narrative from the beginning of the formation of modern nationalism. The presentation of Great Moravia as the statehood of Slovaks existing before the Hungarian period as well as the cultivation of this tradition in the form of myth about the “Golden Age” of Slovaks, demonstrated the ancientness, autochthony, historical continuity and equal status of Slovak nation within the boundaries of Hungary. These facts indicate rather expect no interest than some attention of Hungarian/Magyar historians in the interpretation of this phenomenon. However, as we can follow, their works about the early history of Hungarian/Magyar nation show the contrary. The issue raised in the introduction has become irrelevant. The article is focused*

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on the question how the historical representation of Great Moravia and its fall are understood by the Hungarian/Magyar historians during the period of dualism. Parallel with this we ask them for coping with not own national tradition.

Résumé: La représentation de la Grande Moravie et de sa déchéance dans l'historiographie hongroise de la période du dualisme.

L'interprétation de la question de la Grande Moravie par l'historiographie hongroise du XIX-ème siècle suscita des interrogations. Premièrement, il y en a la question liée de l'intérêt vis-à-vis le sujet qui devint une partie intégrante et constante de la narration nationale slovaque du début de la formation du nationalisme moderne. La présentation de la Grande Moravie comme État souverain des Slovaques existant avant la période hongroise, ainsi que la culture de cette tradition sous la forme du mythe sur "L'Âge d'Or" des Slovaques, démontrèrent l'ancienneté, l'autochtonie, la continuité historique et le statut égal de la nation slovaque à l'intérieur des frontières de l'Hongrie. Cela aurait pu indiquer manque d'intérêt plutôt qu'un certain intérêt des historiens hongrois par rapport à l'interprétation du phénomène qu'on vient de mentionner. Malgré cela, leurs ouvrages faisant référence à l'histoire ancienne de la nation hongroise montrèrent le contraire. On centra l'article ci-joint sur la question comment est comprise la représentation historique de la Grande Moravie et sa déchéance par les historiens allemands de la période du dualisme.

Keywords: Great Moravia, representations, Hungarian/Magyar historiography, Hungary, age of dualism

Introduction

The interpretation of the issue of Great Moravia by Hungarian/Magyar² historiography in the 19th century raises several questions. First of all, the question of interest in the topic that became an integral part of the national narrative of Slovaks from the beginning of the formation of modern nationalism. Actually, the presentation of Great Moravia as the statehood of Slovaks existing before the Hungarian period as well as the cultivation of this tradition in the form of myth about the "Golden Age" of Slovaks, demonstrated the ancientness, autochthony, historical continuity and equal status of Slovaks in a relevant territory.³ We should rather expect no interest than some interest of Hungarian/Magyar historians in

² Distinction is drawn here between the terms "Magyar" (ethnic and cultural significance) and "Hungarian" (state-political significance); or we use both of them (e.g. Hungarian/Magyar historiography, historians, nation).

³ Adam Hudek, *Najpolitickéjšia veda – Slovenská historiografia v rokoch 1948 – 1968* [The Most Political Science. Slovak historiography between years 1948 – 1968], Bratislava, Historický ústav SAV vo vydavateľstve Typoset print, spol. s r. o., 2010, pp. 28-30, 39.

the interpretation of this phenomenon, because the stressing of its importance might undermine the historical right of Magyars to the land of Hungary that was defended during the overall "long" 19th century. However, their works about the early history of Hungary and Hungarian/Magyar nation show the contrary.

Thus, the issue raised in the introduction has become irrelevant and the article is focused on the question how Great Moravia and its fall are understood by the Hungarian/Magyar historians during 1867 – 1914. We will focus on the works of authors such as Mihály Horváth, Károly Szabó, Vilmos Fraknói, Ferenc Salamon, Sándor Márki, Gyula Pauler, Lajos Baróti and Henrik Marczali. We will take into account the extent of their professionalism and external factors influencing their work, methods and attitudes to the topic. In general, the issue of coping with not own national tradition run through the overall study.

Basic Trends of the Development of Hungarian/Magyar Historiography during the Period of Dualism

From the period of reformism and several periods later, national liberalism as a conceptual basis of history writing,⁴ but also diminishing ideas of the Enlightenment and dominant literary romanticism raise their voices in Hungary.

The national and romantic concept of history was developing under the influence of individuals (for example István Horváth, the professor of university in Pest) by new historians such as M. Horváth, K. Szabó, and others. They used historical sources to describe the Golden Age of Hungarian/Magyar nation such as mediaeval chronicles, specifically *Gesta Hungarorum*, the chronicle of the anonymous notary of Bela III, which is currently considered the Hungarian heroic epos or historical novel.⁵ Not earlier than after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise some progress in Hungarian/Magyar historiography was observed, and the bases of more modern infrastructure were laid (but, not specialisations). Thus, it approximated to the West Europe model of historiography. Research into history commenced with the establishment of new scientific associations and journals, the opening of archives and more intensive publishing of the

⁴ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében. Magyar történetírás a 19.-20. században – nemzetközi kitekintéssel* [Under the Enchantment of Clio, Hungarian History Writing in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries – with an International Overview], Budapest, Osiris Kiadó, 2011, pp. 99, 125.

⁵ František Musil, *Gesta Hungarorum a historicko-zemepisný obraz Slovenska* [The Gesta Hungarorum and the historical and geographical picture of Slovakia], in "Historický časopis" [Historical Journal], 2004, Vol. 52, no. 3, p. 434.

sources. From 1867, besides the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the *Hungarian Historical Society* [*Magyar Történelmi Társulat*] with the journal *Századok* and from 1878 with its quarterly *Történelmi Tár* [Historical Repository], became the centre for the popularisation of science and the social organisation of historians.⁶

The turning point of Hungarian/Magyar historiography in the direction to its modernisation and professionalism occurred during the 1880s of the 19th century. Not only its institutional basis was extended, but also university education was reorganised according to the German model. The increasing interest in studies at the Departments of History (Pest, Cluj-Napoca) weakened the influence of historians – auto-didacticians, and created some space for the generation of educated historians. At the turn of the 19th and the 20th century, Hungarian/Magyar historical science was predominantly represented by main European theories (positivism, philosophical idealism, Marxism), but without a major impact. Though there were historians who adopted modern approaches and methods for critical analysis of the sources of Western European (specifically German) historiography; the majority of historians remained apathetic towards theoretical and methodological issues. They continue to research into political history and publish sources.⁷

Half a century of dualism was also typical of stronger links between policy and science. Looser or tighter groups of the historians were formed according to prevailing political camps. As the Hungarian political scene, where government liberals and an independent opposition were pitched against each other, as two historiographical concepts of Hungarian/Magyar historiography – pro-Habsburg (*labanc*) and independent (*kuruc*) – were formed according to their attitudes to the House of Habsburg, Vienna and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Furthermore, some religious aspect was also present. The defenders of the first attitude inclined to Catholicism, the defenders of the second one identified themselves with Protestant Christianity. Several Israelites or Christianized Jews wavered between them, but neither from the ideological point of view nor from the methodological point of view, formed a special group.⁸ The contradictions between these two concepts “*became more apparent at the moment when policy mixed into historiography as it happened at the turn of the 19th and 20th century.*

⁶ Péter Gunst, *A magyar történetírás története* [History of Hungarian historiography], Debrecen, Csokonai, 2000, pp. 197-198.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200, 202, 210; Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], pp. 113, 115-116.

⁸ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], pp. 108-113, 125.

Before, these views were not so strong than it appeared at first sight."⁹ Whether it was the case of Great Moravia, we will see based on the analysis of representative works about Early Middle Ages.

National Romanticizing Representation of Great Moravia and its Fall

Mihály Horváth (1809 – 1878), considered a founder of the national liberal historical school in Hungary, submitted his first synthetic history of Hungarians/Magyars *A magyarok története* (1842). The mix of national liberal and romantic elements manifested themselves in his uncritical adoption of Hungarian/Magyar traditions from Hungarian chronicles. He only acknowledged such foreign sources that did not contradict national traditions.¹⁰ He applied similar concept in his four volume synthesis *Magyarország történelme* (1860 – 1863) under his cover name Hatvani. Contrary to the pre-revolutionary work, he offered more detailed representation of the establishment, territory and rulers of Great Moravia, but not of its fall.¹¹

In the synthesis of the same name, issued and extended in four new volumes during 1871 – 1873, he documented the deep love of Magyars for freedom as their primary aim. He also tried to document it in relation to the new homeland and the inhabitants speaking different languages who were allegedly considered their brothers or comrades-in-arms.¹² Before Horváth described the conquest of the homeland, he also mentions two Slavonic principalities on the both banks of the Danube's middle stream. The Slavonic leader Pribina [*Privina*] formed the basis of Moravian Empire [*Morvaország*] on the left bank; later it was seized by the other leader of Slavs Mojmir [*Moimir*]. He and his successor Rastislav [*Ratiszláv*] were fighting for its independence from German kings, which was achieved by Svätopluk [*Szvatopluk*] in 870. Horváth used the name *Great Moravia* [*Nagy-Morvaország, Marahania*] for the area from the Czech-

⁹ Péter Gunst, *A magyar történetírás története* [History of Hungarian historiography], p. 207.

¹⁰ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 85.

¹¹ Beáta Pintérová, *Pohl'ady maďarskej historiografie na otázku príchodu Maďarov do Karpatskej kotliny a na ich vzťahy k okoliu (od polovice 19. storočia do konca 20. storočia)* [Views of Hungarian Historiography on the Question of the Arrival of Magyars in the Carpathian Basin and their Relations to the Surroundings (From the Middle of the 19th Century to the End of the 20th Century)], in *Dějiny – Teorie – Kritika* [History – Theory – Criticism], 2011, Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 78-81.

¹² Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 126.

Polish border up to the Drava river. He also linked Svätopluk with the mission of apostolic brothers Cyril [Kyrill] and Methodius [Methodius] and this author also mentions that Svätopluk almost succeeded to establish the National Church independent from Rome.¹³

Horváth pointed out the integration efforts of northern and southern Slavs as one nation at the time when Magyars were settling in their new homeland. He did not answer the questions “*if the Slavonic Empire had been established what would have happened to Germany (i.e. the Kingdom of the East Franks) and how would have influenced it Europe as a whole*”, but he at least mentioned the causes of the collapse of this project. It was due to the unexpected arrival of Magyars, the seizure of Pannonia, and the displacement of Slavs from the area of the Danube. In this way the Magyars broke into the northern and the southern Slavonic tribes.¹⁴ In fact Horváth reaffirmed the thoughts of Palacký, and he defined the historical role of Magyars in this space by means of his concept. Furthermore, he mentions that the news about the successful invasion of Magyars was brought to Germany, Arnulf called them on against the powerful and feared Duke of Great Moravian Svätopluk. Horváth described the fate of defeated and humiliated Svätopluk who died in 894 by means of two possible traditional stories. Thus he offered some choice for readers, either to believe in the Hungarian/Magyar tradition according to which he got drowned in the Danube or in the Slavonic romantic tradition about his life as a hermitin Zobor. There is nothing said about the fall of Great Moravia. He only mentions the disputes of Svätopluk’s sons– Mojmír [Moimir] and Svätopluk II. [II. Szvatopluk]. With respect to Árpád’s conquest and in accordance with *Gesta Hungarorum*, he understands it as a happy ending for the Magyars.¹⁵

The influence of romanticizing national concept of professor I. Horváth and traditional education can be also seen in the work of another historian during the 1850s and 1860s, Károly Szabó (1829 – 1890). He was a professor of Hungarian history and its auxiliary sciences at Cluj-Napoca University, but he did not master the method of the critical analysis of sources.¹⁶ This fact was reflected in his monograph dealing with Hungarian/Magyar chieftains starting from Árpád till the rule of St. Stephen of Hungary – *A magyar vezérek kora Árpádtól Szent*

¹³ Mihály Horváth, *Magyarország történelme*. Első kötet [History of Hungary. Volume 1.], Pest, Heckenast Gusztáv, 1871, p. 46.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 46, 50-51.

¹⁶ Péter Gunst, *A magyar történetírás története* [History of Hungarian historiography], p. 203.

Istvánig (1869). He repeated the well-known schemas of his predecessors resulting from German (*Annals of Fulda*), Byzantine (the work of the emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus *De administrando imperio*), Hungarian and Slavonic sources and chronicles. Szabó also referred to Palacký when emphasizing the historical role of Magyars and their impact on the direction of world history. In accordance with the interpretation of anonymous notary, he described the conquest of homeland in details and dated it 889 – 895.

This historian understands the year 892 as a milestone for the topic of Great Moravia. He highlighted not only the alliance of Arnulf with the Magyars against Svätopluk's Empire [*Szvatoplug birodalma*], but also the military expedition of Árpád and the successful conquest of Upper Hungary [*Felső-Magyarország, Felföld*]. Szabó dated the invasions of Magyars to Transdanubia in 894, after Svätopluk deceased and the Moravian Empire [*Morvaország*] was divided between his three sons – Mojmir [*Mojmir*] and Svätopluk [*Z(w)ventibáld*] (but he does not mention the name of the third son). Their competitiveness and the fact that they ignored their father's advice resulted in an armed conflict. Furthermore, the Bavarians also participated, and this fact resulted in the fall of declining empire.¹⁷ In parallel with the establishment of "Magyar Empire" [*magyar birodalom*] and Árpád's rule, Szabó described the last years of Great Moravia as the Moravian Land [*Morva föld*] disappearing due to the Magyar "fatal blow".¹⁸

The texts of Szabó were also embellished with myths and stories that were attributed some historical meaning such as the Legend of Svätopluk's Three Wands or the Legend of the White Horse as a symbol of the conquest of this territory. This legend can be found in all domestic chronicles (*the Buda Chronicle, the Vienna Illuminated Chronicle, the Chronicle of John of Turiec, the Bratislava Chronicle*) and in oral Hungarian/Magyar traditions.¹⁹

The non-critical approach to the history of Hungarian/Magyar nation was also applied by the historian of Jewish origin Vilmos Frankl (1843 – 1924), from 1874 Fraknói, despite his efforts to reveal and evaluate historical sources. His tendency to the policy of dualism and work for Catholic Church (he became a bishop) influenced his scientific activities. Fraknói's conservative, pro-Habsburg and Catholic attitude is proved by his three-volume synthetic work *Amagyar nemzet története* (1872), worked out on the call of the Society of St. Stephen of

¹⁷ Károly Szabó, *A magyar vezérek kora Árpádtól Szent Istvánig* [The Age of Hungarian chieftains from Árpád to Saint Stephen], Pest, Ráth Mór, 1869, pp. 75-81, 125.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 102, 133-134.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67, 93.

Hungary. His concept is based on the role of Church in Hungarian history. He considers the Church the basis for the establishment of Hungarian state, for the protection against enemies, the strength which keeps independence and the national character of state and a tool for the including Hungary among European states.²⁰ The priority given to the topics related to Christianization process starting from the first Hungarian king over the unchristian past of Magyar people was also indicated in the Fraknói's approach to the Great Moravian tradition. He omitted it, and if he mentions something from this period, there is nothing new compared to Horváth and Szabó: the act of alliance in 892 against the Duke of Great Moravia Svätopluk [*Szvatopluk, Nagy-Morvaország*], the defeat of Svätopluk's armed forces, the voluntary subjugation of Slavonic people and the conquest of homeland during 889 – 895 from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, from the Székelys to Moravia.²¹

Representation of Great Moravia and its Fall, between Ideologisation and Professionalization

From the beginning of 1880s, the part of historians in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Gyula Pauler, Tivadar Botka, Károly Szabó, Ferenc Salamon) tried to determine the year of the conquest of the homeland by Magyars because of forthcoming one thousand anniversary of their arrival in the Carpathian Basin and the establishment of the Hungarian state. In general, they agreed that it was the process lasting several years between the years 888 – 900.²² The efforts to determine the "Golden Age" of Hungarian/Magyar nation at the time axis raised strong interest of (semi-) professional historians in early medieval history. They not only wrote about it, but compared to previous works, they "innovated" – reinterpreted in accordance with the method of critical analysis. They continued to work with the historical representation of Great Moravia that served as a tool to identify the beginning and the end of the conquest of homeland by Magyars.

This tool was also used by Ferenc Salamon (1825 – 1892) in his work *A honfoglalás éve* (1883). As one of few historians and despite the fact he had no

²⁰ Emma Lederer, *A magyar polgári történetírás rövid története* [A Brief History of Hungarian Bourgeois Historiography], Budapest, Kossuth könyvkiadó, 1969, pp. 67-68; Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 131.

²¹ Vilmos Frankl, *A magyar nemzet története. I. Füzet* [History of the Hungarian nation. Part 1.], Pest, Szent István Társulat, 1872, pp. 19-20.

²² Gyula Pauler, *Lebedia, Etelköz, Millenarium (II.)* [Lebedia, Etelköz, Millenium II.], in *Századok* [Centuries], 1880, Vol. 14, no. 2, p. 103.

education in history, he was interested in theoretical problems. He called on scientism and impartiality of historians.²³ While searching for significant milestones for leaving the original homeland by Magyars and their settling in a new one, he pointed out two events: the war against the Bulgarians and the dispute of Svätopluk's sons. With respect to the second event, he took into account such facts as the death of Svätopluk (894), one-year ceasefire between his sons and its failure, the mixing in this conflict by Magyars, the defeat of bickering brothers and the conquest of homeland.²⁴

Based on the comparison of two sources – the *Annals of Fulda* and Porphyrogenitus's work – he reconstructed the sequence of events and differentiated two stages of Magyar arrival in their new homeland. He understands the first stage between the years 892 – 894 as a preparation stage.

In his opinion, the alliance with the Germans (i.e. Franks) against the Slavs in 892 prepared the ground for a gradual decline of the Moravian Empire [*Morva birodalom*] and its definite conquest. Two years later, there was an alliance with the Slavs. According to Salamon, the permanent settlement of Magyars occurred during the second stage in 897 and 898.²⁵

Political situation in Hungary in 1890s also activated the historians from the "kuruc" (independent) camp, for example Sándor Márki (1853 – 1925), the professor of world history in Cluj-Napoca. His historical approach links national ideas and the state's independence with idealizing plebeian democratic elements.²⁶ In 1890 the journal *Századok* published his study in two Parts under the name *A középkor kezdete Magyarországon*. This study is very interesting from several points of view: because of the criticism of medieval source (questioning the conquest according to *Gesta Hungarorum*), the terminological preciseness of the way of conquest (the differentiation between a non-violent settlement [*megszállás*] and a conquest [*foglalás*]), because of nationalistic background (the reference to the Magyarization of the most of Slavs in the area of rivers the Váh, the Hron and the Nitra after the arrival of Magyars) and because of the deformation of the national identity of Slovaks. In the case of deformation of their national identity, he wrote about Toths as the descendants of Czechs and Moravians who arrived in Hungary in the 15th century.²⁷

²³ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], pp. 135-136.

²⁴ Ferencz Salamon, *A honfoglalás éve* [The Year of the Conquest], Budapest, Az Athenaeum r. társulat könyvnyomdája, 1883, 48 p.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁶ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 150.

²⁷ Sándor Márki, *A középkor kezdete Magyarországon (I.)* [The beginning of the Middle

Márki describes Great Moravia on several pages as the territory situated in the valleys of the Morava, the Ipel' and the Danube. His description starts with the betrayal of Svätopluk against Rastislav [*Rastizlav*] and ends with the fall of the Empire in 907. This author also considers its civilisation benefit: *"The life of this state was so short, only two decades, and during this time it could not contribute to civilisation. Could it follow the customs of those who defeated it during the first years of the arrival of Magyars?"*²⁸

He described Great Moravia [*Morvaország*] as a northern-west part of Hungary and in the context of the dissemination of Christianity. He started his presentation about the process of converting the Slavs with the year 862. According to Márki the Moravians and the Slovaks [*Morva, Tótok*] came to Constantinople and requested the emperor to send somebody who could learn humble Sloviens [*Szlovének*] the truth and explain the meaning of the Holy Scripture. The mission of Cyril [*Cyrril*] and Methodius [*Methód*] to the territory from the Morava river, the mouth of the Ipel' and the left bank of the Danube was aimed to inform the Slavs [*Szlávok*] about the Christian faith. Furthermore, he mentioned the archiepiscopate from 874 (from the right bank of the Váh to the Sudetenland), the administration of Moravian Church by the apostle Methodius and the administration of Syrmia by his pupils. He explained the importance of Methodius's activities such as the translation of Greek books to Slavonic language and the use of Slavonic language as a sacral language from the point of view of his period and his "kuruc-protestant" attitude: *"Methodius who was Greek in no case did it because of his enthusiasm for the Slavic character of Svätopluk's Moravian-Slovak Empire [Svätopluk morva-tót birodalma]. At that time, they were not interested in national ideas. He simply tried to make the truth of Christian faith understandable, how later it was done by the second Slavic missionary Ján Hus. "Márki mentions that "Svätopluk was not keen for Slavism very much, otherwise he would not defend those who blamed Methodius for the oppression of Latin."*²⁹ He explained it with the expulsion of Methodius's pupils by Svätopluk [*Svätopluk*]. According to his opinion the Slavic liturgical language could not leave permanent traces because it only existed in the area of the Váh for a short period of time.³⁰

Ages in Hungary, I.], in Századok [Centuries], 1890, Vol. 24, pp. 311-327; Sándor Márki: *A középkor kezdete Magyarországon (II.)* [The beginning of the Middle Ages in Hungary, II.], in Századok [Centuries], 1890, Vol. 24, pp. 396-413.

²⁸ Sándor Márki, *A középkor kezdete... (II.)* [The beginning of the Middle Ages..., II.], p. 404.

²⁹ Sándor Márki, *A középkor kezdete Magyarországon (I.)* [The beginning of the Middle Ages..., I.], p. 326.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

For some authors the research into the period of Árpád and the conquest of homeland became a sanctuary from the topics that initiated the disputes between the protestant camp and the Catholic camp of historians. It was also the case of the director of state archives and positivistically oriented historian Gyula Pauler (1841 – 1903). He focused on Árpád after his attempt to link the idea of independence with Catholicism failed. However, with respect to positivism, he only applied the impartial, descriptive method of presenting the past. The Pauler's work is typical of factual material and the collection of written texts about the oldest history of Hungary. As he avoided the critical evaluation of sources, he mostly slipped into the description of facts.³¹ Therefore it is not surprising that the chronicle of anonymous notary was his source for the interpretation of the arrival of Magyars in the Carpathian Basin. He even describes him as a critical writer searching the historical truth in his foreword for the edition of sources from the period of conquest.³²

The Pauler's key works *A magyar nemzet története az árpádházi királyok alatt* and *A Magyar nemzet története szent Istvánig* interpret Great Moravia [*Morvaország*] according to more or less known schemes and stereotypes: the grow of empire to the superpower during the reign of Svätopluk, the arrival of Magyars after his death and their mixing in German-Moravian fights, the conquest and the use of conflict between the sons of Svätopluk in favour of their victory. Svätopluk, who was dead at the time when Magyars arrived in 895, was described by Pauler in accordance with German traditions: "*strong Svätopluk [Swatopluk] was the terror of the neighbourhood, the wisest and smartest for his people, blood craving rebel*". Thus he indirectly included him among the potential obstacles of Magyars while they were taking their new homeland (if he had reigned until then). Pauler attributed Svätopluk the name "*fabulous father*" in relation to his sons who were urged to unite based on the example of three wands.³³

He did not mention the fall of Great Moravia in his work published in 1899. He only described its Slavic inhabitants; some fled to neighbouring nations, some

³¹ Péter Gunst, *A magyar történetírás története* [History of Hungarian historiography], pp. 205-206; Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 134; Emma Lederer, *A magyar polgári történetírás rövid története* [A Brief History of Hungarian Bourgeois Historiography], pp. 34-36.

³² Gyula Pauler, *Béla király névtelen jegyzőjének műve...."A tartalom"* [Work of the anonymous notary of King Béla... "Contents"], in *A magyar honfoglalás kútforrásai* [Sources of the Hungarian Conquest], Budapest, MTA, 1900, pp. 386-387.

³³ Gyula Pauler, *A Magyar nemzet története szent Istvánig* [The History of Hungary up to Saint Stephen], Budapest, A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia kiadása, 1900, pp. 34, 41-42.

subjugated to various extents– as slaves, menials or companions.³⁴ Next year he described in detail this event that was preceded with Magyar attack on Moravians in 902 and the occupation of the area from the Váh, the Nitra up to the Morava. He concludes that because of unsuccessful reign of Mojmir [Mojmir] and Svätopluk II. [Svatopluk], and the fact that the Magyars conquered, the Empire collapsed in 906.³⁵ With respect to Christianity, he only mentions that prior the Magyarsit was Methodius [Methodius] who converted the Czechs.³⁶

The professionalization of Hungarian/Magyar historical science on one hand and the celebration of millennium from the establishment of Hungary on the other hand seems to be two incompatible poles. It was not easy to combine a modern critical and objectivist approach to the study of one's nation past without any inclination to its heroisation and idealisation which was required by the grandiose events regarding the celebration of millennium. Despite this fact, several Hungarian/Magyar historians manifested seriousness in some aspects. On the occasion of millennium during 1895 – 1898 the history of Hungarian/Magyar nation was written in several volumes *A Magyar Nemzet Története*. The oldest history until the extinction of the Árpáds was compiled by Lajos (Grün) Baróti (1856 – 1933). When describing the arrival of Magyars in the Danube river area in 895 and their contacts with indigenous population, he doubted the chronicle *Gesta Hungarorum* and criticised it sharply: because of telling a lie and concealing some facts(not knowing the original homeland of Hungarians/Magyars, the names such as Svätopluk and his sons), fabricating the most of terms and condemning the traditions contrary to other medieval sources (for example *the Legend of the White Horse* and *the Legend of Svätopluk*).³⁷

Baróti offered a survey of the Moravian rules – from Pribina [Privina] up to Svätopluk [Svatopluk] and also mentioned the merits of some of them for the dissemination of Christianity (e.g. the construction of church in Nitra, later Pribina and Kocel' had merits in constructing the other churches in Blatnohrad).

³⁴ Gyula Pauler, *A magyar nemzet története az árpádházi királyok alatt. Első kötet* [History of the Hungarian nation under the kings of the House of Árpád, Volume 1], Budapest, Az Athenaeum irod. és nyomdai r. társulat kiadása, 1899, pp. 7-8.

³⁵ Gyula Pauler, *A Magyar nemzet története szent Istvánig* [The History of Hungary up to Saint Stephen], p. 44.

³⁶ Gyula Pauler, *A magyar nemzet története az árpádházi királyok alatt...* [History of the Hungarian nation under the kings...], pp. 15-16.

³⁷ Lajos Baróti, *Magyarország az Árpádház kihaltáig* [Hungary up to the extinction of the House of Árpád], in József Szalay – Lajos Baróti (Eds.): *A Magyar Nemzet Története* [History of the Hungarian nation], Budapest, Lampel 1895-1898, in <http://mek.oszk.hu/00800/00892/html/> (Accessed in 10.10.2014).

Thus author attributed merits to Rastislav [*Rasztizláv*] and Svätopluk in requesting the emperor Michael III., each of them individually, to send the Slavic apostles – the brothers Constantine/Saints Cyril [*Konstantin /Szt. Czirill*] and Methodius [*Methodius*]. Because of his act, Baróti attributed Svätopluk several modifiers: crafty and snaky because of his betrayal of Rastislav, capricious and uncertain because of his hesitation with respect to German priests and Methodius, and powerful because of his resistance against enemies and the territorial expansion of Great Moravia [*Nagy-Morávia*]. He repeated a well-known scenario about the end of Great Moravia: its weakening due to the disputes between Svätopluk's (unnamed) sons and its collapse under the attacks of Magyars.³⁸

At the same time when individuals contributed to the millennium anniversary by their works, the collective of historians initiated the working out of detailed and representative synthesis regarding the millennium development of Hungarian/Magyar nation – from its oldest history up to the present time. Sándor Szilágyi (1827 – 1899) was authorised to lead the millennium project team. After accepting the political Austro-Hungarian Compromise, it was the role of this self-educated author and the secretary of Hungarian Historical Society to ensure the cooperation of two historical camps – protestant-kuruc and catholic-labanc.³⁹ Similarly to the Hungarian political scene, the coming millennium also brought the period of “*treuga dei*” to Hungarian/Magyar historiography. Finally, during 1895 – 1898 ten-volume monumental work was published *A magyar nemzet története*, also known as *Millenáristörténet*.

The working out of its first volume is associated with the name of Henrik (Morgenstern) Marczali (1856 – 1940), the university professor of Jewish origin who was one of the first Hungarian/Magyar liberal professional historians. Under the influence of German historicism and Ranke's thoughts, he emphasized objectivity, return to primary sources and their criticism as well as research into Hungarian history in international context. He contributed to the implementation of the method of modern critical philology in Hungarian/Magyar historiography.⁴⁰ The “millennium” synthesis as a whole did not achieved harmony in the attitudes of authors, but Marczali's historical approach to the past represented an expected broader perspective with respect to the tradition

³⁸ Lajos Baróti, Magyarország az Árpádház kihaltáig [Hungary up to the extinction of the House of Árpád], in <http://mek.oszk.hu/00800/00892/html/> (Accessed in 12.10.2014).

³⁹ Emma Lederer, *A magyar polgári történetírás rövid története* [A Brief History of Hungarian Bourgeois Historiography], pp. 38-39.

⁴⁰ Ignác Romsics, *Clio bűvöletében...* [Under the Enchantment of Clio...], p. 141.

of revolution and the Compromise and the reaching of accord with respect to the issue of confessional ambivalence.

Marczali also applied his critical approach in his above mentioned volume under the name of *Magyarország a királyság megalapításáig*. First, he studied Hungarian medieval historical chronicles to get a complex picture of Great Moravia period. After he compared them, he concluded that some chroniclers hardly knew anything about the period that preceded the conquest. However, they knew the name of Svätopluk. Though Anonymus was the only one who described the conquering of new homeland by the Magyar tribal union in details, but the fact that he did not mention Svätopluk and his Empire resulted in Marczali's conviction that he knew less about the previous period than the other chroniclers.⁴¹ Therefore Marczali's work was based on foreign sources (*Constantin's work, Annals of Fulda, Conversion of Bavarians and Carantanians*) and thus he mentioned the existence of two Slavic state systems: the Empire of the Moravians stretching to the north from the Danube up to the Morava river [*Morvaország, morva birodalom*] and the area of Lower Pannonia with the centre in Blatnohrad.⁴²

Svätopluk became a central figure also in Marczali's work "*the great rival of the eastern ruler of Frankish Empire*", the traitor and monarch at the same time, that one who won political independence from the Franks and extended his reign over the ridges of the Carpathians, Silesia and Bohemia. He calls the Svätopluk's empire "*the first larger Slavic state, unestablished by foreigners*". Because from 892 to his death, he withstood allied Frankish, Bavarian, Swabian and Magyar armies, according to his opinion he became an equipollent and dangerous rival. In world history, he described him as the first advocate of Slavs who united numerous tribes and made them redoubtable for German oppressors. He described the last part of Svätopluk's death according to three various traditions: the legend of his life in Zobor as a hermit in accordance with Kosmas's chronicle, the legend about the taking of Pannonia by Magyars after his death according to Hungarian/Magyar tradition and the legend of three wands according to Constantine Porphyrogenitus.⁴³

With respect to the conquest by the Magyars, he also mentioned the Legend of Svätopluk [*Zvatapolug*] who gave up his homeland. However, Marczali

⁴¹ Henrik Marczali, *A vezérek kora és a királyság megalapítása* [The age of the chieftains and the foundation of the kingdom], in *A magyar nemzet története*, I. [History of the Hungarian nation, Tomus I.], Budapest, Athenaeum irodalmi és nyomdai részvénytársulat betüivel, 1895, pp. 82-83.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 88-89.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-112.

was aware of the fact that this legend more or less celebrates the bravery of Magyars and luring the smart Svätopluk. Thus he wanted to point out the thinking of Magyars at that time, the fact that there were several legends known to people based on the hereditary right of Magyars to the taken land.⁴⁴ According to German sources, he concludes that during 896 – 900, the Magyar reign [*magyar birodalom*] superseded the Moravian reign and the Magyars favouring Mojmir mixed in the dispute of brothers [*Moimir, Szvatopluk*]. Thus he deduced the consequences for Great Moravia: *"First the Magyars reached the Nitra region, but it lasted several years to subvert the real ancient Moravian Empire. Before the century ended, Hungary was established."*⁴⁵

Marczali attributed the merits for the establishment of Hungarian state to Christianity and to the interconnection of the spirit of the East with the West. He also noticed this cultural and church dimension in pre-Hungarian period when he evaluated the educational level of Slavs and the attitude of the Dukes of Moravia – Rastislav and Svätopluk – to the church organisation in Great Moravia. According to his opinion and despite the territorial expansion to the west and south-west, the Slavic patriotism was developing more slowly in the sphere of education due to its dependence on German (Frankish) and Greek culture.⁴⁶ Besides the dissemination of Christianity by Pribina [*Privina*] in the Lower Pannonia, he also did not forget to mention the Slavic apostles Cyril [*Kyryllos*], in particular Methodius [*Methodios*], the later Moravian archbishop. Marczali characterised Rastislav as that one who did not hesitate to convert to Christianity and so that he might ensure independence from the Franks, he turned to the Greek emperor for help. However, he understood the role of Svätopluk in defending the state and Christian culture as a barbarian action: *"Svätopluk himself destroys the church in Slavic language established by Methodius – capturing or repudiating his scholars, listening to Latin mass and preferring Frankish priests. Therefore, the considerable discrepancy between the Slavic barbarism and the strict Christian doctrine resulted in the prevention of the development of national culture and the substantial contribution to the fall of Empire. There is no better evidence of barbarism than the fact that a ruler and nations from personal reasons, following their instincts, weaken or destroy the most important institutions of maintaining and strengthening the state. The mutual political and church contradictions resulted in the fact that Christianity, at*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 98, 100.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 119-120.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

*least in the territory of ancient Pannonia, did not become deeply rooted among the Slavs. After the arrival of Magyars, paganism prevailed.*⁴⁷

In his own synthesis *Magyarország története* (1911) where he recapitulated the history of Hungary starting from the origin of Magyars up to the Compromise (1867), Marczali repeated the terrifying representations of Svätopluk and intensified the barbarism of Slavs. He concludes that Christianity was a destructive element for the Moravian Empire and the power tool of Svätopluk (Caesario-Papism).⁴⁸

Conclusions:

Did Hungarian/Magyar Historiography cope with the issue of Great Moravia?

If we look at Great Moravia as a whole, and in the way the Hungarian/Magyar historians introduced it during the period of dualism generally and without any details, the historical representation was typical of the following components: the arrival of Magyar tribal union in the Carpathian Basin, the state of Great Moravia and its territorial extend during the reign of Svätopluk, the Slavic apostles Cyril and Methodius and the importance of Christianity, the alliance between the eastern Frankish emperor and the Magyars against the Moravians, the death of Svätopluk and the dispute of his sons over power, the weakening of Great Moravia due to internal military conflicts and its fall under the pressure of Magyar attacks. Of course, not each of them included the overall line of above mentioned events. There were also such authors who misrepresented some facts, consciously concealed, or did not consider the facts to be important. However, there were also such authors who directed one's attention to one concrete phenomenon (for example Márki to Cyril and Methodius mission for the clarification of the significance of Christianity). Therefore, the researched historical representation was not homogenous, which was also proved by the differences in the spelling of first names and geographical names. Depending on the level of professionalism and the ideologisation of historical science, critical approach to sources, the external and internal determinants influencing the work and thoughts of historians, the historical presentations of many differences – factual, terminological and interpretational.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁴⁸ Henrik Marczali, *Magyarország története* [History of Hungary], Budapest, Athenaeum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársulat, 1911, pp. 39-40.

The presentation of Great Moravia and its fall during 1860s and 1870s was influenced by prevailing romanticising ideas about the Hungarian/Magyar nation and its heroic battles, the fantasy of historians, self-education and the automatic repetition of national traditions from the Hungarian medieval chronicles. The fabricated names of principalities, the Árpád's warriors (*Huba, Kadoča, Sovárd*) or Slavic commanders (*Zobor*, the Duke of Nitra), in *Gesta Hungarorum*, enabled to identify the historians who used it. Besides the detailed description of heroic battles, they were brought into light with the repeated interpretation schemes as the basis of subjugation theory: fear and trembling of Magyars among subjugated people, the act of voluntary subjugation, the symbol of selling the homeland, the motive of hostage and gifting. They are present in the works of authors such as Horváth, Szabó, Fraknói and even Pauler. Despite the fact that *Gesta* do not mention Great Moravia and its rulers, because the anonymous author did not write about them, the authors repeated minimum those parts which corresponded with the territory of this state (for example Nitra region, the Hron river). Consequently, their interpretation was supplemented with the terms related to Great Moravia.

The works of Horváth, Szabó and Fraknói were typical of the high level of non-criticism and purposiveness. The presentation of Great Moravia and its fall was based on their sticking to the description of conquest by an anonymous notary. They liked to repeat traditional stories, specifically the Legend of Svätopluk, and they attributed them some historical significance. At the same time, they promoted the symbols of conquering the homeland, the decadency of Empire or the conquering of powerful enemy. Svätopluk became the central figure of their stories about Great Moravia– traitor, the enemy of Germans and Magyars, the redoubtable, powerful duke.

Some progress in the understanding of Great Moravian period was due to the criticism of *Gesta Hungarorum* during 1880s and 1890s (Márki, Baróti, Marczali). Till that time, it was considered to be an undoubtable source about the conquest and subjugation by the Magyars. Thus the unified concept of Great Moravia based on the description by the anonymous notary disappeared. Though the last two critics of chronicle included the legends into their works, they did not demonstrate historical reality, but their purposive, nation glorifying function and mentality of people during the period when they had originated. From the last third of the 19th century, the pantheon of Great Moravia figures also extended in the names of Slavic apostles, the Dukes of Moravia and Transdanubia. However, Svätopluk is a figure who was always mentioned first in the descriptions about the territorial expansion of Great Moravia. His presentation was not changed very much, only some new attributes were used

such as a terror of the neighbourhood, a rebel, a wise man, a rascal (Pauler), a tricky and indecisive man (Baróti), a unifier of the Slavic tribes (Marczali).

The mosaic of the representation of Great Moravia was supplemented in a new aspect approximately during 1880s – the mission of the Slavic apostles, Constantin (Cyril) and Methodius. Hungarian/Magyar historians attributed Christianity civilisational, moral, cultural and state formation dimensions. The approach of the Duke of Moravia, specifically Svätopluk, to the doctrine was evaluated in a larger spectrum. Some authors appreciated his merits with respect to the implementation of Slavic mass thanks to the Slavic apostles (Baróti, Acsády). Some pointed out the reasons why Christian doctrine was not largely accepted and not understood by people (Márki, Marczali). The dissemination of Christianity by Pribina in Transdanubia was appreciated positively, the measures taken by Svätopluk after the death of Methodius are characterised as barbarism, his power aspirations and a lack of interest in the Slavic idea.

Starting from 1880s when the representation of Great Moravia manifested itself in more differentiated form, we find several answers to the reasons why Hungarian/Magyar historians started to cope with a foreign national symbol. The fact that Hungarian/Magyar historiography did not omit Great Moravia could relate to the factor of animosity and to its constitutive and national identification function. Furthermore, the research into the early medieval state formation should also include the precise information about its end. Two different national stories – Magyar and Slovak – overlapped just in this issue. During the 19th century, two “rivalling” national cultures attributed significance to the same narrative but very often with opposite signs. Where the “Golden Age” of one culture ends, the “Golden Age” of the other one (of a conqueror or allies) usually starts. The presentation of foreign phenomenon and the description of its fall with their contribution could mean for the Magyars a certain form of their self-identification, their attitude towards the others and the appreciation of their nation merits when the conquest started. This aspect was more apparent when the preparation for millennium celebrations was in progress and as we could see in Salamon’s work, the last years of Great Moravia were used as an argument for the date of the end of conquest.

The most of Hungarian/Magyar historians agree that the weakening and collapsing of Great Moravia was accelerated by the conflict of Svätopluk’s sons. Furthermore, they agree that the Magyars struck a deadly blow during the years 905–907. Do their works also mention any continuity of Hungarian state formation and Great Moravia through the subjugated ethnic or the territory? With the exception of Márki who unsystematically alternated various ethnonyms to name the inhabitants of Great Moravia (*Moravians, Slovaks, Sloviens, Slavs*),

most of the authors tried to make a distinction between the current (Slovak) inhabitants of the north and north-west regions of Hungary and the original inhabitants (the ancient Slovians, the Moravian Slavs, the Moravia-Pannonia Slavs, the Moravian people). They wrote about their subjugation, mostly without any resistance or about vanishing and disappearing or about their exodus to neighbouring countries. From the territorial point of view, only Marczali mentioned the replacement of Great Moravia with the Hungarian state.

Besides the fact that the European (national) historiographies constructed national narratives in the 19th century and through them also the representations of their enemies, they were becoming modern scientific disciplines. Gradual increase in specialisations and the use of critical method for the analysis and comparison of sources demonstrated a certain level of scientism, impartiality and seriousness in historical works of these authors. Depending on actual political, social or financial situation, historians had various conditions for their self-realisation and professional preparation. Some were only offered a space to participate in professional discussions and a possibility to publish results of their researches. Luckier ones could count on a developed network of specialised institutions and university departments, to qualify for a relevant historical field, to acquire foreign scholarships and respond to incentives abroad. Except for 1848 – 1849 and the post-revolutionary decade, the Hungarian/Magyar historical science has also professionalised. Specifically, from the last third of the 19th century under the influence of rapidly increasing cultural modernisation, some historians continue efforts to achieve some professionalism and impartiality of the interpretation of historical events. For example, Marczali's effort to reconstruct history objectively manifested itself in his both historical works and not only during his studies of domestic chronicles and the comparing of foreign provenience sources, but also with respect the critical reflection of the presentist trends of Hungarian/Magyar culture at the turn of the 19th and the 20th century: *"Currently, when the situation of national minorities becomes more and more important, we can see some efforts to come to the conclusion in accordance with the fact that the Magyars drove a wedge to the centre of the organising and uniting Slavs, and they still stretch its body. However, this understanding is very far from the spirit of the age, and it also does not correspond with reality."*⁴⁹

We can see similar trends in Márki's work when he introduces Great Moravia period as the period not coping with the issue of nationalities. He demonstrated it with an indifferent attitude of Methodius and Svätopluk to the Slavic idea. However, he wanted to point out a lack of basis for the national

⁴⁹ Henrik Marczali, *A vezérek kora...* [The age of the chieftains...], p. 121.

requirements of Slovak patriots during the second half of the 19th century. Márki's "objective" representation of Great Moravia should have served, among others, to help to eliminate the myth about the Slovaks as Svätopluk's descendants. It can be proved by his opinion of the Slovaks as an unhistorical ethnic and their arrival in Hungary in the 15th century. Thus he strengthened his representation about the autochthonousness of Magyars within the boundaries of Hungary.

This approach also proves that despite the increasing level of professionalism most Hungarian/Magyar historians were not able to cross the level of dominant nationalistic ideology. Keeping one's distance from national issues, political pressure or personal beliefs was more difficult if a historian and writer or a historian and politician were the same person. It was not an isolated phenomenon in that century. At that time, it was expected if you write about history that you will take into account national and state interests and respond to the requirements of ruling elites. The analysis of historical works from the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century convinced us not only about the interest of Hungarian/Magyar historians to include the period of Great Moravia into the history of Early Middle Period, but also about their intentions to construct its representation: the determination of the "Golden Age" of their nation, the emphasizing of its military virtue, the defence of its ancientness and autochthonousness in the conquered territory, the severance of the union of Slavic tribes or Magyar-Slovak coalescence.

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY: PUBLIC HISTORY IN THE CONTEXT OF HISTORICAL CULTURE OF THE GLOBALIZATION ERA

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Rezumat: Știință și societate: Istoria publică în contextul culturii istorice a erei globalizării

In secolul al XIX-lea, cunoscut drept „veacul istoriei”, gradul ridicat de încredere față de istorie și de prestigiul social al științei istorice s-a întemeiat pe înrădăcinarea în conștiința publică a ideii de continuitate a dezvoltării istorice a civilizației umane și, respectiv, a oportunităților unice de utilizare a experienței trecutului ca un mijloc de a rezolva problemele din prezent și de a construi un „viitor luminos”. Dar înțelegerea dramatică a experienței secolului al XX-lea a subminat credința în „utilizarea istoriei”, iar această situație a fost mult agravată de intensificarea proceselor de globalizare la granița dintre secolele XX și XXI. Problemele interacțiunii dintre „istoria academică (profesionistă)” și publicul larg și schimbările survenite în relația dintre ele în contextul unor profunde transformări sociale au fost plasate în centrul atenției multor cercetători. Istoria publică depășește, intenționat, alienarea tipică științei istorice a secolului al XX-lea, din perspectiva „neinițiaților”; ea se străduiește să restabilească interesul consumatorului pentru producția istoricilor, să propage standarde profesionale, cunoștințe istorice și înțelegerea corectă a „meșteșugului istoricului” în rândul cercurilor largi ale ne-profesioniștilor.

Abstract: *In the XIX century known as the „historical age”, a high degree of trust to history and social prestige of historical science relied on the entrenched in public consciousness the idea of continuity of historical development of a human civilization and, respectively, of the unique opportunities of the use of the past experience as a means to solve the problems of the present and to build „the bright future”. But the understanding of the dramatic experience of the XX century undermined the belief in the “use of history”, and this situation has been greatly aggravated with intensification of the processes of globalization on the border of XX and XXI centuries. The problems of interaction between “academic (professional) history” and the wide public in the concrete societies and the changes in their relations in the context of deep social transformations proved to take place at the center of many researchers’ attention. Public history is purposefully overcoming the typical for historical science of the XX century alienation from „the uninitiated”; it strives to restore the interest of the consumer to the historians’ production, to propagate professional standards, historical knowledge and proper understanding of the specific character of “historian’s craft” among the wide circles of the non-professionals.*

Résumé: Science et société: L'Histoire publique dans le contexte de la culture historique de l'ère de la globalisation

Le XIX-ème siècle, connu comme "le siècle de l'histoire", le degré élevé de confiance vis-à-vis l'histoire et le prestige social de la science historique se fonda sur l'enracinement dans la conscience publique de l'idée de continuité du développement historique de la civilisation humaine et, respectivement, des opportunités uniques d'utilisation de l'expérience du passé comme moyen de résoudre les problèmes du présent et de construire un „avenir brillant". Mais la compréhension de l'expérience dramatique du XX-ème siècle mina la croyance dans „l'utilisation de l'histoire"; de plus, cette situation fut pleinement aggravée par l'intensification des processus de globalisation à la frontière des XX-ème et XXI-ème siècles. Les problèmes de l'interaction entre „l'histoire académique (professionnelle)" et le grand public et les changements apparues dans leur relation dans le contexte des profondes transformations sociales attirèrent l'attention de plusieurs chercheurs. L'histoire publique dépasse, intentionnellement, l'aliénation typique à la science historique du XX-ème siècle, de la perspective des „non-initiés"; elle s'efforce à rétablir l'intérêt du consommateur pour la production des historiens, à propager les standards professionnels, le savoir historique et la compréhension correcte de „l'art de l'historien" parmi les cercles élargis des non-professionnels.

Keywords: public history, society, historical culture, science, globalization.

Introduction

In every era with the change of living conditions of the society the nature and possibilities of a person, his relation with the world around, forms and content of social interactions, character of standard and value systems, and main tendencies in cultural development are individually revealed. Constructive 'answers' are formulated to the challenges and crises which are so keenly felt at the turn of the century, including new images of culture and new models of intellectual experience.

Radical shifts in the world politics and economy for the last decades have changed contemporary social and cultural space. Globalization refers, first of all, to the economic field, but in many respects defines dynamics of all the processes¹. Mass media and communication technologies do not simply intensify the international contacts but change their nature as well develop rapidly. A set of scholarly publications and popular editions actively discuss the question of what influence globalization and informatization have on a society, what their social consequences are, including such subjects as poverty, growth of violence, crime,

¹ *On the Edge. Living with Global Capitalism* / Ed. by W. Hutton, A. Giddens, Cambridge, 2000; Э. Гидденс, *Ускользающий мир. Как глобализация меняет нашу жизнь* [Runaway World. How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives]. Москва, 2004.

drug addiction, terrorism and so on. Environmental changes have become one of the most alarming global problems of the modern era, and attempts to understand this threat led to the deconstruction of traditional dichotomy of culture and the nature, including its historical measurement. The interest to historical transformations of the climate, landscape and other aspects of the interaction between nature and humanity resulted in the formation and noticeable ascension of the so-called 'ecological history'².

Intellectual consequences of globalization and informatization, even for current social sciences and humanities, including historical knowledge, as well as for the future of the historical profession, are less exposed to understanding. Meanwhile these consequences become apparent very distinctly and at very different levels. One of the most noticeable and keen manifestations is the actualization of historical research of the world social problems such as the problem of migrations in a global context or the mobilizing role of ethnic consciousness. It is not by chance that these and the similar literally global problems became the focus of the international congresses of historical sciences and other largest scientific forums, which took place in 1990–2010th.

Stimuli and changes in the contemporary historical science

The last decades of the XX and the beginning of the XXI century were marked by profound changes in the structure and content of social and humanitarian knowledge, in the very methodology of social sciences and humanities. In this general intellectual context there was a radical reorganization of contemporary historical science. Important quality shift in the world historiography was the so-called 'cultural turn' that reflected the increased interest to manifestations of human subjectivity in history, and also the striving for its contextualization on the new theoretical and methodological basis corresponding to the global character of new civilization, the purposes of development of intercultural dialogue and the principle of unity in diversity. Comparison of key aspects of the world pictures, features of valuable systems and the content of cultural ideals of different historical societies and civilizations is one of the main problems of the 21th-century historical science.

Tendencies of contemporary historiography are varied and ambiguous, professional standards are diversified³. For the last half-millennia, after the bloom of micro-historical studies, has grown the interest in macro-prospect of

² See, for example: *Historical Ecology. Cultural Knowledge and Changing Landscapes* / Ed. by Carole L. Crumley. 1994; Brian Fay, *Environmental History: Nature at Work*, in "History and Theory". Theme Issue, 2003, Vol. 42, No. 4.

³ More about it see: Rolf Torstendahl, *The Rise and Propagation of Historical Professionalism*, New York, Routledge, 2015.

the global history directed to the studying of ecological, epidemiological, demographic, cultural and intellectual consequences of development of global interrelations. Actually within the two last decades there has been formed a new discipline – the global history, which was relying on the idea of coherence of the world historical process. However, the modern understanding of global history doesn't at all excludes, but on the contrary implies the presence of a set of local options and trajectories of development and prefers to dissociate from the linear and Eurocentric generalizing schemes in the spirit of Christian universalism and classical modernization theories. The search for a modern view on endless variety of historical experience actualizes comparative historical researches, at the same time increasingly displacing them to interdisciplinary space. In this status, the new strategy of comparative history is not associated with the de-contextualization of similar phenomena within the universalistic, or evolutionary (Eurocentric in essence) paradigms, but with overcoming of Eurocentrism, with emphasis along with discovered analogies, contrasts and differences with a consecutive consideration of the diversity of local contexts and cultural traditions. Due to the process of the so-called 'globalization' extremely urgent and crucial becomes the issue of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in its historical measurement and the intensification of comparative historical studies on the basis of more theoretically substantiated approaches.

Efforts on historical understanding of current globalization processes lead to the emergence of new research and educational programs such as the Cambridge program „Globalization in Historical Prospect” including among the others, issues on history of the idea of globalization and global interrelations, on „reversibility of globalization”, on history of the United Nations and international institutes and on the so-called 'international history' understood as history of the relations between individuals and cultures including the individuals who are at the same time belonging to several cultures or changing identity, communication language, country of residence and nationality. On the materials of the colloquium „Globalization in World history” carried out within the above mentioned program was published a book of the same name⁴. Noteworthy is the topic of the main report and the introductory article „History of Globalization and Globalization of History”. It is interesting that in the new context the content of such habitual concepts as 'world history' and 'European history' is revised. And it is not only in the definitions which have become so vague but in the image of Europe that is changing and becoming complicated, and besides, the relations of Europe with the „rest of the world” are changing in the era of globalization⁵.

⁴ *Globalisation in World History* / Ed. by A. G. Hopkins, Cambridge, 2002.

⁵ See, for example: A. Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age*. Cambridge, 2007.

Urgent problems of contemporary mankind require resolute refusal of the dominating models which still reconstruct historical processes and events of the remote and recent past in Eurocentric prospect, and the appeals to the world history as a really general one that surely assumes the development of new methods of the analysis capable not only to reveal the general and the special, but also to give an idea of the history of mankind in its integrity and coherence. This task is incredibly difficult. And its real difficulties consist in the need to comprehend, understand and, as far as it is possible, to master the outlooks of other people, to acquire necessary knowledge so that to face this appeal having overcome the Eurocentrism. The problem is about creation of new world in which the historian, using the allotted tools will make possible the dialogue of people with various cultures both in the past and in the present.

In this regard, an expert in the field of history of thought could not but pay attention to semantic transformation and national embodiments of the European idea of universal history, which passed a big way throughout the Modern age. In the Russian intellectual tradition the dynamics of changes of the concept of 'general history' doesn't accidentally coincide with key phases in the long and faltering process of the Russian modernization: in the first half of the XIX century, at the end of XIX – the beginning of the XX century, in the late nineties – the beginning of the XXI century. Noteworthy is the fact that at these historical moments the idea of general history was significant not only for professional historians, but also for a more wide range of Russian intellectuals who were taking part in public ideological and political debates on the prospects of national history⁶.

Interdisciplinarity, place, tasks and status of history

The globalization inseparably linked with communicative processes, including communication of ideas, put on the agenda the new issues for those who is engaged in studying of similar processes in historical dimension as well. As a result, brisk discussions on the place and tasks of the history of ideas during the globalization era were developed. It is in the conditions of radical acceleration of communications and an obvious divergence between economic and technological processes and ideas, which move people, defining their outlook and behavior, that it becomes necessary to rethink the theoretical, critical and axiological bases of the historical discipline. Formation of new valuable reference points is not only reflected in the initial prerequisites of the historian and scientific problems set by him, but also in many respects defines the results of his cognitive and cre-

⁶ About it see: Л. П. Репина, *Всеобщая история в российской интеллектуальной традиции* [World History in the Russian intellectual tradition], in *Диалог со временем*, Вып. 17, Москва, 2006, с. 5-11.

ative activity. According to the apt remark of Antoine Prost, „...eventually the historian creates that kind of history which the society demands; otherwise it turns away from him ... But on the other hand, there is no such collective public project which would be possible without historical education of its participants and without historical analysis of the problems”⁷.

Both redefinition of inter disciplinary hierarchy and the change of configuration of interdisciplinary fields in the nomenclature and in the relations of historical sub-disciplines with each other and in vectors of cooperation of history with the other areas of knowledge take place in this context. It is not accidental that current tasks of intellectual history are quite often directly associated with the comprehension of the problems of interdisciplinary communication. It is interdisciplinarity that is seen „one of the saving lines of history of ideas” which „doesn't allow it to become numb in the orthodoxy of one particular discipline”⁸. This, fair in many respects remark, can be attributed to the other areas of historiography. At the beginning of the XXI century when the history makes its next “cultural turn” in the framework of social and cultural approach a new task is set. And that is to reveal the cultural mechanism of social interaction. In the current research situation, the transfer of the meaning from the academic disciplines to the problems, which are formulated in fact as transdisciplinary is more clearly comprehended: these are problems which can't be put in the constituted disciplinary borders, and the latter in a new informative situation gradually lose the former relevance. In this regard, it is possible to speak about the blurring of disciplinary borders, and about the prospect of formation of new, over-disciplinary areas of social and humanitarian knowledge. Anyway it is obvious that many distinguished sub-disciplines have common theoretical, methodological and conceptual arsenal, show the general direction of development, and differ only in special subject domain that actually creates prerequisites not only for effective cooperation between different interdisciplinary specializations, but also for their subsequent reintegration.

At the same time, the problem of interaction-dialogue of historical science and society, formation of the general zone of understanding between scholarly and public discourses is more clearly put in the forefront. Formation of history as a science, the process of professionalization of historical knowledge gradually led to isolation of historical researches, their closure in the academic and university space. Development of interdisciplinary communication doesn't remove the problem of external communication of research community that in many respects influences the formation of the image of the modern professional histori-

7 Прост А., *Двенадцать уроков по истории* [Twelve lessons on history], Москва, 2000, с. 318.

⁸ А. Мегилл, *Глобализация и история идей* [Globalization and the history of ideas], in *Диалог со временем*, Вып. 14, Москва, 2005, с. 17.

an in mass consciousness and the demand and success of historical research. The processes of interdisciplinary intellectual integration which have already become reality have to continue in the integration of historical science and society.

In contemporary historiography, one can notice the changes which happen in the field of social and historical consciousness, historical epistemology and reflexive (scientific, philosophical, sociological, etc.) reconceptualization of historical knowledge, in the assessment of cognitive potential of historical science. In fact, it is a matter of formation of new historical consciousness capable to adequately comprehend the changes happening in the world, to critically overcome Eurocentric prospect and of the creation in this light of new historical culture and a new image of historical science.

Quite naturally, the issue of public potential and a role of historical science in the last decades have become one of major in the world historiography, in public discussions and journalism. This issue addresses not only many aspects of the most historical science, but reflects the requirements of the general audience, giving public character to scientific discussion about social functions, „use and abuse of history” and responsibility of the historian. What role the historical science is capable to play in this process? Historians wonder how the image of historical science changes in a current situation of „the rapidly arriving future” – both in the opinion of the professional community, and in the society in general. How does the status of history in the system of scientific disciplines change, what place it takes in the hierarchy of the values of contemporary culture? What is happening to the functions of historical knowledge in the conditions of accelerated social transformations? How the processes of globalization and new information technologies affect the structure of historical knowledge and forms of its presentation? And the related issues are on the place of professional historians and their work tasks. What is the role of history in solving the urgent problems of people's existence in this small and hazardous world? How does it „teach to live” today? How can it generally teach the life to contemporaries relying on the principle of historicity of constantly changing reality (and precipitancy of these changes is growing all the time that accelerates the process of alienation of the recent past and makes its experience irrelevant)? And how then professional study of history can be „justified” in the public eye (from the point of view of practical use)?

These pressing problems are realized by the leading historians adhering to different methodological paradigms except for, perhaps, those radical postmodernists who in general deny the concept of scientific history of any kind and its role in society, urging „to forget about history” and „to do without historical consciousness”. However, representatives of the historical profession don't agree with such postulates⁹.

⁹ I have already partly discussed these problems in my book: Л. П. Репина, *«Новая ис-*

Certainly, the study of history helps to understand people, human experience and the origin of changes in society, gives ground for reflections concerning morals and gives aesthetic pleasure, creates conditions for self-identification and turns inhabitants into citizens, develops ability to analyze and think critically, estimate different certificates and their various interpretations, expands knowledge and horizons. And still, with all undoubted arguments of rather public advantage of historical science, its huge potential can remain unclaimed if lost in the XX century of the aesthetic appeal, direct contact and common language with public are not regained. Without these qualities, the restoration of interest of the wide consumer to the scientific production of professional historians is absolutely unreal. Studying of innovations in research practices of historians, on the one hand, and the analysis of the gained successful experience of integrating similar practices into educational programs (of different levels) of public history at universities (there are a lot of them today) on the other hand, could give important reference points for implementation of public potential of historical knowledge.

To the additional reflection induces the fact that the historiography was exported to cultures, which originally had not it, but absolutely unlike the modern natural sciences¹⁰. Today already recognized is both the historicity of the concept of science, and the fact of simultaneous „peaceful co-existence” of various concepts of scientificity. For many participants of these discussions it becomes more and more obvious that keeping the worthy public status for a historian is impossible without comprehending of all the consequences of the methodological turns passed by the social sciences and humanities, without creation of new theoretical models and restoration of the synthesizing potential of historical knowledge at the new level.

If in the XIX century known as the „historical age”, a high degree of trust to history and social prestige of historical science relied on the entrenched in public consciousness the idea of continuity of historical development of a human civilization and, respectively, of the unique opportunities of the use of the past experience as a means to solve the problems of the present and to build „the bright future”, then the understanding of the dramatic experience of the XX century undermined the belief in the advantages of history and the established relations of „a tutor” and „a diligent pupil” between historical science and society. However the fact that the historical explanation doesn't correspond to rigid criteria of scientificity in its traditional understanding, which is going back to the second half of the XIX century, doesn't make the historical knowledge less strict in compliance to high professional standards and, moreover, doesn't leave it unclaimed. The paradigm shift,

торическая наука» и социальная история [“The new historical science” and social history], Москва, 1998 (2 изд., испр. и доп. – 2010).

¹⁰ See, for example: *Интервью с Хейденом Уайтом* [Interview with Hayden White], in *Диалог со временем*. Вып. 14, Москва, 2005 с. 345-346.

which is accurately designated at the beginning of the new millennium, is capable to return history to its main place in the culture of any era.

Functions and strategies of communication. Public History

One cannot but recognize both the value and fairness of such a definition as „History is the richest in knowledge and information, the most alive and, perhaps, the most cluttered area of our memory, but at the same time is the basis giving to any living-being a short-lived light of its existence”¹¹. The latter represents the main social function of history. The historical explanation in a broad sense remains a public necessity, being an essential component of not only cognitive processes, but also orientations of people in the world around, an implementation of valuable choice, any procedure of decision-making and elaboration of strategy of behavior, including in everyday life as we constantly address the past when we carry out our choice for the future.

Thus, it is not about satisfaction of curiosity but about the existential interest¹². And in such context the phrase on „the urgent necessity of history” which the Canadian historian Ged Martin took as a subtitle for his book about „future projections of the past” is not a strained argument¹³. The need to give a historical support to human existence becomes particularly urgent in our super-speedy, self-accelerated time when extraordinary rate of changes instantly turns the future into the present, and the present into the past¹⁴.

In the second half of the last century the historical science was enriched with new objects and methods of research, the enormous massive of new sources was involved in the scientific turn, a number of essentially new approaches to the analysis of traditional sources developed, there appear new effective ways of information processing. But the changes concerned not only cognitive means. Many social functions of historiography such as identification, education and entertainment were effectively mastered by mass media in the conditions of unprecedented growth of a gap between professional and ordinary historical consciousness. The situation was aggravated by the spread in quasi-professional historical culture of a postmodern slogan „everyone is his own his-

¹¹ М. Фуко, *Слова и вещи: Археология гуманитарных наук* [Words and things Archaeology of the humanities], Санкт Петербург, 1994, с. 244.

¹² W. J. Bowsma, *A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History*, Berkeley, 2004, p. 421.

¹³ Ged Martin, *Past Futures. The Impossible Necessity of History*, Toronto, 2004.

¹⁴ See the original elaboration of this theme with detailed comparison of the features of the “fast” and the “super-fast” temporalities: В. А. Шкуратов, *Сверхбыстрое время – новые времена?* [Superfast time - a new era?], in *Образы времени и исторические представления: Россия – Восток – Запад* [Images of the time and the historical representation: Russia - East - West] / Под ред. Л. П. Репиной. Москва, 2010, с. 367-385.

torian". The principle of historical research by means of critical studying of primary sources is nowadays shared by the very few outside the professional environment. And even publications of sources in the Internet, on-line courses and the training programs for fans don't make the situation less problematic. Changes in the very professional historical culture and its systematic expansion into the Web space as well, most likely, are necessary for overcoming the gap and creating of conditions for a new dialogue.

Social and educational function and pragmatics of historical science is particularly found in the area of public consciousness. Its world outlook potential, informative and practical value is realized, mechanisms of its influence on the development of society and its separate groups are involved. To the contrary, the determining impact of social and cultural context on current historical knowledge and prospects of its development are carried out mainly through the situation being developed in public consciousness and public opinion through the perception stereotypes, which are formed in their framework, levels of understanding and trust, criteria of usefulness, ideal images and the horizons of expectations. All these processes need both special researches and analytical development of advisory nature and the practical actions urged to promote open dialogue of professionals with the widest mass audience and increase of the social status of historical knowledge, especially in Russia – the country with "unpredictable past", and also with rapidly developing processes of regionalization and redefinition of group identities.

The important role in this communicative strategy necessary for community of historians has to belong to the public history focused on public outside the professional community or to the so-called 'history for all', capable to overcome alienation from „the uninitiated", quickly responding to social requests, communicating with the widest audience in the understandable language and using new means of communication.

The need for active participation of historians in such a dialogue is realized in the academic environment. This essential task sometimes (under favorable conditions) is implemented in large educational projects. Thus, in the 1990 and in the first years of the XXI century at the universities of a number of western countries special training programs were launched and were established research councils, centers, institutes, societies, periodicals on public history¹⁵ urged to distribute professional standards, 'craft of the historian', historical knowledge and skills of historical thinking in circles of nonprofessionals. It should be noted with regret that in Russia the similar centers and programs still

¹⁵ For example, National Council for Public History and journal "The Public Historian" in USA, Center for Public History and journal "The Public History Review" in Australia and so on.

didn't gain due development.

In contemporary scientific and pseudo-scientific literature there are numerous and ambiguous and quite often very confusing definitions of public history. Useful work on their comparison, classification and integration was done by Irina Savelyeva¹⁶ who offered the following: the public history represents a set of approaches and practice directed on identification, preservation, interpretation and presentation of historical artifacts, texts, structures and landscapes in interaction of professional historians with general public. I suppose, nevertheless that it would be enough to designate all this ill-matched set of practices resisting to the disciplinary definition as *a complex of means for representation of scientific historical knowledge to general public and for formation of knowledge of the past in ordinary life*.

The Muse of history Clio is quite often represented two-faced like Janus. The image of history in intellectual culture and in public consciousness really splits up into history as science and history as an art (craft), or conventional (critical) history and non-conventional (emphatic) which is called sometimes, by analogy with para-science, 'para-history'. However, 'non-conventionality' is very relative as this form of history also represents the past only indirectly: „both of them submit to both conventions of representation and conventions of the second order defining how to recognize and estimate conventions of the first order”¹⁷. It is obviously possible for me to designate this characteristic duplicity a little differently: on the one hand, history as academic (analytical, reflexive and critical), conforming to research standards, conventions and values of professional community, and on the other as the applied (popular) history addressed to „Urbi et orbi” (the entire world).

The subject of „consumer” of the product of the historian, his 'target audience' has become relevant at the end of the last century when far-sighted experts began to pay more attention to features of various areas of „public use of history” and practical application of the knowledge got by historians, to reflect on difficult relations of professional historians with their extra-academic audience, or „public”¹⁸. Among the main problems of „the history open for public” there is an

¹⁶ Irina Savelyeva, 'Public History' as a Vocation, in *Basic Research Program. Working Papers. Series: Humanities*. WP BRP 34/HUM/2013, 29 p. About "historical roots" of public history see also: A. C. Махов, *Рой Розенцвейг: делая историю публичной* [Roy Rosenzweig: making the story opened], in *Диалог со временем*, 2013, Вып. 43, с. 180-189.

¹⁷ Brian Fay, *Unconventional History*, in "History and Theory", 2002, Vol. 41, Theme Issue, p. 1-6 (p. 5).

¹⁸ Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice*, London; New York, 2000, Ch. 6.; *Seeing History: Public History in Britain Now* / Ed. by Hilda Kean, Paul Martin and Sally Morgan, London, 2000.

„amateur history” of a family, arrival of the local community, institutional mechanisms of realization of social and educational potential of history, interrelation of historical science and education, possibility of impact of achievements of science on the society through teaching both in secondary and in the higher school. Public history studies the influence of such public institutions as museums, libraries, archives and funds of cultural heritage, and also popular literature and science fiction, the fine arts, theater, cinema and television on the formation of mass historical representations¹⁹. Its main issue was very precisely formulated in the special project of the Australian Center of Public History (called „Australians and the Past”): „how ordinary people learn about the historical past, estimate it and act according to the knowledge about it”²⁰. Researches of this sort naturally rely on sociological polls and special techniques of oral history.

The main issue is the study of the influence of experience of history on politics. Thucydides noted the role of knowledge of the past for elaborating of political actions. Historical arguments had always been actively used in political practice, in public discussions and in social programs. Today there are no doubts concerning the role of historical experience, use of information, knowledge and ideas of the past in the course of making political and other decisions connected with the intention to achieve a definite goal. Public history transfers this axiom to actual educational practice, carrying out special training of historians-consultants for work in government institutions and local governments.

Training programs of the centers of public history assume preparing of skilled historians for the work out of the university environment, outside the area of science and professional education. They aim graduates at implementation of the professional knowledge and skills gained by them in the most different fields of activity as employees of the government organizations, consulting agencies, commerce and industry corporations and law firms, cultural and historical societies, schools, museums, archives and libraries.

In the „history for all” perspective, the contribution of historical science to the general complex of knowledge, value and possibility of effective application of the historical reflection, specific research methods and techniques in the most different layers of cognitive activity and in public practice can be also focused on.

The most important function of historical discipline is its impact on public consciousness, on the ideas of people about the world around and about society in which they live, and also about the remote and recent past. Supporters and developers of the programs of public history (it is also sometimes called „popular” history) make efforts to reveal the mechanisms of such influence, and both

¹⁹ About it see: *History and Media* / Ed. by D. Cannadine, London, 2004.

²⁰ Information on new projects see on the site of the Australian Center of Public History: <http://www.communication.uts.edu.au/centres/public-history>.

critical knowledge, and mythological constructions. In general, the subject of myths in the history, the role of the dominating and competing versions of the past which developed spontaneously or skillfully introduced in mass consciousness draws the increasing attention of the world historiography. Historical and cultural memory of the collective past, which is the integral part of group, social and national identities, presents a special concern.

The social educational potential of history

The new turn led to the intensive development of various aspects of the problem of cultural and historical symbols, „memory places” and „images of the past” (as key symbolic elements of the memory of some community), „historical mythology” to which hundreds of researches are already devoted²¹. Conditions and mechanisms of formation and fixing of ideas of experience of the recent past and long-term historical memory, ways of commemoration, influence of images of the past in social and cultural memory on motivation of behavior of individuals and groups, methods of instrumentalization of historical memory and use of „historical” constructs in the last and current ethnic, confessional and national conflicts become apparent²².

Having a worthy public status for the historian is impossible without understanding of the current state of historiography and restoration of the synthesizing potential of historical knowledge. The scientific program of the Center for Intellectual History of Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences consisting of a number of research projects realized in 2000-2012 was focused on these key problems²³. The goal of the program is to reveal the public role of histo-

²¹ Л. П. Репина, *Память и знание о прошлом в структуре идентичности* [Memory and the knowledge of the past in the identity structure], in *Диалог со временем*, 2007, 21, Специальный выпуск: *Исторические мифы и этнонациональная идентичность* [Special Issue: Historical Myths and Ethno-National Identity]. С. 5-21.

²² A detailed analysis of research of this direction see in the book: Л. П. Репина, *Историческая наука на рубеже XX – XXI вв.: социальные теории и историографическая практика* [Historical science at the turn of XX - XXI centuries : the social theories and the historiographical practice], Москва: Кругъ, 2011, Главы 10 и 11.

²³ The results of these projects were published in the following collective works: *Образы прошлого и коллективная идентичность в Европе до начала Нового времени* [Images of the past and collective identity in Europe before modern times]/ Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва, 2003, 408 с.; *История и память: историческая культура Европы до начала Нового времени* [History and memory: the historical culture of Europe before the beginning of the modern times]/ Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва, 2006, 768 с.; *Диалоги со временем: память о прошлом в контексте истории* [Dialogues with the times: the memory of the past in the context of history]/ Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва, 2008, 800 с.; *Образы времени и исторические*

ry, a place of historical knowledge and historical consciousness in the development of society and civilization at different stages of history, and especially at the boundary of the XX and XXI centuries when in the situation of deep social and cultural transformations this problem was put in the forefront again, and intensity of its discussion gained the unprecedented character. The special attention was paid to the detection of features of formation of various historical traditions, institutional mechanisms of realization of social educational potential of history, its general scientific value and richness of interdisciplinary communications, the future prospects and ways of integration of historical science and education, the analysis of social memory, ideas of the past as to the integral making group, social and national identity, value of critical function of historiography, and also problems of historical consciousness defined as a structure-forming part of public consciousness and the most important category of its analysis.

Conclusions

By all means the discussion of numerous issues set before historical science by the contemporary society has to be continued and not only by historians, but also by the representatives of many other areas of humanitarian, social and natural science knowledge. However, both the discussion, and the solution of these issues is impossible without deep analysis of theoretical bases, methodological aspects and actual research practice of the world historiography. The developed critical analysis of not only the maintenance of public history, but of the whole structure of the relations between professional and popular knowledge, system of forms and methods of public representation of the past, specific processes of transmission of knowledge in mass media is necessary. Within the analysis there have to be not only the social aspects connected with studying of public history as forms of joint social and cultural practice of professional historians and nonprofessionals, its already developed and newly formed institutions (in education and communication: programs of training, magazines, associations, conferences, etc.), but also its essential cognitive aspects, and first of all the problem of the language of the description of the past in which scientific character and availability have to be realized in consistent unity.

представления: Россия – Восток – Запад [Images of the time and the historical representation: Russia - East - West]/ Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва, 2010, 960 с.; *Кризисы переломных эпох в исторической памяти* [The crisis of pivotal eras in the historical memory]/ Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва: ИВИ РАН, 2012, 336 с.; *Идеи и люди: интеллектуальная культура Европы в Новое время* [Ideas and people: intellectual culture of Europe in modern times] / Под ред. Л. П. Репиной, Москва: Аквилон, 2014, 848 с.

THE POLISH-UKRAINIAN INTER-WAR CONFRONTATION. THE UKRAINIAN POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN POLAND¹

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Rezumat: Confruntarea polono-ucraineană interbelică. Mișcarea politică ucraineană din Polonia

Dezideratul dezvoltării, în perioada interbelică, a unor relații de bună conviețuire între minoritatea ucraineană din Polonia și administrația statală, împărțită, parțial, de ambele părți, a fost dificil de materializat, pe fondul demersurilor constante ale liderilor politici ucraineni de formare a unui stat ucrainean independent. În acest scop, Partidul Național Ucrainean din Polonia s-a conexasă inclusiv mișcării politice ucrainene din Bucovina, liderii acesteia din urmă implementând, întocmai, directivele trasate. Pe de altă parte, autoritățile polone au acționat pentru apropierea de elementele ucrainene moderate, căutând să exercite, prin acestea, o presiune favorabilă asupra partidelor ucrainene naționaliste, ca mijloc de obținere a unei colaborări pozitive. Accederea lui Adolf Hitler la putere, în Germania, a influențat contextul internațional în care Polonia se regăsea, dând speranțe minorității ucrainene în lupta sa de obținere a unității naționale, spre nemulțumirea sovieticilor.

Abstract: *The desire to develop, in the inter-war period, good cohabitation relations between the Ukrainian minority in Poland and the state administration, shared, partially, by both sides, was difficult to carry out, given the constant endeavours of the Ukrainian political leaders to form an independent Ukrainian state. To that effect, the National Ukrainian Party from Poland linked itself including to the Ukrainian political movement from Bukovina, the leaders of the latter implementing, to the letter, the directives mapped out. On the other hand, the Polish authorities acted so that they approach the moderate Ukrainian elements, wishing thus to carry out, a favourable pressure upon the nationalist Ukrainian parties, as a means to obtain a positive collaboration. Adolf Hitler's accession to power, in Germany, has influenced the international context in which Poland was at the*

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time, giving hope to the Ukrainian minority in its fight to obtain national unity, much to the discontent of the Soviets.

Résumé: La confrontation entre la minorité ukrainienne de Pologne et l'état polonais dans la période de l'entre-deux-guerres. Le mouvement politique ukrainien de Pologne

L'ambition de développer, dans la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, de bonnes relations de cohabitation entre la minorité ukrainienne de Pologne et l'administration d'état, partagée partiellement par les deux parties, s'est difficilement matérialisée, sur le fond des démarches constantes des chefs politiques ukrainiens de former un état ukrainien indépendant. Dans ce but, le Parti National Ukrainien de Pologne s'est relié y compris au mouvement politique ukrainien de Bucovine, les chefs de ce dernier implémentant à la lettre les directives reçues. De l'autre part, les autorités polonaises ont essayé de s'approcher des éléments ukrainiens modérés, en cherchant d'exercer par leur intermédiaire une pression favorable sur les partis ukrainiens nationalistes afin d'arriver à une collaboration positive. L'ascension d'Adolf Hitler au pouvoir en Allemagne a influencé le contexte international où se retrouvait la Pologne, en donnant des espoirs à la minorité ukrainienne dans son combat pour obtenir l'unité nationale devant le mécontentement des Soviétiques.

Keywords: *inter-war context, Galicia, Bukovina, political connections, claims, self-determination*

Introduction

Of all the minorities that have lived in Poland, in the period of time between the two world wars, the Ukrainian one was the most important, both as far as number and role in the political life of this country. Polish statistics of that time confirmed the existence of roughly five million Ukrainian inhabitants, two million less than what the Ukrainian polls had estimated². According to the 1931 census, Ukrainians were representing 14,3% of the total of 32.107.000 inhabitants of Poland³, being the second most numerous population following

² As evidenced in a document found in the Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [Ministry of External Affairs' Archives, hereinafter AMAE], Fond 71 / URSS (1929 - 1933). Volumul 39. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / USSR (1929 - 1933). Volume 39. The Ukrainian issue], p. 262.

³ Compared to Poland's specific polls, we are highlighting the fact that, according to the 1930 general census, in Romania, Ukrainians were representing 3,2% of the population total, placing themselves, numerically speaking, after Romanians (71,9%), Hungarians (7,9%), Germans (4,1%) and Jewish people (4%). In Bukowina, the

the native (69%) and outnumbering the Jewish (7,8%), Belorussian (3,9%), and German (3,9%)⁴ populations.

Geographically speaking, native Ukrainian communities were to be found in the south-eastern and eastern part of Poland, predominantly in the Stanisławów⁵, Ternopil⁶, Lvov⁷ and Volhinia⁸ voivodeships, but also in great in the Polesia⁹ and Lublin¹⁰ voivodeships. In the north-eastern part of Poland, the interference of the Ukrainians with the Byelorussians / “white Russians” was visible as far as similar social organisation and political tendencies.

In light of the political influence shed upon them, the Ukrainians of Poland were split into two categories: those coming from territories of the former Austrian province of Galicia, attached to Austria in 1772, on the occasion of the first partition of Poland from the Lvov, Ternopil and Stanisławów principalities, and on the other hand, those who originated from the former Russian Empire (the Volhinia, Polesia and Lublin) voivodeships.

The three voivodeships mentioned initially, which were forming the Oriental Galicia, had come, in fact, back to Poland in 1919, following the Polish-Ukrainian war between 1918 – 1919. Through the decision of the Ambassadors Conference, date March 14th 1923, Poland has been recognized full sovereignty over the region, having been conferred the partial administration mandate ever since June 15th 1919, by the Peace Conference’s Supreme Court¹¹. The areas

majority of the population were natives (44,5%), Ukrainians being almost twice less (27,7%), followed by Jewish (10,8%), Germans (8,9%) and Polish people (3,6%). The data are taken out from a statistical table concerning Romania’s population according to ethnicities and maternal language (rural and urban area), following the 1930 general census, presented in the *Minoritățile naționale din România (1925-1931). Documente* [National Minorities in Romania (1925-1931). Documents book]. Coordinators Ioan Scurtu and Ioan Dordea, București, 1996, p. 458.

⁴ Nicolae Mareș, *Republica Populară Polonă* [The People’s Republic of Poland], Editura Enciclopedică Română, București, 1972, p. 88.

⁵ Now Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine.

⁶ In Polish, Tarnopol, now a city in the region of the same name in Ukraine.

⁷ In Polish Lwów and in Ukrainian Lviv, the most important city in the historical region of Galicia, located at 80 kilometers from the actual border with Poland.

⁸ The historical region of Western Ukraine.

⁹ The Polesia region, located in the north, north-western and north-eastern of Kiev, nowadays consists of territories of Ukraine and Belorussia.

¹⁰ Nowadays the biggest city in the Eastern Poland.

¹¹ AMAE. Fond 71 / URSS (1929 - 1933). Volumul 39. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / USSR (1929 - 1933). Volume 39. The Ukrainian issue], p. 263.

inhabited by Ukrainians, which were an integral part of the former Russian Empire, were incorporated to Poland following the Riga Treaty, concluded with Russia, on March 18th 1921. The Polish victory in the Warsaw battle, of August 1920 (considered by the English ambassador in Berlin, Lord d'Abernon, as being the 18th most important battle in the history of the world), the failure of Lenin's plans, those of installing a communist regime in Poland, as well as the frailty of the political consensus inside of a military victorious Poland, have brought peace within the Central and Easter Europe for the next twenty years¹².

We even identify differences in the spiritual sense, between the Ukrainians of the Austrian Empire and those of the Russian Empire: those living in the Austrian Galicia were under the jurisdiction of the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan from Lvov, while the Ukrainians living on Polish territories annexed by Russia, had their church life managed by the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan from Warsaw. Whereas the Autonomous Greek-Catholic Church of Galicia had gradually become a Ukrainian National Church, disposing of clergy exclusively made of Ukrainians, those from the Russian areas couldn't enjoy the support and protection of priesthood, during the national battle.

The different political regimes that the Ukrainians from Poland lived in, prior to the First World War, have influenced their national development. Under the Austrian regime, the Eastern and Western Galicia were forming the Krakow Principality, a single autonomous province, with a regional diet and legislative power within the province's cultural, educational, medical or public issues. Through the carrying out, by the Polish, of the political and administrative leadership, Galicia was considered¹³, even under the Austrian regime, a Polish province. Yet, benefiting from the support of the Austrian Government, which was acting on two levels, aiming at the reduction of the Polish element, which was powerful in Galicia, and concurrently, separating Ukrainians from Russians, the Ukrainians from Galicia have managed, in time, to establish themselves as an important political factor. In this context, the pre-war life in Galicia was recording, as a specific element, the sometimes violent fight between the Polish (as holders of the political privileges) and the Ukrainians (animated by their own national claims).

Prior to the First World War, the national battles that took place in Galicia meant to awaken the national consciousness and political expression of the

¹² M. K. Dziewanowski, *Poland in the 20th century*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 82, 83.

¹³ AMAE. Fond 71 / URSS (1929 - 1933). Volumul 39. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / URSS (1929 - 1933). Volume 39. The Ukrainian issue], p. 264.

Ukrainians. Despite representing only a small part of the Ukrainian-inhabited regions, Eastern Galicia became, at the beginning of the 19th Century, the intellectual centre of the Ukrainians who were living in Russia, Bukovina and sub-Carpathian Russia. The powerful political organizations, the profitable economical institutions, the numerous elementary schools and high-schools, cultural and sports societies, cooperatives and people's banks, functional in the Ukrainian-inhabited Eastern Galicia, were all proof of this population's level of development, during the Austrian regime.

Ukrainians living in the former Russian Empire have been deprived of the freedom of having their own national life, since even Russia's attitude was against Austria. Thus, Russia wouldn't officially acknowledge the difference between Russians and Ukrainians, the Ukrainian language being considered only a dialect of Russian, and any other form of manifesting the national character was forbidden. Given the conditions, the national idea couldn't develop but in a subversive, revolutionary way. The national movement of the Ukrainians from the former Russian Empire dates back from the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace, on February 9th 1918.

It is worth mentioning that, following the above mentioned peace treaty, the former Russian Empire Ukrainians obtained their political independence, forming a free republic, with its capital in Kiev. As a consequence, the beginning of the independent political life triggered real interest for all Ukrainians living in other countries. Following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Galicia Ukrainians have formed, in Lvov, The Ukrainian National Council, which on November 1st 1918, took on its role as administrator of all territories inhabited by congeners in the former Austro-Hungarian area, proclaiming the Western Ukraine Republic. While the Ukrainian Republic, formed in the region of the former Russian Empire, was forced to succumb to the Bolshevik pressure, the Western Ukraine Republic disappeared as a result of the battles between the new Polish army and the Ukrainian military formations, improvised and equipped by a decaying Austria.

With regard to the Ukrainian National Council members, we must mention that they, that is the five Ukrainian deputies from the Parliament of Wien, supported by those from Galicia, were claiming the right of the Chernivtsi, Storojineț and Siret in the northern part of Bukovina to be a part of the new Ukrainian state. Among the council representatives, one can notice Mykola Spenul, member, since 1915, of the Ukrainian General Council (ZUR), authority with a role in coordinating the activity of the Ukrainian population in Galicia and Bukovina. The active involvement of Mykola Spenul in the division of Bukovina materialized in the participation in the people gathering in Bukovina, on

November 3rd 1918, and in the discussions with other Ukrainian leaders, regarding Bukovina's division into two parts, a Romanian and a Ukrainian one. On the same note, Mykola Spenul, O. Popovici and I. Semaka sign on November 6th 1918, a protocol of taking over the power in the Ukrainian part of Bukovina, an endeavour which proved to be unsuccessful, given the presence of Romanian troops in the area¹⁴.

Those in question found opposition from the Romanian deputies of the same legislature, who asked, on behalf of all their conationals, the right for self-determination, stating that Romanians from Bukovina wanted "the unification, in a single state, of all Romanian provinces from Austria and Hungary"¹⁵. Materialized on November 28th 1918, the act of Bukovina's union with Romania was received enthusiastically by the native Polish population of the historical region. Thus, it is shown that "we, the current Polish people, living in Bukovina, being tied to this region by time (...). We, the Polish people of Bukovina, being the eastern safeguard of the Polish nation (...), we salute the birth day of the United Romanian State. We acknowledge the right of the Romanian people over the entire territory, from the south of Dniester, including over Bukovina"¹⁶.

The Polish military occupation in 1919 not only ended the Ukrainian political independence, but suddenly changed the basis of the Polish-Ukrainian relations. Under the Austrian regime, the Polish and the Ukrainians were forming two nations equally rightful within the area of a neutral state, from the nationality problem perspective. In 1919 this balance was reduced, so the Ukrainians found themselves in a national state with chauvinist tendencies¹⁷.

Throughout the transition period, that is, from 1919 until March 14th

¹⁴ Data source is represented by the book Петро Брицький, Олександр Добржанський, *Буковинці на дипломатичній службі УНР та ЗУНР* [Bukovinians within the diplomatic service of the UNR and ZUNR], Чернівці, 2007, p. 235.

¹⁵ Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu, *Ion Nistor, luptătorul pentru unirea Bucovinei cu România* [Ion Nistor, the fighter for Bukowina's union with Romania], in *Ion Nistor (1876 - 1962)*, prepared by Alexandru Zub, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 1993, p. 117.

¹⁶ As it results from a document of the Poland Republic Consulate in Chernivtsi, with regard to „*The declaration of the Polish people from Bukowina, concluded on 28.11.1918, on the occasion of Bukowina's union with the Romanian state*”, in B. M. Запоровський, С. Д. Осачук (ред.), *Буковина: національні рухи та соціально-політичні процеси 1918-1944 рр, Погляд дипломатів (документи)* [Bukowina: national movements and social-political processes (1918 - 1944), Diplomats' opinion (documents)], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2007, p. 15.

¹⁷ AMAE. Fond 71 / URSS (1929 - 1933). Volumul 39. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / USSR (1929 - 1933). Volume 39. The Ukrainian issue], p. 267.

1923¹⁸, the day when Poland's sovereignty upon Eastern Galicia was formally acknowledged by the Council of Ambassadors, the Ukrainians resisted Poland, not wanting to acknowledge, prematurely, the new state of affairs. Thus, by ignoring the Polish administration's dispositions, by refusing to pay the wealth tax, and by boycotting the 1922 elections, the Ukrainian national life had acquired a subversive character and the retaliation of the Polish authorities have further alienated the two nations. The enactment of the new state of affairs, through treaties and international conventions, took the Ukrainian leaders by surprise, generating, in their turn, pro-soviet and philo-Polish oscillations.

Ukrainian parties in the context of political life in Poland

In the raised context, the overcoming of the disquietude and the tensions within the Ukrainian community in Poland took place as late as 1926, through the founding of the Ukrainian National Party (UNDO) from this country, as a result of the fusion between the Democrat Party, Labour Party and the parliamentary group with adherents within the territories which previously belonged to Russia, the principalities of Volhina, Polesia and Lublin, respectively.

Having become the most powerful political organization of the Ukrainians living in Poland, UNDO gradually controlled the economical and cultural life of this population, having, socially speaking, a moderate character. A series of claims, ranked in the accessed archive documents, as radical, such as the expropriation of the great Polish big landowners, in the detriment of the peasants, have rather had more of a national character, since the materialization of such an endeavour would have contributed to the strengthening of the Ukrainian element in the Eastern Galicia.

From the confessional point of view, the UNDO were manifesting a neutral attitude with reference to the Greek-Catholic Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia and those Orthodox from the former Russian territories, while politically speaking there was both an anti-Polish as well as an anti-Russian attitude. The Philo-Soviet current disappeared almost completely until 1932, as a consequence of the persecutions to which the Ukrainian political leaders and intellectuals in the Soviet Russia have been subjected to.

The UNDO strategy in relation to the Polish authorities has been established at the time of the congress held in Lvov, in November 1926. On this occasion, a decision has been made over adopting of an opportunistic, cautious

¹⁸ Ukrainians hoped, throughout this period of time, that there would be a favorable resolving of their independence aspirations or at least they longed for a great national autonomy, imposed by the Great Powers.

and conciliatory orientation, especially given the significant reduction, following the coup d'état in May of the same year, of the Polish National Democrat Party supremacy, known for its chauvinism. In the UNDO representative's sense, for a short amount of time the moment was seen as a new beginning for the national minorities in Poland, since the lack of an actual program of the Ukrainian National Party to favourably solve the Ukrainian issue and the problems regarding the relation with the Polish authorities that soon followed (the administrative chicanery, the encroachment in the 1928 elections, the Polish colonization in the areas inhabited by Ukrainians, as well as misunderstanding their cultural and economical needs), culminating in the arresting of the party leaders prior to the 1930 elections, led, in this final year, to the rupture between the two parts.

Under these conditions, UNDO redefined its orientation, militating in favor of an independent Ukrainian state which would include all the Ukrainian-inhabited territories, under a democratic-parliamentary regime. On behalf of Ukrainians living in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, UNDO claimed the right to self-determination, considering that the current situation had intervened against the Ukrainian people's will and consultation. The UNDO headquarters was located in the Eastern Galicia, yet the party was disposing of organizations also in Volhynia and other Russian territories. The Ukrainian National Party from Poland became the most important form of political association of the Ukrainians from this country, in terms of its influence. Following the 1930 elections, UNDO, managed by Dr. Lewicki, obtained 17 mandates, three were obtained by other Ukrainian parties, while eight were obtained by Ukrainians who were up for and were chosen on the lists of the governmental lists.

The Ukrainian movement in Poland, coordinated by UNDO, which acted for the obtaining of the autonomy for the Ukrainian-inhabited territories and which, following Konrad Ernst Eduard Henlein's action¹⁹ in Czechoslovakia, was perceived as a threat to the Polish state, and thought of as having repercussions over state of mind of the Ukrainians living in Romania²⁰, too.

¹⁹ May 6th 1898 – May 10th 1945. He was the most important pro-nazi politician from Czechoslovakia, leader of the Sudeten German separatists. Through his actions, which included conventional political activities and instigations to violence, The Sudet / Sudeten region (which, politically speaking, belonged to the Austrian Empire until 1918, from 1918 to 1938 to Czechoslovakia), was annexed, in 1938 until 1945, to Germany (from 1945 to 1993 again to Czechoslovakia). For his activity, Konrad Ernst Eduard Henlein became SS general and leader of the Nazi Party in the Sudeten region.

²⁰ AMAE, Fond 71 / URSS (1938). Volumul 41. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / USSR (1938). Volume 41. The Ukrainian issue], p. 173 – 178.

Guided by the principle that a good economic situation draws after itself political power and cultural development, Ukrainians of Galicia proceeded to the founding of cooperatives („Maslosoiuz” – „The milk industry”, „Silskyi Gospodar” – „The rural householder”, „Narodna Torhovlea” – „Popular commerce”), financial institutions, credit and insurance institutions, as well. As a consequence, the success of these actions materialized itself not only in the exclusion of the Polish and Jewish elements from the economic life, but also in the development of the cultural and political life in Galicia, the financial support being represented by such revenues made. All the while, the political-cultural development of the Ukrainians conferred Galicia a Ukrainian national character.

Against this background, on Polish authorities level, there has been recorded a duplicitous political attitude, in the sense that, within the political spectrum of Krakow, one would discuss of the normalization of the relations with the Ukrainians, an aspect which was vehemently disputed in Galicia, where one would aim at the weakening of the Ukrainian movement, in order to abolish it²¹.

Proposals of recovery have been submitted by the Polish leaders, to the leader of the National Ukrainian Party in Poland, Dr. Lewicki; however, he refused them. Subsequently, he was removed from the UNDO management by the Polish circles, his place being taken by Vasyl Mudryi, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian daily paper „Dilo”²², who accepted all the requests of the Polish government and signed a pact with it. The normalization of the Polish-Ukrainian relations, which had also occurred given Vasyl Mudryi’s appointment as vice-president of Poland’s Sejm, gave back the Ukrainian population the hope that, by benefiting from Poland’s and Germany’s support, the creation of The Great Ukraine would finally be possible.

Directives that would be common to all Ukrainians have been therefore established, that is, including the Ukrainians from Bukovina²³, where the UNDO policy had been implemented, at regional level, by the Ukrainian National Party (UNP), with its headquarters in Chernovtsy²⁴, which officially led the

²¹ In reply, UNDO summoned, on July 13th and 14th 1936 a congress of the Ukrainian parliamentaries. Subsequently, a press release was issued by which the Polish government policy was criticized, as being non-unitary.

²² Another press body of UNDO was the weekly newspaper „Swoboda”.

²³ AMAE. Dosar 71 / URSS (1934 – 1937). Volumul 40, referitor la problema ucraineană [File 71 / USSR (1934 – 1937). Volume 40, in reference to the Ukrainian issue], p. 244.

²⁴ AMAE, Fond România (1920-1944), vol. 389, Referat privitor la Partidul Național Ucrainean [Romania Fund (1920-1944), vol. 389, Essay with a reference to the National Ukrainian Party], p. 57.

political activity of the Ukrainian minority in Romania²⁵, seconded by „Ukrainska Volia”, a political formation managed by Dr. Vasyl Dutchak, a close-by of Petr Sievich, founding supporter of the Ukrainian Republic, in the composition of which the northern part of Bukovina was anticipated to enter²⁶. In the first part of 1936, Iuriy Serbyniuk, as general secretary of the UNP, travelled to Lvov, where he discussed with the UNDO leaders, while the „Ceas” newspaper– UNP’s press body, criticized the Soviet regime, thus spreading the UNDO policy. A similar role had „Hliborobska Pravda” - „The ploughman truth” newspaper, managed by the former deputy C. Kracalia, who was under the influence of Warsaw and the Polish-Ukrainian circles from the Ukrainian Institute in the capital of Poland, as well as having good relationships with the representatives of the Poland Republic Consulate in Chernovtsy²⁷. The institution, founded in the spring of 1919 and managed by Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, whose rank was that of Honorary Consul, had, as evidenced in a letter sent to the Warsaw headquarters, good relationship with the local authorities, no misunderstandings having been signalled²⁸.

Contrary to the open attitude manifested by the Warsaw authorities, the Polish people from the Ukrainian-inhabited territories have enclosed all their cultural organizations in a single Union, acting concurrently, with the purpose of aggravating the activity of the Ukrainian cooperatives, precisely in order to diminish the national Ukrainian character of Galicia. Thus, one proceeded to the dissolution of the most important Ukrainian cultural and sports societies: „Soiuz

²⁵ *Raport întocmit (1930) de Serviciul Secret de Informații privind activitățile și scopul societăților ucrainene din Bucovina* [Review prepared (1930) by the Information Secret Service, related to the activities and purpose of the Ukrainian societies in Bukovina] in *Minoritățile naționale din România (1925-1931). Documente* [National minorities in Romania (1925-1931). Documents]. Coordinators Ioan Scurtu and Ioan Dordea, București, 1996, p. 472.

²⁶ AMAE. Fond Geneva. Dosar Societatea Națiunilor. Referitor la minoritatea ucraineană din România (1927-1938). Volumul 237 [Geneva Fund. The Nations Society File. With reference to the Ukrainian minority in Romania (1927-1938). Volume 237], p. 14.

²⁷ AMAE. Dosar 71 / URSS (1934 – 1937). Volumul 40, referitor la problema ucraineană [File 71 / USSR (1934 – 1937). Volume 40, related to the Ukrainian issue], p. 244.

²⁸ According to the *Annual administrative review for the period: January 1st – December 31st 1922*, addressed to the Warsaw Ministry of External Affairs, by the consular representative, with headquarters in Chernovtsy, cited in *Буковина: національні рухи та соціально-політичні процеси 1918-1944рр, Погляд дипломатів (документи)* [Bukovina: national movements and social-political processes (1918 - 1944), The diplomats’ opinion], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2007, p. 17, 21, 22.

Ukrainok” – „The Ukrainian Women Union”, which had 1200 branches, 72 county organizations and 50.000 members; „The Sela Catholic Labour Society” and „The Ukrainian Sports Union”. Also, towards the end of the inter-war period, the Polish authorities forbade any cultural, sports or any other type of manifestation which could have had a Ukrainian character (the celebration of the most important and old Ukrainian cultural societies – „Prosvita”).

One must hereto mention, that the German-Polish nonaggression pact, dated January 26th 1934, changed the Polish political orientation towards a normalization of the Polish-Ukrainian relationships and a collaboration in both the internal and external political area. The pact, signed in Berlin by Józef Lipski and Constantin von Neurath, agreed to both parties by ensuring the time required for the tactical settlement, but instead, determined the soviet disquietude and „cooled off” the Polish-Romanian diplomatic relations. Poland had managed, in less than two year from the normalization (June 25th 1932) of the relations with the Soviet Union, to obtain an agreement similar to Germany, made easier by the attitudinal mutations of the Polish diplomacy (along with colonel Józef Beck's²⁹ taking over the external affairs, who, by alienating France, entered into the disgrace of Nicolae Titulescu, who was a close-by of both the French and British circles) and the contracts carried out, in 1933, by the Polish representatives with the Germans, including with Adolf Hitler. According to the pact text, the parties officially undertook to exclude the force within the bilateral relations. In reality, Adolf Hitler invoked the pact as a justification for the massive subsequent arming, therefore, Poland, based on the agreement, was shielded only for a limited period of time. For Hitler, getting close to Poland was important in terms of its effect (straining the French-Polish relations and diminishing a possible interstate coalition in the Central and Eastern Europe) and the role that this country could play within the anti-Soviet alliance, the very reason why the pact was contested by the Soviet officials³⁰.

Given the context, marked, at the beginning of 1938, by the weakening of the economic, cultural and political situation of the Ukrainian population living in Poland, UNDO, through its representatives reacted, by exploiting the international context, created due to the annexation (March 12th 1938) of Austria by Germany (Anschluss Österreichs). On May 7th 1938, following the

²⁹ Ioan Scurtu, *Structuri politice în europa Centrală și de Sud-Est (1918 – 2001)*, Vol. I [Political Structures within Central and South-Eastern Europe (1918 – 2001), Vol. I], Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2003, p. 33.

³⁰ Daniel Hrenciuc, *România și Polonia (1932 - 1939). Relații politice și diplomatice* [Romania and Poland (1932 - 1939). Political and diplomatic relations], Editura Universității Suceava, 2005, p. 33 – 50.

meeting of the party's central committee, a press release was issued, stating the difficulties faced by the Ukrainian community at that time. In its contents, it is shown that the normalization of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship hasn't registered any real improvement, on the contrary, the situation has worsened due to the Polish attacks, favoured by and not limited or stopped by the central authorities of Warsaw: such attacks, carried out by the Polish, occurred by the forced transition of the Orthodox and United people to Catholicism, as well as by turning the Orthodox churches into Catholic cult institutions. The dissatisfaction of the UNDO representatives also occurred as a result of: the exclusion of Ukrainian peasants from the agrarian reform, the prohibition of educating children in the Ukrainian language, the refusal to accept the Ukrainian element within the local administration and its removal from public functions, given that one wouldn't give up religion and nationality; limiting the Ukrainian economic and cultural manifestations, the authorities' arbitrary attitude towards their relationship with Ukrainian elements in the border area; the authorities' limitation of the Ukrainian population's access to cultural, educational and economic-destined credits.

The most important claim made by UNDO is, without a doubt, the autonomy of all territories inhabited by Ukrainians in Poland. The basis of this request was the acknowledgement of the party's representatives, according to which these territories form a geo-political, economic unit, as well as the obligation assumed by Poland, in 1923, through which it guaranteed the autonomy of the Ukrainian-inhabited territories in this country.

Facing the Polish „danger”, UNDO called on the Ukrainian people, urging them to unite and coordinate the activity, with the purpose of achieving the Ukrainian national policy in Poland (*„no one has any rights or power to stop us in our national, constructive and creative battle”*³¹). The endeavour, which aimed at obtaining autonomy for the Ukrainians living in Poland, is interesting, considering the fact that the Ukrainians fight started at the same time with that in Czechoslovakia and that, during the political crisis of the 1937 – 1938 Europe, caused by disputes and contradictions among the totalitarian-revisionist and democratic states, and fuelled by inner political crisis (France's case).

The public opinion and the Polish press (the editions of the „Robotnik”³², „Warszawski Dzienik Narodowi”³³ newspapers of May 12th 1938, as well as those

³¹ AMAE. Fond 71 / URSS (1938). Volumul 41. Problema ucraineană [Fund 71 / USSR (1938). Volume 41. The Ukrainian issue], p. 176.

³² Socialist body: „The tone and way of formulating the UNDO declaration reminds Henlein's action. Is it possible that the Ukrainian nationalists have revived their

of the „Ilustrovani Curjer Codzieni”³⁴ and „Dzenik Polski”³⁵ newspapers of the next day) showed a determined attitude towards Ukrainians’ claims, the Ukrainian autonomous movement being linked with that of Konrad Ernst Eduard Henlein. In reply, the Ukrainian press of Poland empathized with UNDO, arguing the justice of those over seven million Ukrainians’ claims, by making a reference to the Polish request to obtain the autonomy for the Polish element living in Czechoslovakia.

The moral support that UNDO found in Germany’s actions indicates, in the context of these autonomous endeavours, the tendency of getting rid of the anti-German policy, promoted through the „Ukrainian Bureau” in London. As far as Germany’s policy towards the Ukrainian minority living in Poland was, we keep in mind³⁶ that, following Adolf Hitler’s accession (January 30th 1933) in the position of Chancellor, „the new Germany” turned the Philo-Soviet policy into an anti-Soviet one, supporting the Ukrainian nationalists, who were, thus, hoping for³⁷, the

sympathies towards Berlin?”.

³³ The „Endeki” nationalist group body: „Reading the UNDO declaration, one has the impression that Henlein’s movement hasn’t remained echoless before the events in Poland... This Henlein analogy all the more takes on a troublesome expression as UNDO’s appeal, that of uniting all factors, had as consequence the union of all Ukrainian of every nuance from Austria and Germany, on the very next day following the achievement of the Anschluss... The Ukrainian desideratum expressed by UNDO is an exponent of the German policy, which wants to weaken Central and Eastern Europe, by creating federative autonomous states, where, it is self understood, will find the perfect place for the fixation of economical and political spheres... The first step towards the achievement of this policy is Henlein’s action in Czechoslovakia and once achieving it, Poland will come in its turn, with the Ukrainian issue.”.

³⁴ „It looks like the UNDO gentlemen ... immitate Conrad Henlein’s claims”.

³⁵ „UNDO requests, for the Ukrainians, rights which inflict a blow in the integrity of the Polish territory. The tone of this declaration exceeds any expectation. UNDO has forgotten that any right conditions obligations as well and how is the Ukrainian people fulfilling its obligations towards Poland? ... You, gentlement, threaten with foreign factors. Your threat describe the feelings that you have for the Polish state”.

³⁶ AMAE. Dosar 71 / URSS (1934 – 1937). Volumul 40, referitor la problema ucraineană [File 71 / USSR (1934 – 1937). Volume 40, regarding the Ukrainian issue], p. 240 - 244. The information is selected from a copy of Report no 12024 / 1936, of the Chernovtsy Regional Police Inspectorate, related to Poland’s new Ukrainian policy, adopted following the conclusion of the German-Polish non-aggression pact of 1934.

³⁷ The publication of a book regarding Ukraine, by the mentor of the Hitlerist external policy, Alfred Rosenberg, has been seen, by the leaders of the two anti-Polish organizations („Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv – OUN, translated „The

Ukrainian independence, by disruption of the Soviet Russia. The measures taken by the Russian government, consequences of the Ukrainian movement's approach to the new Berlin power, and the oppressions that followed, consisting of arrests, deportations and/or death sentences of certain Ukrainian leaders, have only eliminated Ukrainians' sympathies towards Soviet Russia³⁸.

Close to UNDO, in terms of the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet attitude, yet with an acute radical character, was the Radical Socialist Ukrainian Party (USRP)³⁹, consisting of, in Eastern Galicia, socialist principles which didn't exclude a national specific program. USRP aimed at organizing the Ukrainians from villages to cities, with the purpose of carrying out a joint battle for social and national freedom of the working classes, as well as for turning the economic and political regime specific to 1932, into a socialist regime⁴⁰, achievable only as a result of having obtained national independence⁴¹. In such a situation, the new Ukrainian Republic of the working class would reunite all territories inhabited by Ukrainians, the power being exercised by a working classing council, chosen by proportional, secret, legal, universal and direct voting. Whereas UNDO's social program had a national bourgeois character, comprising all social classes, the USRP registered an acute class character, its leaders relying on the agricultural and industrial proletariat. The USRP program paid particular attention to Ukrainian workers, without showing sympathy towards the Polish proletariat.

In May 1927, UNDO split, the left wing of this formation having reorganized itself under the title of The Labor National Party (UPP)⁴², which

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists", and „Ukrainska viiskova orhanizatsiia – UVO", translated „The Ukrainian Military Organization"), refugees in Berlin, was a confirmation of the German support.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

³⁹ In the 1930 elections, the USRP formed an electoral bloc with UNDO, obtaining three mandates. The USRP's official newspapers was „Hrondzkij Holes". The party had a tight connection with the Ukrainian „Obrony Ukrainy" – „Defenders of Ukraine" organization, in the United States of America.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

⁴¹ According to the party leaders.

⁴² Significant is the fact that Dr. Petruszewicz, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian emigration and author of the UPP doctrine, acted as subscriber of more complaints addressed to the Nations League, in the contents of which he incriminated both Poland and Romania's policy in relation to the minority population. In 1932, the party was led by Dr. Zieczeslaw Budzynaki, and his official newspaper was „Rada". Unlike UNDO and USRP, the UPP didn't have, following the 1930 elections, representatives in the Polish Seym.

militated, through the few adherents it had, for the unification of all Ukrainian within the borders of an independent, socialist state, all the while keeping the national tendency. Contrary to UNDO and USRP, UPP was of philo-Soviet orientation seeing in the Soviet vicinity, a possible solution for obtaining of the independence and achieving the union of the Ukrainian people.

Through the fusion of the „National Will” sovietophile party from Eastern Galicia with the „Ukrainian Socialist Union”, which manifested both socialist and nationalist tendencies, in 1926 „The Socialist Union of the Ukrainian Peasants and Workers” was created, a political formation also known as the „Sel-Rob” Party⁴³, which national program was marked, ever since its establishment, by divergence. Thus, whereas the group deriving from the „National Will” Party manifested, influenced by the communist doctrine, an international tendency, accepting, out of tactical considerations, the nationalist ideology of form, the other fraction was opposing the international communist doctrine of the party, making a priority out of the national program. Adopting the „Szumskist ideology”⁴⁴, the „Sel-Rob” followers, supporters of the national current, were militating for the establishment of a communist Ukrainian Republic, independent of Moscow, in other words, for a communist regime within the borders of an independent national state. On the other hand, the representative of the international current was „Sel-Rob Unity”⁴⁵, in reality a communist party, having connections with communist elements, which was constantly receiving instructions from the Soviet Russia. In order to activate on the political scene, „Sel-Rob Unity” wanted to follow the law, the clandestine activities being the responsibility of certain secret organizations. With an eye to the importance criteria, the „Sel-Rob Unity” ranked third, after UNDO and USRP.

A way of getting close to and understanding in the relation with the Polish state, has been manifested, even though in a timid manner, by the Catholic National Ukrainian Party⁴⁶, established in September 1930, under the influence of the Greek-Catholic Bishop of Stanisławów. Lacking unification with the moderate groups within other Ukrainian political organizations, the Catholic National Ukrainian Party’s influence upon the Ukrainian population was moderate. Also, the actions of the party were refuted by the other

⁴³ Selanki - rural, robotnicze – working.

⁴⁴ Named after the former commissioner of the people of Soviet Ukraine, Szumski.

⁴⁵ Led by a former deputy, Walnicki. Under various pretexts, the electoral committees cancelled the majority of the candidates list in the 1930 elections, so that the party didn’t have representatives within the Polish Sejm anymore.

⁴⁶ The party’s press body was „Nowa Zoria”.

Ukrainian political formations and by the irredentist clerical circles, clotted around the Greek-Catholic Metropolitan Szeptycki and organized in the „Ukrainian Catholic Union”⁴⁷.

Conclusions

Animated by the wish to evade the Polish administration management, seen as inflicted upon them, despite the will of the Ukrainian people living in Poland, the Ukrainian parties haven't managed, during the inter-war period, to adopt a joint position in the perspective of achieving their desideratum of autonomy, based on the right for self-determination, proclaimed by the American president Woodrow Wilson⁴⁸. The differences identified in the Ukrainian parties' programs, materialized in the opposed tactics adopted and purpose proposed, have deprived the Ukrainian population from Poland from an optimal representations in their relations with the authorities. It was for these reasons that the political organizations formed by the Ukrainians have been dissolved, in the context of the 1922 elections – The Agrarian Ruthenian Party of the Eastern Galicia, and the 1928 elections – „The National Ukrainian Union”.

Not being able to form the basis of a personal party, the Ukrainians supporting the Polish regime, few in number, have adhered to the territorial organizations of the government party, managing, with the help of the administration, to occupy mandates within the Sejm, on the occasion of the 1930 elections (six mandates in the Volhinia voivodeship and two in Eastern Galicia), though with a limited influence upon the congener population.

⁴⁷ Having as press body the weekly newspaper „Meta”.

⁴⁸ Ileana Maria Ratcu, *Teodor Bălan (1885 - 1972), istoric și arhivist al Bucovinei* [Teodor Bălan (1885 - 1972), Bukowina's historian and archivist], Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2013, p. 44.

**LES MAISONS PAYSANNES DE MARGINEA
(DÉPARTEMENT DE SUCEAVA, ROUMANIE)**

**THE PEASANT HOUSES OF MARGINEA
(SUCEAVA COUNTY, ROMANIA)**

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Rezumat: Casele țărănești din Marginea, Județul Suceava (România).

Lucrarea evidențiază trăsăturile locuinței populare din Marginea din secolul XX, în raport cu viața socială și privată a gospodăriei țărănești. Aceste locuințe, astăzi în număr tot mai mic datorită fenomenului migrației internaționale, se integrează în specificul cultural al zonei, fiind o materializare a obiceiurilor și mentalităților unei lumi rurale pe cale de dispariție. Lucrarea se bazează pe un studiu de caz realizat în perioada 2009-2011, în comuna Marginea, o comunitate rurală puternic marcată de migrația internațională.

Abstract: *The article highlights the features of the peasant houses of Marginea, during the twentieth century, in connection with the social and private life of the household. These houses, today fewer and fewer, due to the phenomenon of international migration, are characteristic of the cultural identity of the region, being an objectification of practices and mentalities of a passing rural world in danger of disappearing. The article is based on a case study of a Romanian village strongly influenced by international migration.*

Résumé: *L'article souligne les traits des maisons paysannes de Marginea, pendant le XXème siècle, en relation avec la vie sociale et privée du ménage paysan. Ces habitations, aujourd'hui de moins en moins nombreuses suite au phénomène de la migration internationale, sont caractéristiques de l'identité culturelle de la région, étant une objectification des coutumes et des mentalités d'un monde rural en danger de disparition. L'article est basé sur une étude de cas d'un village roumain fortement marqué par la migration internationale.*

Keywords: *Marginea, peasant family, peasant houses, 'Romanian' house, 'German' house, practices, social life*

Introduction

Le présent article décrit les maisons paysannes de Marginea (y compris leurs dépendances), ainsi que leur rapport avec la vie familiale, sociale et culturelle de la communauté villageoise. Bâties pendant le siècle dernier, ces maisons sont aujourd'hui en train de disparition suite au phénomène de la migration internationale. Le déclin de l'architecture traditionnelle débute à Marginea pendant le régime communiste de Ceaușescu, dans les années '70, causé par la systématisation des zones rurales, qui imposent aux paysans des plans de maisons standardisées : « on avait quelques modèles, affichés dans chaque mairie communale »¹. Le clivage s'accroît surtout après les événements de 1989, durant la nouvelle ère de la migration et dans le contexte du nouvel capitalisme, quand toute tradition est abandonnée. Le phénomène est bien illustré par un des habitants de Marginea : « ce que Ceaușescu n'a pas réussi au niveau de l'urbanisation, de la perte des traditions et de l'identité locale, le capitalisme, l'ouverture des frontières et la migration vers l'Italie l'ont fait »².

Cet article est basé sur une étude de cas de ce village roumain de 10 529 habitants, fortement marqué par la migration internationale, dans lequel nous avons fait plusieurs visites durant les périodes d'été – automne des années 2009, 2010 et 2011, en utilisant l'observation du cadre bâti et l'entretien. Les informations recueillies ont été fixées sur support numérique ou papier, à l'aide des photos, vidéo, notes et croquis. Pour la collecte des données nous avons utilisé des sources primaires et secondaires : documents publics officiels et bases des données statistiques, œuvres scientifiques ayant comme sujet la Bucovine ou la région de Rădăuți et le village de Marginea, articles dans des journaux et photos appartenant aux villageois.

Nous avons considéré les plans des maisons et les autres traces matérielles comme « un texte qui peut être lu par ceux qui comprennent le langage des formes bâties »³, car l'espace domestique (qui comprend la maison, les dépendances, la cour et le jardin) forme un environnement matériel de la vie

¹ Entretien Marginea, 2010.

² Pietro Cingolani, *Romeni d'Italia. Migrazioni, vita quotidiana e legami transnazionali* [Les roumains d'Italie. Migrations, vie quotidienne et relations transnationales], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2009, p.96.

³ James S. Duncan, *The house as a symbol of social structure*. Irwin Altman and Carol M Werner (Eds) "Home environments. Human Behavior and Environment", Vol 8, New York, Plenum press, 1985, p. 137.

familiale⁴ et peut être considéré comme une représentation de son mode de vie⁵. En effet, l'habitation paysanne révèle une multitude de mentalités, pratiques et significations, qui diffèrent d'une culture à l'autre et d'une époque à l'autre. En outre, le village et ses habitations expriment l'interaction complexe entre la communauté villageoise et son cadre cosmique, biologique, psychique et historique qui la conditionnent⁶.

Contrairement aux immeubles résidentiels conçus par un architecte, qui s'imposent par une originalité délibérément cherché, la maison paysanne reflète plus fidèlement la vie sociale d'une communauté dans un certain temps et zone géographique, car il représente une « traduction directe et inconsciente des besoins, des valeurs, des désirs, des rêves et des passions d'une nation »⁷. En fait, dans le passé, les paysans roumains n'auraient jamais employé un architecte pour concevoir leur maison, car celle-ci était construite selon un petit nombre de modèles, commune à tous les logements d'une aire culturelle définie. Leur but n'était pas la délimitation, mais l'intégration culturelle et d'être en ligne avec la tradition locale, qui avait force de loi, étant suivi par tous les habitants. Le résultat a été reflété dans la formation, au cours du temps, d'un nombre limité de types de maisons ou dans un type de maison avec plusieurs variantes.

La commune de Marginea

Marginea est une commune formée d'un seul village, ayant une population de 10 529 habitants en 2011. Située au Nord de la Roumanie, dans l'ancienne région historique de Bucovine, la localité s'inscrit dans la sphère d'influence de la municipalité de Radauti, une ville située à une distance de 8 km de Marginea. La commune s'avoisine au nord avec la commune de Horodnic, à l'est avec la commune de Volovat, au sud avec la commune d'Arbore et à l'ouest avec la commune de Sucevita.

La localité est franchie de l'ouest à l'est par le ruisseau Sucevita, un affluent de Suceava. La forme de l'agglomération est tentaculaire, développée au long des

⁴ Traian Herseni, *Teoria monografiei sociologice* [La théorie de la monographie sociologique], Dimitrie Gusti, Traian Herseni et Henri H. Stahl (Eds) *Monografia-Teorie și metodă* [La monographie : théorie et méthode], București, Editura Paideia, 1999, p. 75-174.

⁵ Paul H. Stahl, *La maisnie (gospodăria) du paysan roumain*, Freiburg, Biblioteca Română, 1978.

⁶ Henri H. Stahl, *Amintiri și gânduri* [Mémoires et pensées], București, Editura Minerva, 1981.

⁷ Amos Rapoport, *Pour une Anthropologie de la Maison*, Paris, Dunod, 1972, p. 3.

voies de communication principales et secondaires. Dans cette région au milieu du XXe siècle, le type de village linéaire dispersée ou linéaire tentaculaire était prédominant. L'Ethnographe Maria Cioara⁸ mentionne parmi ces types de villages Sucevita et Voievodeasa, ainsi que Marginea, avec sa configuration dispersée, les bâtiments étant placés à une distance considérable les uns des autres (les espaces libres étant remplis par les champs et les vergers), ayant une forme « dispersée avec des tendances de rassemblement », développé le long des cours d'eau et des principaux réseaux routiers. Les routes les plus importantes qui l'en traversent sont : la route nationale DN 17 A – qui relie la municipalité de Radauti à la ville Campulung Moldovenesc -, la route nationale DN 2E - qui relie la commune Putna à la ville Gura Humorului, et la route départementale DJ 209 K vers la commune de Volovat.




Fig. 1: La carte du Département de Suceava

Marginea dans une perspective historique

Le village de Marginea est attesté par les documents du XVIIIème siècle, au moment où il se sépare du Volovăț en obtenant sa propre identité juridique - jusqu'à cette période étant nommé « Prund » et appartenant à une agglomération des villages ayant comme centre le village de Volovăț. Sous l'ancien Empire austro - hongrois, plusieurs familles des germains catholiques

⁸ Maria Cioară, *Zona etnografică Rădăuți* [La zone ethnographique de Rădăuți], București, Editura Sport Turism, 1979.

(environ 500 personnes) sont venues dans la commune⁹. Ainsi, durant les années 1934, le professeur Ilie Visan mentionnait que la population de la région était composée par plusieurs minorités ethniques (germains, hébreux, hongrois, polonais) et religieuse (catholiques et gréco – catholiques, protestants, hébreux et néo-protestants). Malgré la diversité ethnique, les paysans roumains « ont vécu avec elles dans la paix et l'entente, en honorant leur travail et en s'inspirant de leurs œuvres »¹⁰. Les colons germains ont quitté le pays après la deuxième guerre mondiale, leurs maisons étant cédées aux veuves, orphelins et aux vétérans de guerre.

La commune est franchie par la vieille route « des Tatars » (aujourd'hui elle se superpose à la route DN 17 A) qui raccordait la ville de Siret à la ville de Câmpulung et de la Transylvanie. La rue qui reliait les villages de Marginea et de Horodnic à la ville de Rădăuți était nommée « La rue royale ». Au long de cette voie – qui menait au marché de Rădăuți –, les habitants aisés du Rădăuți ont bâtis les premières et les plus belles maisons¹¹. De plus, les paysans des alentours venaient commercialiser leurs produits au marché du Rădăuți tous les vendredis. Parmi eux, les paysans de Marginea vendaient leur poterie de céramique noire, conçues après des techniques anciennes. En effet, dans cette région, la céramique noire a connu un fort développement entre le XII^{ème} siècle et le XV^{ème} siècle, mais la technique est utilisée depuis le néolithique sur le territoire de la Roumanie.

Les anciennes maisons de Marginea (bâties dans le village avant 1989)

On distingue deux types des maisons paysannes à Marginea, qui suivent les caractéristiques de la zone ethnographique de Radauti, avec plusieurs variantes selon le climat, le relief et les occupations des habitants :

- La maison nomme « casa românească » (la maison roumaine) – le plus ancien type
- La maison appelée « casa nemțească » (la maison allemande) – inspiré du modèle des colonisateurs allemands

⁹ Gavril Crăciun, Cristina-Violeta Popescu, *Mică enciclopedie a localității Marginea – Suceava* [Petite encyclopédie de la localité de Marginea – Suceava], Suceava, Editura Lidana, 2007.

¹⁰ Ilie Vișan, *Județul Rădăuți în imagini* [Images du département de Rădăuți], Institutul de arte grafice, București, Editura Marvan, 1934, p. 5.

¹¹ Emil Grigorovitz, *Cum a fost odată. Schițe din Bucovina* [Mémoires d'antan. Esquisses de Bucovine], București, Editura Librăriea Națională, 1911.

La maison « roumaine » de Marginea

Le premier type, en bois, avec des longues poutres horizontaux emploi un système constructif, qui « est extrêmement ancien en Roumanie. Son utilisation par la gent des Colchis du Pont, est attestée par M. P. Vitruvius, dans sa description détaillée, en 16 av. J.-C. Le système était utilisé aussi par les Daces, tel que l'illustre la Colonne de Traian »¹².



Fig. 2: Maisons « roumaines » (en 2009 – gauche, et dans les années '70 - droite, photo prof. T. Magopat)

L'orientation de l'habitation par rapport à la trajectoire du soleil et la protection contre les vents dominants étaient très importantes : la maison s'ouvrait vers le sud et se fermait vers le nord, avec la façade principale au sud. Par contre, l'implantation par rapport aux voies était moins importante et on trouve des maisons roumaines qui tournent le dos à la rue si celle-ci correspond au nord géographique. Aussi, le versant nordique de la toiture descend jusqu'au sol (ou près du sol), la façade nord n'ayant aucune fenêtre.



Fig. 3: Le versant de la toiture descend près du sol vers le nord

¹² Silvia Paun, *La valeur de l'architecture autochtone*, Bucuresti, Editura Per Omnes Artes, 2003, p. 146.

Une des signes distinctifs de ce type d'habitation était le toit raide, à quatre pentes, couvert de bardeau, ayant des larges auvents. La toiture était munie de deux ou trois ouvertures placées sur le versant sud de la toiture, pour l'évacuation de la fumée du poêle, car il n'y avait pas de conduit de fumée dans les combles, la fumée étant utilisée pour chauffer le grenier, pour conserver la viande et pour préserver les bardeaux de la toiture¹³.



Fig. 4: Les ouvertures de la toiture

Les plus anciennes maisons utilisaient les clous en bois pour la charpente du toit comme pour la couverture, les éléments métalliques étant plus chers.



Fig. 5: Clous en bois pour la charpente du toit

Aussi, pour éviter le fer, les assemblages des poutres horizontales se font selon un système appelé en « cheotori ».

¹³ Florea Stănculescu, *Case și gospodării la țară* [Maisons et fermes rurales], București, Editura Cartea medicală, 1927.




Fig. 6: Jonctions des poutres horizontales (à droite - ancienne photo)

Un autre élément particulier de la maison roumaine était la « prispa » (sans poteaux) dont le sol était couvert d'argile posée sur une couche de gravier, ou le « gang » (une sorte de porche avec des poteaux et parapet) dont le sol était fait des planches clouées sur des poutres. Tant la « prispa » que le « gang » entourait la maison sur un ou plusieurs côtés (sud, est et ouest), pour protéger les façades contre la pluie. Les plafonds des chambres étaient construits des poutres apparentes, en bois, celle-ci constituant aussi un support pour l'accrochage des divers objets. Le sol présentait une couche composée des plaques de bois posées sur des poutres en bois. Mais les plus anciennes maisons avaient le sol en argile sur une couche de gravier. Des pierres, placées aux coins de la maison, servaient de fondations.



Fig. 7: Maisons « roumaines » avec « prispa » (gauche) et « gang » (droite)

Les façades restaient soit nues (ayant le bois exposé), soit couvertes (entièrement ou seulement autour des fenêtres et de la porte d'entrée) d'une couche composée d'argile et des pailles, appliquée sur un support de treillis et enduit à la chaux.



Fig. 8: L'entrée (« tinda ») d'une ancienne maison « roumaine »



Fig. 9: Poigné de la porte d'entrée d'une ancienne maison « roumaine »

La maison était composée de quatre pièces basses : un hall d'entrée (« tinda »), une chambre d'apparat (« cea casa »), la chambre de la famille et une autre pièce situé à l'arrière du bâtiment, fonctionnant comme cellier ou – dans le cas de maisons roumaines anciennes – comme abris pour les moutons.



Fig. 10: Le cellier

L'agencement des chambres était en général le même, à quelques différences. « Cea casa » se trouvait sur le côté droit de l'entrée, sur la façade de

l'est; « casa de zi » (la chambre multifonctionnelle) était sur le côté gauche, sur la façade ouest, le hall d'entrée au milieu, et le cellier le long de la façade nord. L'entrée principale était orientée vers le sud, selon les conditions climatiques spécifiques à la partie nord de la Roumanie. D'autre part, en choisissant cette façon de positionner les pièces peut avoir des connotations symboliques parce que la partie sale est à l'ouest et vers la gauche et la partie propre est à droite et à l'est¹⁴.

Généralement, une maison roumaine mesurait 10 mètres sur 9 mètres. Le processus de construction de ces maisons durait longtemps : environ 10 – 20 années, en dépit de leurs dimensions réduites, car « il était très difficile avec l'argent [...] et il était très difficile avec les matériaux »¹⁵.

Dans le contexte de la pénurie de ressources financières, l'ingéniosité du paysan roumain s'est matérialisée dans les techniques de construction et les moyens d'exploitation de la maison. Ainsi, tous les maisons paysannes de Marginea, bâties avant l'année 1989, comprenaient une ou plusieurs chambres sans source de chaleur (« cea casa » n'était pas prévue d'un poêle, cette chambre étant rarement utilisée). L'ancien système paysan recyclait la chaleur du poêle de la cuisine : « le même feu chauffant la plaque métallique [sur laquelle on cuit les aliments] et le poêle »¹⁶. Il utilisait aussi un seul poêle pour chauffer deux pièces : « La chaleur du feu sur lequel on cuit les aliments dans la cuisine passe dans la pièce voisine où se trouve un poêle aveugle, la traverse et ressort dans la cuisine pour remonter ensuite vers le grenier. C'est la solution des vieilles maisons »¹⁷.

Pendant l'hiver toute la famille se rassemblait dans une ou deux chambres dotée d'un poêle : « Et comme ils ont grandi [les enfants], il n'y avait pas assez d'espace [dans l'ancienne cuisine] et ... nous occupions les autres chambres. Quand il faisait froid, nous avions l'habitude de nous entasser de nouveau »¹⁸. De la même manière, B. (un homme d'environ 60 ans) se souvient de la façon dont il vivait dans son enfance. La maison de ses parents, une maison « roumaine », avait un vestibule, deux chambres et un cellier. Ils étaient 5 frères et pendant l'hiver, ils dormaient tous dans une chambre - la seule pièce chauffée de la

¹⁴ Radu Drăgan, *La représentation de l'espace de la société traditionnelle*. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999.

¹⁵ Entretien T.R., charpentier, Marginea, 2009.

¹⁶ Henri, H. Stahl, Paul, H. Stahl, *Civilizația vechilor sate românești* [La civilisation des anciens villages roumains], București, Editura Științifică, 1968, p. 51.

¹⁷ Paul H. Stahl, *La maisnie (gospodăria) du paysan roumain*, Freiburg, Biblioteca Română, 1978, p. 117.

¹⁸ Entretien GM, Marginea, 2010.

maison -, avec leur mère (veuve). Pendant l'été, ils dormaient parfois dans « cea casa », car il y avait un lit là-bas, aussi.

Une caractéristique des maisons paysannes de Marginea était donc le chauffage sélectif des chambres. Les maisons avaient une ou deux pièces avec poêle, le reste d'entre eux étant maintenu non chauffé. Les chambres avec poêle étaient utilisées pendant l'hiver, les autres seulement en été. « Cea casa » ou la bonne pièce dans laquelle la dot et d'autres objets représentatifs étaient gardés n'avait pas de poêle, étant rarement utilisée (seulement pour certaines fêtes ou événements familiaux tels que le mariage ou les funérailles des personnes décédés).




Fig. 11: La poêle d'une maison « roumaine »

La chambre appelée « cea casa » était utilisée pour recevoir les hôtes. Dans cette pièce la famille stockait les objets de valeur, l'argent et la dot, les beaux meubles, les vêtements pour des événements spéciaux et la meilleure poterie, ce qui explique pourquoi ses fenêtres ont été équipées de volets à l'intérieur¹⁹. Donc « cea casa » est la plus importante pièce de la maison et « même si elle est équipée des lits, personne ne dort là, seuls les invités importants de temps en temps »²⁰. « Cea casa » était également la chambre où les jeunes mariés dormaient dans les premiers jours après le mariage. Des événements comme le mariage ou le baptême se déroulaient en partie dans cette pièce. Elle servait également à l'organisation des rassemblements sociaux qui commençaient dans la soirée et duraient jusqu'à minuit. Les rassemblements se déroulaient « une nuit chez moi, la nuit suivante chez toi » et « nous [les filles] y allions avec les quenouilles et pendant que nous étions occupés avec la filature, les jeunes

¹⁹ Paul H. Stahl, *op.cit.*

²⁰ Paul H Stahl, Paul Petrescu, *Oameni și case de pe valea Moldovei* [Des hommes et des maisons sur la vallée de Moldavie], București, Editura Paideia, 2004, p. 87.

célibataires venaient nous racontaient des histoires et nous riions jusqu'à minuit »²¹. En outre, « cea casa », servait à organiser « des groupes pour le claquement du maïs. On apportait le maïs, l'éplucher et l'amener à l'intérieur. On le posait près du mur et les garçons et les filles enlevaient les feuilles, puis on le stockait dans le grenier ... à l'automne, nous mettions le maïs pour sécher sur le porche »²².



Fig. 12: « Cea casa »

La maison « allemande » de Marginea

La maison d'inspiration germanique était bâtie des poutres de bois, mais en utilisant d'autres techniques, qui permettaient une mise en œuvre rapide. Aussi, la quantité du bardage utilisé pour la couverture du toit était réduite, car la surface du toit n'était pas si grande comme celle de la maison roumaine à quatre pentes. La toiture de la maison germanique comportait seulement deux versants, couverts de bardage.

Ce type d'habitation comprend deux sous-types :

- a. les maisons bâties par les colons germains
- b. les maisons bâties par les roumaines, inspirées du model germain.

Le plan d'une maison allemande généralement inclus plus de chambres que celui d'une maison roumaine, mais leurs taille est plus petite : un porche, un hall, une cuisine multifonctionnelle (qui fonctionne aussi comme chambre à coucher et salon), une salle de stockage et une ou deux chambres (parmi eux la chambre appelée « cea casa »).

Les façades étaient enduites à l'extérieure ou elles étaient couvertes d'un bardage. Les dimensions générales de la maison « allemande » étaient de 6/4 m, 7/7 m ou 8/8 m.

²¹ Entretien avec une femme âgée, Marginea, 2010.

²² Entretien avec une femme âgée, Marginea, 2010.



Fig. 13: Maisons « allemandes » (enduite- gauche, et couverte d'un bardage - droite)

Les vraies maisons allemandes²³ – habitées par les colons et bâties avant la deuxième guerre mondiale - utilisaient aussi des poutres en bois, enduites à l'extérieure comme à l'intérieure. Les chambres - plus grandes, y compris leur hauteur – étaient chauffées par plusieurs poêles. Le schéma de ce type d'habitation présentait cinq pièces : une véranda (l'entrée), une cuisine et trois chambres. En plus, le bâtiment était prévu d'une cave localisée au-dessous de la cuisine ou de la véranda.

Jusqu'aux années '60, les villageois construisaient tant des maisons roumaines que des maisons allemandes, mais à partir des années '60 – '70 les habitants de la commune ont commencé à bâtir de plus en plus des maisons allemandes, étant facile à réaliser – car la maison roumaine est « deux fois plus compliquée »²⁴.

Les procédés de construction

Tant la maison roumaine que la maison allemande, utilisaient le bois d'essence autochtone, qu'on pouvait procurer facilement des forêts d'alentours. De ce point de vue, nous comprenons la perplexité d'un officier - Heinrich von Schneider Weismantel²⁵ -, qui notait dans sa brève description de la Moldavie²⁶, au début du XVIII siècle : « Et même si le paysan habite la forêt et, comme pour tous les autres gens du pays, le bois est à portée de sa main, de façon gratuite, il possède encore une pauvre cabane ». Le bois choisi pour les murs comme pour la

²³ Nous avons visité une vraie maison allemande dans le village voisin – Voievodeasa.

²⁴ Entretien T.R., charpentier, Marginea, 2009.

²⁵ *Călători străini despre țările române* [Voyageurs étrangers sur les Principautés Roumaines], vol. VIII, la a II-ème partie, (Volume soignée par Maria Magdalena Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru), București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1983, p. 350.

²⁶ Marginea appartient à la Bucovine, une région située au nord de la Moldavie.

charpente du toit était le sapin. L'exploitation des sapins se faisait en respectant quelques règles :

- Il fallait abattre les arbres pendant l'hiver
- On choisissait les sapins de l'intérieure de la forêt – qui n'étaient pas trop exposés au soleil, donc leurs troncs n'avaient pas des nœuds
- Au printemps, on travaillait le bois à l'aide de la hache
- Le bois était séché en le déposant à l'extérieure, pendant un an (minimum)

Cependant, certains hommes choisissaient de réutiliser les poutres des anciennes maisons ou même l'achat d'une maison entière. Celle-ci était démontée pour être ensuite assemblée sur son nouveau site. Bâtir une maison était donc une affaire d'homme, car la construction d'une maison pour soi-même était un signe de passage à l'âge adulte qui devait précéder l'acte du mariage. Toutefois, dans le milieu rural, les travaux de constructions d'une maison étaient accomplis aussi par des femmes et des enfants (de la famille ou des voisins), chacun ayant des tâches spécifiques²⁷.

Les annexes et les dépendances

Dans le passé, avant l'instauration du régime communiste, la différence entre les maisons roumaines appartenant aux paysans riches et celles des paysans pauvres était négligeable, les deux groupes différant par le nombre des bétails et la taille de l'étable. Les bâtiments annexes étaient placés parallèlement ou perpendiculairement à la maison, au long des limites de la cour, mais il y en a bien des exemples où les annexes ferment la cour sur deux côtés. Les dépendances des maisons roumaines et allemandes avaient une ossature en bois et des façades de planches. Le toit à deux versants était couvert de bardeaux.



Fig. 14: Les annexes d'une maison « allemande »

²⁷ Paul H. Stahl, *La maisnie (gospodăria) du paysan roumain*, Freiburg, Biblioteca Română, 1978.



Fig. 15: Les annexes d'une maison « roumaine »

Généralement, toutes les maisons construites avant l'année 1989 avaient des dépendances, telles que la grange, l'étable et un abri pour le stockage du bois à feux (le bûcher). Outre ces annexes, la plupart des maisons avaient une autre annexe appelé « *cuhnea* ». Cette construction est apparue une fois avec les maisons « allemands » et abritait une cuisine d'été ou une cuisine et une chambre, et, plus tard, dans certains cas, une salle de bain. Toutefois, selon la taille du ménage, le plan de la « *cuhnea* » était plus ou moins développé. En général, les foyers roumains ne disposaient pas d'une « *cuhnea* », mais d'une petite maison ou une cabane qui avait le rôle de cuisine d'été, dans laquelle « on prépare les repas pendant l'été, on mange, on lave les linges »²⁸. En effet, le charpentier T.R. nous rend claire le rôle des annexes : « Quand les maisons roumaines formaient une majorité, les annexes étaient rares. Quand on a commencé à bâtir les maisons allemandes, chacun y faisait une annexe »²⁹.

Les récits et les observations ont relevé ici un système d'héritage qui a survécu : la coutume qu'un des fils – d'habitude le cadet – reste avec ses parents sur la même parcelle : soit dans leurs maison (les parents déménageant dans la « *cuhnea* »), soit dans une nouvelle maison bâtie d'habitude sur la place de l'ancienne maison. Les autres fils – s'il y en a – vont habiter sur des parcelles voisines appartenant à la famille (à leurs parents, aux grands-parents ou à un oncle).

Les maisons roumaines avaient des enclos simples, en bois. Plus tard, les villageois bâtissent des portes cochères en bois. Celles-ci avaient un système de couverture en bardeaux pour les protéger des intempéries.

²⁸ Paul, H. Stahl, Paul Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

²⁹ Entretien T.R., Marginea, 2009.

L'ornementation

L'appel aux symboles au sein de l'architecture populaire roumaine est un fait répandu dans toutes les zones ethnographiques de la Roumanie. Les ornements a contenu symbolique étaient placés sur les poteaux du porche, les balustrades, les encadrements des portes et des fenêtres, sur les poutres et aux terminaisons des chevrons, sur les frontons des annexes, sur les faîtes des toits, sur les portes des annexes, sur les portails de la cour. Le vocabulaire des éléments ornementaux comporte des symboles d'origine chrétienne et païenne, représentés par des motifs géométriques, végétaux, zoomorphes, anthropomorphes ou cosmiques³⁰. Dans la commune de Marginea, le répertoire symbolique est réduit, les seuls motifs rencontrés étant la croix, le soleil, les éléments zoomorphes (le cheval, le cerf), les éléments végétaux (le sapin, les branches ou la vigne) et géométrique (le louange). Les ornements sont placés surtout sur les portes cochères et sur les toitures des maisons et des annexes



Fig. 16: L'ornementation des poteaux des portes cochères



Fig. 17: Des ornements traditionnels sur les portes cochères

³⁰ Andra Jacob, *Comunicarea prin simboluri în arhitectura populară românească* [La communication par symboles dans l'architecture vernaculaire roumaine], en « Sociologie românească », 2009, Vol. VII, no. 3, p. 121-134.



Fig. 18: Des ornements traditionnels sur les toitures des maisons

Rites de passage, fetes et coutumes

Tous les types d'habitation incorporaient des rites de construction (notamment la maison roumaine qui est le plus ancien type), comme le choix des lieux purs, la sanctification du terrain, de la maison et de la fontaine et l'emplacement des monnaies (pour assurer l'abondance du ménage) et de romarin à la base des maisons. En effet, des monnaies autrichiennes datant des années 1853 ont été découvertes à l'occasion de la démolition d'une ancienne maison.

Un autre usage était celui d'imposer aux charpentiers de parler sans blasphémer pendant les travaux de construction. De plus, les paysans de religion orthodoxe accrochaient à l'intérieure de la maison des icônes - sur les murs coté est.




Fig. 19: Icônes

La maison était le témoin de tous les événements majeurs de la vie de famille : naissance, baptême, mariage, décès. La maison est devenue le centre de la vie familiale, autour de laquelle diverses activités socio-économiques, traditions culturelles et religieuses tournaient ; elle était l'espace des

interactions humaines dans la famille et la communauté.

Avant 1989, les filles se mariaient à un âge compris entre 16 et 18 ans et les jeunes hommes après l'âge de 19 ans. A Marginea, la majorité des femmes s'installent dans le logement de leurs maris. On trouve cette coutume même dans la situation des mariages exogames. Donc, l'épouse devait joindre son mari dans son lieu d'origine et y résider : « [...] la fille doit venir là-bas, d'où est le garçon, ce n'est pas le garçon qui va à la fille, [mais] la fille au garçon, c'est normal comme ça car dans toute la Roumanie c'est comme ça »³¹. Dans le passé, la plupart des mariages étaient arrangés. Lors du mariage, la maison du marié était décorée de la dot de la mariée. Le transport de la dot se faisait avec un char de la maison des parents de la jeune fille à l'époux. C'était un événement important qui suscitait la curiosité de nombreux villageois. Ceux-ci sortaient à la porte pour voir combien de chariot apportaient la dot :

« Le marié venait avec d'autres jeunes hommes [...] avec les parrains et marraines, samedi soir [...] ils venaient avec quatre, cinq, six chars à la maison de la mariée, accompagnée par la musique [...] on met la table [...] dans 'cea casa' [...] et ceux qui viennent avec le marié seraient assis à la table [...] pour manger un peu de pain, selon la tradition, un verre d'alcool et de gaieté. Il y avait une personne qui souhaitait les meilleurs vœux à la mariée et à son mari [...] en disant: 'Nous avons peu, Dieu a plus [...] que vous avez en abondance' [...] et puis les femmes [qui sont venus avec le marié] [...] iraient dans cour en criant et mettant la dot à l'intérieur des chars [...] elle n'ont pas eu grand-chose à mettre en autant de chars, mais c'était la coutume d'avoir de nombreux chars [...] et le coffre à dot doit être lourd, les vêtements de la mariée étaient dedans et il a été fermé à clé [...], puis deux jeunes hommes venaient de le porter [...] et il était très lourd [...] fait qui signifiait que la belle-mère avait été une bonne maîtresse de maison »³².




Fig. 20: La mariée reçoit le pardon de ses parents avant la noce, à l'intérieur de la chambre appelée « cea casa »

³¹ Entretien C.B., Marginea, 2010.

³² Entretien avec P, Marginea, 2011.

Alors que la dot était transportée à la maison du marié, les femmes battaient avec une cuillère sur une casserole pour faire du bruit dans le village tout entier et pour annoncer l'événement. Seules les femmes envoyées par la mariée iraient le samedi soir à la maison du marié pour arranger la future maison du jeune couple, la mariée et sa mère s'en restant à la maison. À l'époque, la maison du marié n'avait pas beaucoup de meubles : « [...] un lit en bois [...] et une table »³³.

La réception de mariage avait lieu à la maison du marié, dans la pièce appelée « cea casa ». Les nappes étaient « belle et blanc », mais devenaient sales et colorées plus tard, quand les invités s'enivrent. On servait de la viande hachée dans des feuilles de chou, une sorte de pain sucré aux graines de pavot et une grande tarte avec remplissage de confiture. Il n'y avait pas d'autres gâteaux, juste « un poulet farci à la place de gâteau, un don fait par les parrains »³⁴.

Un autre événement important suivi par l'ensemble de la communauté était les funérailles d'un membre du ménage : « Une cérémonie religieuse a lieu pendant trois nuits consécutives et tout le monde vient quand il peut »³⁵. Le défunt est placé dans la pièce appelée « cea casa ». Toutes les maisons construites avant 1989 avaient une telle chambre : « Comme, disons-nous, si quelqu'un meurt, nous avons cette pièce, une 'cea casa' [...] »³⁶.

La maison reste l'espace où les principales traditions liées au Nouvel An sont gardées. À la veille du Nouvel An, les filles vont chanter d'une maison à l'autre et les garçons jouent sur un instrument folklorique traditionnel. Le lendemain matin, les enfants vont 'semer'. Ils vont à chaque maison et « s'ils voient la porte ouverte, ils entrent et leur souhaitent leur vœux »³⁷. La porte laissée ouverte est un signe de l'attente pour les chanteurs de Noël.

Conclusions

Nous avons énuméré auparavant les traits caractéristiques de l'habitation rurale de Marginea, communes à toutes les maisons « roumaines » et « allemandes », comme le rendement thermique et le chauffage sélectif des pièces. La présence de la chambre d'apparat appelée 'cea casa' et d'une pièce multifonctionnelle abritant le coin cuisine sont des autres caractéristiques communes aux anciennes maisons de Marginea. En outre, la maison paysanne de

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*.

³⁵ Entretien avec AP, Marginea, 2011.

³⁶ Entretien E.H, Marginea, 2009.

³⁷ Entretien V. Marginea, 2010.

Marginea est une objectification des modes de vie de ses utilisateurs, l'espace de la maison et les annexes étant étroitement liées aux activités économiques et sociales de la famille. C'est pourquoi, on peut affirmer que l'habitation rurale de Marginea est un produit social, défini par les rapports qui s'établissent entre l'espace domestique et les différentes entités sociales (la communauté, la famille, la parenté, le genre) et leur rapport avec les diverses sphères de la vie sociales (la sphère des valeurs, la sphère symbolique, économique etc.).

МОРАЛЬНО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ СОСТОЯНИЕ РУССКИХ
ВОЙСК РУМЫНСКОГО ФРОНТА В 1917 ГОДУ

THE MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF RUSSIAN TROOPS
ON THE ROMANIAN FRONT IN 1917

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Rezumat: Starea psihologico-morală a trupelor ruse de pe Frontul Român în 1917

În articol se examinează starea psihologico-morală a armatei ruse din ultima etapă a existenței ei, când în Rusia au început unele transformări fundamentale, generate de revoluțiile din Februarie și Octombrie. Se menționează că problema dată este slab cercetată atât în istoriografia occidentală, cât și în cea rusă. O atenție primordială este acordată trupelor Frontului Român care avea în componența sa atât trupe ruse, cât și române. În baza unor exemple concrete este oglindit procesul destrămării armatei ruse, impactul lui negativ asupra capacității de luptă a unităților ei. Sunt enumerate cauzele interne care au contribuit la defalcarea personalului militar și în primul rând – politica legislativă a autorităților, politică care nimicea fundamentul organizatoric al vieții militare.

Abstract: *The article deals with the morale of the Russian army in the last period of its existence, when Russia began a fundamental change caused by the February and October revolutions. It is noted that this issue is still little studied not only foreign, but also in the national historiography. The focus is on the front of the Romanian troops, which had in its composition as a Russian, and Romanian troops. On concrete examples, it is showing the process of decomposition of the Russian army, its influence on the reduction of the combat capability of units and formations. Lists the internal reasons, promote the decomposition of personnel, reveals one of them - the legislative policy of the authorities, and destroys organizational foundations of army life.*

Résumé : Moral des troupes russes avant roumaine en 1917

L'article traite le moral de l'armée russe dans la dernière période de son existence, quand la Russie a commencé un changement fondamental causé par les révolutions de février et d'octobre. Il est à noter que cette question est encore peu étudiée non seulement étrangère, mais aussi dans l'historiographie nationale. L'accent est mis sur le front des troupes roumaines, qui avaient dans sa composition comme un Russe, et les troupes roumaines. Sur des exemples concrets montrant le processus de décomposition de l'armée russe, son influence sur la réduction de la capacité de combat des unités et des formations. Énonce les raisons internes, favorisent la décomposition du personnel, révèle l'un d'eux - la politique législative des autorités, détruit les fondations de l'organisation de la vie militaire.

Keywords: *Soldiers, Russian army, revolution, morale, the decomposition, the combat capability*

Вступление

Научные исследования морально-психологического состояния русской армии в годы Первой мировой войны в СССР практически не проводились. Проблема рассматривалась с точки зрения интересов революционного движения и правящей партии, потому, что одним из принципов советской исторической науки являлся принцип партийности. Даже массовые девиации в поведении военнослужащих, широко распространившиеся в 1917 году и отражавшие духовно-нравственный кризис в войсках, считались положительным явлением. «...Дезертирство, саморанения, избиения и оскорбления офицерства, отказ идти в наступление во время войны...все это суть различные формы классовой борьбы»¹.

Подобные оценки являлись характерными, так как разложение армии, согласно господствовавшей в то время точке зрения, свидетельствовало о сознательности солдат, поддержке ими революционных идей, раскрывало «...величественную картину революционной борьбы российского пролетариата, большевистской партии за армию...»².

¹ И.Г. Кизрин, *Распад старой армии* [The collapse of the old army], Воронеж, издательство «Коммуна», 1931, с. 10.

² Е. П. Воронин, Л.М. Гаврилов, Т.Ф. Кузьмина (составители), *Октябрьская революция и армия. 25 октября 1917 г. – март 1918 г.: сборник документов* [The

Несмотря на то, что издавались сборники документов, описывавшие крайне негативную морально-психологическую атмосферу в войсках³, излагавшиеся в них факты и события трактовались историками в аналогичном ключе. Представляется, что подобный узкопартийный подход не способствовал объективности и всесторонности исследований.

Труды, выходящие в последние годы, отличаются большей степенью объективности⁴. В то же время, в данных работах морально-психологические проблемы не являются предметом исследования, а лишь затрагиваются в контексте военных действий.

Определенное внимание этой проблеме уделялось некоторыми русскими военачальниками, оказавшимися после гражданской войны в эмиграции⁵. В их работах предприняты попытки осмысления причин и последствий

October Revolution and the army. October 25, 1917 – March, 1918: collection of documents], Москва, издательство «Наука», 1973, с. 5.

³ *Разложение армии в 1917 году: сборник документов* [The decomposition of the army in 1917: collection of documents], под ред. М.Н. Покровского, Москва – Ленинград, Государственное издательство, 1925; *Революционное движение в русской армии. 27 февраля – 24 октября 1917 года: сборник документов* [The revolutionary movement in the Russian army. February 27 – 24 October 1917: collection of documents], под ред. Л.С. Гапоненко, Москва, издательство «Наука», 1968; *Революционное движение в армии и на флоте в годы Первой мировой войны. 1914 – февраль 1917 г.: сборник документов* [The revolutionary movement in the army and navy during the First World War. 1914 – February 1917.: collection of documents], под ред. А. Л. Сидорова, Москва, издательство «Наука», 1966 и др.

⁴ Е.С. Сенявская, *Психология войны в XX веке. Исторический опыт России* [The psychology of war in the twentieth century. The historical experience of Russia], Москва, издательство «Российская политическая энциклопедия», 1999; С.Н. Базанов, *Великая война: как погибала Русская армия* [The Great War: as a dying Russian army], Москва, издательство «Вече», 2014; М.В. Оськин, *Неизвестные трагедии Первой мировой. Пленные. Дезертиры. Беженцы* [Unknown tragedy of the First World War. The POWs. Deserters. Refugees], Москва, издательство «Вече», 2014; Е.С. Сенявская, *Противники России в войнах XX века. Эволюция «образа врага» в сознании армии и общества* [Opponents of Russia in the wars of the twentieth century. Evolution of the "enemy image" in the minds of the army and society], Москва, издательство «РОССПЭН», 2006; И.Н. Гребенкин, *Русский офицер в годы мировой войны и революции. 1914-1918 гг.* [Russian officer during World War I and the Revolution. Of 1914-1918], Рязань, издательство Рязанского государственного университета, 2010 и др.

⁵ Н.Н. Головин, *Наука о войне. О социологическом изучении войны* [The science of war.

разложения русской армии, происшедшего в годы мировой войны.

В западной историографии история русской армии периода 1914 – 1918 гг. долгое время почти не исследовалась. Что касается морально-психологического фактора, то о нем лишь упоминалось в мемуарах германских военачальников и некоторых других участников боевых действий⁶. В XXI столетии положение стало изменяться, в европейских странах и США вышел ряд трудов, посвященных действиям русской армии в Первой мировой войне⁷. В то же время, поднимаемая в данной статье проблема рассматривается в них лишь эпизодически. Между тем, еще Наполеон подчеркивал значение морального фактора: «Во всяком военном предприятии успех на три четверти зависит от данных морального порядка и только на одну четверть от материальных сил»⁸.

В предлагаемой вниманию читателей статье предпринимается попытка рассмотреть морально-психологическое состояние русских войск

On a sociological study of the war], Париж, издательство газеты «Сигнал», 1938; Н.Н. Головин, *Военные усилия России в мировой войне* [Russian military forces in World War], Париж, Товарищество объединённых издателей, 1939; Ю.Н. Данилов, *Россия в мировой войне. 1914 – 1915 гг.* [Russia in World War. 1914 – 1915 years], Берлин, книгоиздательство «Слово», 1924; А.И. Деникин, *Очерки русской смуты* [Essays on Russian Troubles], Париж, издательство Поволоцкого, 1921, том 1 и др.

⁶ Э. Людендорф, *Мои воспоминания о войне 1914 – 1918 гг.* [My memories of the war 1914 - 1918 years], перевод с немецкого А.А. Свечина, Москва, издательство «Вече», 2014; П. фон Гинденбург, *Из моей жизни* [From My Life], перевод с немецкого, Москва, издательство «Принципум», 2013; Э. фон Фалькенгайн, *Верховное командование 1914-1916 в его важнейших решениях* [The High Command in 1914 –1916 the most important decisions], перевод с немецкого А.Е. Снесарева, Москва, Высший военный редакционный совет, 1923; В. Бекман, *Немцы о Русской армии* [The Germans on the Russian army], перевод с немецкого В.В. Чернавина, Прага, 1939 и др.

⁷ Gatrell P., *Russia's First World War: A Social and Economic History*, Edinburgh Gate, Harlow, 2005; Rielage D.C., *Russian Supply Efforts in America During the First World War*, London, 2002; Holquist P., *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914 – 1921*, Cambridge (MA), 2002; Fuller W.C., Jr. *The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of the Imperial Russia*, Ithaca, London, 2006; Stoff L.S. *They Fought for the Motherland: Russia's Women's Soldiers in World War I and the Revolution*, Lawrence, 2006; Sanborn J.A., *Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905 – 1925*, DeKalb, 2003; McMeekin S., *The Russian Origins of the First World War*, Cambridge (MA), 2011 и др.

⁸ *Военная энциклопедия* [Military Encyclopedia], Санкт-Петербург, 1912, Т. 6, С. 479.

в 1917 году, в течение которого в жизни армии произошли радикальные перемены. Внимание акцентируется на войсках Румынского фронта, однако проблема рассматривается в контексте положения дел во всей действующей армии.

Образование Румынского фронта

17 августа 1916 г. был заключен договор о союзе между Россией, Францией, Великобританией, Италией и Румынией. Кроме того, была подписана русско-румынская военная конвенция, где указывалось, что Румыния обязуется мобилизовать свои морские и сухопутные силы и не позже 28 августа начать наступательные действия против Австро-Венгрии. В свою очередь, русская армия должна была «действовать самым энергичным образом» на австрийском фронте, чтобы обеспечить действия Румынии. В числе прочего, планировались наступательные действия русских войск в Буковине, определялись задачи русскому флоту, намечались меры по снабжению румынских войск. В период проведения мобилизации румынской армии Россия обязывалась направить «...в Добруджу две пехотные дивизии и одну кавалерийскую для совместных действий с румынской армией против болгарской армии»⁹.

По мобилизационному расписанию Румыния выставляла 25 дивизий, общей численностью около 400 000 человек. Во взаимодействии с русскими войсками и союзными войсками Салоникского фронта румынская армия должна была нанести удар по Болгарии и вывести ее из войны. Выступление Румынии на стороне Антанты представляло серьезную опасность для стран германского блока, так как открывалась возможность совместных действий русско-румынских войск к югу от Дуная и английских, французских, сербских и итальянских войск со стороны Салоник по сходящимся направлениям. Для наступления против Румынии Берлину пришлось снимать войска с других фронтов, в том числе, с Западноевропейского театра войны, где шли напряженные бои¹⁰.

⁹ Русско-румынская военная конвенция 1916 г. [Russian-Romanian military convention 1916], in Сборник секретных документов из архива бывшего Министерства иностранных дел [The collection of secret documents from the archives of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ответственный редактор Н. Маркин, Петроград, типография комиссариата по иностранным делам, декабрь 1917 г., № 3, с. 81–82.

¹⁰ А. А. Строков, *Вооруженные силы и военное искусство в Первой мировой войне* [The

Большая часть румынских войск находилась на границе с Трансильванией, операцию, по овладению которой они начали 28 августа. Поддержку румынам оказывала 9-я армия русского Юго-Западного фронта. Первоначально русско-румынским войскам удалось добиться некоторых успехов, но вскоре германское командование сосредоточило значительные силы и нанесло удары сначала в Добрудже, а затем в Трансильвании. Германские и австро-венгерские войска вторглись в Валахию, захватили Бухарест и оттеснили румынскую армию на восток, нанеся ей значительные потери¹¹.

Следует отметить: несмотря на достигнутые успехи, противнику не удалось вывести Румынию из войны. Более того, даже находясь в сложном положении, румынские войска сумели внести свой вклад в коалиционные действия Антанты. Как отмечал один из высших германских военачальников генерал Э. Людендорф, «мы разбили румынскую армию, но нам не удалось уничтожить ее. Мы достигли всего, к чему представлялась малейшая возможность, но были все-таки вынуждены оставить в Добрудже и в Валахии силы, которыми, до вступления в войну Румынии, мы могли располагать на восточном и западном фронтах, а также в Македонии»¹².

10 октября представители Румынии обратились в русскую Ставку с просьбой о помощи. Для оказания поддержки союзнице русское командование перебросило значительные силы – 35 пехотных и 11 кавалерийских дивизий. К концу 1916 – началу 1917 года продвижение сил противника удалось остановить на линии Браила – Фокшаны – Окна – Дорна-Ватра. Тогда же был образован новый фронт – Румынский, проходивший от Буковины по Молдавским Карпатам, рекам Серет и Дунай до Черного моря. Общая его протяженность достигала почти 500 километров. Главнокомандующим фронтом номинально являлся король Румынии Фердинанд I, оперативное управление войсками осуществлял помощник главнокомандующего русский генерал от кавалерии В.В. Сахаров, которого в апреле 1917 года сменил генерал от инфантерии Д. Г. Щербачев. В состав фронта первоначально входили две русские и одна

armed forces and the art of war in World War I], Москва, Воениздат, 1974, с. 414.

¹¹ Н. А. Таленский, *Первая мировая война 1914 – 1918 гг.* [The First World War 1914 – 1918], Москва, государственное издательство политической литературы, 1944, С. 66.

¹² Э. Людендорф, *указ. соч.*, с. 268.

румынская армия, к лету 1917 года – три русские и две румынские армии. В августе фронту была передана еще одна русская армия, увеличилось количество резервных корпусов¹³.

Морально-психологическая обстановка в войсках Румынского фронта в 1917 году

После отступления русско-румынских войск в 1916 году верховное командование русской армии пришло к выводу, что в сложившейся ситуации Румынский фронт не может решить стратегическую задачу – разгромить Болгарию. Поэтому в соответствии с планом операций на 1917 год, разработанном русской Ставкой, перед фронтом ставилась частная задача – захватить Добруджу¹⁴. Наступательные действия войск Румынского фронта (а также Западного и Северного фронтов) должны были приковать к себе максимальное количество сил противника, чтобы облегчить действия Юго-Западного фронта, наносившего главный удар.

Однако планы Ставки были нарушены Февральской революцией 1917 года. Начало наступления, первоначально планировавшееся на май, неоднократно переносилось, ввиду стремительного разложения русской армии. О причинах этого явления будет сказано далее, здесь же отметим некоторые проявления морально-психологической деградации войск.

Уже в первые недели после революции «...солдаты занялись дискуссиями, стали митинговать, беспрерывно обсуждая, когда и как смогут вернуться домой и, отказываясь выполнять приказы»¹⁵. Многократно увеличилось количество дезертиров, обычным явлением стал отказ частей и соединений выполнять боевые задачи, повсеместное распространение получил самовольный уход войск с занимаемых позиций. Случаи неповиновения солдат своим командирам приобрели массовый характер, в отношении офицеров был развязан настоящий террор, вплоть до убийств. Значительная часть нижних чинов превыше всего поставила сохранение собственной жизни и стремилась избежать

¹³ К. А. Залесский, *Первая мировая война. Энциклопедия* [World War I. Encyclopaedia], Москва, издательство «ФИВ», 2014, часть 2, С. 604 – 605.

¹⁴ Российский государственный военно-исторический архив (*infra* РГВИА) [Russian State Military History Archive], фонд 2003, оп.1, д. 63, л. 284.

¹⁵ А.Ф. Керенский, *Россия на историческом повороте. Мемуары* [Russia at the historic turn. Memoirs], Москва, издательство «Республика», 1993, с. 180.

участия в боевых действиях. Именно поэтому огромной поддержкой пользовались лозунги о заключении мира, в том числе, провокационно выдвигавшиеся германской стороной.

Один из русских генералов характеризовал ситуацию следующим образом: «Фронт представлял зрелище небывалое. Загипнотизированный немецко-большевистской речью, он забыл все: и честь, и долг, и Родину, и горы трупов своих братьев, погибших бесцельно и бесполезно. Беспощадная рука вытравила в душе русских солдат все моральные побуждения, заменяя единственным, доминирующим над всем, животным чувством – желанием сохранить свою жизнь»¹⁶. Аналогичного мнения придерживался офицер Генерального штаба, в обязанности которого входили поездки в полки, отказывавшиеся выполнять боевые приказы. В своем докладе командованию он отмечал: «Глубокое моральное разложение... объясняется психологией малосознательных масс. Полученная свобода, обещанная земля... сделали массы солдат очень чуткими к сохранению своей жизни и, как говорят сами солдаты, выдвинули так называемый «шкурный вопрос»¹⁷.

Таким же образом рассуждал депутат Государственной Думы Н. А. Маньков, который в телеграмме на имя председателя Думы М. В. Родзянко сообщил, что в основе неподчинения нижних чинов приказам командования лежит «...животный страх смерти», который с падением дисциплины стал играть «первенствующую роль» в поведении личного состава¹⁸.

Получившая широкое распространение революционная фразеология не подкреплялась делами и никак не влияла на улучшение морально-психологического состояния войск. Так, в ходе поездки в действующую армию военного министра А. И. Гучкова солдаты 28-й и 29-й пехотных дивизий клялись идти в бой за революцию. Когда он уехал, войска «...вынесли резолюцию не наступать». На совещании в Ставке, где обсуждалось положение в армии, генерал А. И. Деникин сообщил о факте, когда он «...присутствовал при трогательной картине передачи Потийскому пехотному полку красного знамени, когда солдаты на нем клялись идти на смерть; этот же самый Потийский полк за час до

¹⁶ А.И. Деникин, *указ. соч.*, том 1, выпуск 2, с. 76.

¹⁷ РГВИА, фонд 2048, оп. 1, д. 1121, л. 154.

¹⁸ Гончаров В.Л. (автор – составитель), 1917. *Разложение армии* [1917. The decomposition of the army], Москва, издательство «Вече», 2010, с. 153.

наступления ушел назад за 15 верст»¹⁹.

Огромные размеры приобрело братание, до Февральской революции носившее ограниченный характер. При этом, как отмечают иностранные и отечественные исследователи, в 1917 году его организатором чаще всего являлось австро-германское командование. В ходе братаний специально подготовленные военнослужащие противника, в основном, офицеры, вели пораженческую агитацию, передавали пропагандистскую литературу и занимались сбором разведывательной информации. Следует подчеркнуть, однако, что указанные явления были характерны, главным образом, для пехотных частей, составлявших около 80% численности армии. В артиллерии, инженерных войсках и кавалерии морально-психологическая атмосфера была более здоровой.

Процесс разложения охватил все фронты, но войска Румынского фронта были затронуты им в меньшей степени. По мнению генерала Н.Н. Головина, бывшего в 1917 году начальником штаба Румынского фронта, это вызывалось его отдаленностью от революционных центров, откуда приходила «...каждая новая волна разложения армии». Быстрее всего разложение солдатских масс происходило на Северном фронте, в тылу которого находился главный очаг революции – Петроград, затем – на Западном фронте, в тылу которого находилась Москва. На Юго-Западный фронт «волны разложения» приходили позже, в то время как «...в наилучшем моральном состоянии находились... армии Румынского фронта; пребывание на территории чужого государства значительно задерживало проникновение заразы»²⁰. Аналогичное мнение высказывал начальник германского генштаба П. фон Гинденбург, отмечавший, что нежелание русских войск воевать, столь сильно сказывавшееся на северном фланге Русского фронта, к югу ослабевало, и в Румынии было почти незаметно²¹.

Следует отметить справедливость оценок этих военачальников: в российских архивах документов о разложении войск Румынского фронта многократно меньше, чем о положении дел на других фронтах.

Однако и на Румынском фронте сложилась обстановка, ранее немыслимая. Солдаты перестали подчиняться командирам, в результате

¹⁹ *Протокол совещания, бывшего 16 июля 1917 года в Ставке* [Protocol of conference of July, 16, 1917 is in Rate], in *Красная летопись* [Red chronicle], 1923, №6, с. 21.

²⁰ Н.Н. Головин, *Военные усилия России в мировой войне* [Russian military forces in World War], Т. 2, с. 181–182.

²¹ П. фон Гинденбург, *указ. соч.*, с. 215.

чего система управления войсками оказалась разрушенной. Во многих частях и соединениях нижние чины открыто отказывались готовиться к наступательным действиям. Например, в апреле части 2-го армейского корпуса 9-й армии отказались вести работы по сооружению наступательных плацдармов. Аналогичный случай произошел в 14-й стрелковой дивизии²².

Накануне запланированного наступления отказались занимать боевые позиции 79-я пехотная дивизия, 32-я пехотная дивизия, начались волнения в 660-м пехотном Черновицком полку 165-й пехотной дивизии, 33-м пехотном Елецком полку 9-й пехотной дивизии, 161-м пехотном Александропольском полку 16-го армейского корпуса²³.

В тот же период времени полки одной из кавалерийских дивизий 6-й армии отказались менять на позициях другую дивизию, и сделали это лишь после того, как своя артиллерия открыла предупредительный огонь по району их расположения²⁴.

Настроение солдатских масс отчетливо выражено в письме солдата 29-го армейского корпуса, входившего в состав Румынского фронта. В послании в Петроградский совет он так описывал настроение личного состава: «...солдаты... корпуса не согласны, ни под каким предлогом делать наступление...»²⁵.

В отношении офицеров начался террор. Так, в начале апреля командир 26-го армейского корпуса генерал – лейтенант Е.К. Миллер, проводивший смотр ротам, прибывшим для пополнения, приказал снять красные банты, как не соответствующие форме одежды. Это вызвало бунт, толпа арестовала генерала и отвела на гауптвахту²⁶. В этой связи помощник главнокомандующего Румынским фронтом генерал от кавалерии В. В. Сахаров доложил в Ставку, что данный факт в очередной раз подчеркнул отсутствие какой-либо власти у командного состава: офицеров оскорбляют, избивают, смещают с должностей и арестовывают.

²² Гончаров В.Л., указ. соч., с. 124, 141.

²³ *Антивоенные выступления на русском фронте в 1917 году глазами современников* [Antiwar action on the Russian front in 1917, through the eyes of contemporaries], автор-составитель С.Н. Базанов, Москва, Издательский центр Института российской истории РАН, 2010, с. 160.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 165 – 167.

²⁵ Солдатские письма 1917 года [Soldiers' letters 1917], подготовлены к печати О. Н. Чаадаевой, Москва-Ленинград, Госиздат, 1927, с. 77.

²⁶ РГВИА, фонд 2085, оп. 1, д. 141, л. 1.

Далее он отметил, что непринятие мер по восстановлению дисциплины ведет к «...полному разрушению военной силы, которая будет опасна уже не для врага, а для Родины». Кроме того, генерал подчеркнул, что румыны относятся к происходящему в русских войсках крайне отрицательно, и выражают опасения «... в отношении возможности продолжения союзных с нами действий»²⁷.

Доклад генерала Сахарова подтверждают документы военной цензуры. В сводках военно-цензурного отделения Румынского фронта, перлюстрировавшего сотни тысяч писем, отмечалось резкое увеличение числа «писем преступного характера», призывавших к неповиновению и расправе над офицерами²⁸. В сводке за март сделан вывод: «Солдаты видят в офицерах приверженцев старого строя, из-за этого происходят эксцессы, вплоть до арестов и оскорблений»²⁹. Характерным является случай, описанный в солдатском письме: «...ротного нашего чуть не убили. Дело вышло из-за пустяков. Ротный – Георгиевский кавалер, воюет с начала войны, был несколько раз ранен». В письмах офицеров звучит отчаяние: «Боже, что делается с солдатами. Как больно на них смотреть. Из них большая половина ровно ничего не понимает, и ими другие ворочают, как хотят. ... Я считаю, что войска нет, а лишь вооруженная толпа». В письме другого офицера говорилось: «В батальоне кавардак ужасный... только бы не избили или не убили случайно»³⁰.

Участились случаи грабежей местного населения. Например, подобное позорное деяние совершили солдаты частей 163-й пехотной дивизии (6-я армия) Румынского фронта. Более того, три из четырех полков дивизии отказались подчиняться приказу о ее расформировании, в одной из частей был арестован командир полка и другие офицеры. Дивизию удалось расформировать лишь под угрозой использования силы³¹.

Морально-психологическое состояние войск Румынского фронта к началу запланированного на 1917 год наступления начальник штаба Верховного Главнокомандующего характеризовал следующим образом:

²⁷ Гончаров В.Л., *указ. соч.*, с. 115.

²⁸ РГВИА, фонд 2085, оп. 1, д. 139, л. 41.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, л. 23.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 33, 35, 41, 42.

³¹ Гончаров В.Л., *указ. соч.*, с.155, 156.

«На Румынском (фронте. – В.С.) особого улучшения не наблюдается, пехота наступать не желает...»³².

Подобная ситуация была на всех фронтах, поэтому начало наступления неоднократно переносилось. В конечном итоге, наносивший главный удар Юго-Западный фронт перешел в наступление 16 июня, войска Румынского фронта – 9 июля. В первые дни наступления войска Юго-Западного фронта добились некоторых успехов, прорвали позиции противника и захватили город-крепость Галич. Однако далее ход событий изменился, ввиду усиливавшегося сопротивления противника и отказов солдат выполнять приказы командования. Многие части самовольно покидали передовую и уходили в тыл. Например, когда противник начал атаку на участке южнее Броды, 607-й пехотный Млыновский полк ушел с позиции, вследствие чего отошли и соседи. Противник стал развивать успех, при этом русские войска, получив боевой приказ о поддержке атакованных частей, собирались на митинги и обсуждали, подлежит ли он выполнению. Некоторые полки отказывались выполнять приказ и уходили с позиций без всякого давления противника³³.

«Дивизии 11-й армии и частью 7-й армии бежали, под давлением в пять раз слабейшего противника..., сдаваясь в плен ротами и полками..., зарегистрированы случаи самосуда над офицерами и самоубийств офицеров, дошедших до полного отчаяния..., сообщены возмутительные факты, когда дивизия отступала перед двумя ротами»³⁴.

В Галиции в ходе летних боев 1917 года погибло до 80 % офицеров, в то время как солдаты почти все ушли в тыл. Участвовавший в тех сражениях генерал Л.Г. Корнилов так описывал ситуацию: «Армия обезумевших темных людей..., потерявших чувство человеческого достоинства, бежит. На полях, которые нельзя даже назвать полями сражения, царит сплошной ужас, позор и срам, которых русская армия еще не знала, с самого начала своего существования»³⁵.

³² *Ibid.*, с. 214.

³³ *Удар в спину* [Backstab], in Разведчик [The Scout], 1917, № 1391 – 1392, с. 411.

³⁴ *Революционное движение в русской армии. 27 февраля – 24 октября 1917 года: сборник документов* [The revolutionary movement in the Russian army. February 27 – 24 October 1917: collection of documents], с. 213.

³⁵ Цитируется по: П.Д. Бурский, *Революция и офицеры* [Revolution and officers], Москва, издательство преподавателей Московского университета, 1917, с. 13.

На Румынском фронте перед наступающими русско-румынскими войсками стояла задача разбить противника, оборонявшего населенный пункт Мэрэшти и открыть дорогу на Фокшаны. Сломив упорное сопротивление немцев, союзные войска овладели Мэрэшти, в результате чего создались благоприятные условия для преследования германских войск. Однако наступление Румынского фронта происходило в то время, когда войска Юго-Западного фронта стремительно катились назад: это создавало реальную угрозу оголения правого фланга русско-румынских войск. Дальнейшее наступление могло привести к негативным последствиям. Кроме того, в русских войсках Румынского фронта начались антивоенные выступления, что побудило командование заменить многие русские части румынскими войсками³⁶.

Учитывая сложившееся положение, 12 июля военный и морской министр А.Ф. Керенский от имени Временного правительства приостановил наступление на всех фронтах. В сложившейся ситуации румынские войска одни продолжили выполнение операции³⁷.

Воспользовавшись ситуацией, противник начал контрнаступление. Австро-германские войска удалось остановить в битве при Мэрэшешти и реке Ойтуз, где 24-29 июля происходили тяжелые бои. Румынские части оказали упорное сопротивление противнику, что не позволило вывести Румынию из войны. Что касается русских войск, то они в этих боях проявляли пассивность, нередко бежали перед противником. Командир одного из русских полков, участвовавших в тех боях, писал: «...наступали немцы в незначительных, меньших силах... Но деморализованная, развращенная, трусливая масса почти не поддавалась управлению и при малейшей возможности покидала окопы, даже не видя противника... Много раненых офицеров и солдат было брошено... на позиции»³⁸.

После подавления выступления генерала Л.Г. Корнилова разложение армии еще более ускорилося. С 1 по 30 сентября 1917 г. в действующей армии было зарегистрировано 160 случаев самовольного оставления позиций и неисполнения частями боевых и не боевых приказов³⁹, по

³⁶ А.П. Жилин, *Последнее наступление (июнь 1917 года)* [The last offensive (June 1917)], Москва, издательство «Наука», 1983, с. 81 – 82.

³⁷ К.А. Залесский, *указ. соч.*, с. 604.

³⁸ *Антивоенные выступления на русском фронте в 1917 году глазами современников* [Antiwar action on the Russian front in 1917, through the eyes of contemporaries], автор-составитель С.Н. Базанов, с. 196.

³⁹ Кизрин И.Г., *указ. соч.*, с. 92-93.

подозрениям в сочувствии Л.Г. Корнилову убиты десятки офицеров. На Румынском фронте продолжались дезертирство, братания с противником, как это было, например, в 117-й пехотной дивизии, неповиновение командирам (в частях 4-й армии), отказы от работ по укреплению позиций (32-я пехотная и 165-я пехотная дивизии)⁴⁰. Иногда разложение войск проявлялось в крайних формах. Так, в 26-м стрелковом полку 7-й стрелковой дивизии Румынского фронта общее собрание полка приняло решение в окопы не идти и «работ по обороне» не производить. Начальник дивизии генерал-майор В.И. Зиборов выехал в этот полк для расследования, и был убит толпой⁴¹.

После Октябрьской революции 1917 года процессы разложения войск получили дополнительный импульс. Это вызывалось тем, что новая власть стремилась фактически и юридически ликвидировать русскую армию, как главного столпа, на котором веками зиждилась традиционная русская государственность. В этой связи В.И. Ленин писал: «Первой заповедью всякой победоносной революции – Маркс и Энгельс многократно подчеркивали это – было: разбить старую армию, распустить ее, заменить ее новой»⁴².

Уже в ноябре 1917 г. официально начался процесс демобилизации армии, завершившийся к концу марта – началу апреля 1918 года. Кроме того, в нарушение международных соглашений, заключенных с союзниками по Антанте, большевистское руководство приступило к переговорам о заключении перемирия, а затем и мира со странами германского блока. 9 ноября, еще до начала официальных переговоров Совет Народных Комиссаров обратился непосредственно к войскам с предложением вступать в переговоры с противником. В Берлине стремились к выводу России из войны путем заключения сепаратного мира, поэтому к концу ноября – началу декабря локальные перемирия были заключены на всем Восточноевропейском театре войны, в том числе, на Румынском фронте. В декабре 1917 г. на переговорах в Бресте

⁴⁰ *Антивоенные выступления на русском фронте в 1917 году глазами современников* [Antiwar action on the Russian front in 1917, through the eyes of contemporaries], автор-составитель С.Н. Базанов, с. 242 – 243, 246, 258 – 259.

⁴¹ РГВИА, фонд 2085, оп. 1, д. 141, л. 58, 59.

⁴² В.И. Ленин, *Пролетарская революция и ренегат Каутский* [The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky], in *Полное собрание сочинений: в 55 томах* [Complete Works: in 55 volumes], издание 5-е, т. 37, с. 295.

было заключено общее перемирие, а в марте 1918 года – мир со странами Четверного союза, на чрезвычайно тяжелых и невыгодных для России условиях.

Весь этот период морально-психологическое состояние русской армии продолжало оставаться на чрезвычайно низком уровне. В войсках Румынского фронта по-прежнему продолжалось дезертирство, отказы от исполнения боевых приказов, смены частей на позициях, выхода на работы и занятия. Вновь значительные размеры приняло братание, не прекращались случаи ареста офицеров, смещения их с должностей, избиений и даже убийств. В отношении прихода к власти большевиков настроение в частях и соединениях фронта было различным: одни поддерживали Октябрьскую революцию, другие выступали в поддержку Временного правительства⁴³.

В конечном итоге, еще не демобилизованные остатки армии оказались полностью небоеспособными. В ходе германского наступления в феврале 1918 года, вызванного отказом советской делегации подписывать мирный договор на невыгодных условиях, противостоять противнику было некому. Отдельные части старой армии, еще остававшиеся на позициях, не представляли собой реальной боевой силы: управление войсками отсутствовало, разложение личного состава дошло до крайней степени. Что касается формировавшейся Красной Армии, то ее численность была совершенно недостаточна: к весне 1918 года в ней состояло лишь около 70 000 добровольцев. Это составляло примерно 1% личного состава, находившегося в действующей армии осенью 1917 года⁴⁴.

В.И. Ленин так характеризовал состояние армии в период немецкого наступления в феврале 1918 года: «...мучительно-позорные сообщения об отказе полков сохранять позиции, об отказе защищать даже нарвскую линию, о неисполнении приказа уничтожать все и вся при отступлении; не говорим уже о бегстве, хаосе, безрукости, беспомощности, разгильдяйстве»⁴⁵.

⁴³ *Сводка сведений о настроении в частях Румынского фронта. 8 ноября* (Summary information about Configured in Part Romanian front. November 8), in *Октябрьская революция и армия. 25 октября 1917 г. – март 1918 г.: сборник документов* [The October Revolution and the army. October 25, 1917 – March, 1918: collection of documents], с. 71 – 79.

⁴⁴ С.Н. Базанов, *Великая война: как погибала Русская армия* [The Great War: as a dying Russian army], с. 334.

⁴⁵ В.И. Ленин, *Тяжелый, но необходимый урок* [Hard, but necessary lesson], in Полное

К вопросу о факторах, влиявших на снижение морально-психологического потенциала русской армии в 1917 году

Стремительное разложение войск, еще в первые годы мировой войны отличавшихся высоким боевым духом и стойкостью в бою, было не случайным. Причинами тому явились негативные процессы в политической, экономической, идеологической и духовно-нравственной сферах жизни общества и армии. Первая мировая война послужила своего рода катализатором этих процессов, резко усилила их деструктивное влияние. Кроме того, свою роль сыграли некоторые внешние факторы, например, массированная германская пропаганда, направленная на принуждение России к сепаратному миру.

Главную роль в беспрецедентном разложении армии сыграли внутренние причины. Рамки статьи не позволяют рассмотреть каждую из них, поэтому автор остановится лишь на одной, самым непосредственным образом, влиявшей на моральное состояние армии – действиях новых властей в вопросе организации внутриармейской жизни.

Практически сразу после Февральской революции от имени Петроградского Совета рабочих и солдатских депутатов был опубликован приказ № 1 от 2 марта 1917 года. Небольшой по объему документ содержал положения, разрушавшие важнейший принцип строительства вооруженных сил – единоначалие. Так, в подразделениях и частях требовалось «...выбрать комитеты из выборных представителей от нижних чинов»; вскоре комитеты были наделены управленческими функциями. Оружие должно было находиться в их распоряжении, выдача его офицерам запрещалась. Предусматривалась возможность политических выступлений воинских частей, в ходе которых они обязывались подчиняться Петроградскому Совету. Обо всех конфликтах между офицерами и солдатами последние должны были сообщать в ротные комитеты⁴⁶.

Приказ №1 был отпечатан тиражом в 9 миллионов экземпляров, и разослан как в войска Петроградского гарнизона, так и в действующую

собрание сочинений: в 55 томах [Complete Works: in 55 volumes], издание 5-е, т. 35, с. 394.

⁴⁶ Эйдеман Р., Меликов В., *Армия в 1917 году* [Army in 1917], Москва – Ленинград, Государственное издательство, 1927, с. 39 – 40.

армию⁴⁷. Последовавшее через несколько дней заявление властей о действии приказа только в границах Петроградского военного округа последствий не имело и не повлияло на ход событий, вызванных его появлением.

6 марта 1917 г. Временное правительство объявило общую политическую амнистию, которая вскоре была распространена на деяния, предусмотренные военными и военно-морскими уголовными законами⁴⁸. Вскоре вступило в силу постановление о повсеместной отмене смертной казни, в том числе за убийство командира, измену, побег к неприятелю, уход с поля боя и другие воинские преступления. Несмотря на то, что летом 1917 года за наиболее тяжелые воинские преступления смертная казнь была восстановлена, в действительности она практически не применялась: смертные приговоры вызывали массовые беспорядки в частях, отчего командование и военные суды опасались брать на себя ответственность.

В конце марта специальным приказом было объявлено «Временное положение об организации чинов действующей армии и флота». Во многом оно дублировало приказ №1, но, кроме того, здесь излагалась организация всей системы комитетов в вооруженных силах. Ротные комитеты, как наиболее многочисленные должны были являться «посредниками между ротным командиром и солдатами во всех вопросах внутреннего быта роты...». Боевые вопросы обсуждению не подлежали, но в «...случае злоупотреблений ...комитеты должны немедленно и совершенно секретно извещать полковой комитет...»⁴⁹. Что понимать под злоупотреблениями, в приказе не указывалось. Как показали дальнейшие события, это предоставило возможность относить к ним любые намерения и действия командования, в том числе, меры по сохранению боеспособности войск и выполнению боевых задач.

⁴⁷ Верховский А.И., *На трудном перевале* [On a difficult pass], Москва, Воениздат, 1959, с. 207.

⁴⁸ Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего от 15 мая № 284 [Supreme Commander of the Order of May 15, number 284], in Приказы Верховного Главнокомандующего за 1917 год [The orders of the Supreme Commander for 1917], библиотека Национального исторического архива Беларуси (*infra* НИАБ) [Library of the National Historical Archives of Belarus], инвентарный № 14994, нумерация страниц отсутствует.

⁴⁹ Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего от 30 марта № 51 [Supreme Commander of the Order of March 30, number 51], in *ibid.*, нумерация страниц отсутствует.

В апреле военное ведомство издало приказ, указывавший, что комитеты имели право наблюдать за поддержанием дисциплины и порядка в своих частях, контролировать хозяйственную деятельность, принимать меры «против злоупотреблений и превышения власти со стороны должностных лиц своей части»⁵⁰.

Число комитетов только в действующей армии достигло почти 50 000⁵¹, что позволило им оказывать решающее влияние на жизнь и деятельность войск. Роль командного состава фактически оказалась сведенной к минимуму. Так, на основе анализа солдатских и офицерских писем, проведенного военной цензурой, был сделан вывод: «Офицеры в громадном большинстве растерялись и потеряли возможность приказывать даже в боевой обстановке»⁵².

17 мая А.Ф. Керенский, ставший военным и морским министром, утвердил так называемую «декларацию прав солдата», вскоре введенную в действие специальным приказом Верховного Главнокомандующего. В соответствии с этим документом каждый военнослужащий мог быть членом любой политической, национальной, религиозной организации, имел право открыто высказывать устно или в печати свои политические, религиозные, социальные и прочие взгляды⁵³.

В условиях военного времени, когда в стране действовало множество конкурировавших и даже враждовавших между собой партий, когда активизировались националистические и сепаратистские движения, это означало развал армии, противопоставление военнослужащих друг другу по идеологическим, этническим и иным признакам. Этим же приказом

⁵⁰ Приказ по военному ведомству от 16 апреля № 213 [Order of the Defense Ministry on April 16, number 213], in Приказы по военному ведомству за 1917 год [Orders for the Defense Ministry for 1917], библиотека НИАБ [Library of the National Historical Archives of Belarus], инвентарный № 14971, с. 189 – 190.

⁵¹ П.А. Голуб, *Партия, армия и революция. Отвоевание партией большевиков армии на сторону революции. Март 1917 – февраль 1918* [The party, the army and the revolution. Reconquest of the Bolshevik Party of the army on the side of the revolution. March 1917 – February 1918], Москва, Издательство политической литературы, 1967, с. 33.

⁵² РГВИА, фонд 2048, оп. 1, д. 905, л. 54 об.

⁵³ Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего от 17 мая № 293 [Supreme Commander of the Order of May 17, number 293], in Приказы Верховного Главнокомандующего за 1917 год [The orders of the Supreme Commander for 1917], библиотека НИАБ [Library of the National Historical Archives of Belarus], инвентарный № 14994, нумерация страниц отсутствует.

начальники были лишены права наложения дисциплинарных взысканий на подчиненных и отменено даже внешнее проявление уважения к старшим по чину – обязательное отдавание воинской чести⁵⁴.

Современник отмечал: «Эта «декларация прав», давшая *законное признание* тем больным явлениям, которые распространились в армии... окончательно подорвала все устои... Она внесла безудержное политиканство и элементы социальной борьбы в неуравновешенную и вооруженную массу, уже почувствовавшую свою грубую физическую силу. Она... отняла у начальников дисциплинарную власть, передав ее выборным коллегиальным организациям, и лишний раз, в торжественной форме... унизила и оскорбила их»⁵⁵.

Свою лепту в разложение армии вносила революционная литература, в больших количествах поступавшая в войска. Командование отмечало: «...масса всякого рода литературы, хлынувшей в армию, ... воззвания и приказы советов рабочих и солдатских депутатов приносят громадный вред, так как отвлекают части от боевого дела и расшатывают их потому, что масса солдат... принимает на веру и усваивает и з прочитанного лишь то, что ей в данный момент нравится»⁵⁶.

Среди прочих революционных партий, активную пропаганду в войсках вели большевики, но не они были главной причиной распада армии. Главнокомандующий армиями Западного фронта А.И. Деникин в письме на имя Верховного Главнокомандующего А.А. Брусилова писал: «Позволяю себе не согласиться с мнением, что большевизм явился решительной причиной развала армии: он нашел лишь благоприятную почву в систематически разлагаемом и разлагающемся организме. Причины развала совершенно определены: полное упразднение дисциплины и внутреннего порядка в войсках; оплевание офицерского состава...безнаказанность тягчайших преступлений – бунта, измены...». Несколько позже он отметил: «Я слышал, что большевизм разрушил армию. Я это отвергаю. Разрушили армию другие, проводившие разрушавшее армию военное законодательство последнего времени,

⁵⁴ Приказ Верховного Главнокомандующего от 17 мая № 293 [Supreme Commander of the Order of May 17, number 293], in *ibid.*, нумерация страниц отсутствует.

⁵⁵ А.И. Деникин, указ. соч., том 1, выпуск 2, с. 46.

⁵⁶ *Разложение армии в 1917 году: сборник документов* [The decomposition of the army in 1917: collection of documents], С. 27.

люди, не понимающие быта и условий существования армии»⁵⁷. Так же считал и сам А.А. Брусилов: «Вина большевиков в развале армии есть, ... но ...главная причина все-таки кроется в разрушении старой воинской дисциплины»⁵⁸.

Подобным образом рассуждали и военачальники менее высокого ранга. Например, начальник 42-й пехотной дивизии генерал-лейтенант А.К. Байов в донесении командиру 9-го армейского корпуса писал: «Пропаганда большевиков, вместе с немецким провокаторством не является основной причиной той разрухи, того совершенного развала армии, который мы наблюдаем теперь. Эта пропаганда – лишь последний толчок...». Главной причиной развала армии генерал назвал «демократизацию» армии, которая «... в корне противоречит природе вещей, не согласуется с историческим опытом и не имеет под собой никакого научного основания»⁵⁹.

После Октябрьской революции были приняты законодательные акты, окончательно уничтожившие армейские устои. 30 ноября председатель военно-революционного комитета при Ставке Верховного Главнокомандующего А. Ф. Боярский подписал приказ, передававший всю полноту власти в войсках соответствующим солдатским комитетам. Комитеты могли смещать командиров на низшие должности, вплоть до рядового; офицерские чины, звания и ордена упразднялись. Ношение наград и погон отменялось, вводилась выборность командного состава; те из бывших офицеров, кто увольнялся в отставку, и те, кто был уволен ранее, пенсии за службу не получали; потерявшие трудоспособность поступали в ведение органов государственного призрения⁶⁰.

16 декабря был принят декрет Совнаркома об уравнивании всех военнослужащих в правах, отчасти дублировавший приказ А.Ф. Боярского. В частности, декрет гласил: «Все чины и звания в армии, начиная с ефрейторского и кончая генеральским, упраздняются. Армия Российской Республики отныне состоит из свободных и равных друг другу граждан, носящих почетное звание солдат революционной армии». Кроме того, в

⁵⁷ *Красная летопись*, 1923, №6, с. 12, 24.

⁵⁸ П.Д. Бурский, указ. соч., с. 15.

⁵⁹ *Революционное движение в русской армии. 27 февраля – 24 октября 1917 года: сборник документов* [The revolutionary movement in the Russian army. February 27 – 24 October 1917: collection of documents], с. 265.

⁶⁰ РГВИА, фонд 2067, оп. 2, д. 213, л. 223.

документе отмечалось, что наряду «с уничтожением офицерского звания уничтожаются все отдельные офицерские организации», еще раз подчеркивалась отмена «всех орденов и прочих знаков отличия...»⁶¹.

В тот же день 16 декабря был принят еще один декрет Совнаркома – о выборном начале и об организации власти в армии. В документе, в числе прочего, вновь указывалось, что «вся полнота власти в пределах каждой войсковой части и их соединений принадлежит соответствующим солдатским комитетам и Советам». Кроме того, декрет придавал законный статус выборам командиров. «Вводится выборность командного состава и должностных лиц. Командиры до полкового включительно избираются общим голосованием своих отделений, взводов, рот, команд, эскадронов, батарей, дивизионов и полков. Командиры выше полкового, до верховного главнокомандующего включительно, избираются соответствующими съездами или совещаниями при соответствующих комитетах»⁶².

Однако ликвидацией корпуса офицеров дело не ограничилось. В течение нескольких месяцев была произведена демобилизация всей старой армии и ликвидированы органы военного управления, в том числе, Ставка. В результате русская армия прекратила свое существование. На повестку дня был поставлен вопрос о создании новой армии на добровольных началах.

Заключение

Таким образом, русская армия, традиционно отличавшаяся высоким боевым духом и стойкостью в бою, в кратчайшие сроки превратилась в неуправляемые толпы вооруженных людей и перестала являться частью политической системы государства. Представляется, что масштаб и глубина разложения армии той поры являются беспрецедентными, не имеющими аналогов в мировой истории. Безусловно, подобные скачкообразные изменения были бы невозможны без влияния ряда фундаментальных факторов политического и социально-экономического характера, действовавших длительное время и оказавших значительное

⁶¹ Декрет об уравнении всех военнослужащих в правах [Decree on the equation of all troops rights], in *Декреты Советской власти* [The decrees of Soviet power], Москва, Государственное издательство политической литературы, 1957, том 1, с. 243.

⁶² Декрет о выборном начале и об организации власти в армии [The decree on the election and the beginning of the organization of power in the army], in *ibid.*, с. 244.

влияние на настроения солдатских масс. В то же время, важную роль в морально-психологической деградации армии сыграл духовно-нравственный кризис, в котором оказалось российское общество конца XIX – начала XX веков. Активная деятельность революционных партий радикального толка, которые поддерживала значительная часть населения страны, усиление влияния либеральной идеологии в правительстве и Государственной Думе, беспринципность чиновничества, ослабление роли традиционных нравственных ценностей в обществе – все это не могло не сказаться на морально-психологическом состоянии армии.

Моральному разложению подверглась большая часть русских войск, на всех фронтах, в том числе на Румынском фронте. Несмотря на то, что в первые месяцы 1917 года масштабы разложения здесь были меньшими, чем на других фронтах, моральный дух и боеспособность русских войск совершенно не соответствовали требованиям военного времени. Особенно заметно это стало в ходе попытки наступления русской армии летом 1917 года, на фоне действий входивших в состав фронта румынских войск, проявивших стойкость и мужество в боях с противником. В последующие месяцы, вплоть до фактической и юридической ликвидации русской армии, ситуация оставалась такой же.

POLITICS AND TOURISM IN MSSR: A CASE STUDY OF THE TOURISTS FROM THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA (1964-1979)*

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Rezumat: Politică și turism în RSSM: cazul turiștilor din Republica Socialistă România (1964-1979)

Perioada ce a urmat celui de-al doilea război mondial a fost una tumultuoasă și destul de greoaie în ceea ce privește raporturile dintre Chișinău și București. O învioreare a relațiilor turistice dintre aceste a fost sesizată abia pe la sfârșitul anilor '60. Din 1964 și-a început activitatea Direcția turismului extern de pe lângă Consiliul de Miniștri al RSSM, iar aceasta s-a ocupat direct de deservirea și primirea turiștilor străini care soseau în RSS Moldovenească sau mergeau în afara țării. Activitatea acesteia s-a focusat în special pe deservirea turiștilor din RSR, deși în rapoartele de activitate apar menționate datele și despre restul turiștilor. Prezentarea numărului de turiști care au ajuns la Chișinău prin prisma raporturilor dintre Moscova și București sau a anumitor evenimente care aveau loc pe arena internațională este în măsură să ne faciliteze înțelegerea fluctuațiilor numărului acestora în anii '60-'70. Iar politica de distanțare față de Kremlin dusă de Nicolae Ceaușescu, considerată una dușmănoasă nu a făcut decât să intensifice controlul față de „oaspeții” din România.

Abstract: *Although the period following World War II was turbulent and defined by a difficult relation between Kishinev and Bucharest an improvement concerning touristic relations between those two has been established during '60s. In 1964 Department for External Tourism has started its activity as part of The Council of Ministers of the Moldavian SSR and handled directly the accommodation and services for international tourists visiting Moldavian SSR or tourist going abroad.*

The main activity of the Department was to accommodate tourists from Romanian Socialist Republic although in their reports you also can find information about other international tourists. Presenting the number of the Romanian tourists visiting Kishinev as being influenced by the relationship between Bucharest and Moscow might facilitate the understanding of the tourists' number fluctuations in "60s and '70s. As Nicolae Ceausescu

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set out to distance Romania from Kremlin and it was considered as a threatening policy the result was an increase of control towards visitors from RSR.

Résumé: La politique et le tourisme en République Socialiste Soviétique de Moldavie (RSSM): le cas de touristes de la République Socialiste de Roumanie (1964-1979)

Après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale a suivi une période tumultueuse entre Chisinau et Bucarest. Une amélioration des relations touristiques entre ces deux villes a été notifiée qu'à la fin des années '60. Depuis 1964, le Département du Tourisme externe du Conseil des ministres de RSSM a commencé son activité, celui-ci a traité directement la réception et l'accueil des touristes étrangers arrivant en République Socialiste de Moldavie ou allant à l'étranger. Son activité a été axée sur l'accueil des touristes du RSR, cependant dans les rapports d'activité on peut trouver des données sur les autres touristes.

Les statistiques sur les touristes qui sont arrivés à Chisinau en termes de relations entre Moscou et Bucarest ou de certains événements qui ont eu lieu sur la scène internationale est en mesure de faciliter la compréhension des fluctuations de leur nombre dans les années 60-'70. Et la politique de distanciation du Kremlin menée par Nicolae Ceausescu, a été considéré comme une politique hostile et celle-ci simplement a intensifié le contrôle vers les «invités» de Roumanie.

Keywords: *RSR, Moldavian SSR, tourism, Kremlin, activity report, Department for External Tourism within MSSR's Council of Ministries.*

Introduction

The year of 1964 is an important milestone for the development of external tourism of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic as it is also the year when within the Council of Ministries (CM) of USSR, on August 22, 1964¹, the Department for External Tourism was established under the CM resolutions. On September 26, 1964 under resolution no. 376-26 the Department for External Tourism had its activity officially started within CM of Moldavian SSR (MSSR). Department's responsibilities and staff hierarchy has been approved by the chief of MSST Council of Ministries A. Diordytza². The main tasks performed by the Department concerned improvement of the accommodations for the foreign tourist coming to MSSR and work with soviet tourist that went abroad. The joint stock company *Inturist* was one of Department's main partners for working with tourists.

In 1945-1953, before the Department for External Tourism was established there were few visitors from foreign countries. If speaking strictly

¹ Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova (ANRM) [National Archive of the Republic of Moldova], f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 1, p. 2-4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 11-18.

about touristic relations between MSSR and RSR, in the written press of '50s we can find some data concerning the arrival of delegations from RSR.³ Those were specialized delegations or groups and their staying was in the least for touristic purposes. Practically the beginning of the touristic relations between MSSR and other countries started when the Department for External Tourism was established. Therefore, starting with 1965 *Inturist* Jsc. began writing reports on accommodation and services for foreign tourists be they from soviet or capitalist countries. We should mention that *Inturist* Jsc. was also responsible for preparing the documentation necessary for soviet tourist in order to go abroad.

In order to organize the tours during tourist season *Inturist* Jsc. and Department for External Tourism cooperated with specialized organization and institutions from the countries willing to send their citizen to visit the republic. For example, responsible for this activity in RSR was the National Office for Tourism (NOT) *Carpati*.

It is important to mention that during 1964-1979 the Bulgarian tourist was the main contingent to visit Kishinev, followed by tourists from RSR. The number of tourists from Polish People's Republic, Hungarian People's Republic and from German Democratic Republic was low as we can see it from statistical data provided by *Inturist* Jsc. for the period of time specified.⁴

Groups visiting the republic had their activities managed according to the program given by the *Inturist*. Tourist attractions open for visiting were those included in the list drafted by local authorities and approved by MSSR's Council of Ministries. The responsibility of the guides- translators was to entertain the tourists and at the end of the season to submit activity reports. The reports presented not only statistical data about international tourists but also tourists' opinions about sightseeing tours and even citations of people who weren't afraid to talk about sensible topics such as Bessarabia problem. The importance of these opinions was determined by the guides when it captured their attention and they were very precautious when it came to Romanian tourists. Therefore, the characteristics given to Romanian tourists haven't changed substantially during the years. The groups from the left of Prut were thought of being the most difficult as they were the groups who complained the most about provided accommodation. Also the relationship between *Inturist* Jsc. and *Carpati NOT* wasn't one of the best: in the reports submitted by *Inturist* Jsc. often will be mentioned complaints about the activity of the Romanian firm, especially, concerning the organization of the tourist groups visiting Kishinev.

³ „Советская Молдавия” [Soviet Moldova], Nr. 209 (3561), 07 сентября 1956.

⁴ Arhiva Organizațiilor Social-Politice din Republica Moldova (AOSPRM) [Archive of Socio-Political Organizations of the Republic of Moldova], f. 51, inv. 47, d. 11, p. 130-138.

An analysis of the dossiers on Department's for External Tourism activity allowed us to operate with data about international tourists visiting the republic gathered during the years. It's interesting to analyze the touristic relations between RSR and MSSR especially in the context of all the events from that period of time when it's highly necessary for us to relate to the Romania and Soviet relations. The relation between Bucharest and Moscow was extremely tense during 1964 until 1979. Such problems as cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), Czechoslovak invasion, and also reintroduction on Romanian-Soviet agenda of some of the subjects that Moscow didn't like led to Romania's estrangement from Soviet countries. The mentioning of the territorial dispute during Romanian and Soviet delegations' meetings was something that annoyed the soviet authorities. In this context it is easier to explain the attitude towards Romanian tourists visiting Kishinev.

In 1979 the hostility between Bucharest and Moscow become visible on August 1 during the meeting of Nicolae Ceausescu and Leonid Brezhnev in Crimea. The problems both leaders were concerned about referred to territorial disputes and also some historical publications from both RSR and USSR that were contrary to the agreements made between countries' leaders. Nevertheless, the number of Romanian tourists was still high comparing to other socialist countries.

Statistical data on the number of Romanian tourist who visited MSSR (1964-1979)

Further we will present data on tourists' movement between Socialist Romania and Moldavian SSR from 1960 until 1970. The year of 1964 was marked by many disputes between Bucharest and Moscow and it's also the year of publication of *Notes on Romanians (Unpublished manuscripts)* by Karl Marx, edited by academicians A. Otsetya and S. Schwann under the auspices of Romanian's People Republic Academy of Sciences.⁵ The publication had some critical remarks about tsarist policies concerning Bessarabia and it irked Moscow at that time. Even if the year was full of disputes during the touristic season in particular in 1964 the *Inturist* Jsc. accommodated 4830 international tourists from 25 countries: 4116 tourists from socialist countries and 714 tourists from capitalist countries⁶, when next year until October 15th, 1965 the

⁵ Vasile Buga, *Pe muchie de cuțit. Relațiile româno-sovietice 1965-1989* [On the edge. Romanian-Soviet relations in 1965-1989], București: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2013, p. 342.

⁶ ANRM, f. 2782, inv 3, d 3, p. 53-58.

Inturist Jsc. subsidiary in Kishinev accommodated 5141 international tourists including 4129 tourists from soviet countries and 1012 tourists from capitalist countries.⁷ In 1964, 1028 Romanian tourists visited MSSR. The next year there were only 514 tourists - half of the previous year's number.⁸

Table 1. Tourist form socialist countries who visited MSSR in 1964 and 1965⁹

Country	1964	1965
Bulgaria	2645	3236
Czechoslovakia	149	311
Romania	1028	514
GDR	60	32
Poland	234	27
Hungary	-	9
Total	4116	4129

Despite the changes within the Communist Party of Soviet Union in October 1964 after Nikita Khrushchev's dismissal and the changes within Romanian Worker's Party, in March 1965 after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in 1966 MSSR accommodated 6319 tourists from socialist countries and 734 tourists from capitalist countries, according to the statement from March 14, 1968 of the deputy chief of the Central Committee's (CC) department for administrative bodies submitted to the Moldavian Communist Party's CC secretary. In 1967 MSSR was visited by 11.283 international tourists from 35 countries including 9642 tourists from socialist countries and 1491 tourists from capitalist countries. Most of the tourists were from Bulgaria: 4804 tourists in 1966 and 6154 tourists in 1967. In the second place were Romanian tourists: 988 people in 1966 and 2454 people in 1967.¹⁰

We can see an improvement of the relation between Kishinev and Bucharest during 1966-1967. A proof of the improvement is also the project proposed by CC of the MCP regarding the friendship relations between border districts of MSSR and border counties of RSR for the year of 1967. According to its plan Vulcanesti District would receive during the second semester of the year a visit from a group of party officials, specialists and employees in agriculture from Galati County. There will be 3-5 group members and the visit will last for 5 days in order to share experience in the field of farming, animal husbandry,

⁷ ANRM, f. 2782, inv 3, d. 4, p. 137-139.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 29, d. 240, p. 74-75.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

rational use of technology in agriculture, constructions of cultural and industrial objectives.

Groups from Vulcanesti were also expecting to share the same experience during a visit to Galati. These groups exchange were meant to improve the collaboration between border cities. The main interest represented areas such as viticulture, crops of fruits and vegetables, their harvesting and also the construction of industrial and cultural buildings.

The time for the visits had to be well calculated in order to overlap with proposed activities. For example, Leova District from Moldavian SSR had to invite for the III trimester of the year a group of party officials and specialists in agriculture from Husi County to share experience in the field of mechanized harvesting for arable farming, viniculture and animal husbandry. In the same period a group from Leova District should have been sent to Husi County. The number of visitors and the duration of the visit had to be the same.

Ungheni District had to invite for the same period a group of party officials, specialists and citizen working in agriculture from Iasi County. The objectives of this group were to share experience in agriculture.

Cahul District from Moldavian SSR had to host during the 3rd trimester of the 1967 a group of workers from the party, specialists and citizen working in agriculture from the Barlad County. The main goal of this group was to learn about the District's achievements in agriculture, industry, culture during the Soviet Union. At the same time, Cahul District had to send a group to the Barlad County in order to share experience on vegetable and fruits production, viticulture, crop storage and building of special places for preservation.

Friendly sports meetings were expected to take place at the same time in border counties Iasi, Galati from Romanian Socialist Republic and in the border districts from Moldavian SSR: teams would be sent according to a previous agreement.

It was also discussed the possibility of inviting a group of pioneers and pupils from Iasi and Galati to visit the republican festival of pioneers and pupils from Moldavian SSR.¹¹

Another suggestion was to invite a delegation of 3-5 people from Iasi si Galati to celebrate 49 years of activity of the Union of the Communist Youth (Komsomol) following an exchange of komsomolist and pioneer delegations between Iasi-Kishinev-Galati-Cahul.¹²

It was also meant to organize a meeting between delegations of members of Academy of Sciences of Moldavian SSR and members of the Romanian

¹¹ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 27, d. 98, p. 119-123.

¹² *Ibid.*

Socialist Republic's Academy of Sciences, Iasi subsidiary, where issues of common interest would be discussed.

Professors and students from Agricultural Institute of Kishinev had meetings with professors and students from Agricultural Institute of Iasi in order to discuss the analysis and studies on educational process.

It was also suggested to organize a meeting of the employees and technical engineering workers from textile enterprises of Iasi and Kishinev. Moldavian Societies of friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries together with border districts of Moldavian SSR had to send to the Romanian border counties materials presenting the achievements of the Moldavian people in areas such as industry, sciences and art during the Soviet Union.¹³

Besides agricultural cooperation between RSR and MSSR an important part of their relations was the tourism therefore it was proposed to organize systematically within kolkhozes, sovkhozes, industrial enterprises, educational institutions or other institutions with Romanian-Soviet friendship societies from border regions, especially in places for tourists to visit, literature and photography exhibition about achievements of the Romanian people towards strengthening socialism.

Special activities were proposed to take place on days of national importance to MSSR and RSR. For example, on August 23, 1967, at the border Districts centers were planned to take place meetings and to organize parties dedicated to the liberation of Romanian people from fascist occupants at the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, industrial enterprises and other institutions.¹⁴

On November 30, 1967, the Secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee I. Melkov submitted to the CC of the Soviet Union Communist Party the scheduled activities for the year 1968 to consolidate the friendly relations between the Districts Tiraspol, Kotovsk and the RSR's Counties.¹⁵ According to the schedule, in order to develop and improve the quality of the experience sharing between workers' groups from MSSR's and RSR's border areas it was recommended to organize in the 3rd trimester of the 1968 exchanges of delegations between the districts and counties – Vulcanesti and Galati, Cahul and Barlad, Leova and Husi, Ungheni and Iasi, all from border areas of Moldavian SSR and Romanian SR. Delegations, including workers, specialist and citizen from the districts and counties mentioned, will be of 3-5 members and the duration of the visit will be of maximum 5 days. There will be discussed topics such as industry,

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 28, d. 91, p. 189.

agriculture, construction of industrial and cultural premises and political activity for the population.

Union of the sports societies and organizations from Moldavian SSR together with border districts according to the agreement with Iasi and Galati counties from Romanian SR were expected to organize exchanges of sport teams for football, volleyball, tennis, basketball, swimming, free style and Greco-Roman wrestling competitions.

An active youth was desirable for the implementation of the scheduled plans; therefore a proposal was submitted in order to organize youth delegations exchanges including youth from Kishinev and youth from border counties Iasi and Galati. The young will discuss political activity and young generation's involvement.

According to the scheduled plan Moldavian societies for friendship and cultural relations with foreign countries together with party's administration and soviet administrations from border districts of the republic had to send systematically to the friendly Romanian counties informational materials presenting the development of the industry, agriculture, science, culture and art in Moldavian SSR.

On the occasion of national holidays and also because of the concluded Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Bucharest and Moscow a variety of thematic meetings, friendship parties, lectures, reports and discussions were planned to take place.¹⁶

In spite of being a promising developmental plan for a friendly relationship between border areas of the RSR and MSSR, in 1968 the relation between Bucharest and Moscow has come to a critical juncture and therefore it affected the relation with Moldavian SSR. The crisis that affected the Romanian-Soviet relation in 1968 was determined by the invasion of Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia and later by the visit to Bucharest of the American president Richard Nixon. In a few months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between Romania and Soviet Union sensible topics related to the Romanian-Soviet/Russian history came in focus again but it hasn't affected their touristic relations. Eventually in 1968, 2856 Romanian tourists visited the country and 4115 tourists visited in 1969.¹⁷ Local authorities highlighted the fact that 1969 was the year with the highest number of Romanian tourists visiting MSSR since 1959 when the *Inturist* Jsc. was established.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 192-193.

¹⁷ ANRM, f. 2782, inv 1, d 40, p. 21-22.

In 1970's there's a visible increase of the number of international tourists visiting the republic, except years 1970¹⁸, 1977 and 1978. Historians such as Gheorghe Negru consider the year 1970 as a culmination of the Soviet's propagandistic war from 1970 to 1975¹⁹ started by Soviet authorities against "nationalism" in MSSR and "peculiar politics" of the RSR. Nevertheless, in 1974 the number of Romanian tourists for the first time in the period we analyze exceeded the number of Bulgarian tourists. This data is confirmed by Department's for External Tourism notice *Concerning the accommodation of RSR tourists in Moldavian SSR in 1968-1978* from December 11, 1978 submitted to Central Committee of MCP, MSSR's Council of Ministries, and General Directorate for External Tourism within MSSR's Council of Ministries.²⁰

According to the informative note on accommodation of the Romanian tourists visiting Moldavian SSR for the period 1968-1978 overall the numbers are as shown below.

Table 2. Number of Romanian tourists who visited MSSR in 1968-1978

Year	Number of people
1968	4.877
1969	4.310
1970	3.326
1971	4.249
1972	6.369
1973	10.955
1974	16.617
1975	22.548
1976	26.612
1977	14.837
1978	17.829

The table below shows how the number of international tourists from other socialist countries who visited MSSR in 1968-1978 compares to the number of tourists from RSR for the same period of time.

¹⁸ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 19, p. 1-21.

¹⁹ Gheorghe Negru, „Cursul deosebit” al României și supărarea Moscovei. Disputa sovieto-română și campaniile propagandistice antiromânești din RSSM (1965-1975). *Studiu și documente* [Romania's „Peculiar politics” and Moscow's anger. Soviet-Romanian dispute and anti Romanian propaganda from MSSR. (1965-1975). Study and documents], Chișinău, 2012, 48.

²⁰ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 47, d. 11, p. 130-138.

**Table 3. Tourists from socialist countries who visited
Moldavian Republic in 1968-1978**

Country	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
RSR	4.877	4.310	3.326	4.249	6.369	10.955
PRB	7.503	10.672	6.472	16.548	16.000	17.000
GDR	14	273	599	253	458	960
PRU	3	40	37	177	179	77
PRP	245	115	118	621	350	347
CSR	90	17	223	1.010	1.375	1.212
SFRY	337	85	83	120	61	99
Capitalist countries	1.366	1.009	995	1.276	1.586	2.379

Country	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
RSR	16.617	22.548	22.612	14.837	17.829
PRB	15.452	14.793	9.273	11.336	11.984
GDR	1.183	1.526	855	891	560
PRU	487	432	306	414	410
PRP	419	668	465	1.125	1.024
CSR	792	1.946	1.863	2.925	2.513
SFRY	401	187	16	118	56
Capitalist countries	1.992	2.064	4.026	2.536	3.694

We can conclude therefore that until 1976, especially in 1973-1976, there is a constant and substantial increase of the number of Romanian tourists who visited MSSR. Moreover, in 1972-1976 the number of tourist increased from 6369 people to 26.612 people otherwise the number increased by 4.18 times.²¹

Tourist from PRB occupied the top position on the chart until 1973; from 1974 the top position was occupied by tourists from RSR.²² Numbers continued to increase until the end of 1978. In 1977 there was a significant decrease of tourists from RSR: the numbers represented only 56% of the number of tourists who visited MSSR in 1976. Nevertheless, they still represented the largest group of international tourists. As reported by the tourists this decrease was due a new international travel law enforced in 1976-1977 that forbid traveling more than once in two years and also because of the earthquake's consequences.

The first half of the year 1978 brings an increase in number of the

²¹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 41, p. 147-172.

²² *Ibid.*

Romanian tourists: their number for 11 months of 1977 reaches to 12.648 people and for 11 months of 1978 that number is 17.829 people what is by 5.181 people or 40.9 % more.

An important aspect to consider was the diversification of cities and counties where tourists were coming from.²³ Until 1974 the majority of the tourists were from Bucharest but during the second part of 70s tourists were coming from almost all Romanian counties.

Age range and professions of the tourist group members remain the same during the period specified. Most of them were representatives of intelligentsia: doctors, engineers, professors, commercial workers. Although during the second part of the period we can see more tourists who work in service sector and mid-level technical staff from small enterprises. Usually the group had many retirees and housewives. On rare occasions there were workers, students, and pupils in a tourist group and almost never peasants.²⁴ As about age range, mostly the groups were of middle aged or old people and the young people would come scarcely ever.

Starting with 1974 we can distinguish a substantial increase of the number of Hungarian tourists.

NOT Carpati would usually organize mixed groups of different age, professions and nationality and it was unacceptable for the responsible from Kishinev: it was difficult to interest all the members at the same time. Therefore, they suggested organizing specialized groups.²⁵ As a solution it would satisfy both parts: on the one hand tourists would be able to visit the sights they'd like and on the other hand they'd participate at the tours where guides' propaganda work would flourish. Surely specialized groups meant an easy work for guides and translators from Kishinev. Even so, there were few such groups during the period mentioned, 1-2²⁶ groups per year mostly and seldom were they made of members with same specializations.

For this period of time *NOT Carpati* never changed the duration of the visit nor the itineraries.

Itineraries for train travelling:

1. Ungheni – Kishinev – Kiev – Moscow (1.5 days in Kishinev)

2. Ungheni – Kishinev – Kiev – Ungheni (2.5 days in Kishinev)

Ungheni – Kishinev – Odessa – Ungheni (2 days in Kishinev)

3. Ungheni – Kishinev – Rostov on Don – Volgograd – Moscow – Ungheni

²³ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 31, p. 20-23.

²⁴ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 30, p. 55-60.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 34, p. 1-15.

(from 1978, 1 day in Kishinev)

4. Ungheni – Kishinev – Kiev – Baku – Erevan – Tbilisi – Moscow – Ungheni
(from 1978, 1 day in Kishinev)

Itineraries for bus travelling:

5. Leuseni – Kishinev – Odessa – Kishinev – Leuseni (3 days in Kishinev)

6. Leuseni – Kishinev – Tiraspol – Kishinev – Leuseni (2 days in Kishinev and 2 days in Tiraspol)

7. Leuseni – Kishinev – Balti – Chernovtsy – Porubne (2 days in Kishinev, 1 day in Balti)²⁷

Car travel became popular from 1974. In 1975 only 46% tourists traveled by bus but 50-51% in 1977-1978.

It was important that during their visit in MSSR Romanian tourists would receive the maximum information about soviet reality, soviet life style, CPSU's and Soviet Government's domestic and foreign policy, successful implementation of the provisions established during the XXV Congress of CPSU and XIV Congress of MCP, history of Moldova's revolutionary struggle, about national flourishing during Soviet Union and Moldavian's people success as part of the soviet republics family, about Leninist solutions for nationality problem in USSR following MSSR's example.²⁸

Romanian tourists' view on MSSR

Tourism cooperation between MSSR and RSR had an interesting start. On the one hand there were tourists who visited Kishinev once in interwar period and who were very surprised to find many changes at their second visit on the other hand the first time visitors weren't as impressed neither by the sightseeing nor by the accommodation.²⁹ *Inturist's* activity reports show that Romanian tourists were displeased by the program proposed for their staying in Kishinev.³⁰ Guides, in their turn, found working with Romanian tourists being difficult, as they were, according to them, disorganized and their main goal seemed to be meeting their family and friends from republic which interfered with guides' propaganda work.

In order to familiarize the tourists with MSSR's achievements during Soviet Union visiting Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy was mandatory. And usually Romanian tourists were under good impression after

²⁷ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 41, p. 147-172.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 6, p. 43-44.

³⁰ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 14, p. 11-20.

visiting EANE. For example, Gologan – a Romanian tourist from group E-232 – confessed after seeing eren: “*What I’ve seen needs no additional comments. I’d never realized that Moldova produced such equipment. We need some of it in our country...*”

Gradually the tourists’ number visiting Kishinev increased significantly therefore *Inturist’s* usual tours had to be changed. For example, in 1975 tourists with the itinerary Kishinev- Kiev and Kishinev-Odessa and all tourists travelling by bus had a schedule that besides city tour also included museum visits, visit to the Glory Memorial, EANE tour, and visit to the youth center “Iu. A. Gagarin”, documentary movies about Moldova, and other activities organized in partnership with Friendship Society and Cultural Center. A new touristic attraction for Romanian tourists was the possibility to participate at the wine tasting while visiting fabrics and sovkhos such as *Romanesti*, *Peresecina* and other.³¹ This being possible because *NOT Carpati* bought the right for wine tasting. Tourists were thrilled by the possibility to learn from up close about local enterprises. These kind of practical activities were the best way to show Moldova’s achievements during Soviet Union. At the local kolkhozes and sovkhos tourists could meet farm workers and compare work conditions in MSSR and RSR.³²

In the late 70s tourist were more interested by the tours proposed. If previous years less than a half of a group would’ve participated at the activities proposed, now every member followed the schedule.³³ The group leaders were also responsible for tourist thoroughly following the schedule.

Romanian tourist were really impressed by everything seen in Moldavian SSR: the grandeur of the buildings, achievements in industry and agriculture, social realities, friendly relations between different nationalities and different people living together in Moldova, party and government’s interest in citizen problems, MSSR flourishing as equal in a union of friendly soviet republics.

Important to mention that in 1974-1975 Romanian tourists openly complained about lack of information about USSR.³⁴ However later in 70s because tourist were thoroughly prepared before going abroad there were few remarks of that kind. Even so, judging by reviews given Romanian tourists still had little knowledge about what was happening in USSR and MSSR- every trip brings a new discovery.³⁵

³¹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 41, p. 95-98.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 147-171.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 185-201.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 39, p. 1-17.

On November 29, 1978, Romanian tourist Radulescu as a member of the group EA-076 shares his impressions after a walk in town: *"When I saw the newly erected neighborhoods, with nice contemporary buildings and the lowest rent in the world I come to realize that your government really cares about people".*³⁶

Maxim V. tourist from Cluj-Napoca, member of the group ACR – 239 is also impressed by the country: *I was thrilled by this country right when I entered the customs. We liked the vineyards and the fields clearly very well maintained. Obviously the government makes an effort to use mechanized support in agriculture. About Kishinev I can say that it surpassed my expectations. We don't have much information about your republic therefore we compare everything to our cities. I have to say Kishinev is far above when it comes to constructions and contemporary architecture.*³⁷

A member of the group EA – 092, Branza confessed: *"I work as a farmer and I have to say I was very impressed by your vineyards and orchards. At this time of the year you've already finished, everything is perfect. We didn't even start yet. It's unexpected to see no one on the fields but everything is already handled."*³⁸

At the beginning people avoided trips to the historical museums and EANE sometimes more than a half of tourists from a group weren't present. Nevertheless, from 1975 the staff noticed that tourists complied easier with the proposed schedule and willingly visited EANE and historical museums.³⁹

Buliga Stefan, a tourist from E-246 group after a visit to EANE on September 21, said: *"It's hard to believe that a small country with low population can produce such diversity of high quality products. I always thought that Moldova is mostly an agrarian country and surely it progressed a lot in that field. But at the same time it has great achievements in heavy industry, electronics, and why not light industry. This shows a high economical development and by default the wealth of the nation."*⁴⁰

After a visit to museum of MCP history, on October 18, Revilac Frantzishek from tourist group E -306 said that at the museum of RCP history Bessarabia's origins are explained differently and on the maps dating 1902 or 1903 Bessarabia is represented as a part of Romania. He claimed that *"at the MCP history museum I learned that Bessarabia was part of Romania only in 1918. Also we learned about illegal communists like P. Tkachenko that fought for reunification of the Bessarabia with Soviet Motherland. They contributed to the*

³⁶ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 47, d. 11, p. 130-138.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 41, p. 147-171.

⁴⁰ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 47, d. 11, p. 130-138.

fight of the RCP against the bourgeois government."

Molinari Carol – group E-246 leader – talking to his guide- translator after a visit to MCP history museum said that every time when visiting Kishinev with his tourist groups he likes to visit the museum where he can always learn new things about MSSR, USSR, and Moldavian Communist Party.⁴¹ Back home he never visited a historical museum because the numbers and estimates presented there seem to be false, especially the data on country's history from 40s and 50s.

Romanian tourists gladly visited the Youth Center *I. A. Gagarin* and watched movies about MSSR.⁴² Tourist Samsonov from group EA 076 impressed by the visit said: *It was a wonderful encounter. It felt as we became part of your country with its music and dances*"⁴³

Most of the Romanian tourists appreciated the wine tasting at the farms and learning how farms work. They liked watching movies about the vineyards and visiting social servicing facilities. ⁴⁴ As from 1975 there was not a single negative opinion regarding wine tasting events. Group leaders who often visited MSSR requested organization of such events at the farms.⁴⁵

Inturist Jsc. subsidiary in Ungheni accommodated in 1968-1979 200 thousands tourists from RSR. It became a custom for tourists travelling by train on the route Kiev-Leningrad-Moscow to participate at informative and entertaining activities in MSSR. Also the subsidiary organized in Ungheni city tours and museum visits for Romanian tourist who didn't stay in republic during their travel.

These type of visits were more difficult to organize – mention the activity reports on Romanian tourists' accommodation. It was explained by the group composition – a lot of its members were looking forward to meet their relatives and friends from MRRS or had commercial interests.⁴⁶ However their number reduced when in 1976-1977 RSR adopted the law forbidding travelling abroad more than once in two years. This change contributed to the increase of commercial activities by Romanian tourists what was far more wide-spread than in 1968-1970.⁴⁷ In some cases an entire tourist group would come for commercial business. Some tourist would visit more than once in two years and the same individuals would use this trips for meeting relatives and chaffer.⁴⁸

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 34, p. 1-15.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 41, p. 147-171.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 47, d. 11, p. 130-138.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Many of the tourists didn't bother hiding that the true reason for visiting MSSR was to buy some merchandise. They confessed that selling was necessary if they wanted to buy necessities during their stay as they were allowed to exchange only a small amount of money.⁴⁹

Guides complained that those tourists who sold things brought from home were responsible for disorganization of group's stay in MSSR. Also there was the second category of tourist: the one who came to visit their relatives. They would often miss the scheduled activities and never inform about it the soviet guides.⁵⁰ They made the group late and would go outside the town even if they were forbidden.

In response to the problems *Inturist* Jsc. offered solutions for improving accommodation for Romanian tourists. Also they suggested to improve the quality of informational activities in order to rise the propaganda effect of the tours.

To improve the quality of the informational activities there were some problems to be solved:

1. Romanian tourist who traveled by car and carried individual visits were subjected to less surveillance and usually didn't ask for guides during their stay in MSSR (except city tours for tourists with cars) therefore it was advised to decrease the number of such tourists and to stimulate them traveling by train.

2. To solve the problem with commercial activities responsible institutions had to increase the amount of money the tourist could exchange for personal use.

3. Responsible organizations should intensify their fight against soviet jobbers who undermined the results of the informational activities their activity being detrimental for the state.⁵¹

On December 26, 1978, I. Calin, secretary at the CC of the MCP mentioned in his statement *Concerning MSSR's participation and management of tourist exchanges between USSR and RSR* submitted to the chief of the General Directorate for External Tourism S. Nikitin: "*an analysis of MSSR's participation at the tourists' exchanges between USSR and RSR shows a considerable increase of the number of Romanian tourists for the last eight years. In 1971 MSSR was visited by 4564 Romanian tourists accommodated by Inturist Ltd. and Travel agency Office from Moldova (TAOM). In 1977 Moldova was visited by 16,801 people (by 35 times more).*"⁵² The highest number of visits was recorded in 1975 and 1976: 24 503

⁴⁹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 19, p. 66-70.

⁵⁰ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 31, p. 10-12.

⁵¹ Next to it was written by hand „rubbish”.

⁵² According to the Notice on December 11. 1978 by Stretscul E.P., chief of the

people in the first year and 28234 people in the second year.⁵³ For 11 months in 1978 our republic has been visited by 21.150 Romanian tourists.

Until 1973 most of the tourists from friendly countries came from PRB now the top position is occupied by Romanian tourists: 48%⁵⁴ in 1974, 55, 2 % in 1975, 55% in 1978 (11 months) from total number of tourists from socialist republics.”⁵⁵

The increase in number of Romanian tourists visiting MSSR was due the CC's decision *Concerning the implementation of provisions stipulated by CC of CPSU on developing tourism in USSR* from September 23, 1975. This decision includes a list of actions to be taken for tourism development in republic by “rising its economic and political efficiency”.⁵⁶ Central Committee's decision established also a new tourist route Ungheni - Balti-Kishinev, a new 3 days river trip Dubasari – Soroca. One of the actions was to review the list of tourist attractions and to improve the accommodation quality by modernization of routes, hotels and restaurants.⁵⁷

The fund no. 2782 of the National Archive of Republic of Moldova (related to Department's for External tourism activity in 1964-1975) preserves a large amount of information reflecting Romanian tourists' impressions on visiting MSSR. The information can be found in activity reports and guides' personal agendas. As already mentioned you can read different opinions: some of them were satisfied by the visit others were disappointed because of a tight schedule.

On intensification of ideological propaganda aimed at tourists from RSR

Soviet period was the perfect opportunity for tourism to become an

Department for External tourism within Council of Ministries of USSR submitted to CC of MCP, CM of MSSR, General Direction for external tourism in 1977 MSSR was visited by 14.837 Romanian tourists.

⁵³ According to the same Notice the number of Romanian tourists in 1975 and 1976 was 22.548 and 26.612 people.

⁵⁴ According to the activity report from Inturist Jtc. from December 25, 1975 submitted to chief of Department for External tourism within Council of Ministries of MSSR in 1971-1973, 35-37% of Romanian tourists who visited USSR also visited MSSR. In 1974 MSSR was visited by 50% of Romanian tourists who visited USSR and 60% in 1975.

⁵⁵ Elena Negru, Gheorghe Negru, *PCM și naționalismul (1965-1989). Documente [MCP and nationalism (1965-1989). Documents]*, Destin Românesc, nr. 5-6, 2010, 30-36.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

instrument of indoctrination used for international tourists visiting MSSR. Therefore, one of the main activities of the Department for External Tourism was ideological propaganda aimed at tourists. The most favorable occasions for spreading the information aimed at well established target groups were the trips and tours in republic. All the information pretended to be true and presented the achievements MSSR had since being a part of USSR.

In 1967, on October 7, CC office of MCP adopted the decision *Concerning the measures for improving the information and propaganda on Soviet Moldova's achievements aimed at foreign countries and citizens*.

According to this decision guides who worked with Romanian tourists had the main responsibility. Same year at the department for propaganda and agitation from CC of MCP was established a new section responsible for propaganda abroad. It also monitored the activity of the *Inturist* Jsc. Subsidiary in Kishinev.⁵⁸

As a result of implementing these provisions the ideological propaganda aimed at international tourist visiting MSSR in 1967 had improved claims the chief of Department for External tourism. The efforts of the external propaganda section within CC of MCP were most significant.

In a few months after the decision mentioned another one *concerning the support of Moldavian SSR on improving ideological work* was adopted by CC of CPSU on May 6, 1968. This was the next step "in the war against unfriendly influence of the foreign reactionary ideology". Hence the Department for External Tourism" within Council of Ministries had to "*focus on tourist relations between RSR and USSR, on tourists with individual visas traveling to MSSR and other soviet republics. To inform Romanian people about internal and external policy of the USSR and about Moldavian people achievements during communist government*".⁵⁹

Every commission within township and district committees had the task to "improve the quality of work with foreigners, the quality of the propaganda groups from enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhoses and to prepare the locations for touristic visits. It was very important to inform tourist about the economical and cultural achievements of MSSR during Soviet Union".⁶⁰

Central Committee office of MCP by the decision approved on June 3, 1968 requested the Department for External tourism within CM of MSSR, the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Gheorghe Negru, *Campanie împotriva României și a naționalismului românesc din RSSM în anii 50-80 ai sec. XX*, [Campaign against Romania and Romanian nationalism in MSSR in 50-80s of XX century], Destin românesc, 2010, nr. 1, p. 55.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

Moldavian Society of Friendship and Cultural relations with other countries, and the State Press Committee of Moldavian SSR to: *"intensify the propaganda aimed at the foreign citizen and tourists going abroad"*. Also they requested to increase *"the number of publications in foreign languages for external use presenting information on economical, scientific and cultural development of MSSR."*

Given a high number of tourists in 1968-1969 local authorities decided to use any possibilities for improving ideological propaganda reach the Romanian tourists. Those who traveled by bus were taken on by guides-translators at the customs in Leuseni. For two hours while travelling to Kishinev guides would inform the tourists about the achievements of MSSR during Soviet Union government. This way the information reached even those tourists that came to visit their relatives and wouldn't participate at any tours in Kishinev. Those realities were necessary because local authorities considered that there is very little information about MSSR in Romanian Socialist Republic and Romanian citizen had no access to even basic information about soviet reality and especially Moldavian reality.⁶¹

The fact that from 1969 tourists had the possibility to visit industrial enterprises, kolkhozes sometimes an entire district – the case of group E821 meant an efficient propagandistic work. Prior to 1969 the usual schedule would include visits to some museums in Kishinev and city tour.⁶²

From 1969 new propaganda methods were introduced that would help Romanian tourists develop a certain attitude towards soviet policy and reality. In 1965-1968 the tourists were required to visit EANE but later on they were also required to visit the museum of MCP history, the underground printing house of *Iskra (Spark)* newspaper, the "civil war heroes" Kotovski and Lazo.⁶³

Comparing the current achievements with the realities before Soviet Union was one of the propaganda methods used with Romanian tourists. Quantitative indices presenting economical and cultural achievements seemed to have the most noticeable effect on Romanian tourists and therefore considered by soviet authorities as the most effective propaganda technique.⁶⁴

According to the activity reports and guides' work agendas Romanian tourist were becoming more open-minded. Some of them were ready to talk about politics even if other tourist groups showed apolitical attitude".⁶⁵ There was also seen more revolutionary fight veterans visiting and they had "a very

⁶¹ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 14, p. 74-86.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 33, d. 90, p. 39-40.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 16, p. 79-85.

*good attitude towards USSR and can appreciate at its real value the achievements of Moldavian people. For the upcoming 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin those tourists were requesting guides pay attention to the revolutionary topics.”*⁶⁶

An increase in number of Romanian tourists in early 70s led to the intensification of ideological propaganda activities aimed at them. The large number of Romanian tourists has also become a veritable challenge for the local authorities and for the guides who had the goal to make everything work the best possible way.

The main activity of a guide still remained sharing information with tourists about Moldavian SSR's reality especially when they saw the tourists had wrong ideas about the republic. In order to reach the expected political effect, the guides had to keep in mind that Romanian tourists, as well as any other international tourists otherwise disliked “empty words”, declarations and slogans. ⁶⁷ Therefore, they had to rely not only on arguments but also on their knowledge adjusted to the needs and differences of the group members. That is why in early 70s of the 20th century the seriousness of the training courses for guides-translators increased.

During the 70s the conflict arisen between Nicolae Ceausescu and Leonid Brejnev led to displease the soviet authorities and they disagreed with the “special course” Romanian politics had taken. As the result the anti-Romanian propaganda war ⁶⁸ became stronger in MSSR. In 1970, on November 16 CC office of CPSU adopted the top secret document *concerning further increasing of ideological propaganda aimed at Moldavian citizens and citizens from Chernovtsy area of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*. On November 5, CC office of MCP also adopted the decision *concerning increasing of ideological propaganda aimed at MSSR citizens*.

The preamble itself contains harsh remarks about Romania's politics as *“they use actively literature, radio, television, visits of Romanians to MSSR and Moldavians visiting RSR for propaganda and spread of the “special politics” ideas among our citizens. They also would say hostile remarks about USSR.*⁶⁹ Remarkable fact is that Romanian travel agencies would send their tourist mostly to Moldova rather than other areas of USSR.”

⁶⁶ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 14, p. 74-86.

⁶⁷ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 14, p. 11-20.

⁶⁸ Gheorghe Negru, „Cursul deosebit” al României și supărarea Moscovei. Disputa sovieto-română și campaniile propagandistice antiromânești din RSSM (1965-1975). Studiu și documente [Romania's „Peculiar politics” and Moscow's anger. Soviet-Romanian dispute and anti-Romanian propaganda from MSSR. (1965-1975). Study and documents], Chișinău, 2012, p. 31.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

In order to avoid "spread of nationalist ideas" by Romanian citizens visiting relatives in MSSR it was requested of Ministry of Internal Affairs to take measures *"for regulation of invitations given to Romanian citizens and our citizens travelling to Romania"* of course in order to reduce *"significantly the mutual visits on basis of individual visas"*. Among other the Ministry was requested to *"strictly supervise Romanian tourists' behavior during their stay on Moldova's territory: they have to respect the soviet laws and the regulations concerning the stay of foreigners on USSR's territory"*.

Tourist groups exchange with Romania, the increasing number of private visits of Romanians to their relatives in MSSR during 60s were considered by MCP leader as sources of "contamination" for Moldavian citizens with "nationalist" and "anti-Soviet" ideas.⁷⁰

Romanian tourists showed a favorable attitude towards their own government and that was a source of concern when the ideas were spread during their stay in MSSR. I.Bodiul emphasized *"many Romanian citizens support and approve of the anti-Soviet direction their country had taken; they don't hide their negative attitude towards our country and they support openly Romania's closer relations with America and China"*

Propaganda campaign from 1970 against the political tendencies in RSR and "nationalism" in MSSR aimed to reduce the contacts between Romanians from both sides of the Prut. Bodiul insisted that it was necessary *"to reduce significantly"* the number of RSR citizens visiting MSSR and the number of MSSR citizens who have private visits in RSR. They also requested *"an increase of responsibilities for those (from MSSR) who invited their relatives and facilitated their travelling and also contributed to the spread of hostilities";* strict surveillance of RSR tourists in private visits to their relatives. Those who would show an anti- Soviet behavior will be deported. Citizens travelling to RSR were *"instructed and informed on what they might encounter and requested in case they will be engaged in anti-Soviet discussions to protest vehemently and boldly retaliate."*⁷¹

Institutions responsible for accommodation of Romanian tourists were requested by Ivan Bodiul to *"provide for them the most qualified, politically mature, and best employees of Inturist. They should be well trained in their ability to resist unhealthy discussions. In case the international guests won't answer to their objections they will be requested to leave the country."*⁷²

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁷¹ AOSPRM, fond 51, inv. 33, d. 201, p. 76.

⁷² *Ibid.* p. 77

Inturist activity reports for 1970 provide clearly the tasks every guide should perform during the tourist season. For Romanian tourist guides had to “present every detail of our realities and to offer them as much correct information as possible about our lifestyle and our state policy; to remind them in a subtle way about our help in building socialism – they will learn and accept then the friendship and collaboration between our countries. To perform these tasks properly the qualities mentioned above aren’t sufficient. They have to permanently improve their abilities because you have to find optimal methods and the right tone for these groups.”⁷³

Season finale however showed that efficient ideological propaganda aimed at international tourists depended on quality of the services provided. Data from 1970 confirmed the importance of accommodation, food and transportation in shaping tourists’ opinion about soviet reality. Based on the experience of the late touristic season when hotel services, restaurants were of high quality tourists accepted easily information about Moldavian people’s achievements and the guides were seen as trustworthy therefore the propaganda goals were reached easily. “The situation is explained by tourists’ habit to connect our achievements and our ability to solve “small” problems. Therefore, this year an extra effort was needed in order to satisfy the needs of our guests. As a result, complaint and suggestions books showed messages of positive feedback from satisfied tourists who appreciated the high quality services and warm welcome.”⁷⁴

The tourist season from 1971 become of particular importance. Preparations included a seminar for the guides-translators where the previous results were discussed. Their main task was to intensify the ideological propaganda aimed at international tourists coming this season. At the seminar close attention was paid to tours and how to lure tourists to participate by using their nationality, social position, age and profession.

In 1971 at the end of training courses for translators the participants had an exam and were able to obtain the right to organize tours in Kishinev. Department for External Tourism published teaching materials to help the guides: “Tours in Kishinev- capital of Moldavian SSR” – based on materials from CPSU’s XXIV Congress and MCP’s XIII Congress.⁷⁵

According to decision *Concerning organization of USSR 50th anniversary*⁷⁶ guides-translators had to focus on Leninist national policy based on which “republics benevolently united into Soviet Union, leading to disappearance of hate

⁷³ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 19, p. 1-21

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 21, p. 20-24

⁷⁶ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 25, p. 37-42

and mistrust and consolidation of friendly, unbreakable relations between brotherly republics where mutual help and a new life begun."⁷⁷ Those were the facts to be shared during city tours in Kishinev, visits to EANE or museums - museum of MCP history, art museum - and other touristic attractions.

In 1972 the majority of Romanian tourist groups participated at the city tour in Kishinev even if not all the members were present. Visit to EANE of Moldavian SSR was an important part of the schedule. From 48 Romanian tourist groups who visited Kishinev in first 4 months of 1972 37 groups visited EANE, 18 groups visited museum of MCP history, 13 groups visited history museum, 18 groups visited the Cinema (Film House), 2 groups visited pioneers' Palace and 9 groups visited other museums.⁷⁸

Apart from training courses designed for the guides-translators at the beginning of every new season authorities tried to find and implement new methods of work with international tourists. For example, this period was characterized by an increase of documentaries for tourists. In 1973 documentaries were still popular and tourist would see them at Union Palace and Youth Center *I. A. Gagarin*. Documentary movies were an efficient propagandistic method. They were popular among tourists and filled harmoniously the tight schedule they had visiting Kishinev. Unfortunately, the joy didn't last for long as Youth Center couldn't provide movies in "Moldavian language" and shortly after, due road repair the Center couldn't be reached at all.⁷⁹

Department for External tourism within Council of Ministries of MSSR took in consideration the specifics of propagandistic work aimed at Romanian tourists and the need to share experience between experienced guides and novices. Therefore they scheduled for March, 1974 a practical seminar for Romanian language guides-translators.⁸⁰ The necessity of this seminary was explained by the need to cope "*with anti-Soviet representatives responsible for spread of detrimental ideas and falsification of historical facts related to Moldova and to diminish their influence on uninformed citizens including Romanian citizens.*"⁸¹ They also proposed to include history of MSSR lessons with topics on "development specifics of the Moldavian socialist nation".⁸² CC of MCP submitted the proposal to involve other institutions during organization and unfold of the

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ ANRM, f 2782, inv. 3, d. 34, f. 1-15

⁸⁰ ANRM, f 2782, inv. 3, d. 36, f. 1

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸² *Ibid.*

seminar. They will help with quality ideas and also their involvement complied with political perspectives.

Soviet authorities strongly believed the amount of information Romanian citizens received was insufficient; therefore the guides should share with tourists a wide range of information about soviet realities, especially information about Soviet Union's achievements in external and internal affairs of Soviet Moldova when they were near their 50th anniversary.⁸³

Tourists from Romania often refused to participate at the tours and it was the main difficulty guides encountered during their work. Tourist explained their refusal by frequent visits to Kishinev and their need to meet the relatives and friends. As the result responsible for meeting tourists used any opportunity for ideological propaganda. Guides found it to be easier working with tourist traveling by bus because they could meet them at the Ungheni customs and on their way to Kishinev tourists would receive various information and even visit tourist attractions open for visiting.⁸⁴

Following years guides-translators were trained according to the schedule established and supervised by the Methodological Council. The council was managed by the chief of guides-translators section. Responsible informational group, under the guidance of Methodological Council and with its approval would publish every month informational leaflets about events in republic and country. Guides found these informative leaflets very helpful for their work as they stayed away from Kishinev for a long time and hadn't any access to other information.

Another important task of the Methodological Council was to share their experience with tourists. Experienced guides-translators would prepare informational materials under the guidance of a coordinator and a responsible methodologist and in supervision by superior methodologists.

Methodological Council was responsible not only for the quality of propagandistic work but also for the content of the tours. In 1975 the Methodological Council analyzed and reviewed more than 30 tours organized by guides-translators of the Section. Linguistic qualifications of the guides were also important. Therefore, in 1975 Department for External tourism organized 3 months language courses graduated by more than 30 persons that year.

For the next touristic season, in 1976, of great importance was newly established examination system: all guides-translators had exams to show their theoretical knowledge and a practical exam where they had to apply their theoretical knowledge on propagandistic work in the field.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 89-99

⁸⁴ ANRM, f. 2782, inv. 3, d. 34, f. 96-104

By CC of CPSU decision to increase the efficiency of propagandistic work aimed at Romanian tourists Department of Public Relations of the *Inturist* in Kishinev organized a pan-union seminar for Romanian language guides-translators.⁸⁵ At the seminar participated Kuskevici I.V, chief of the Department for External tourism within CM of MSSR, Zavarzina N.I., deputy chief of Translations Section, Ghritsesko F.I., chief of Information and International Relations Section within CC of MCP, Barbaneagra P.A., deputy chief of the Department for External tourism, translators from Moscow, Kiev, Chernovtsy, Odessa, and Kishinev. The main topic was focused on specific problems of work with Romanian tourists, historical problems, and differences between Moldavian and Romanian languages, economic development of the MSSR.⁸⁶

From 1976 at the meeting of special tourist trains in Ungheni, Department for External Tourism together with Moldavian Society for friendship, soviet party and local administration organized demonstrations and friendly parties. At the demonstrations and parties participated chiefs and members of the Department for External Tourism, secretaries and members of the Party District committee from Ungheni, and prominent people from the city. They organized also concerts of amateur artistic ensembles and watching movies. This way during customs formalities tourist would feel happy and believe in good will and hospitality of the soviet people. This program was organized for 27 trains i.e. 8500 tourists.⁸⁷

Conclusions

In 60s and 70s of the 20th century relations between RSR and MSSR developed and extended as we can see from the data presented above. However, when we talk about tourism we have to mention the quality of those relations was different in that period of time. It was difficult to receive individual visas and only at the end of the 70s car travelling became popular. Usually a visit will last only for a few days and there was a limited list of places tourists could visit. The annex to Decision no. 35-5 from January 28, 1965 adopted by Council of Ministries of MSSR concerning *the approval of touristic attractions allowed for visiting by international tourists and delegations and improvement of the services and accommodation for them*⁸⁸ stated clearly the touristic sights. After establishing the touristic attractions allowed for visiting

⁸⁵ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 40, d. 27, f. 112-134.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ AOSPRM, f. 51, inv. 44, d. 12, f. 19-28.

⁸⁸ ANRM, F. 2782, inv. 3, d. 1, f. 27-37

the lists will be sent to the local authorities from districts and cities involved in order to prepare the locations.

This period was characterized by an increase of Romanian tourists and by mutual complaints related to services and accommodation of the tourists. Guides-translators from Department for External tourism had to be extremely careful interacting with tourists who had “wrong ideas” about Soviet realities, and MSSR in particular. They had to be well informed and able to argue every remark coming from the tourists. The receiving party usually was unsatisfied by the groups sent by NOT *Carpati*: they weren’t specialized therefore guides had to work hard.

Tourism was seen as an opportunity for ideological propaganda aimed at foreign citizens visiting MSSR. At the same time, it was an opportunity for the tourist to bring in the country merchandise for selling. Therefore, they weren’t interested in the program proposed by the *Inturist*. Having a fixed schedule was unacceptable for the most tourists who came to visit their relatives or friends in Kishinev. People who tried to reach cities not included in the program had to pay a fine.

Soviet authorities at that time were concerned with coming up with solutions for “chauvinist propaganda” coming from Romania and aimed at MSSR’s citizens, especially intelligentsia. In order to fight this propaganda, authorities established administrative penalties. Tourists were also thoroughly controlled and in extreme cases they were deported.⁸⁹

Although during 70s the number of Romanian tourist increased and soviet authorities were open for improving touristic relation between the two countries by finding common elements, unifying in their nature, and cooperation in border areas by opening new border crossings they showed an anxious attitude towards Romanian tourists, often clearly visible, that had behind it a territorial dispute – Bessarabia problem.

⁸⁹ Vasile Buga, *op.cit*, p.346.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. POSITION TOWARD DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE (2000-2008)

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Rezumat: *Evoluția poziției SUA față de dezvoltarea democratică a Ucrainei (2000-2008).*

Autorul descrie și analizează evoluția poziției SUA privind dezvoltarea democratică în Ucraina, în timpul mandatului Președintelui George W. Bush (2000-2008). În acest sens, au fost analizate patru campanii electorale din Ucraina, din care trei dintre ele parlamentare (2002, 2006, 2007) și una prezidențială (2004). Se încearcă identificarea principalelor particularități ale poziției SUA față de fiecare dintre aceste campanii electorale ucrainene, privite ca indicator al dezvoltării democrației. Conform rezultatelor analizei efectuate, în opinia experților americani, aprecierile SUA asupra procesului democratic în Ucraina s-au modificat pe parcursul perioadei examinate. Alegerile parlamentare din anul 2002 au fost clasificate drept un scrutin în care standardele internaționale au fost respectate doar parțial. Revoluția portocalie din anul 2004 a fost punctul cheie care a generat democratizarea procesului electoral și a stimulat dezvoltarea democrației în Ucraina, în general. Alegerile parlamentare din 2006 și 2007 au fost date ca exemple de afirmare a democrației în Ucraina. În mare parte, responsabilitatea pentru aprofundarea procesului democratic în Ucraina a fost atribuită guvernului de atunci și, în special, președintelui Ucrainei.

Abstract: *In the article the author describes and analyzes the evolution of the US position on democratic development in Ukraine at the time of George W. Bush presidency (2000-2008). Four election campaigns in Ukraine have been examined, three of them for the parliament – Verkhovna Rada (2002, 2006, 2007) and one – for Presidency (2004). There is a try to determine the main features of the US position towards each of these Ukrainian election campaigns as the indicator of the development of democracy. According to the results of research we can say that, in accordance with American side opinion, the US assessment to the democratic process in Ukraine has changed during the 2000-2008. Parliamentary elections in 2002 were classified as ones in which international standards have been partially respected. The Orange revolution of 2004 was the key point, which caused the democratic changes in the electoral processes and the development of the*

democracy in Ukraine, in general. Parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 were named as examples of democracy development in Ukraine. Much of the responsibility for the deployment of the democratic process in Ukraine has been given to the current government, especially to the president of Ukraine.

Résumé : Évolution de la position américaine envers le développement démocratique en Ukraine (2000-2008).

L'article analyse l'évolution de la position américaine envers le développement démocratique en Ukraine pendant la présidence de George W. Bush (2000-2008). Nous avons examiné quatre campagnes électorales en Ukraine, trois d'entre elles au parlement - la Verkhovna Rada (2002, 2006, 2007) et une - présidentielle (2004). Nous avons essayé d'identifier les principales caractéristiques de la position américaine envers le chacun des campagnes électorales ukrainiennes comme indicateur du développement de la démocratie. Selon l'étude, on peut dire qu'après l'évaluation du côté américain pendant l'exercice des années 2000-2008 en Ukraine, la position aux États-Unis sur l'évaluation du processus démocratique en Ukraine a changé. Les élections en 2002 ont été classées comme celles dans lesquelles on a été respecté partiellement les normes internationales. Le point tournant a été la Révolution orange de 2004, qui a conduit à des changements positifs dans le processus de l'élection pour le développement de la démocratie en Ukraine. Les élections parlementaires en 2006 et 2007 ont été nommées un exemple de démocratie en Ukraine. Une grande partie de la responsabilité pour le déploiement du processus démocratique en Ukraine a été donnée au gouvernement actuel, et surtout la figure du président de l'Ukraine.

Keywords: *The USA, the foreign policy, the Ukrainian election, Orange revolution, democratic development*

Introduction

One of the important directions of US foreign policy since the second half of the twentieth century was to support the development of democratic processes in the world. After the Second World War, with the rejection of isolationism, US has become one of the leaders of the postwar world. Since 1946, when the US-Soviet Cold War began, an important part of which was the ideological component – it started the fight between Communist (USSR) and Democratic (USA) worlds. At the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR (1991) USA found themselves in a brand new situation – „the enemy” was defeated, and therefore it was necessary to determine the new „priorities” for US foreign policy. The support of democracy and free markets in the world became one of the new main American national

interests. The development of the „democratic component” in US foreign policy should be considered in terms of the security factor and as opportunity for the United State to maintain the global leadership.

Let's assume that that “democratic component” was present in the rhetoric of all American presidents. But it became the main pillar of US foreign policy since Clinton 1994 National Security Strategy, which stated that „promoting of the democracy abroad” is one of the three objectives of the United States, along with increasing of military and diplomatic components. It was considered that in case of enlargement of the community of democratic nations, the prospects for political stability in the world and for the US in particular, will increase. That is why it is important to examine how the United States estimated the development of democracy in Ukraine.

We can name a number of historians and political scientists, such as D. Lakishyk, G. Mernikov, I. Khraban, A. Khudoliy, A. Krapivin and others, who studied some issues of the US position on the development of democratic processes in Ukraine. But still – there is no special generalizations about this. The aim of this publication is to consider the evolution of the US position on democratic development in Ukraine at the time of George W. Bush presidency (2000-2008). This period is interesting because during the presidency of George W. Bush the „basic” strategy, announced as the support of democracy by B. Clinton in 1994, was changed and the fight against the terrorism became the priority number one for the USA. We have to mention that the idea of fight with the terrorism was combined with the idea of spread and support of democracy, because democratic countries were and still are considered as safer and reliable for the United States.

Since George H. W. Bush all American presidents paid attention to the development of democracy in newly independent Post-Soviet states. It was caused by the reason that democratic states are more peaceful and consequently, more friendly to the USA. As it was mentioned in National Security Strategy (1994): “Democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests, and more likely to cooperate with us to meet security threats and promote sustainable development”¹.

This official position we can find in political experts' opinion. Thus, in one of his works Z. Brzezinski wrote that US will be committed to Kyiv until Ukraine will follow the fundamental principles of Western-style democracy and market

¹ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House July 1994*, in <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1994/> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

reforms². In turn, H. Kissinger wrote, concerning Ukraine among others: «America will always judge other societies, to some extent, by their respect for human rights»³.

The abundance of the electoral process in Ukraine with Western standards is considered as one of the most important components of building a democratic society in post-communist countries. Thus, the study of the American position toward the development of democracy in Ukraine is relevant, because the US is positioning itself as a country-leader of democracy in the world.

Among the main criteria of democracy development in Ukraine, as well as in other countries, there are usually named: the compliance of the electoral procedure, the access of the opposition candidates to mass-media and transparent voting procedure. Holding the elections in accordance with democratic standards is interpreted as extremely important for Ukraine because the implementation of transparent and fair electoral process is considered as a mean of substantial democratization of the Ukrainian political system and as an opportunity to integrate efficiently into the international states⁴.

During the presidency of George W. Bush there were held four election campaigns in Ukraine, three of them to the parliament – Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) (2002, 2006, 2007) and one – for Presidency (2004). Let's try to determine the main features of the US position towards each of these Ukrainian election campaigns as the indicator of the development of democracy.

The US position toward democratic development of Ukraine in 2000-2004

For better understanding of the basis of the American attitude towards Ukrainian election in 2002, we have to consider US-Ukrainian relations,

² Бжезинский Зб. *Великая шахматная доска (Господство Америки и его геостратегические императивы)* [The Grand Chessboard (American Primacy and Its Geostategic Imperatives)], Москва, Международные отношения, 2010, 256 с., in <http://www.lib.ru/POLITOLOG/AMERICA/bzhezinskij.txt>.

³ Kissinger H. *The Icon and The Eagle*, in "International Herald Tribune", March 20, 2007; <http://www.henryakissinger.com/articles/iht032007.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

⁴ *Senate Concurrent Resolution 5 - Congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on December 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as president of Ukraine and his commitment to democracy and reform*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgS502.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

which were strained and ambiguous. On the one hand, Ukraine had supported the US in their War on Terror (2001). On the other, the disappearance of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze (2000), „Kolchuga scandal” (2001) and strengthening of the authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine during Kuchma presidency led to sharp criticism of the Ukrainian government by the United States. That’s why the considerable attention was paid in the USA to the Ukrainian parliamentary elections in 2002. Another reason of such an attention was the fact that the parliamentary elections of 2002 were perceived by the American side as a rehearsal of the upcoming presidential elections in Ukraine, scheduled for 2004⁵.

The representatives of the American political establishment compared Ukraine with other countries from the former Soviet Union. General perspective on Ukrainian election was given in Z. Brzezinski interview the day before 2002 parliamentary vote, when he said that the Ukrainian elections, despite some drawbacks, were likely to be the most free and democratic in the Post-Soviet space⁶.

However, the distinguishing feature of these elections was a certain distrust of the United States concerning Ukraine, as being disable to conduct an independent and fair election according to international standards. This fact explains a number of US politicians visits to Kyiv in February 2002. In particular, Ukraine was visited by Deputy Secretary of US on Global Affairs P. Dobriansky, former US State Secretary M. Albright, Deputy Secretary of US on Europe and Eurasia S. Pifer⁷. During these visits, a series of meetings between US officials and representatives of Ukrainian official authorities and the opposition were held. American politicians shared their experiences which they believe would be useful for their Ukrainian counterparts during the parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

The United States concern about the Ukrainian parliament elections was embodied in 205 Congress Resolution (March 21, 2002), where Ukrainians were appealed to hold free, fair and democratic elections⁸. It was emphasized that

⁵ Бжезинский: Белый дом примет любые результаты выборов в Украине [Brzezinski: The White House will take any election results in Ukraine], in “Корреспондент.нет”, 2002, 1 апреля; <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/43641-bzhezinskij-belyj-dom-primet-lyubye-rezultaty-vyborov-v-ukraine> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ США і парламентські вибори в Україні [The USA and parliamentary elections in Ukraine], in <http://polityka.in.ua/tomenko/content.php?id=pc02-2002-10> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

⁸ *Senate Ukraine elections resolution March 21, 2002 S.Res.205 on parliamentary elections in*

before the Ukrainian elections in the US there were concerns about a number of key components of Ukrainian electoral process: the level of press freedom in Ukraine, the imperfection of the legislative framework and the rights of the Ukrainian opposition. Subsequently, in the case of ignoring the above named obstacles, the resolution named the possibility of the introduction of economic sanctions against Ukraine⁹.

Subsequently, on attainment of Ukrainian election campaign in 2002, the US announced that the elections were a failure compared to international standards. It was concluded that the Government of Ukraine was not able to take appropriate actions to provide the necessary level for democratic vote¹⁰. Among the major violations of the electoral process had been named the following: pro-government candidates used and abused their official position and government „resources”; pro-government parties and candidates were ensured by the benefits given by the government support; the pressure on the part of newly elected opposition deputies to „stimulate” their transition from one political party to another¹¹. As a result, we can quote the words of US State Department spokesman P. Reeker who underlined that the people of Ukraine will feel the consequences of undemocratic elections later¹².

It should be noted that a great resonance in America was caused by Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004 or so called the Orange Revolution. In

Ukraine Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, in http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=146&ContentType=S&ContentRecordType=S&UserGroup_id=45®ion_id=45&year=0&month=0&Subaction=ByDate&CFID=27354725&CFTOKEN=52403170 (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

⁹ *Senate Ukraine elections resolution March 21, 2002 S.Res.205 on parliamentary elections in Ukraine Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado*, in http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewDetail&ContentRecord_id=146&ContentType=S&ContentRecordType=S&UserGroup_id=45®ion_id=45&year=0&month=0&Subaction=ByDate&CFID=27354725&CFTOKEN=52403170 (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁰ *США та вибори в Україні* [The USA and elections in Ukraine], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-a-2002-04-09-1-1-86888902/222184.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹¹ *Існує можливість масштабних фальсифікацій на виборах в Україні – американські спостерігачі* [There is a possibility of large-scale election fraud in Ukraine – US observers], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/helsinki-comission-elections-in-ukraine-152032395/918879.html>.

¹² *США та вибори в Україні* [The USA and elections in Ukraine], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-a-2002-04-09-1-1-86888902/222184.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

the US, the Ukrainian elections in 2004 were estimated as the endeavour of Ukrainian government to put into practice Western standards and build a democratic society based on free elections and the rule of law¹³.

Thus, the situation during two rounds of Presidential elections in Ukraine was interpreted as disappointing because of violation of the democratic rights¹⁴. Political atmosphere in Ukraine at the time of the election campaign was qualified as such that it gave little hope of maintaining democratic voting procedures¹⁵.

Among the major violations of election procedures there were considered: falsification, intimidation, misuse of administrative resources, absentee voting, multiple voting, attacks on journalists and observers, use of false papers etc.¹⁶. It was repeatedly emphasized that the second round of Ukrainian presidential elections failed to meet international election standards¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹.

That is why, in the United States dominated the point of view that the cancellation of the second round and the establishment of third one was the best

¹³ *Senate Concurrent Resolution 5-congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on december 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as president of Ukraine and his commitment to democracy and reform*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgS502.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁴ *Latvia, Ukraine, Russia, Jordan and Iraq*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-06-13/html/CREC-2005-06-13-pt1-PgS6391-2.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁵ *Milestone for democracy – Hon. Marilyn N. Musgrave (Extensions of Remarks – February 08, 2005)*, in <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r109:E08FE5-0028>: (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁶ *Senate Concurrent Resolution 5- Congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on december 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as president of Ukraine and his commitment to democracy and reform*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgS502.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁷ *Milestone for democracy – Hon. Marilyn N. Musgrave (Extensions of Remarks – February 08, 2005)*, in <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r109:E08FE5-0028>: (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁸ *Congratulating the people of Ukraine on recent presidential elections*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgE66-2.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

¹⁹ *Tribute to the ukrainian people and their president, Viktor Yushchenko – (Extensions of Remarks – April 07, 2005)*, in <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r109:E07AP5-0035>: (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

way out of the situation. In the US Senate Resolution (December 26, 2004), this decision was called as „turning point” for the presidential campaign²⁰. This conclusion was made by the fact that, unlike the first two, the third round of elections was more objective and it reflected the true picture of the vote²¹. On the day of inauguration of the newly elected Ukrainian president, the US Congress passed a resolution, which congratulated Yushchenko with his victory and the people of Ukraine – on holding of free elections²². The resolution, which was initiated by Senator R. Lugar, represented the support for the efforts of the Ukrainian people and the new government of Ukraine on the establishment of full democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, also expressed hope for the creation of a prosperous market economy in Ukraine, confirming its independence and territorial sovereignty²³.

During Yushchenko's visit to the US, George W. Bush said: „We salute the people of Ukraine who claimed their right to elect freely their leadership. Their brave stand was a victory for democracy inspiring those throughout the world who yearn for freedom and dignity in the face of tyranny, isolation and oppression”²⁴. The US president also paid attention that the United States were planning their further assistance to Ukraine in the development of democracy and reforming of the Ukrainian economy.

Thus, the Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004 were estimated in the US as starting point in the transformation of the electoral process and

²⁰ *S. Con. Res. 7 Congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on December 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as President of Ukraine*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109sconres7ats/html/BILLS-109sconres7ats.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²¹ *Senate Concurrent Resolution 5- Congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on december 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as president of Ukraine and his commitment to democracy and reform*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgS502.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²² *S. Con. Res. 7 Congratulating the people of Ukraine for conducting a democratic, transparent, and fair runoff presidential election on December 26, 2004, and congratulating Viktor Yushchenko on his election as President of Ukraine*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109sconres7ats/html/BILLS-109sconres7ats.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine*, in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73794&st=UKRAINE&st1=> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

democracy in Ukraine²⁵.

New features in American perception towards democratic process in Ukraine after Orange revolution

After the presidential campaign in 2004 and the Yushchenko's coming in to power the US attitude towards the democratic process in Ukraine had changed: the US Senate made a decision to provide Ukraine the status of market economy, and also, US House of Representatives had abolished the Jackson-Vanik amendment concerning Ukraine (9 March 2006). Ukrainian authorities in foreign policy area had become more focused on cooperation with Western countries. That is why the Western analysts predicted the intensive development of democratic processes.

Thus, the next elections in 2006 inspired in advance more confidence in the US, compared to the elections in 2002²⁶. George W. Bush noted that in the last 2 years, Ukraine held free election; and also, the people of Ukraine and its president, V. Yushchenko were deeply committed to democratic reforms²⁷.

According to the point of view of the American establishment, the parliamentary elections in 2006 were provided with better legal framework, compared to the campaign of 2002. Before the elections in 2006 the following positive developments were observed: the election of candidates from the party lists; reducing of the entry level for political parties to 3%; improvement of the national register of electors. Besides, American politicians stressed the idea that the level of civic consciousness of Ukrainian society has increased qualitatively, fact that increased the monitoring of the election procedure by the representatives of the civil society. A significant increase of freedom in mass media, and reducing restrictions on the coverage of the electoral process were also noticed.

²⁵ *Congratulating the people of Ukraine on recent presidential elections*, in <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-01-25/html/CREC-2005-01-25-pt1-PgE66-2.htm> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²⁶ *Підтримка прав людини і демократії: Що зроблено Сполученими Штатами у 2005-2006 роках* [Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: What made the United States in 2005-2006], in http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ukraine/164171/pdf/dhr05_ukr.pdf (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²⁷ *Remarks on Signing a Bill To Authorize the Extension of Nondiscriminatory Treatment to the Products of Ukraine*, in <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65420&st=UKRAINE&st1=> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

The fact that the Party of Regions, at that time the opposition political force, gained the majority of votes, was perceived by American circles with cautious approval. In the United States it was explained that it could balance the presidency and give it the objective possibility for better governing of the country. Thus, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, M. McFaul said that the progress and results of the election campaign in 2006 are very positive²⁸. The report, prepared by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor inside the US Department of State, based on the results of elections in Ukraine, declared that: „The March parliamentary elections became the freest in 15 years of an independent country”²⁹. However, some disadvantages were mentioned: mechanical errors, some deficiencies on a complete set of election commissions and availability of electoral lists. However, it was stressed that these violations did not cause significant obstacles to the results of voting.

The negative result of the 2006 parliamentary election was the polarization of the Verkhovna Rada, which gave the arguments to American experts and politicians to predict the political instability in Ukraine³⁰. And it really happened, because next year the president dissolved parliament. Thus, in 2007 there were announced extraordinary parliamentary elections leading to the situation of political confrontation of presidential and parliamentary branches of power.

In 2007 the US attitude concerning democratic development in Ukraine had an ambiguous character: on the one hand, the United States continued to hold the focus on the events in Ukraine; on the other hand, they concentrated their main attention on the problems of other regions, such as Iraq and the Middle East.

But, overall, the United States called the Ukrainian elections in 2007 as ones which were held on a high level of political culture. It was interpreted as an

²⁸ *Експерти у США аналізують українські вибори* [Experts in the US analyzed Ukrainian elections], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-2006-03-30-voa4-86941617/224265.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

²⁹ *Підтримка прав людини і демократії: Що зроблено Сполученими Штатами у 2005-2006 роках* [Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: What made the United States in 2005-2006], in http://photos.state.gov/libraries/ukraine/164171/pdf/dhr05_ukr.pdf (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

³⁰ *Експерти у США аналізують українські вибори* [Experts in the US analyzed Ukrainian elections], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-2006-03-30-voa4-86941617/224265.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

opportunity to solve legally the problem of misunderstanding in the Ukraine Parliament. Thus, the US perceived the extraordinary elections in Ukraine as the most civilized way out of the political crisis. This argument was reinforced by the adoption of 320 Congress Resolution (21 September, 2007). It was appealed to all Ukrainian parties (government and opposition) to resolve the contradiction by re-election of deputies to the Verkhovna Rada in compliance with all international standards³¹.

Among the positive characteristics that Americans remarked about the extraordinary elections in 2007 in Ukraine, it was the possibility of everyone to be able to present his candidature to the Parliament and took advantage of this opportunity without interference.

On the other side, there were mentioned few negative features, which described some kind of worsening of the procedure of Ukrainian elections: the conflict between Ukraine political forces and the next correction of the electoral legislature. So, it was noted that Ukrainian leaders were losing time for solving the energy and economic issues because of the absence of consensus among them. The deputy Assistant Secretary of State D. Kramer said that „The issue of energy security is a priority task ... the WTO is also an important question...”³². A Ukrainian political chaos, caused by conflicts, became the basis of the uncertainty for the Western countries in terms of their co-operation with Ukraine. The Ambassador in Ukraine at that time C. Pascual noted, „Today it is very difficult to understand Ukrainian politics. Ukrainians themselves don't understand their policies. Therefore, in my opinion, it seems to the political leaders of the United States that Ukraine as a country that is very difficult to understand”³³.

However, after the official announcement of the election results, the American side noted that the elections in Ukraine were fair in contrast to other former Soviet republics, and furthermore such elections had become the norm for Ukraine. As a result, the report of the International Republican Institute

³¹ *Bill Summary & Status 110th Congress (2007-2008) S.RES.320*, in <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:S.Res.320>: (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

³² *США очікують плідної співпраці з урядом Тимошенко* [The USA expect fruitful cooperation with the Government of Tymoshenko], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-2007-12-19-voa3-86825227/219208.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

³³ *Карлос Паскуаль: Україна багато досягла за 16 років* [Carlos Pascual: Ukraine has achieved a lot in 16 years], in <http://ukrainian.voanews.com/content/a-49-2007-08-23-voa4-86822827/218733.html> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

indicated that the elections which were held in 2007, were not worse than the elections in 2004 and 2006³⁴.

Conclusions

So, we can say that within the period of 2000-2008 the American position toward the development of democracy in Ukraine significantly changed. The turning point was the Orange revolution of 2004, which led to the positive changes in the electoral processes and also to the development of the democracy in Ukraine.

³⁴ *The International Republican Institute: Advancing Democracy Worldwide. Ukraine parliamentary elections, September 30, 2007. Election Observation Mission. Final Report*, in <http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine's20200720Parliamentary20Elections.pdf> (Accessed in 12.06.2015).

CHALLENGES TO NATO'S FIFTH ENLARGEMENT ROUND: TURKEY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ROMANIA'S ADMISSION

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Rezumat: Provocările celei de-a cincea etape de extindere a NATO: Poziția Turciei față de aderarea României

Relațiile dintre România – singura națiune latină în Peninsula Balcanică, în sens larg – și Turcia au o istorie lungă care se întinde până în epoca otomană. Aceste relații au fost suspendate într-o oarecare măsură în timpul Războiului Rece. După prăbușirea Uniunii Sovietice, în relațiile turco-române a început o nouă eră. În timpul Primului Război Mondial, Rusia Țaristă a forțat România să fie un aliat pentru a ataca Germania din sud și de asemenea pentru a amenința Austria. Pe această cale se urmărea direcționarea atacurilor Puterilor Centrale în zona Balcanilor pentru a menține războiul cât mai departe de liniile frontului și de Rusia propriu-zisă. Continuând politica țaristă panslavistă, Rusia bolșevică a indicat teritoriile balcanice drept vitale pentru securitatea și apărarea sa. Cu proxima ocazie, după al Doilea Război Mondial, Stalin a inclus aceste state în rândul teritoriilor aflate dincolo de Cortina de Fier. După o perioadă destul de lungă sub Cortina de Fier, după 1989, România, ca și alte țări est-europene, a obținut libertatea, însă atitudinea Rusiei față de Balcani în perioada post-Război Rece a rămas neschimbată.

Studiul de față își propune să analizeze politicile NATO în perioada post-Război Rece și poziția Turciei față de extinderile alianței. În centrul atenției va fi plasată cea de-a cincea etapă de extindere, în cadrul căreia România și alte șase state balcanice și baltice au fost invitate să adere la Alianța Nord-Atlantică. De asemenea, se va insista pe reflectarea rolului Turciei în cadrul extinderii și a sprijinului ferm pentru aderarea României la NATO.

Abstract: *The relations between Romania – the only Latin nation in Balkan Peninsula, in a broader sense – and Turkey has a long history, which is traced back to the Ottoman period. These relations were relatively ceased during the Cold War. After the collapse of Soviet Union, a new era started for Turkish-Romanian relations. During the WWI, Tsarist Russia forced Romania to be its ally, in order to besiege Germany from South, and also to threat Austria. Its aim was intended to direct the Central Powers' attacks to the Balkans, in order to keep the warfare away from the front lines and from the Russian heartland. Following the Tsarist pan-Slavist policy, the Bolshevik Russia designated Balkans territories as vital for its security and defence. At the first opportunity emerged after the WWII, Stalin had included those lands behind the Iron Curtain area. After a fairly lengthy period under the Iron Curtain, after 1989, Romania*
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like other eastern European countries achieved its freedom, but post-Cold War attitude of Russia towards the Balkans has remained unchanged.

This paper seeks to explore the post-Cold War policies of NATO and the Turkey's attitude towards the enlargements of alliance. It focuses on the fifth round of enlargement, when Romania and other six Balkans and Baltic countries were invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition, it will insist on the role of Turkey in the enlargement process, and its firm support for Romania's accession to NATO.

Résumé : Les provocations de la cinquième étape d'extension de l'OTAN : la position de la Turquie vis-à-vis l'adhésion de la Roumanie

Les relations entre la Roumanie, l'unique pays latin de la Péninsule Balkanique, et la Turquie ont une longue histoire qui remonte jusqu'à l'époque ottomane. On interrompit dans une certaine mesure ces relations pendant la Guerre Froide. Après la chute de l'Union Soviétique, une nouvelle ère commença dans les relations turques-roumaines. Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale, la Russie Tsariste força la Roumanie à devenir son allié afin d'attaquer l'Allemagne du sud et de menacer l'Autriche. De cette manière, on voulait diriger les attaques des Puissances Centrales dans la zone des Balkans pour maintenir la guerre plus loin que possible des lignes du front et par conséquent, de la Russie proprement-dite. Tout en continuant la politique tsariste panslaviste, la Russie bolchevique indiqua les territoires balkaniques comme vitaux pour sa sécurité et sa défense. A l'occasion suivante, après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, Staline inclut ces États parmi les territoires situés au-delà du Rideau de Fer. Après une période assez longue sous le Rideau de Fer, après 1989, la Roumanie, tout comme des autres pays est-européens, obtint sa liberté, mais l'attitude de la Russie vis-à-vis les Balkans dans la période post-Guerre Froide ne changea point.

L'étude ci-jointe se proposa d'analyser les politiques de l'OTAN pendant la période post-Guerre Froide et la position de la Turquie par rapport aux extensions de l'alliance. On y accorda le plus d'attention à la cinquième étape d'extension, au cadre de laquelle on invita la Roumanie et autres six États balkaniques à adhérer à l'Alliance Nord-Atlantique. On y insista, aussi, sur le rôle de la Turquie au cadre de l'extension et sur l'appui ferme pour l'adhésion de la Roumanie à l'OTAN.

Keywords: NATO, Romania, Turkey, Russia, Depth Security

Post-Cold War Security Risks and Romania's Application for NATO Membership

After high tension and lethal rivalry between Western and Eastern Blocks, Cold War was concluded with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Romania did not have any land borders with Russia, yet as other post-communist countries was under tentative Russian pressure and felt compelled to find a firm defence alliance. NATO (founded on 1949) was the most extensively and successfully executed defence Alliance of the West. The

Alliance, which originally was the expression of Cold War collective security cooperation, confronted Warsaw Pact (founded on 1955) of Soviet Union (SU) during decades of Cold War. The Alliance – the solely elaborate and adequate defence system of post-Cold War era – had left door open for new members. Membership to the Alliance had been regulated by article 10 requiring unanimous approval of existing members and explicit consent of USA Senate. This means that any of existing members could/can veto admittance of new comers. Turkey has been member of NATO since 1952, and when the Cold War came to an end, it faced with some broadly implicated challenges. Furthermore, Turkey was in favour of former Communist Balkan countries' entry into Alliance; concretely, during the fifth round enlargement, Ankara supported and encouraged Romania's membership. But Russia's attitude and policy towards Romania remained as same as the one that SU had developed.

Post-communist Russia, which a few years after the end of the Cold War formed Russian Federation (RF), was/is not happy with the "open door" policy of the Alliance, exerted a powerful hold on periphery. For instance, Russia will stir its border neighbour Ukraine (in 2014) to prevent its strong readiness on integration to Western Europe. Mirroring the fragmentation in post-communist lands, Russia's intervention in western neighbourhood was/is a vital threat for other Balkan countries likewise. Assessment of said security dilemma, together with other conceivable RF victims forced Romania for NATO membership, thus stability and sovereignty of the country would be secured for future.

Soviet Union was collapsed in six month of the Warsaw Pact's dissolution. Beside their security challenges, post-communist Balkan countries had to cope with economic and democratic problems. The relationship of those countries, lacking a focus on such major challenge with the security limbo, was another issue of the beginnings. A few years after, the first crisis emerged in former Yugoslavia, with which Romania was one of three Balkan countries sharing common borders. This was the first challenge, while the second one came from old-boss SU, extremist and ultra-nationalist political figures such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky who declared that their first aim is to reunite SU and redraw the map of Balkans. This was a vital threat to post-communist Balkan and Baltic countries. The third challenge was the international trafficking in refugees and contraband using Balkans as a bridge in their access to reach Europe.¹ Aforesaid security

¹ Hillary Appel et alia, *The Changing Face of Europe: European Institutions in the Twenty-First Century*, "International Studies Review", Vol. 8, No. 1/March 2006, p. 167.

problems that happened to raise post-communist countries' eyes on NATO, fuelled membership desires.

The last and most vital challenge was soon after quick dissemination of global terrorism distinctive sophisticated 9/11 terrorist attacks in USA. All these challenges and serious security threats forced former Iron Curtain Balkan and Baltic countries to request for NATO membership. Because of the unanimous decision making rule of the Alliance, any of 16 existing members could prevent or encourage membership processes. Turkey, seeking friendly relations with the Balkan countries, encouraged and supported their desire on NATO membership. In this context, the historical and long-lasting cultural ties between Turkey and Romania played a facilitative role, providing an extensive assistance during Romania's admittance to membership.

Among others post-communist Balkan countries, Romania exclusively has a special place. Differing from the rest, Romania ethnically is not Slav, but Latin. In addition, the Orthodox Church had a dominant role in the country though Communism's fear-based oppressive policies. Especially after 1962, the Romanian Government had allowed Orthodox Church get into contact with the Western churches. Because of this reason Romania was one of the eligible countries ready to contact with Western world when the Cold War came to an end.² Nowadays, the old communist behaviours, economic and political corruption, resistance to pass democracy and weak militaristic power were main challenges the country had to face with through its integration with the modern world. In that tentative inroad, NATO was the first and the easiest western organization after 9/11 for such an integration turning its door open for participation.

Nine years after the end of Cold War, NATO enlarged in 1999 Washington summit, accepting three post-communist countries into membership namely Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. By this expansion the number of members had become 19. Before acceptance of new members, NATO was already in Balkans, initially with two missions: one in Bosnia, and other in Kosovo, respectively SFOR and KFOR.³ The scholars tried to analyse this first expansion through the International Relations (IR) theories, including neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, organization theory, constructivism and other foreign policy-based approaches. Yet, no one could grasp ground relied on logic for enlargement. Therefore, the scholars were

² Lucian N. Leustean, *Between Moscow and London: Romanian Orthodoxy and National Communism, 1960-1965*, "The Slavonic and East European Review", Vol. 85, No. 3/ Jul., 2007, p. 493.

³ *NATO in Twenty-first Century*, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2004, p. 13, 16.

discontented because IR theories had failed to predict this expansion.⁴ Even some IR scholars thought that the first expansion was ill-conceived, ill-timed and ill-suited antagonizing Russia by strengthening anti-Western tendencies in the Russian political circles. That is why some of them argue that the first enlargement of NATO was one of the most important events of IR after Cold War, while the other part were arguing that NATO was/is the most powerful international alliance in the world. Therefore, the former Iron Curtain countries were trying to become members, looking for sheltering against any possible threat, especially from the east.⁵ They were implying but hesitant to name it concretely, no doubt said that the threat was coming from Russia.

Nowadays, the International Relations thinkers and some Western policy makers including Turkish likewise consider that the antagonism of Russia was curious about planned fifth round enlargement that would include other former Warsaw members such as Romania. As in the past, one more time Russia was confronting West, stirred European security approach and NATO policies. NATO tried to calm Russia down by proposing joint activities and operations; yet, thanks to numerous mistrust and challenges, these initiatives never had a chance to work.⁶ Meanwhile, there was a defence and security paradox which post-communist Balkan and Baltic countries had to face with.

Post-Cold War period was a process in which the Alliance decided to transform itself against newly emerging threats, as well as ethnic conflicts. The Alliance also had decided to foster democracy, rule of law, economic rehabilitation and solve border disputes among new members. This made new comers had to meet new Western standards of NATO membership determined soon after Cold War.⁷ After 9/11 attacks, NATO accelerated modernization process and new rules put in use for combating sophisticated terrorist activities. This new policy was a radical change NATO's founding rules.

Meanwhile European Union (EU) was also trying to establish a new defence system structuring European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The legal basis for establishing such a common policy was laid out three

⁴ Robert W. Rauchaus (ed.), *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, Portland, 2001, apud Ted Galen Carpenter, *Review*, "Political Science Quarterly", Vol. 116, No. 4/ Winter, 2001-2002, pp. 665-666; Andrew Kydd, *Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement*, "International Organization", Vol. 55, No. 4/Autumn, 2001, pp. 802-803.

⁵ Terry Terriff et alia, 'One in, All in?' *NATO's Next Enlargement*, "International Affairs", Vol. 78, No. 4/October, 2002, p. 714.

⁶ Terry Terriff, *op. cit.*, p. 713.

⁷ *NATO in Twenty-first Century*, pp. 21-22.

years after the end of the Cold War in the text of Maastricht Treaty (1993).⁸ Continuing EU's enlargement towards post-communist Balkan and Baltic countries would be fastened by NATO membership.

Turkey, as a member to NATO whose relations with the EU was/are practically complicated, sought to strength the mutual cooperation with post-communist countries. In this context, there was a mutual cooperation between Turkey and Romania. Turkey supported and encouraged Romania's participation into NATO though its worries about Russian conduct to newly emerging situation. Turkey's firm support has been underlined by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer through his meeting with Romanian President Ion Iliescu in Ankara. In this meeting, President Sezer during his speech said that: *"Turkey and Romania jointly will contribute to the peace and stability in the region [Balkans] and [the region's] integration to Europe"*.⁹ Both countries have close historical ties: there was Turkish minorities living in Romania albeit Turkey had not isolated Romania from its foreign policy during the period between two wars and Cold War.¹⁰ Hence Turkish media had published several news regarding with SU oppressions in the country.¹¹

Beside historical Russian activities and the very existence of Kaliningrad enclave, there were several other factors forcing Balkan countries to seek NATO membership. Participation into Alliance would foster military, economic and political importance, encouraging stability and assisting the combat against transnational crime and global terrorism. Two of the most important contributions would be (1) the acceleration of democratization and (2) the civil control over the army. The influence especially would be effective in case of Romania and Bulgaria, trying to cope with precarious political situation and relatively slow economic development.¹²

On the other hand, NATO also was ready to grant the membership to the post-communist countries, but was reluctant to accept problematic countries before their eligibility for membership. In connection with this po-

⁸ *Front Matter*, Foreign Policy, No. 152/Jan. -Feb., 2006. pp. 2-4.

⁹ *Romanya ile Karşılıklı Güvence* [Mutual Assurance with Romania], "Cumhuriyet", 29 September, 2005, p. 6; *Sezer'den Romanya'ya Öneri* [Sezer's Proposal to Romania], "Cumhuriyet", 5 December 2003. p. 6.

¹⁰ *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri* [State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey], 14/04/1936/Fon 301812, Kutu 63, D. 28, S. 18.

¹¹ *Romanya'da Ayaklanma Başladı* [Uprising Begun in Romania], "Akın", 19 September 1951, p. 1; Abdi İpekçi, *Demirperde Aralığından Romanya ve Bulgaristan* [Romania and Bulgaria through Iron Curtain Daylight], "Milliyet", 9 September 1956. p. 3.

¹² Terry Terrif, *op. cit.*, p. 715.

licy, five years after the end of the Cold War, in September 1995 NATO issued an official set of political and military criteria for new members, including stipulation that all countries entering Alliance must adhere to democratic principles and procedures, and must resolve any kind of standing border disputes with their neighbours.¹³ On Washington Summit (1999) at the fiftieth anniversary of Alliance, it was declared that further enlargement would have been considered in up-coming summit held in Prague, in November 2002. After Washington Summit, 10 former Iron Curtain countries – including Romania – had applied to NATO for membership. The Alliance, despite its “open door” policy, declared that it was reluctant to accept new members in order not to antagonize Russia soon after the Cold War. But two years after, NATO preferences would have an unforeseeable radical change.¹⁴ Thus, post-communist countries had an accelerated chance to be a member to NATO.

Under this conditions Romania was facing with a handful series of problems. One year before the planned next NATO summit, December 2000, the presidential elections of Romania had resulted with the victory of neo-communists, implying a serious problem for democratization process. Additionally, economic and political reforms were slowed down.¹⁵ Also, Romania was facing with massive corruption reaching to the highest echelons of political power.¹⁶ Nowadays, together with Bulgaria, it was supporting NATO operations near Balkans, being one of the key countries for rehabilitation and stability process of the area.

Bearing in mind above mentioned realities and challenges on decision making process, after the fourth round enlargement, it seems that Romania and other Balkan countries heading for membership. But, 9/11 attacks had a “Bing-Bang expansion” effect on NATO; during the Prague Summit it was decided to admit seven new members (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) to the Alliance implying that the new numbers of members reached 26.¹⁷ After discussions and negotiations in March of 2004, seven new members including Romania were granted with membership status. Before their accession new members had benefited from Membership Action Plan (MAP) to rehabilitate their economy, democracy,

¹³ Mark Kramer, *NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement*, “International Affairs”, Vol. 78, No. 4/ Oct., 2002. p. 736.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 732.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 738; Appel, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁶ Hillary Appel, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

¹⁷ Paul Cornish, *NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation*, “International Affairs”, Vol. 80, No. 1/Jan., 2004, p. 64; Hillary Appel, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

state-people relations, rule of law, and defence expenditures.

Turkey's Attitude towards New Members: particularly, Romania

Soon after the collapse of the Communist Bloc, in the London Summit in 1990, NATO had invited post-communist Balkan countries to establish partnerships and cooperation with the Alliance. This was the first hand of friendship extended to the former Warsaw Pact members, inviting them to form a new relationship with the Alliance. Warsaw Pact had not been dissolved at that date officially. One of the basic aims was to achieve sustainable cooperation and stability in post-communist areas. It was important to rehabilitate the post-Cold War world against any kind of undesirable radical threats. Thus, NATO leaders had also envisaged cooperation through political and military activities. It was also planned that, beside cooperation opportunities, relations should be built through the establishment of regular diplomatic liaison with post-communist countries. One year after the London Summit, NATO, the Soviet Union and 11 other post-communist countries formed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).¹⁸ The trigger point of NACC was that, through this move Russia would also have a chance to form good neighbourhood relations with its old rival Western Block countries. On the other hand, about one year had passed since Communist Block collapsed or started to dissolve and the picture in post-communist Balkans, Baltic Region, Central Asia and Russia was not clear defined. The existing picture of world was more or less similar to the post WWII politics and it was impossible to predict how the new world's order will be shaped. Assessing this situation, NATO had moved forward to block any kind of radical change or lethal conflict as experienced after the WWII.

As it is seen, the unexpected sudden dissolve of Communist Block had created a power vacuum remained at the former Iron Curtain space, that was shaped by Stalin soon after the WWII. Lacking any peaceful attempt would cause numerous problems such as ethnic conflicts or clashes and border fights between post-communist countries. Moreover, a few days after the end of the Cold War, a civil war had already broken out in former Yugoslavia, which was a part of the Iron Curtain area. Serbians was committing a brutal ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims and there was a widespread war threat over Balkans.¹⁹ Considering above said facts, a forum has been created

¹⁸ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_116133.htm [accessed 08/11/2015].

¹⁹ *CIA Documents, National Intelligence Estimate, Yugoslavia Transformed*, Doc. No.: 1990-10-01-NIE 15-90, 18 October 1990, p. 5.

by NACC, broke new ground by enabling multinational political consultation and cooperation, and confidence-building measures between NATO and post-communist countries. Initially, the NACC had focused on residual Cold War security concerns, but as cooperation developed, the council led to the creation of Partnership for Peace (PfP), a NATO programme of collaborative and practical cooperation, signed by Russia and most of other former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries in 1994.²⁰ Meanwhile, the rise of interest in the relations with post-communist countries, and a membership process of Romania and other Balkan and Baltic countries has started.

Turkey, together with Greece was a member to the Alliance as they granted membership during first round enlargement, in 1952. After this date, through Cold War it was Turkey that shouldered south-eastern defence of the Alliance. Yet when Cold War came to an end, all strategic and militaristic priorities had changed. It was not possible to predict the possible consequences of post-Cold War period's politics and enlargement initiatives; especially for this case it was more difficult for Turkey that has been a wing country of the Alliance for about 38 years. During the Cold War, Turkey had conducted comprehensive experiments empowering its capacity to cope with militaristic offensives. Nevertheless, Ankara was thinking that enlargement of NATO, especially the fifth round, which seven Balkan and Baltic countries planned to be a member to the Alliance, would foster and accelerate Europe's integration and Turkey's accession process to European Union (EU).

Therefore the fourth and especially the fifth round enlargements provided important positive effects on Turkey. Three aspects in particular are worth mentioning for their broader implications, respectively: (1) Membership of Southern European Countries, namely Bulgaria and Romania would create a strategic depth and would provide important conveniences for Alliance's operation capabilities. (2) Due to enlargement towards eastern and south-eastern Europe, Europe-Atlantic Security area's eastern front would shift towards Baltic's and Turkey. Under existing threat and risks, Turkey's role in Transatlantic Security relations would gain importance. (3) Due to Alliance's enlargement towards Balkans and Black Sea, the Alliance's sphere of interest would inevitably focus on Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia where Turkey has vital interests and historical relations.²¹

As it was underlined above, since the very beginning, Turkey has been supporting NATO enlargements and unyieldingly in favour of Romania's membership to the Alliance. Meanwhile, after the first round enlargement

²⁰ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_116133.htm [accessed 08/11/2015].

²¹ *TBMM [TGNA]*, 10/06/2003, Period: 22, Legislative Year: 1, Number: 227.

(1999) of post-Cold War period and fourth during Alliance's whole history, the Alliance decided to achieve new members. According to decision taken in Brussels on March 26, 2003 it has decided that, invitations would be sent to seven candidates including Romania by the General Secretary of the Alliance, George Robertson (UK). After its receipt of official invitation, in accordance with Article 10, each candidate should send its participation document to USA, and for participation to the Alliance. After the completion of 19 existing members' approval, Romania and other six will become members of NATO.²²

Contrary its support to the participation of new members, there was confusion in Ankara. Some of decision makers were thinking that Balkan enlargement was a risky process for Turkey because it could diminish the balance between USA and Europe, and even could undermine a long-lasting strategic importance of Turkey. As further, new aspirations and new anxieties after Cold War were propelled Turkish decision makers. Those distrusting had been questioned in Ankara; yet there was a strong sentiment for membership of seven post-communist Balkan and Baltic countries. Despite that worries, Ankara overwhelmingly was thinking that Alliance's enlargement would ease NATO's militaristic operational capabilities, contribute Turkey's Trans-Atlantic strategic importance and foster the security relations. It was also expected that, as it was mentioned above, the planned fifth round enlargement including Romania differing from past four enlargements, will focus Alliance's sphere of interest to the peripheral vulnerable areas namely Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia.²³ Russia was still in these areas and has not changed its approaches for power politics. Balancing Russian desiderata was only possible by NATO participation.

In addition, despite its energetic support there were some drawbacks for approval of the new seven members. Turkey has an about 40 year long-lasting full-membership process with EU which the participation Agreement had been signed in the year of 1963, some days after Greece, but in so far never given the chance to be a full member. There was a standstill and discontinuity in Turkish-EU relations the process never working in a desired road for both sides. Apart from this, after the Cold War, EU had transformed its security and defence policies. The Union was requesting to use NATO facilities and capabilities under EU flag. In contrast, although neither EU countries were ready to grant Turkey full membership, ironically they

²² *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmi Gazete* [Official Journal of Turkish Republic], 08/11/2003, No. 25283.

²³ *TBMM Dışişleri Komisyonu Raporu* [TGNA Report of Foreign Affairs Commission], No. 227, 15/07/2003.

compelled to use NATO capabilities. Turkey – a member to NATO, but not to EU – had some difficulties in its relations with the Union, could use its veto on EU's right about NATO capabilities. Bearing this case in mind and the standstill of membership process, Turkey had to cope with; it was essential not to handle NATO and EU enlargement round apart. Turkey, USA and UK, more or less traditional strategic partners of WWII and Cold War era, sought to produce a midway between Turkish challenges and EU's ironic desires.

Considering Turkey's mistrust and challenges, NATO already had decided and endorsed that harmonization shall be realized during EU and NATO enlargements, providing some guarantees for Turkish-EU relations. Nevertheless, some Turkey parliamentarians were thinking that those seven candidate countries when admitted NATO membership, economically could enter into rivalry with Turkey, benefiting EU funds and introducing an unfair competition against Turkey.²⁴ This idea was a kind of exaggeration of existing facts because there were good working economic relations between Turkey and candidate members. As it is seen some of the mistrusts had relied on a series of conjectures.

Moreover, despite NATO's endorsement of integrity and harmonization for both processes, membership acceptances to EU and to NATO were different cases. If Turkey had used its veto right to prevent participation of seven new members, this would do nothing for EU membership of those countries. Hence the reservation of some parliamentarians actually just a brain storming which Turkey had no means to block. Furthermore, for seven candidates to NATO membership would accelerate participation to EU and any accident on this road would have indirect effect on EU integration process. Also *vis é vis* the seven new members, after their participation to EU may use their veto right to prevent Turkey's participation to Union. This was a serious danger but already Southern Cyprus Greek Administration and Greece were blocking agreed pre-accession payments of EU funds to Turkey and opening of necessary chapters for membership. The question was deceptively simple. It was clear that both countries would veto Turkey's full-membership when – if ever possible – the necessary chapters of *acquis* completed. In addition, there was a strong opposition to Turkey's full-membership by central-western European countries, such as Germany and France. Therefore, there was no ground to wonder about new seven members' probable veto in the unforeseeable future.

Apart from those doubts, there also was a high expectation in Ankara to preserve advantages achieved in NATO's 1999 Washington Summit. In

²⁴ *Ibid.*

case of any cooperation between NATO and EU, the Turkey's existing rights should be considered and the unanimous decision making process should be preserved. Washington Summit had afforded some guarantees for Turkey. As it was told before, EU had a strong desire to use the NATO facilities and capabilities. EU – through Alliance's capabilities – could arrange operations in Aegean Sea and Cyprus. Turkey also had/has vital interests in this region and as a member to NATO should be invited to take part in those operations. But there was a deadlock Turkey had to face with. Southern Cyprus Greek Administration was a member to EU, but not NATO could veto EU decision making process for Turkey's invitation to NATO leded periphery operations. Such possibility should be removed from agenda and Turkey's participation to such NATO operations should be guaranteed. Ankara Document signed by Turkey, USA and UK (in 2001) and signed by EU Countries (in 2002) allowing non-EU countries, exclusively Turkey, to take part in the decision making process.²⁵ Turkey and EU had different defence conceptions; hence Ankara Document was a cornerstone, preserving Turkey's existing rights in NATO, it should be an inarguable ground for all negotiations. If this rule was undermined, Turkey would be ousted from peripheral NATO operations and its membership to NATO would be a symbolic alliance, only visible on paper.

Despite these reservations and worries, Turkey's support to Balkan Countries and to Romania – that already contributed to NATO operations – never ceased. Because of this policy, the Euro-Atlantic Council and NATO members, the Partnership for Peace Programs, which built cooperation with those countries, and other initiatives addressing Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean countries were supported by Turkey.

Because of its firm support, soon after Brussels decision the necessary formalities for Romania and other six post-communist countries' participation to the Alliance immediately begun in Turkey. For approval of the Turkish Government, Turkish Grand National Assembly's (TGNA) consent was needed. The issue initially was discussed in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence after hard talks and controversial debates. On July 10 of the same year, Foreign Affairs Commission of TGNA discussed Romania's participation. In 2003, there were two parties in the TGNA, respectively the Ruling, Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Opposing, Republican Party (CHP). Foreign Affairs Commission had consisted 17 members four from CHP and 13 from AKP. Representatives from both National Defence Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs also

²⁵ *Ibid.*

attended to the meeting.²⁶ Above said worries and doubts were comprehensively discussed during the approval talks of new members.

However, during discussions in the Foreign Affairs Commission it was seen that both opposing and ruling parties were unanimously agree for Romania's and other six candidates' membership to the Alliance. Both political parties were thinking that NATO membership would be one of the most important steps for the post-Cold War world to realize the target of free, democratic and integrated Europe.²⁷ After discussions, the new seven's admittance to the Alliance was endorsed by Turkish Parliament on the year of 2003.²⁸ On March 2004, Romania and other six Baltic and Balkan countries participated to NATO in Washington, and in April of the same year at Brussels there was a joint ceremony addressing the fifth round enlargement.²⁹ It is expected that Romania and Bulgaria would afford about 70.000 land soldiers to the Alliance; yet their armies have urgent need for modernization. After its participation, Romania had firm and close relations with the Alliance.³⁰

Putting its worries and short-sided doubts aside, Turkey provided a strong support to the new members. It was clear that integration to NATO would contribute to the rehabilitation in the Balkans and the confidence building majors could have a chance to blossom. Post-communist world's premier needs were peace, democratization, rule of law, free market and economic development. It is expected that membership to NATO will contribute realization of those ideals.

Conclusions

The Cold War and especially the terror balance during this period was a lethal threat against the world's peace. When it was ended, new security problems emerged and the only surviving militaristic alliance NATO had to shoulder and produce solutions to that newly emerged threats. Enlargement to post-communist Balkan and Baltic countries should be assessed considering post-Cold War period facts. Actually when Cold War come an end, the world politics were not clear, and NATO's capability to cope with handful set of conflicts and its grasp of post-communist periphery

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ TGNA [Report of Foreign Affairs Commission], No. 227, 15/07/2003.

²⁸ TCRG, 08/11/2003, No. 25283.

²⁹ <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-054e.htm> [accessed 03/11/2015].

³⁰ *Ibid.*

unforeseeable. If the Alliance had decided not to expand or minimize its security approaches due to the dissolve of its rival Warsaw Pact, the post-Cold War world would have numerous security risks. In case of such event there would be confusion in Ankara and Turkey's future position in NATO would be unclear.

Turkey acquired a distinctive policy and produced a cumulative effect that gave courage to the post-communist countries during their membership to NATO. Same approach should be granted to Turkey during its EU membership process although neither EU countries are sincerely ready to arrange. The unintended result of NATO enlargements caused distrust between Russia and Alliance. Having to rely on fragmentary mutual trust mechanism it was impossible to use confidence building majors.

As it is seen, some Turkish decision makers have numerous reservations on NATO enlargements after the Cold War, but those doubts were mostly inflated conjectures. Having analysed the challenges faced with by Turkey, we may conclude that Turkey, ignoring its challenges and mistrusts, played a key role through the post-Cold War NATO enlargements. This preference recalled the hesitant unwelcome and one more time heightened the security confrontation between Russia and West. Russia struggled to reconcile the different security aspects and decided to go on its traditional way. Perhaps if NATO had moved slowly, a peaceful conversion of Russia into a peaceful environment could be possible. The corollary of this move is that we will never be able to have a chance to test the ridiculous idea, because NATO policies left some questions unresolved.

The conclusion driving from a handful set of results is that even though it is not visible, Turkey played a facilitating role through NATO membership. Having historical and cultural connections with Balkans, it contributed to the rehabilitation of the post-communist countries; its support and encouragement to new members, exclusively Romania deserves appreciation.

Despite the radical changes in the world's order and the emergence of new global threats, Russia continued to consider Balkans as a region belonging to its one of interest, namely "western depth security". Post-communist countries, aware of their security and inadequate defence vulnerabilities, extended to compel to find an ally against sophisticated threat they had to face. In connection with this expectation, the aim of NATO membership supplied a key factor for post-communist countries' security worries. Turkey had to solve its challenges and newly emerged post-communist countries had to investigate the relation between nuts and bolts of their NATO approaches.

MILITARY ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH IN 1706

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Rezumat: Acțiuni militare pe teritoriul Uniunii Polono-Lituaniene în 1706

Politicile iresponsabile ale lui August al II-lea, care s-a aliat cu Rusia și Danemarca în dorința de a-l înfrânge pe tânărul rege al Suediei, Carol al XII-lea, au condus la implicarea Uniunii statale polono-lituaniene în Marele Război al Nordului (1700-1721). Dar sfâșiata de disputele interne de la acea vreme, Uniunea nu s-a putut apăra în fața invaziei vecinului din Nord. Întinsul teritoriul al Uniunii a devenit câmp de luptă pentru armatele Suediei, Rusiei și Saxoniei. Între timp, conflictul dintre partidele politice s-a transformat într-un război civil deschis între partizanii și adversarii lui August al II-lea cel Puternic. Aceștia din urmă, sprijiniți de regele Suediei, Carol al XII-lea, și împotrivindu-se legii Uniunii, l-au ales pe Stanislaw Leszczyński ca nou rege, în 1704. În pofida numeroaselor confruntări, nici una dintre părți nu a reușit să obțină victoria finală. Marșurile, urmărirea și eschivele armatelor aflate în luptă au fost numite de contemporani "Hopa-Mitică". Apogeul luptelor s-a produs în 1706. A început ca o blocadă nereușită a armatei ruse la Grodno și ca o mare izbândă a armatei suedeze la Fraustadt, și s-a încheiat cu ocuparea Saxoniei și abdicarea lui August al II-lea, prin Tratatul de la Altranstädt. Înfrângerea lui Wettin nu a putut fi evitată nici chiar prin victoria de la Kalisz în fața armatei suedeze. Cu toate acestea, nici măcar forțarea regelui de a abdică de la tronul Poloniei nu a pus capăt acțiunilor militare poloneze pe teritoriul Uniunii. 1709 s-a dovedit a fi anul crucial.

Abstract: *Irresponsible politics of Augustus II, who allied with Russia and Denmark in a wish to defeat the younger king of Sweden, Charles XII, led to involvement of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth in Great Northern War (1700-1721). However, the Commonwealth, which was torn by internal disputes at that time, could not defend itself against the invasion of the northern neighbour. The vast territory of the Commonwealth became proving ground for the fighting armies of Sweden, Russia and Saxony. In the meantime, the conflict between the political parties turned into open civil war between supporters and opponents of Augustus II the Strong. The latter ones, with the support of the king of Sweden, Charles XII, and against the Commonwealth law, in 1704 elected Stanislaw Leszczyński as the new king. Despite numerous fights, neither of the parties was able to gain the ultimate victory. The marches, chases and escapes of the fighting armies were called by the contemporaries "both kings' ducking dance". Apogee of the fights is dated to*

1706. It started as an unsuccessful blockade of the Russian army in Grodno and great victory of the Swedish army in Fraustadt, and ended with the occupation of Saxony and abdication of Augustus II under the Treaty of Altranstadt. The Wettin's defeat could not be avoided even by the victory over the Swedish army in Kalisz. However, even forcing the king to abdicate the Polish throne did not end the military actions on the Commonwealth territory. 1709 turned to be the crucial year.

Résumé : Actions militaires sur le territoire de l'Union Polonaise-Lituanienne en 1706

Les politiques irresponsables d'Auguste II, qui s'allia avec la Russie et le Danemark voulant vaincre le jeune roi de la Suède, Charles XII, conduisit à l'implication de l'Union étatique polonaise – lituanienne dans la Grande Guerre du Nord (1700-1721). Déchirée par les querelles internes de cette époque-là, l'Union ne put pas se défendre devant l'invasion de son voisin du Nord. Le vaste territoire de l'Union devint champ de bataille pour les armées suédoises, russes et saxonnes. Pendant ce temps, le conflit entre les partis politiques se transforma dans une guerre civile ouverte entre les partisans et les adversaires d'Auguste II le Puissant. Les derniers, appuyés par le roi suédois, Charles XII et s'opposant à la loi de l'Union, élurent Stanislaw Leszczyński comme nouveau roi en 1704. Malgré les nombreuses confrontations, aucune des parties ne réussit à obtenir la victoire finale. Les contemporains nommèrent les marches, les poursuites et les esquives des armées en lutte "lot changeant". En 1706 on enregistra l'apogée des luttes. Celui-ci commença comme un blocus pas réussi de l'armée russe à Grodno et comme un grand triomphe de l'armée suédoise à Fraustadt et finit par l'occupation de la Saxe et l'abdication d'Auguste II, par le Traité d'Altranstädt. On ne put pas éviter la défaite de Wettin malgré la victoire de Kalisz devant l'armée suédoise. Cependant, ni même après avoir forcé le roi à abdiquer du trône de la Pologne, les actions militaires polonaises sur le territoire de l'Union ne prirent pas fin. 1709 prouva être l'année cruciale.

Keywords: Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Great Northern War, Battle of Fraustadt, Battle of Kalisz, XVIII century, the modern era military

Introduction

Great Northern War (1700-1721) was one of the most unusual conflicts Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was involved in. At that time, it was decided by the Noble's Parliament whether the Commonwealth entered war with another country or not. At the beginning of the XVII century king Augustus II the Strong of Wettin, who was also hereditary monarch of Saxony, signed an anti-Swedish treaty with tsar of Russia, Peter the Great and the king of Denmark, Frederick IV. He did it as the ruler of this German Duchy because he could not do it as the king of the Commonwealth, as he could not count on the support of the

pacifist-oriented Polish nobility. However, when one looks at the map of Europe of that period, it becomes clear that the Saxon army could attack Swedish Livonia only from the territory of the Commonwealth. As a consequence, the victory of the young Swedish king in the battles of Narva (1700) and Crossing of the Düna (1701), and retreat of Saxons into the territory of Lithuania led to encroachment of the Swedish army in the territory of the Commonwealth during their chase after the defeated army of Augustus II¹. That is why the territory of the Commonwealth became the proving ground, even though it was not involved in the war officially. Additionally, it could not stand against the aggression, as it was torn by internal conflicts. On the other hand, Wettin was supported by Russia and had untouched financial and military supply base in Saxony, which allowed him to continue fights despite losses. Apogee of the fights is dated to 1706, the fifth year of so-called “both kings’ ducking dance”, as the chase of Charles XII after Augustus II on the vast territory of the Crown and Lithuania was called by the contemporaries. The consequence of the 1706 fights was the treaty of Altranstädt. The battle of Kalisz, bloody and not bringing lasting political effects, became the symbol illustrating the intricacies of the policies of Wettin.

The Divided Commonwealth

The society of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, especially its “political body”, i.e. the nobility, had been divided since the Royal Elections in 1697². The most evident manifestation of the division was the civil war in

¹ K. Вагнер, *Первые военные действия Великой Северной войны или что предшествовало битве под Нарвой (1700) в свете польской и шведской историографий* [The first military actions of Great Northern War, or what preluded the battle of Narva (1700) in the light of Polish and Swedish historiography], „Codrul Cosminului”, vol. XIX, no. 2, 2013, p. 311 – 334; B. Dybaś, *Inflanty a polsko-litewska Rzeczpospolita po pokoju oliwskim (1660)* [Livonia and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the treaty of Oliwa (1660)], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej w epoce nowożytnej* [Between West and East. Studies on the history of the Commonwealth in the modern era], ed. J. Staszewski, K. Mikulski, J. Dumanowski, p. 114 – 115; G. Sliesoriūnas, *Wywiad moskiewski o wydarzeniach w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim na przełomie wieku XVII i XVIII* [Moscow’s Intelligence about the events in Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the turn of XVII and XVIII century], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Etniczne, kulturowe i religijne pogranicza Rzeczypospolitej w XVI-XVIII wieku* [Between West and East. Ethnical, Cultural and Religious borders of the Commonwealth in XVII-XVIII century], ed. K. Mikulski, A. Zielińska-Nowicka, Toruń 2005, p. 110 – 111.

² K. Jarochoński, *Dzieje panowania Augusta II od śmierci Jana III do chwili wstąpienia*

Lithuania between the supporters of the most powerful at that time house of Sapieha and the houses of Wiśnowiecki, Radziwiłł, Pac and Ogiński, who were supported by the middle nobility. Sapieha house was defeated in the battle of Olkieniki in 1700, however, they quickly found the chance to fight back when the Swedish army entered³. Also after the victories of Kliszów in 1702 and Pułtusk in 1703 and surrender of Saxon army sieged in Toruń on 14 October 1703, the anti-royal opposition in the Crown found itself a protector in Charles XII. However, despite his victories, the king of Sweden could not achieve his basic goal of forcing Augustus II to withdraw from the war⁴.

Not being able to end the conflict the way he wished, Charles XII attempted to drastically resolve the situation by the end of 1703. He had gained the control over the major cities of the Commonwealth, what guaranteed him safety in the Greater Poland and enabled him to control strategically important line of Vistula (Cracow, Warta, Toruń, Elbląg)⁵. He had seen the house of Sapieha and the royal opposition as his allies, however, during that year the situation changed drastically. On the one hand, the General

Karola XII na ziemię polską [The reign of Augustus II from the death of Jan III to entering the borders of Commonwealth by Charles XII], Poznań 1856; J. Pielas, *Szlachta sandomierska wobec najważniejszych wydarzeń politycznych pierwszych lat panowania Augusta II (1696 – 1704)* [The nobility of Sandomierz in the face of the political events in the first years of reign of Augustus II (1696-1704)], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej* [The Commonwealth during Great Northern War], ed. J. Muszyńska, Kielce 2001, p. 130 – 131; J. Staszewski, *Elekcja 1697 roku, „Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici”* [The election of 1697, „Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici”], v. 28 (259), 1993, p. 73 – 92; J. Staszewski, *„Jak Polskę przemienić w kraj kwitnący...”*. *Szkice i studia z czasów saskich* [How to change Poland into a country in bloom.... Drafts and studies from Saxon period], Olsztyn 1997, p. 7 – 22;

³ G. Sliesoriūnas, *Wywiad moskiewski o wydarzeniach...* [Moscow's Intelligence about the events...], p. 111 – 115; J. Pielas, *Szlachta sandomierska wobec...* [The nobility of Sandomierz in the face...], p.138 – 139.

⁴ B. Krzysztopa-Czupryńska, *Rzeczpospolita w wielkiej wojnie północnej w świetle relacji Johna Robinsona (1703-1707)* [The Commonwealth during Great Northern War as described by John Robinson (1703-1707)], , in *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych w XV – XVIII wieku* [Poland in great European conflicts of modern era. Diplomacy and international affairs in XV – XVIII century], ed. R. Skowron, Kraków 2009, p. 96 – 98; M. Wagner, *Działania wojenne na ziemiach polskich w drugiej połowie 1703 r.* [Military actions within Polish territory in the second half of 1703] , in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...*[Commonwealth during...], p. 56; M. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Kliszowem 19 lipca 1702 roku* [The battle of Kliszów, 19 June 1702], Oświęcim 2013.

⁵ M. Wagner, *Działania wojenne na ziemiach polskich...*[Military Actions...], p. 56.

Sejm convened in Lublin by Augustus agreed to enter peace talks with Russia, what showed that the nobility started to support Augustus II and forecast involvement of the Commonwealth in the war against Sweden. On the other hand, the head of the Catholic Church in Poland, primate Michał Radziejowski, expressed his support for the anti-royal confederation of Greater Poland⁶. Charles XII saw his chance to drive Augustus II from the Polish-Lithuanian throne and force him to sign peace treaty. For that purpose, in 1704 the king of Sweden managed to establish pro-Swedish and anti-royal confederation of nobility under the command of Radziejowski. The supporters of Sweden who entered the confederation declared dethronement of Augustus II, and in July 1704, while being guarded by the Swedish army, elected a new king. Even though the election was conducted according to the will of Charles, not many nobility came to the Election Field, they were mostly reluctant to the adventurous politics of Wettin and being advocates of legalism. After the imprisonment of prince Jakub and prince Konstanty Sobieski, Stanisław Leszczyński, hitherto Poznań governor, was elected king. However, the election broke the law of the Polish-Lithuanian monarchy and, paradoxically, led to the increase of support for Augustus among the nobility⁷. Because of the military instability, the crowning ceremony of the king-elect was conducted later, on 4

⁶ J. Kopiec, *Polityka Augusta II wobec Rzymu na tle obsady biskupstw w pierwszym okresie rządów* [Augustus' II Policy towards Rome and bishops in the first period of his reign], in *Dwór a kraj. Między centrum a peryferiami władzy* [The court and the country. Between the centre and the periphery of reign], ed. R. Skowron, Kraków 2003, p. 526; H. Suchojad, *Sejmy i zjazdy walne czasów wojny północnej* [Sejms and General Sejms during Great Northern War], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 105; J. Pielas, *Szlachta sandomierska wobec...* [The nobility of Sandomierz during...], p. 144 – 145; J. Poraziński, *Sejm lubelski w 1703 roku i jego miejsce w konfliktach wewnętrznych na początku XVIII wieku* [Sejm in Lublin in 1703 and its role in the internal conflicts of the beginning of XVIII century], Warszawa-Poznań-Toruń 1988, p. 120 – 121.

⁷ D. Dolański, *Związki polsko-śląskie w latach wielkiej wojny północnej* [Polish-Silesian relationship during Great Northern War], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 218 – 220; J.A. Gierowski, *Kandydatura Sobieskich do tronu polskiego w czasie wielkiej wojny północnej*, [Sobieski's candidacy to Polish throne during Great Northern War] „Sobótka” 1980, nr 2, p. 369 – 381; K. Piwarski, *Królewicz Jakub Sobieski w Oławie* [Prince Jakub Sobieski in Oława], Kraków 1939, p. 35 – 37; J. Poraziński, *August II, Piotr I i Karol XII. Polityczne koncepcje trzech monarchów a Rzeczpospolita w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej (1702 – 1710)* [Augustus II, Peter I and Charles XII. Political ideas of the three monarchs and the Commonwealth during Great Northern War (1702-1710)], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia z dziejów...* [Between West and East. Studies on...], p. 132.

October 1705 in Warsaw, not in Cracow, as it was done traditionally⁸.

Moreover, the Warsaw confederates were forced to sign a treaty of alliance with Sweden in 1705 which restricted political and economic sovereignty of the Commonwealth⁹. Under the treaty, the "Leszczyński's Commonwealth" agreed to pass the territory of Livonia and Courland into the Swedish hands, and Swedish army was allowed to be stationed and collect contributions from the citizens of Commonwealth. Moreover, the treaty obliged the nobility to cooperate in the war against Augustus II until his formal abdication from the commonwealth throne and gave Sweden a number of trade privileges¹⁰.

In response to the actions, in 1704 the pro-royal party created nobility confederation in Sandomierz. The authorities of the confederation saw themselves as the representatives of the whole society. They sent their emissaries to Tsar Peter I. In August 1704, in Narva, the emissaries signed a treaty with Russia. It is assumed that since that moment the Commonwealth, or at least its part recognising the rule of the Saxon (so called "Augustus' Commonwealth"), was at war with Sweden. In the treaty both sides declared united continuation of the war without possibility of signing a separate treaty with Sweden. Peter I also promised military help and financial subsidy¹¹.

⁸ A. Wieczorek, *„Została Polska dla niezgody w kartach...” – implikacje rozbieżnych przekonań w świetle pism politycznych 1705 r.* [„Poland was to cause discord...” – implications of diverse beliefs in the light of political letters of 1705], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia ku czci profesora Jacka Staszewskiego* [Between West and East. Studies to commemorate professor Jacek Staszewski], vol. II, ed. J. Dumanowski, B. Dybaś, J. Poraziński, S. Roszak, Toruń 2003, p. 601 – 605.

⁹ *Traktat warszawski między Leszczyńskim a Karolem XII z dnia 18 listopada 1705 roku* [Treaty of Warsaw between Leszczyński and Charles XII signed on 18 November 1705], in W. Konopczyński, *Czasy saskie w Polsce w świetle źródeł* [Saxon period in Poland in source texts], Kraków 1923, p. 4 – 5.

¹⁰ J. Feldman, *Polska w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej 1704 – 1709* [Poland during Great Northern War 1704-1709], Kraków 1925, p. 128 – 132; W. Konopczyński, *Polska a Szwecja od pokoju oliwskiego do upadku Rzeczypospolitej 1660 – 1795* [Poland and Sweden from treaty of Oliva to the fall of the Commonwealth 1660 – 1795], Warszawa 1924, p. 50 – 52; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], trans. W. Łygaś, Gdańsk 2010, p. 134 – 135.

¹¹ P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne za panowania Piotra I* [Russian armed forces during the reign of Peter I], Kraków 2010, 318; J. Pielas, *Szlachta sandomierska wobec...* [The nobility of Sandomierz in the face...], p. 147 – 148; G. Sliesoriunas, *Starania dyplomacji rosyjskiej o wciągnięcie Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów do wojny ze Szwecją w roku 1702 a problem integralności państwa polsko-litewskiego* [The efforts of Russian diplomacy to involve the Commonwealth into the war with Sweden in

Nevertheless, in the face of focus of Russian forces in the Baltic theatre, the military situation of Augustus still was not advantageous. After the battles of Poniec in 1704 and Warsaw in 1705 Sweden and its allies gained control over the Duchy of Courland, Samogitia, Cuiavia and major part of Royal Prussia. Even the king retreated to Saxony where he rebuilt his destroyed army while allied Saxon and the Commonwealth detachments were involved in limited military operations¹².

The situation of Charles XII, whose major forces were positioned in Greater Poland at that time, also was not easy as he was vastly outnumbered and the opponents were using hit-and-run tactics based on the local population. Territorial acquisitions were only temporary and victories in battles were insufficient to end the war¹³. What is more, the king of Sweden rejected every peace proposal from Russia as he did not agree to give up Petersburg, even though in the meantime he lost Dorpat and Narva. He was convinced that after bringing Augustus II to his knees he would also force Peter I to surrender¹⁴. In the meantime Wettin, who was in Saxony at that time, managed to gather another army using the resources from a wealthy and untouched by the war duchy which was at his disposal, and with military and financial support of tsar. Additionally, his loyal Crown and Lithuanian hetmans enlarged their armies. Moreover, in July 1705 strong Russian forces entered Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the east with the intention to permanently separate Charles' XII army from Swedish forces stationed in Courland and Livonia¹⁵.

1702 and the problem of the integrity of Polish – Lithuanian state] , in *Polska wobec wielkich...* [Poland during great...], p. 465 – 481.

¹² K. Wagner, *Szwedzka okupacja Starej Warszawy w źródłach narracyjnych 1702-1705* [Swedish occupation of the Old Warsaw in narrative sources] , in *Na z góry upatrzonych pozycjach* [On the positions chosen before], ed. B. Międzybrodzki, M. Gajda, K. Fudalej, M. Przeperski, Warszawa-Zabrze 2011, p. 175-184; D. Płowy, *Poniec 7 XI 1704. Kampania jesienna Karola XII* [Poniec 7 XI 1704. Autumn campaign of Charles XII], Zabrze-Tarnowskie Góry 2013.

¹³ More about the Swedish army of that period: A. Aberg, *The Swedish Army, from Lützen to Narwa* , in *Sweden's Age of Greatness 1632 – 1718*, ed. M. Roberts, London 1972, p. 265 – 287.

¹⁴ J. Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers 1685 – 1715*, New York 1951, p. 54.

¹⁵ J. Przebendowski do A. Sieniawskiego, obóz pod Sandomierzem 8 V 1704 [Sandomierz camp 8 V 1704] , in *Listy Jana Jerzego Przebendowskiego podskarbiego wielkiego koronnego do Adama Mikołaja Sieniawskiego wojewody bełskiego i hetmana wielkiego koronnego z lat 1704 – 1725* [The letters of Jan Jerzy Przebendowski, Grand Treasurer of the Crown, to Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski, voivode of Belz and Crown Grand Hetman from 1704-1725], ed. A. Perłakowski, Kraków 2007, p. 44 – 45; В.С. Великанов,

On 12 November 1705 Augustus II forced his way to Grodno, which was the Russian army's headquarter, operating within the territory of the Grand Duchy. Crown and Lithuanian senators loyal to the king also arrived there, what marked the beginning of the meeting of General Confederate Council at Grodno due to the impossibility to convene Sejm, the most important political body of that part of the country that still recognised the reign of Wettin in the torn by the war state¹⁶.

One of the decisions that were taken in Grodno was the one dated to 20 December 1705 concerning the creation of a new "komput" of army. After the expansion, the number of soldiers in the Crown army was supposed to be as follows: 2 080 Polish Hussar horses, 8 660 heavy cavalry, 3 000 light cavalry, 1 300 harquebusier, 4 360 dragoon, 16 600 infantry. The numbers totalled to 36 000 horses and people. The number of soldiers in the Lithuanian army was also increased: 430 hussar horses, 3 300 heavy cavalry, 1 770 light cavalry, 900 harquebusier, 2 000 dragoon, 3 600 infantry - 12 000 in total. It is clearly visible in the numbers that the military potential of immersed in crisis Commonwealth was reduced to 24 000 horses and people after the war with Turkey in 1699. At the same time, at the beginning of the conflict, Sweden had 76 000 armed soldiers, what was increased to 115 000 in 1708. At that time Russia had 220 000 soldiers and France - 350 000. Prussia had similar sized army; however, its population was 2-3 times smaller¹⁷.

It should be noted, that the actual number of soldiers was drastically different from the official statistics. It may be explained by the fact that in the Commonwealth army of that time officers were not provided with a separate soldier's pay. They earned equivalent of several pays of an ordinary soldier (that is why "horses" and "people" were considered financial, not military units). Secondly, the army had to deal with a high level of desertion due to irregularity of pay and unwillingness to take part in what seemed to be a civil

Участие русских войск в боевых действиях на территории Польши и Литвы в 1702 – 1704 гг. [The involvement of Russian military forces in the military actions in the Commonwealth of 1702-1704], in *Wybrane problemy badawcze historii wojskowej. W panczerzu i mundurze* [Selected research issues of the history of military. In armour and uniform], ed. K. Kościelniak, Z. Pilarczyk, Toruń 2014, p. 129 – 161.

¹⁶ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny północnej* [The memoir of Great Northern War], issued M. Nagielski, M. Wagner, Warszawa 2002, p. 30 – 31, 36.

¹⁷ P. Kennedy, *Mocarstwa świata. Narodziny, rozkwit, upadek* [The powers of the world. The birth, the blossom, the fall], Warszawa 1994, p. 109; J. Wimmer, *Polskie wojsko i sztuka wojenna w czasie wielkiej wojny północnej* [Polish army and the art of war during Great Northern War], SMHW, v. 21, 1978, p. 360.

war. It was not uncommon for infantry and dragoon to be 30 to 50% smaller than the official numbers. The situation in the cavalry was similar. Another problem was the attitude of officers who went on vacation during their service very often. At that time, however, a lot of units existed outside of the komput system, mainly private detachments which belonged to magnates and financed from contributions gathered from local residents by force. That is why the actual size of the Crown and Lithuanian army is extremely difficult to precisely estimate¹⁸.

Additionally, it should be remembered that because of the defeats Polish-Lithuanian army started to show signs of so-called "Swedish complex" which can be defined as unwillingness to open fight with Sweden because of lack of faith in victory. Officers started to rely on limited military actions focusing mainly on attacks on smaller units or destroying supply lines - hit-and-run tactics¹⁹. Also permanent shortage of infantry (mostly used in manning fortresses in threatened by Cossacks Ukraine) and artillery made it impossible to take over permanently or defend major cities. The shortage of infantry is visible in the battle of Kliszów in which only 2 rota of Polish infantry (about 500 soldiers) were fighting against 10 500 Swedish infantry²⁰. What is more, Polish infantry was also underequipped when compared to its opponent. Only between 1703 and 1708 the matchlock muskets were replaced by flintlock guns. That is the reason why only small units of cavalry were operating. Using their mobility and

¹⁸ M. Nagielski, *Upadek staropolskiej sztuki wojennej w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej* [The fall of traditional Polish art of war during Great Northern War], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 25 – 26.

¹⁹ A.K. Link-Lenczowski, *Czy wojna północna była okresem trwałego załamania systemu wartości funkcjonujących w Rzeczypospolitej?* [Was the Northern War the period the lasting collapse of the value system of the Commonwealth?], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 285 – 286; M. Prejs, *Obraz wojny północnej w poezji pierwszej połowy XVIII wieku* [The Northern War in the poetry of the first half of XVIII century], in *Wojny, bitwy i potyczki w kulturze staropolskiej* [Wars, battles and encounters in old Polish culture], ed. W. Pawlak, M. Piskala, Warszawa 2011, p. 271; J. Ronikier, *Hetman Adam Sieniawski i jego regimentarze. Studium z historii mentalności szlachty polskiej 1706 – 1725* [Hetman Adam Sieniawski and his regimentaries. Study on the history of mentality of Polish nobility 1706 – 1725], Kraków 1992, p. 146 – 150.

²⁰ M. Nagielski, *Upadek staropolskiej sztuki wojennej...* [The fall of traditional...], p. 17; J. Ronikier, *Hetman Adam Sieniawski...* [Hetman Adam Sieniawski...], p. 130 – 132; M. Wagner, *Bitwa pod Kliszowem...* [The battle of Kliszów...], p. 84; J. Wimmer, *Historia piechoty polskiej do roku 1864* [The history of Polish infantry to 1864], Warszawa 1978, p. 261; A. Шкваров, *Пепл I и казаки*, Санкт-Петербург 2010, p. 152 – 158.

the element of surprise they harassed the opponent at the same time being unable to drive him out of the territory permanently. While the conflict prolonged, the units started to aim on conquering territories which were supposed to become their source of supply, however. The fact that unpaid soldiers had to organise their stocks themselves had miserable effect on the discipline and morale²¹.

Due to the expansion of the forces loyal to Augustus and the entry of Russian forces to Lithuania at the beginning of 1706, the allies gained advantage over the enemy: about 25 000 Russian soldiers were located to Tykocin near Grodno, Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov with his 12 000 soldiers was in Belarus, and about 10 000 Saxons and Lithuanians were stationed near Brest-Litovsk. The Crown army was also numerous: 30 000 Cossacks of Hetman Ivan Mazepa stationed probably in Volyn and Right-bank Ukraine. The Crown army (officially 36 000, actually smaller) supported by about 1 000 nobility volunteers was resting during winter in Lesser Poland, Rus, and Podolia. Additionally, 18 - 20 000 Saxons and Russians of general Hans Wostromirski started preparing for military actions in Saxony. That way the allied armies formed a great ring surrounding the army of Charles XII and Stanisław Leszczyński²².

Winter - Spring Campaign of 1706

Taking into consideration the facts presented in the previous chapter, Charles XII, the head of the Polish-Swedish army placed west from Vistula, had every right to fear coming spring. That is why the king of Sweden wanted to anticipate coaxial attack of his opponents by gathering all the available forces and attacking Grodno in January 1706. He left only covering corps of about 10 - 12 000 soldiers in Greater Poland under the command of Karl Rehnskiöld²³. The launch of military actions in winter surprised the allied who were not able to gather their army. The army of Charles XII of about 19 - 20 000 Swedish and 8 -

²¹ M. Nagielski, *Upadek staropolskiej sztuki wojennej...* [The fall of traditional...], p. 19, 39; J. Ronikier, *Hetman Adam Sieniawski...* [Hetman Adam Sieniawski...], p. 135 - 145; M. Wagner, *Działania wojenne na ziemiach polskich...* [Military actions...], p. 57; J. Wimmer, *Polskie wojsko i sztuka wojenna...* [Polish army and the art of war], p. 361.

²² W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny..* [The memoir of...], p. 36; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II i Rzeczpospolita 1697 - 1706*, Kraków 2010, p. 555 - 556; A. Шкваров, *Пётр I и казаки* [Peter I and Cossacks], p. 307.

²³ O. Sjöström, *Bitwa pod Wschową 1706. A potem pole bitwy zabarwiło się na czerwono...* [The battle of Wschowa. And then the battlefield turned red...], trans. W. Łygaś, Zabrze-Tarnowskie Góry 2012, p. 72

10 000 Polish soldiers crossed Bug and blocked the majority of Russian army in Grodno. After consulting other officers and with the approval of Augustus II, the commander of the army, Georg Oglivie, chose to fortify, rather than fight in the open field. On the other hand, Charles XII did not dare to storm strong fortifications. He began to block the city counting on famine and diseases to force Russians to surrender after some time. Seeing the development of the situation, Wettin used the last open passage to retreat from Grodno with 4 000 Russian cavalry, which could not be used during a siege, to command operations that were aimed firstly on defeating the Swedish units left in Greater Poland, and secondly, defeating the forces of Charles XII surrounding Oglive in Grodno. When Peter I learnt about the siege of his best units of infantry, he ordered to secure the borders of the Russian empire by building fortifications, mobilising population, and concentrating the remaining forces near Minsk what would enable them to relieve Oglive. Other Russian units together with allied Lithuanian banners were ordered not to let the army of Charles XII join with Swedish army operating in Livonia²⁴.


Augustus II moved towards Mazovia calling the Crown army and Saxon units placed in Cracow and Lublin from winter rest. However, instead of relieving Grodno, as Peter I wished, he send urging orders to general Mathias Johann von der Schulenburg, who commanded Saxon army placed in Saxony and had just rebuilt after previous defeats²⁵. That way he wished to attack from both sides the covering corps of general Rehnskiöld. He assumed that the Swedish units would be defeated and the victorious Saxon army would recapture Poznan and only then move to fight Charles XII. This bold plan was not executed, because Swedish general gathered all his forces and moved to attack the stronger of the two opponents, the army of Schulenburg²⁶.

The Saxon general was trying to convince his king that his units were not ready to fight experienced and well-trained Swedish army. Saxon army had had troubles with recruitment after big losses in the previous years. That is why the

²⁴ A. Kamiński, *Przeciwko Szwedom i Leszczyńskiemu. Działania wojsk rosyjskich na terenie Polski w 1705 – 1706 roku* [Against Sweden and Leszczyński. Military actions of Russian army in Poland in 1705 – 1706], SMHW, v, 12, 1966, part 2, p. 239 – 242; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* [Russian armed forces...], p. 324 – 325; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], p. 135 – 136; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie wojny północnej* [The army of the Commonwealth during Great Northern War], Warszawa 1956, p. 304 – 305.

²⁵ O. Sjöström, *Bitwa pod Wschową 1706* [The battle of Wschowa 1706], p. 108 – 109.

²⁶ B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], p. 136; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 616, 622.



Ł. Więch, *The military actions in the Commonwealth, I-VI 1706*

contingents had been replenished in every possible way, what resulted in poor quality of the soldiers. In the end Schulenburg had to rely on Bavarian and French captives from the war on Spanish succession and people such as seasonal workers, or vagrants, all enlisted by force. However, the king's orders were clear and the monarch himself was convinced that he would win. Not having the choice, Schulenburg gathered all his army (16 000 infantry and 4 000 cavalry, including 6 000 Russian infantry) and on 7 February 1706 crossed the border of Austrian Silesia in order to enter Poland the shortest way. Unfortunately, poor weather conditions and slow pace of the crossing of Oder River caused by unexpected thaw gave Sweden enough time to recognise the opponent's moves and concentrate all the forces in the area²⁷.

On 11 February Saxon army reached the border village of Sława. Schulemburg received the message there that Swedish troops were approaching, so he forbade crossing the border and ordered his army to occupy defensive positions on a hill. Rehnskiöld did not decide to attack more numerous opponent in an easy to defend place which was located within the neutral Silesian

²⁷ O. Sjöström, *Bitwa pod Wschową 1706* [The battle of Wschowa 1706], p. 109, 111 – 113; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p. 305 – 306.

territory. He had learnt from the prisoners that Saxons had some troubles with supplies, so he understood that they would not be able to stay there for long, so they would have to enter the territory of the Commonwealth. To encourage them to do so, he decided to simulate a retreat. The manoeuvre was risky, because each day of delay could end with cavalry under the command of Augustus II entering the battlefield. Saxons could also bypass Swedish army and meet the army of their king²⁸.

However, the manoeuvre was successful and when he learnt that the Saxon army moved towards the nearest town of Fraudstadt, he turned back his army and attacked the surprised enemy. The Saxon general formed a combat force as quickly as possible in a way very similar to his enemy, with infantry in the centre and cavalry on the sides. The battle began on 13 February 1706 in the afternoon. Even though Saxon and Russian army was bigger (18 000 compared with 10 000 soldiers and 32 to 0 canons), they took defensive positions and waited for the actions of their enemy. However, they were completely defeated by Swedish corps attacking from the front in the whole line. Russian forces in the left wing of Schulenburg's army were broken first. Next, the Saxon cavalry in the right wing surrendered. Saxon infantry in the centre defended itself for the longest time. It dealt the enemy considerable damage; however, it was also defeated after the attack from the wings and back by Swedish cavalry²⁹.

Up to this day the murder of part of the Russian infantry by Swedish troops is unsolved. Probably about 500 prisoners were killed because they tried to hide in Saxon uniforms. In total, about 7 400 Saxons and Russians died in the battle, and twice as much were imprisoned. Sweden lost 400 people and 1000 - 1500 were injured. Some of the injured were able to continue the service. The victory greatly impressed the contemporary, and is still considered one of the biggest victories in the history of Sweden³⁰. Augustus the Strong did not manage to reach the battlefield in Wschowa, and being afraid of the victorious Sweden, he retreated to Cracow by Piotrkow, where he gathered his remaining forces³¹.

²⁸O. Sjöström, *Bitwa pod Wschową 1706* [The battle of Wschowa 1706], p. 138 – 142.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 181 – 242.

³⁰B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], p. 136 – 137; O. Sjöström, *Bitwa pod Wschową 1706* [The battle of Wschowa 1706], p. 243 – 248; A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Propaganda sukcesów szwedzkich w czasie wielkiej wojny północnej w niemieckojęzycznych gazetach ulotnych 1701-1709* [The propaganda of Swedish successes of Great Northern War in german newspapers 1701 – 1709], in *Rzeczpospolite w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 412 – 414.

³¹W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...*[The memoir of...], p. 39 – 42.; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...*[Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 627.

In that situation Russian army in Grodno, reduced almost by half because of the losses and diseases, and not hoping for relief, was forced by the tsar to fight through the Swedish blockade, because otherwise they could be totally annihilated. Peter I wanted to avoid it at all costs because it would mean losing his best units of the reformed army and opening the borders to the Swedish attacks. Grodno army was supposed to move as the ice on Neman River breaks, what would secure it from the main forces of Charles XII³². On 3 April 1706 Russian units escaped the siege and retreated quickly to Kiev marching by Tykocin, Brest-Litovsk and Kovel. The Swedish army tried to stand in the way of the retreat of Russian army by marching towards Minsk and Polesia. They found many fortifications there, mostly manned by Kosack units under the command of Ivan Mazepa, or Lithuanian units loyal to Augustus. All the fortifications were captured, and Cossack's relief defeated by Col. Kreutz in the battle of Klatsk, however, due to the delays it had caused, it was impossible to catch up Russian army³³. It was also the last campaign of marshal Ogliva as the commander of Russian army. After some disputes with tsar he resigned. As it seems, until the end of his command he was not able to understand, as well as other Saxon generals, that the army of Charles XII fights differently than other western European armies, what was the reason why they could not fight them successfully in the battlefield³⁴.

A the same time (April - June 1706) Augustus gathered Saxon and Crown military detachments in Lesser Poland, collected taxes to cover the needs of his army and reinforced Cracow. However, when Swedish army moved towards him from Greater Poland, Wettin did not choose to fight. He retreated north, towards Radom since he feared he could be separated from Russian forces. At

³² A. Kamiński, *Przeciwko Szwedom i Leszczyńskiemu* [Against Sweden and Leszczyński...], p. 243 – 248; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* [Russian armed forces...], p. 326 – 327; A. Шкваров, *Петр I и казаки* [Peter I and Cossacks], p. 307 – 308.

³³ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 42 – 43; A. Kamiński, *Przeciwko Szwedom i Leszczyńskiemu* [Against Sweden and Leszczyński...], p. 254 – 257; B. Krzysztopa-Czupryńska, *Rzeczpospolita w wielkiej wojnie...* [The Commonwealth during...], p. 105; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], p. 138; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 624 – 626.

³⁴ G. Arteus, *Szwedzka taktyka walki podczas wielkiej wojny północnej* [Swedish tactics during Great Northern War], SMHW, v. 21, 1978, p. 347 – 358; R. Frost, *W sprawie zachodniej techniki wojskowej w okresie Wojen Północnych (1558-1721)* [On western tactics in the period of Northern Wars (1558-1721)], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem. Studia z dziejów...* [Between West nad East. Studies on...], p. 300; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* [Russian armed forces...], p. 326 – 328.

that time, he had nearly 10 000 Crown soldiers under his command, as well as part of Lithuanian, Saxon and Russian cavalry. In total, the Crown forces summed up to about 15 000 people, according to the contemporaries, so they were comparable with Rehnskiöld army. Next, after crossing Vistula river he travelled towards Lithuania, which was free from Swedish units and merged with the forces of 6 000 Lithuanian army under the command of Hetman Wiśniowiecki. Even having under his command so significant military force he avoided fights with corps of general Arvid Axel Mardefeld stationed in Brest, even though his army outnumbered several times the army of the Swedish General. It seems that the king lost his fighting spirit after the defeat of his army in Wschowa, or he was not convinced about the loyalty of numerous Polish soldiers fighting on his side³⁵.

Due to the Swedish victory in Wschowa and the escape of Augustus II from Cracow, divisions of the Crown army under the command of Crown Chamberlain Jerzy Aleksander Lubomirski and Oboźny of the Crown, Jerzy Dominik Lubomirski switched the sides and joined Leszczyński. Additionally, seeing further successes of Charles XII and his Polish supporters, the following magnates sponsored private detachments and joined Leszczyński: Lublin voivode Adam Tarło and Chamberlain of Cracow, Franciszek Lanckoroński. Their regiments operated in Lesser Poland and joined later the main forces under the command of Kiev voivode and hetman of Leszczyński's army, Józef Potocki³⁶.

The Attack on Saxony


By the end of spring 1706 the military situation was much better for Sweden and their Polish supporters than it had been half a year earlier, however, they were still far from victory. Even though Saxon army had been defeated in Wschowa, it was slowly rebuilt, as well as Russian detachments, which were fortifying borders in fear of direct Swedish attack on Kiev or Smolensk. Also Cossacks, defeated in a number of battles, or the Crown army operating between Cracow and Lviv were still able to fight. That is why Charles XII decided to take a risky step, even though he travelled from Grodno to Wolyn during his chase. He

³⁵ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 43 – 44; K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich spraw wewnętrznych, polityki i wojny* [On Saxon internal affairs, policies and war], Poznań 1886, p. 392 – 395; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p. 308 – 309.

³⁶ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 46; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p. 308.

decided to attack Saxony in an attempt to throw Augustus II to his knees and subject all the Commonwealth to Stanisław Leszczyński³⁷.

The decision was probably taken in July 1706 when Swedish army was resting after difficult marches in Wolyn and causing terrible devastation in the area. Charles XII decided to attack from the territory of Silesia, which separated Poland and Saxony, the hereditary principality of Augustus in order to force him surrender. He hoped that because of the victory the majority of nobility and magnates in the Commonwealth would recognise the reign of Stanisław Leszczyński and the whole country would become his ally in the war against Russia. Saxony was the most sensitive point of Wettin. It was left almost defenceless after the battle of Wschowa, even though the Saxon army was being rebuilt, it was clear that it could not stand a chance against experienced Swedish soldiers. That is why it was possible to eliminate one of the two anti-Swedish coalition partners with one bold move. The economic potential was also important, which was supposed to be used in the near future to modernise and rebuild Swedish army exhausted by the few years of constant battle³⁸.



Ł. Więch, *The military actions in the Commonwealth, VII-XI 1706*

³⁷ A. Kamiński, *Przeciwko Szwedom i Leszczyńskiemu* [Against Sweden and Leszczyński], p. 257 – 259.

³⁸ J. Poraziński, *August II, Piotr I i Karol XII...*, [Augustus II, Peter I and Charles XII...], p. 132 – 133; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p.308, 310.

Charles XII gathered the majority of available forces on his side and on 17 July 1706 marched west from Jarosławice near Lutsk³⁹. He did it against the advice of the majority of his officers, who were afraid that entering Silesia would cause Austria enter war supporting Augustus. Swedish army marched through Wojnicz, Pidhaitsi and Vladimir to Horodło, where it joined the forces of general Mardefeld from Brest and Polish-Lithuanian divisions loyal to Leszczyński⁴⁰. The king of Sweden with all his forces moved from there to Greater Poland through Puławy and Radom accepting pledges of allegiance to king Leszczynski from forced to do so nobility⁴¹. West from Vistula a covering division was chosen to stay in Greater Poland, and on 15 August king of Sweden left Warta with the divisions of generals Rehnsköld i Mayerfeld. On 11 September 1706 the allied forces entered the borders of Saxony⁴².

The plan of Charles XII was successful - Wettin, who was in the Commonwealth at that time, seeing occupation and ruination of his hereditary principedom, which he valued more than the elective throne of Polish - Lithuanian state, entered peace talks. He had seen through the plan of Charles XII quickly, and on 16 August 1706 authorised his secret representatives, Georg Pffingsten and Anton von Imhoff to enter peace talks with the king of Sweden when his army was still marching through Greater Poland⁴³.

Augustus began simultaneous diplomatic game full of ambiguities. He decided to negotiate with Sweden, and at the same time asked tsar for financial and military support in order to resume fights with the Swedish king. In order not to disclose his negotiations to Polish and Russian allies, whom he was simply betraying, Augustus II agreed to begin military actions against small divisions of Polish - Swedish army. Firstly, one of the commanders of the Crown army, Crown Master of the Hunt Jakub Zygmunt Rybiński led Polish and Saxon army towards

³⁹ J.. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem 29 października 1706 roku* [The battle of Kalisz 29 October 1706], in *Osiemnaście wieków Kalisza* [Eighteen centuries of Kalisz]. V. 3, ed. A. Geysztor and K. Dąbrowski, Kalisz 1962, p. 122.

⁴⁰ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 46 - 47; K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 398 - 399; B. Krzysztopa-Czupryńska, *Rzeczpospolita w wielkiej wojnie...* [The Commonwealth during...], p. 106; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 674.

⁴¹ A. Panek, *Sejmik lubelski w okresie wojny północnej 1702 - 1716* [Sejmik of Lublin in the period of Northern War 1702-1716], in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 161.

⁴² D. Dolański, *Związki polsko-śląskie...* [Polish - Silesian relationship...], p. 224.

⁴³ K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 405 - 406; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p. 310 - 311.

Cracow, and Spiš to fight pro-Swedish starosta of Spiš, Teodor Lubomirski⁴⁴. Wettin moved later with the main Polish - Lithuanian forces from Navahrudak to Lublin, where on 30 September 1706 joined the forces with the Russian reinforcements of prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov and accompanying him irregular divisions of Cossacks and Bashkirs (Russian forces were directed to defend Kiev from the following winter, and after retreat of Charles they entered Wolyn). Russian forces were about 10 000 regular cavalry, 6 000 Bashkirs (called Kalmyks in memoirs), 4 000 Cossacks and 62 battalions of infantry (each was 600 people on the payroll, but all the sources talk about 20 - 25 000 infantry, not 37 000 as it resulted from the payroll)⁴⁵.

Military Actions in Greater Poland

On 1 October 1706 the joined forces moved west from Lublin and after crossing Vistula in three columns near Kazimierz, they reached Poitrków - Opoczno line before 15 October 1706. Because of the insistence of the officers and probably because of fear Peter I felt that the situation in Grodno would repeat, where most of his reformed army was isolated from the supply base, he decided to leave all the infantry on the other bank of Vistula. Russian army did not differ from the Swedish or Saxon soldiers when considering its behaviour. It also confiscated and robbed local people whenever it could⁴⁶.

In order to maintain his reign in the Crown, Charles XII left a division of about 6 000 soldiers in Greater Poland under the command of Arvid Marderfeld. They were supposed to be supported by his Polish allies stationed in Rawa Voivodeship, but without Stanisław Leszczyński, who moved to Saxony with his personal division. The Swedish general focused near Warta his

⁴⁴ E. Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski pod panowaniem Augusta II* [Poland under the reign of Augustus II], Kraków 1849, p. 96; M. Wagner, *Jakub Zygmunt Rybiński jako organizator i dowódca wojsk koronnych w latach 1706 - 1712* [Jakub Zygmunt Rybiński as the organiser and commander of the Crown army between 1706 - 1712], in *Między Zachodem a Wschodem* [Between West and East], v. II, p. 584.

⁴⁵ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 50; K. Zawisza, *Pamiętniki Krzysztofa Zawiszy wojewody mińskiego (1666-1721)* [The memoirs of Krzysztof Zawisza, voivode of Minsk (1666 - 1721)], issued J. Bartoszewicz, Warszawa 1862, p. 243; K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 408; P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* [Russian armed forces...], p. 329; A. Шкваров, *Петр I и казаки* [Peter I and Cossacks], p. 310; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 123.

⁴⁶ A. Panek, *Sejmik lubelski w okresie...* [Sejmik of Lublin...], p. 158.

forces that had been distributed near Wschowa. Uniejów and Sieradz. Additionally, he was in constant contact with the armed forces of Józef Potocki, who commanded a well-armed, rested and paid divisions in comparison with other armies of that period⁴⁷.

On 2 October the Swedish forces moved from the area of Warta to Wieluń and Brzeźnica. From there small units were sent towards the allied forces which were crossing Vistula, the Crown forces of Rybicki stationed near Cracow, and divisions of Śmigieński operating in Greater Poland. That way general Mardefeld received information that a great army was marching towards him, which consisted of i.a. 20 000 experienced Russian infantry. In that situation he decided to retreat towards Kalisz, where he kept his supplies and could easily continue towards Poznań. General did not let hetman of Leszczyński's army attack the marching allies, even though Polish reconnaissance informed that the actual number of infantry was lower, what was the result of leaving infantry divisions on the other bank of Vistula, as described earlier⁴⁸. Marderfeld was constantly exchanging letters with Charles XII, however, the correspondence was delayed in relation to the accelerating events. For example, we learn from the memoirs of the general that he received the letter in which the king let him retreat towards Poznań after he had made the decision himself⁴⁹.

At the same time, simultaneously with military actions in southern Greater Poland, negotiations were taking place with occupying Saxony Charles XII. As a result, on 24 September 1706, the Treaty of Altranstädt was signed by the representatives of Augustus II, Charles XII and Stanisław Leszczyński. The Saxon elective king gave up Polish throne and released his Polish subjects from the pledge of allegiance. What is more, Wettin was supposed to discontinue contacts with Russian tsar, return Polish archives and crown jewels, and surrender to Sweden all the Russian soldiers who supported Saxon army and deserters from Swedish army⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ J.A. Nordberg, *Konung Carl XII: p. Historia* [King Charles XII: true story], v. I, Stockholm 1740, p. 682; W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 47; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 123.

⁴⁸ *Relacyja bataliej kaliskiej in Anno 1706 die 30 8bris odprawionej* [The relation from the battle of Kalisz of 1706], Biblioteka Czartoryskich, manuscript 1687, p. 225 – 229.

⁴⁹ *Arvid Axel Marderfelts berättelse* [Arvid Axel Mardefelt narrative], in *Karolinska krigares dogböcker* [Karolinska warrior diaries], v. 8, Lund 1913, p. 95 – 124; E. Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski...* [Poland under...], p. 105; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 125. I would like to express my gratitude to Katarzyna Wagner for sharing the account of general Mardefeld.

⁵⁰ J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 686 – 688; B.

The news about signing the treaty and its conditions reached Saxon prince and hitherto Polish king when he was near Piotrków (probably on 15 October), where he signed the peace treaty brought by Georg Pfingsten. However, the treaty was kept secret, because Wettin was afraid of the reaction of the Poles and Russians fighting on his side. What is more, Pfingsten had brought a letter from Charles XII to general Mardefeld, but he left it in Wrocław on his way back to Saxony. In order not to break the terms of the treaty with his actions, Augustus was trying to delay the activities of Polish - Saxon - Russian forces and sent a letter to Mardefeld informing about the treaty and asking him to withdraw without fight. However, the Swedish general, who had not received a confirmation of this fact, did not trust Augustus II and did not retreat on time because he thought it could be a trap⁵¹.

The Swedish general ordered to stop the retreat of infantry near Kalisz and returned there cavalry in order to concentrate all the forces. Only after he had done it, he received a letter from Charles XII informing about the peace treaty and advising to retreat in order to avoid battle. Unfortunately, when the letter came the army of Mardefeld was dangerously close to the advance party of the allied (what is more, it was cavalry and dragoons, whereas Swedes had also infantry), on the back of the army staroste of Gniezno Adam Śmigielski with Polish cavalry and two detachments of Saxon dragoons showed up. In that situation retreat was impossible without sacrificing all the infantry and laagers.

On 26 October 1706, when the main forces of Augustus II reached a village called Staw (about 20km from Kalisz), Józef Potocki proposed a counter attack against the allied. When Mardefeld refused, the following day hetman arbitrarily attacked the enemy with several dozen units of cavalry. A day later, on 28 October 1706, the allied forces came near Kalisz in a battle formation, however, they were separated from the forces of general Mardefeld by Prosna river. It was crossed at night 5 km from the city. Because of muddy banks and collapse of the bridge, the last units crossed the river at dawn⁵².

Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII], p. 141; J. Wimmer, *Wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie...* [The army of the Commonwealth...], p. 311.

⁵¹ J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 688; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 126.

⁵² *Relacja odprawionej szczęśliwie batalie pod Kaliszem die 29 8bris Anno 1706* [The relation from the battle of Kalisz of 1706], Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, manuscript 274, p. 169 – 172; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 127.

Battle of Kalisz

The battle took place on 29 October 1706 on the foregrounds of Kalisz, between Dobrzec, Kościelna Wieś and Warszówka⁵³. Because of the size of the fighting armies, it was the biggest battle of the Great Northern War that took place within the borders of Commonwealth.

General Arvid Axel Mardefeld had only 4 358 Swedish soldiers under his command: a regiment of cavalry from northern Scania, three regiments of dragoons, a Pomeranian regiment of infantry, a Bavarian regiment of infantry, a battalion of Swedes and a battalion of French grenadiers (both consisted of soldiers captured during the battle of Wschowa) - in total there were 6 battalions of infantry and 26 companies of cavalry. There was only one additional small regiment of infantry in Greater Poland, stationed in Poznań, so in case of defeat, it was clear that the Swedish reign in the Crown would end. What is more, the newest studies show that not only the Swedish and French battalions, but also other, mostly German units, were formed after the battle of Wschowa. In the Mardefeld's corps only one regiment was formed in Sweden, what irritated the soldiers serving there, because they were the only regiment that did not go with their king to wealthy Saxony⁵⁴.

These forces were supported by about 9 000 Polish and Lithuanian soldiers, however, they were equipped and trained much worse than their Swedish allies. The command over the units took the voivode of Kiev and hetman of Leszczyński's army, Józef Potocki. His forces were divided into regiments: Royal, Józef Potocki's, Michał Potocki's, Crown Chamberlain Jerzy Dominik Lubomirski's, Crown Great Quartermaster Jerzy Aleksander Lubomirski's, Crown Master of the Kitchen Stanisław Tarło's, and Chamberlain of Cracow, Franciszek Lanckoroński's. Lithuanian forces of about 3 000 soldiers were commanded by Great Field Writer of the Crown, Michał Potocki and the house of Sapieha: staroste of Babruysk, Jan, and Lithuanian pantler, Antoni Kazimierz. Additionally, both Mardefeld and Potocki had 10 cannons at their disposal⁵⁵.

⁵³Publications on the battle: R. Jankowski, P.S. Skworoda, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem w świetle polskiej historiografii lat 1954-2013 i wątpliwości z nią związane* [The battle of Kalisz in the light of Polish historiography of 1954-2013 and doubts connected with it], in *Studia historyczno-wojskowe* [Historical and military studies], v. 5, ed. M. Nagielski, K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, Zabrze-Tarnowskie Góry 2015, p. 195 – 208.

⁵⁴K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 401 – 402; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...*, [Battle of Kalisz...] p. 128.

⁵⁵M. Nagielski, *Kalisz w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej (1701-1716)* [Kalisz during Great

In the army of Augustus II Strong the most valuable element were 9 regiments of Saxon cavalry and 5 regiments of dragoons under the command of Michał Brandt. These should be about 600 people in 56 squadrons, however, it is known, that there were only 42 squadrons (some of them had to be either dismissed because of losses, or left in the home country. In total, it was about 6 000 soldiers instead of 8 400⁵⁶. Additionally, Augustus had cavalry and Russian dragoons under his command led by prince Alexander Menshikov. Various sources state that they were about 4 to 8 000 soldiers, and about 6 000 Cossacks and 4 000 Bashkirs⁵⁷. There were also probably 10 000 Polish soldiers under the command of Crown Grand Hetman Adam Sieniawski and Crown Field Hetman, Stanisław Rzewuski. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find any sources that would tell which units (chorągiew) participated in the battle. Comput of 1706 assumed that 15 000 cavalry and 5 640 dragoons would fight against Sweden, however, as it was mentioned earlier, the actual number of soldiers was much lower. Additionally, the nature of the hit-and-run tactics makes it doubtful that all the units were placed on the battlefield. It is also worth remembering that the regiments of both Lubomirski brother sided with Stanisław Leszczyński. The regular forces were reinforced by 12 units (chorągiew) of *pospolite ruszenie* under the command of Adam Śmigielski, which were about 1 000 people⁵⁸.

In total, the whole Saxon-Russian-Polish army is estimated by historians to be between 31 and 36 000 soldiers. The artillery consisted of 17 canons. Additionally, Russian dragoons carried small mortars, which were effectively used in the final stage of the battle⁵⁹.

As it is possible to estimate from the comparison, the proportion was about 2.5:1 in favour of Augustus army. With such disproportion of power, it is surprising that the Swedish general did not decide to fight the battle in a defensive manner based on not very modern city walls or reinforced camp, but he chose to fight an open battle in the fore fields of Kalisz instead. He began to march out of the city on 27 October. It is even more surprising when one takes into account the fact that the Polish-Saxon-Russian forces consisted mostly of

Northern War (1701-1716)], in *Kalisz na przestrzeni wieków* [Kalisz over the centuries], ed. T. Baranowski, A. Buko, Kalisz 2013, p. 230 – 231.

⁵⁶ K. Zawisza, *Pamiętniki Krzysztofa Zawiszy...* [Memoires of Krzysztof Zawisza...], p. 243.

⁵⁷ J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 128.

⁵⁸ K. Jarochoowski, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 420; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 129.

⁵⁹ M. Nagielski, *Kalisz w dobie...* [Kalisz during...], p. 231.

cavalry, Cossacks and Bashkirs who had little value when storming reinforcements. There could be three motifs of the decision. Firstly, it could be caused by Swedish tactics of Charles XII who had focused on quick and breaking attack on the enemy lines. Secondly, it was also possible that he chose the tactics because of the fact that he had numerous cavalry under his command. These were units that had little value when fighting defensive battles. What is more, there was no guarantee that both leaders and not disciplined soldiers would agree to get trapped in the camp or feel urge to fight. Finally, they could not expect relief forces, since the main Swedish forces were in Saxony and there was no chance that they could manage to travel to Kalisz quickly.

Arvid Maderfeld set his forces in two lines. In the centre there were regiments of infantry and Swedish cavalry backed up by the artillery. These were the units having the biggest combat value. In the wings he put units of Warsaw Confederates. On the left wing there were Lithuanian units commanded by Michał Potocki and the Sapieha brothers. On the right wing there was the Crown army under the command of Józef Potocki, supported by Lubomirski brothers, Stanisław Tarło, and Franciszek Lanckoroński. At the back of the formation, Polish soldiers formed a traditional reinforced camp that was made from carts which they fastened together in a shape of quadrangle. In case of defeat it was also a place where the soldiers could hide. There were also the families of the higher rank officers in the camp, including both Potocki. Swedish army put up their camp in the suburbs of the city. General left small Swedish garrison of 2 companies of dragoons in Kalisz. The wings of Mardefeld's army were placed between swamps and wood, what was supposed to protect it from outflanking, however, at the same time it forced to attack uphill⁶⁰.

Due to the natural restrictions of the battleground and the vast number of the soldiers, the opposing army was arranged in a much deeper set up consisting of four lines. In the centre were placed the best units: on the right side 3 lines of Russian cavalry commanded by prince Menshikov and on the left Saxon cavalry and dragoons commanded by general Brand. Also whole 17-cannon artillery was placed there. The Crown cavalry was placed in two lines on both wings. The left wing was commanded by the Crown Field Hetman Stanisław Rzewuski and the right wing – by the Crown Grand Hetman Adam Sieniawski. On the left wing there was also a group of 12 units (*chorągiew*) of cavalry hidden behind forest and commanded by Adam Śmigielski, mayor of Gniezno, which could outflank the right wing of the opponent. Bashkirs and Cossacks, together with two regiments of Russian cavalry crossed the Prosna

⁶⁰ J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 130.

River what caused encircling of the Mardefeld army and the company guarding the city without participating in battle⁶¹.

Augustus II was the nominal commander of the allied forces; however none of known accounts mentions his role in the battle, besides disciplining retreating units. Thus, we get the picture of the battle in which 4 parties were fighting independently. However, this issue still needs additional research. The battle began late, at about 15.30, and ended late in the evening. The reason for such late hour was because when the allied lined their army to the battle, they realised that they have to move left from their original position in order to bypass obstacles.

The first to attack was Swedish cavalry grouped in the centre of general Maderfeld forces. The first wave was fought off with loses, however, the second wave of cavalry supported by infantry forced the centre of Augustus II army to move back. Especially critical was the situation in the section of Russian troops who did not stand against the impact of the attack of cavalry of general Krassau and colonel Horn. However, the forces grouped in the centre were retreating in order and caused significant loses to the Swedish army It was because of general Michał Brandt's orders, who rushed Saxon dragoons and stopped the attack of Sweden with fire.

It gave some time needed on the wings, where Poles were fighting with each other. The attack of Warsaw confederates on the wings was stopped and they were forced to retreat by Augustus' II chivalry. Sieniawski's units started to outflank slowly the Swedes attacking Saxons due to their numerical superiority. The first to retreat were the units of Józef Potocki. They were attacked by more numerous adversary and when they saw forces of Adam Smigielski emerging from the forest behind them, they simply fled towards the reinforced camp and to Kalisz. Later their deed was repeated by the Lithuanian forces attacked by Rzewuski's troops. Józef Potocki hid with some of his soldiers in the camp, among wounded, wives and children of some of the commanders. This resulted in the Swedish centre being double flanked and it was surrounded soon. Swedish forces were hit by the artillery and had to split into smaller groups which soon were forced to surrender. Only general Krassau managed to escape to Poznan due to brave attack of his 500 cavalry and breach they managed to make in the line of the Augusts' army. Infantry which was still defending itself was surrounded by general Mardefeld when the allied brought cannons and mortars of Russian dragoons. Many escapees

⁶¹ J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 130 – 131.

drowned in Prosna river or were caught, because of the fact that Cossacks and Bashkirs, taking advantage of numerical superiority, were sent to the back of Polish- Swedish army⁶².

Also the camp of Crown army and Kalisz itself fell a prey to the winners as they did not have any chance for relief. However, due to the late hour, it happened the following day. The health condition of the soldiers within the city walls and their small number could not guarantee any chances for victory. Only few units, among them part of confederates under the command of Michał Potocki, Sapieha brothers, and Jerzy Aleksander Lubomirski, managed to escape during the night through Prosna River and fight their way to freedom through Cossack detachments⁶³.

Swedish and Leszczyński's losses were significant. General Mardefeld was held captive, as well as many officers (among them four out of five who participated in the battle of Swedish colonels) and the commander of Polish army loyal to Leszczyński, Józef Potocki, Crown chamberlain Jerzy Dominik Lubomirski, Crown Master of the Kitchen Stanisław Tarło, Colonel Andrzej Skórzewski. Additionally, there were few thousands of Swedish and confederate soldiers captured due to taking over the city and cutting off possible ways of retreat. Zofia Potocka, the wife of Michał, and Wiktoria Potocka, the wife of Józef, were also captured. Over thirty banners fell prey to the winners of the battle. Swedish lost 780 soldiers in the battle, about 1 800 - 2 000 were captured, as well as the whole artillery and 5 000 supply carts. Russians lost 230, Saxons 120 and Poles about 100 soldiers. The majority of the prisoners, also the ones captured by Russians, were passed to Augustus II, who promised Menshikov to exchange them for the prisoners held by the Swedish army. A day after the battle, vice-chancellor Jan Szembek expressed his gratitude on behalf of the king and Kuyavian bishop Felicjan Konstanty Szaniawski conducted mass⁶⁴.

The effects of war were visible in the city as well: Kalisz was strafed on 30 October in order to make the garrison surrender, next it was looted by the winning army, and later the citizens suffered from famine and epidemic, two usual consequences of war at that time. The evidence of the distresses can be visible in later resolutions of sejmik szlachecki in Środa, which exempted the city from taxation.

⁶² M. Nagielski, *Kalisz w dobie...* [Kalisz during...], p. 232 – 233.

⁶³ J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 133.

⁶⁴ P. Krokosz, *Rosyjskie siły zbrojne...* [Russian armed forces...], p. 329 – 330.

Due to the victory in Kalisz major part of Greater Poland was released for a short time from the Swedish reign. The result of the battle greatly impressed opponents of Swedish reign in Poland. Many of them were ready to acknowledge the reign of Augustus II the Strong. He had received such proposition just after the battle from recent commanders in the battle, Michał Potocki and Jerzy Aleksander Lubomirski. The proposition did not matter for Augustus, as he was bound by the earlier agreement with Charles XII and was focused on retreating from this complicated situation. That is why he did not go towards Poznań, but to Warsaw, officially to receive triumph because of his victory. From there he travelled back to Saxony officially to address key issues of the country⁶⁵. It was the best moment to leave, as soon later the public found out about the Altranstädt treaty. The information was given to the public by Charles XII himself, as after the battle of Kalisz he was fed up with duplicity and intrigues of Augustus. In the meantime, Wettin, who did not want to threaten his relations with the king of Sweden, released the prisoners from the last battle, what resented Peter I, as wanted to exchange the prisoners for Russians who were held captive by Swedes⁶⁶.

Conclusion

The events that took place on the fields near Kalisz on the last days of October 1706 are commemorated by the mound in the Kolonia Koscielna Wies village. In this small barrow rest the remains of the soldiers who took part in the battle, as it was confirmed by the archaeological study in 2006. The archaeologists also found some muskets bullets and military buttons from that period there. Unfortunately, these are the only possessions that remained, what can lead to the conclusion that the bodies were scavenged before burial, however, only a fourth part of the barrow has been examined. The archaeologists could not identify the remains, the process of identification will be conducted during anthropological study. However, taking into consideration the way they had been buried, they were probably

⁶⁵ K. Jarochoński, *Z czasów saskich...* [On Saxon...], p. 438; B. Liljegren, *Karol XII* [Charles XII],

p. 142; J. Wimmer, *Bitwa pod Kaliszem...* [The battle of Kalisz...], p. 134.

⁶⁶ W.F. Rakowski, *Pamiętnik wielkiej wojny...* [The memoir of...], p. 53; J. Burdowicz-Nowicki, *Piotr I, August II...* [Peter I, Augustus II...], p. 689; M. Nagielski, *Kalisz w dobie...* [Kalisz during...], p. 235.

private soldiers of the defeated army, as people do not usually throw their companions to a hole in the ground, but they put one next to the other in carefully dug graves. Archaeologists discovered that there are whole skeletons deeper, and in the top layers there are only fragments of bodies, limbs and heads (there were bullets in two skulls), as if at the end of the battle the fragmented bodies had been placed there. The layers of bodies were separated with lime mixed with sand, what was supposed to prevent epidemic and scare away animals⁶⁷.

However, in the face of Augustus' escape to Dresden and comeback of the main Swedish forces to Poland, the victory in Kalisz could not be used properly. What is more, Stanisław Leszczyński became the only king of the Commonwealth, even though he had been elected illegally. It forced Peter I to act, as he feared that he would be left alone in the war against Sweden. He took great financial and military effort which resulted in strengthening of anti-Swedish faction among Polish and Lithuanian magnates⁶⁸. The final battle took place three years later, on the other bank of Dnieper river, where the victorious king Charles XII ventured. The battle of Poltava marked the end of Swedish reign in the Commonwealth⁶⁹. It resulted in a comeback of Augustus II, how "did not remember" giving up the throne. It was also the end of major military actions within the borders of the Commonwealth; however, hit-and-run episodes were still taking place. Due to constant movements of armies, robberies, contributions and epidemics spread by the soldiers, Great

⁶⁷ A. Kędzierski, S. Miłek, L. Ziabka, *Tajemnice kopca pobitewnego w Kościelnej Wsi* [The secrets of the mound in Kościelna Wieś], „Kalisia Nowa” [New Kalisia], n° 9-10/2009, p. 31; L. Ziabka, S. Miłek, A. Kędzierski, *Archeologiczne ślady „bitwy narodów” pod Kaliszem w 1706 roku* [Archaeological evidence of „the battle of Nations” of Kalisz in 1706], „Kronika Wielkopolski” [The Greater Poland Chronicle], 2007, n° 1, p. 41 – 45.

⁶⁸ A.K. Link-Lenczowski, *Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski – faworyt czy opozycjonista?* [Adam Mikołaj Sieniawski – favorite or oppositionist?], in *Faworyci i opozycjoniści. Król a elity polityczne Rzeczypospolitej XV – XVIII wieku* [Favorites and oppositionists. King and political elites of the Commonwealth of XV – XVIII century], ed. M. Markiewicz, R. Skowron, Kraków 2006, p. 403 – 405.

⁶⁹ A. Kamiński, *Piotr I a wojsko koronne w przededniu szwedzkiego uderzenia na Rosję w 1707 r.* [Peter I and the Crown army just before the Swedish attack on Russia in 1707], SMHW, v. XV, 1969, pt. 1, p. 41 – 59; Ł. Pabich, *Bitwa pod Koniecpolem 21 listopada 1708* [The battle of Koniecpol, 21 November 1708], Zabrze-Tarnowskie Góry 2014.

Northern War has set back the Commonwealth's development by 50 years. It was again in ruin, just like after the wars of the middle of XVII century⁷⁰.

⁷⁰ Z. Guldon, J. Wijaczka, *Zarazy a zaludnienie i gospodarka Polski w dobie wielkiej wojny północnej*, [Epidemics and population of Poland during Great Northern War] , in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 199 – 215; J. Motylewicz, *Obciążenia wojskowe w czasie wielkiej wojny północnej i ich wpływ na przemiany społeczne i etniczne w miastach ziemi przemyskiej* [Military contributions and their influence on the social and ethnical changes in the cities of Przemyśl land] , in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 225 – 237; J. Półciwiarzek, *Ziemie czerwonoruskie czasów wielkiej wojny północnej. Charakter rozkładu gospodarczego i głębokich zmian społecznych* [Red Ruthenia during Great Northern War. The nature of economic distribution and deep social changes] , in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 263 – 277; M. G. Zieliński, *Chełmno na tle miast województwa chełmińskiego w okresie wojny północnej* [Chełmno on the background of the cities of Chełmińskie voivodeship during Northern War] , in *Rzeczpospolita w dobie...* [Commonwealth during...], p. 250 – 257; D. Kupisz, *Mieszkańcy województwa lubelskiego a wojsko Rzeczypospolitej w dobie wojny i kryzysu państwa w latach 1702 – 1717* [The citizens of Lubelskie voivodeship and the army of the Commonwealth during the war and the crisis of the state between 1702 – 1717], in *Spółeczeństwo staropolskie* [Society of the old Poland], v. IV: *Wojsko a społeczeństwo* [Army and society], Warszawa 2015, p. 217 – 27; J. Topolski, *Polska w czasach nowożytnych. Od środkowoeuropejskiej potęgi do utraty niepodległości (1501-1795)* [Poland in the modern era. From Central European power to the loss of independence (1501 – 1795)], Poznań 1994, p. 532, 575.

DIE STAATSRECHTLICHEN FRAGEN, DIE DER WIENER HOF BEI DER INTEGRATION SIEBENBÜRGENS IN DER HABSBURGISCHEN MONARCHIE ERLEDIGEN MUSSTE

THE ISSUES OF STATE LAW, WHICH THE VIENNESE COURT HAD TO RESOLVE DUE TO INTEGRATION OF TRANSYLVANIA INTO THE HABSBURG MONARCHY

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Rezumat: Aspectele de drept statal, pe care Curtea Vineză a trebuit să le rezolve la integrarea Transilvaniei în Monarhia Habsburgică

După ocuparea militară a Transilvaniei de către trupele habsburgice, în anul 1688, Curtea Vineză s-a preocupat, printre altele, de rezolvarea unor probleme deosebit de importante de drept statal referitoare la fostul Principat autonom transilvănean: stabilirea noului statut internațional al Principatului, forma de integrare a Transilvaniei în Monarhia Habsburgică – prin unirea Principatului cu Regatul Ungariei, respectiv prin integrarea sa ca provincie de sine stătătoare, și nu în ultimă instanță, luarea unei hotărâri referitoare la păstrarea sau nu a statutului de Principat al țării.

Stabilirea noului statut internațional al Principatului s-a realizat pe calea tratatelor diplomatice pe plan internațional purtate cu Principele transilvănean Michael (Mihai) Apafi I, și cu reprezentanții stărilor generale transilvănene, respectiv cu Imperiul Otoman. Prin declarația din 9 mai 1688, reprezentanții stărilor generale transilvănene au renunțat la suzeranitatea Porții Otomane asupra Transilvaniei, acceptând suzeranitatea și protecția Habsburgilor. La rândul său Imperiul Otoman, silit de situația militară nefavorabilă în care se afla, a renunțat prin tratatul de pace încheiat la Karlowitz în anul 1699 cu Imperiul Habsburgic la suzeranitatea sa asupra Transilvaniei și a recunoscut alipirea acesteia la Monarhia Habsburgică. Dorind să scadă puterea politică și influența stărilor generale din Ungaria, Curtea Vineză s-a opus intenției acestora de a integra Transilvaniei în Regatul Ungariei. Ca urmare, Transilvania a devenit parte a Imperiului Habsburgic, dar nu ca posesiune a Regatului Ungariei, ci ca provincie de sine stătătoare.

De asemenea, habsburgii au decis să păstreze statutul Principatului Transilvaniei. Pentru a accentua individualitatea Transilvaniei față de Regatul Ungariei, Principatul Transilvaniei a fost proclamat, în anul 1765, drept Mare Principat. Evident, acest lucru a

contribuit la sporirea prestigiului Transilvaniei, precum și a celui al monarhilor Habsburgi, care au purtat astfel titlul de Mari Principi ai Transilvaniei.

Abstract: *After the military occupation of Transylvania by the Habsburg troops, in 1688, the Viennese Court dealt, among other things, with solving the most important issues of state law related to the former autonomous Principality of Transylvania: the establishment of a new international status of the Principality, the form of integration of Transylvania into the Habsburg Monarchy – through the unification of Principality with the Kingdom of Hungary, respectively through its integration as a freestanding province – and not ultimately, the decision on whether or not to keep the status of Principality of Transylvania.*

The establishment of the Principality's new international status has been achieved through diplomatic negotiations with the Prince of Transylvania Michael (Mihai) Apafi 1st, with the representatives of Transylvanian general assemblies, respectively with the Ottoman Empire. By the Statement of the 9th May 1688, the Transylvanian Diet renounced Ottoman Porte suzerainty, accepting the Habsburgs' suzerainty and protection. In its turn, through the Treaty of Peace concluded in Karlowitz in 1699, the Ottoman Empire, forced by its unfavorable military situation, renounced the suzerainty over Transylvania Principality and recognized its annexation to the Habsburg Monarchy. Wanting to decrease the political power and influence of the general assemblies of Hungary, the Viennese Court opposed their intention to integrate Transylvania into the Kingdom of Hungary. As a result, Transylvania became part of the Habsburg Empire, not as a possession of Kingdom of Hungary, but as a freestanding province.

In addition, the Habsburgs decided to preserve the status of Principality of Transylvania. In order to emphasize the individuality of this province against the Kingdom of Hungary, the Principality of Transylvania was proclaimed by Viennese Curt, in 1765, a Grand Principality. Obviously, this contributed to enhancing the prestige of Transylvania, as well as that of the Habsburg Monarchs, who henceforth bore the title of Grand Princes of Transylvania.

Résumé: Aspects de droit étatique que la Cour Vienneise dut résoudre à l'intégration de la Transylvanie dans la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise

Après l'occupation militaire de la Transylvanie par les troupes habsbourgeoises, l'année 1688, la Cour Vienneise se préoccupa, entre autres, à résoudre des questions extrêmement importantes de droit étatique concernant l'ancienne Principauté autonome transylvaine: établir le nouveau statut international de la Principauté, la forme d'intégration de la Transylvanie dans la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise – par l'union de la Principauté avec le Royaume de l'Hongrie, respectivement par son intégration comme province par elle-même, et pas dernièrement, la prise d'une décision concernant la préservation ou pas du statut de Principauté de la Transylvanie.

L'établissement du nouveau statut international de la Principauté se réalisa à l'intermédiaire des pourparlers diplomatiques internationaux portés avec le Prince transylvain Michael (Mihai) Apafi I, mais aussi avec les représentants des états généraux

transylvains, respectivement avec l'Empire Ottoman. Par la déclaration de 9 mai 1688, les représentants des états généraux renoncèrent à la suzeraineté de la Porte Ottomane sur la Transylvanie, acceptant la suzeraineté et la protection des Habsbourg. A son tour, l'Empire Ottoman, obligé par sa situation militaire défavorable, renonça par le traité conclu à Karlowitz l'année 1699 avec l'Empire Habsbourgeois à sa suzeraineté sur la Transylvanie et reconnut son annexion à la Monarchie Habsbourgeoise. Comme la Cour Vienneise voulait diminuer le pouvoir politique et l'influence des états généraux de l'Hongrie, celle-ci s'opposa à leur intention d'intégrer la Transylvanie dans le Royaume de l'Hongrie. Par conséquent, la Transylvanie devint partie composante de l'Empire Habsbourgeois, pas comme possession du Royaume de l'Hongrie, mais comme province indépendante.

En même temps, les Habsbourg décidèrent à garder le statut de la Principauté de la Transylvanie. Afin d'accentuer l'individualité de la Transylvanie par rapport au Royaume de l'Hongrie, on proclama la Principauté de la Transylvanie en 1765 comme Grande Principauté. Evidemment, cela contribua pleinement à augmenter le prestige de la Transylvanie, mais aussi celui des monarques Habsbourgeois, qui portèrent ainsi le titre de Grands Princes de la Transylvanie.

Keywords : Habsburgs; Transylvania; Integration, Monarchy; state law

Nach der militärischen Besetzung des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1688 durch die habsburgischen Truppen¹ hatte der Wiener Hof verschiedene Maßnahmen getroffen, die auf eine langfristige Integration dieses Landes in der Habsburgischen Monarchie abzielten. Zu diesen Maßnahmen zählt unter anderen auch die Klärung der staatsrechtlichen Fragen bei der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie. Es geht um die Änderung des internationalen volksrechtlichen Status Siebenbürgens (1) und um die Fixierung des staatlichen und rechtlichen Status des Fürstentums Landes (Siebenbürgens) innerhalb der Habsburgischen Monarchie: Die Form der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie – durch die Vereinigung mit Ungarn oder als eigene Provinz (2) und nicht zuletzt um die Frage, ob der Status Siebenbürgens als Fürstentum erhalten bleiben soll oder nicht (3).

1. Die Änderung des internationalen volksrechtlichen Status Siebenbürgens

Ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie nach der militärischen Besetzung des Landes war die

¹ Über die Eroberung Siebenbürgens durch die Habsburger, vgl. KOCH- TUFİŞ Marinela Ovidiu, *Die Eroberung des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen durch die Habsburger. Die Gründe und die verwendeten Methoden*. In: Codrul Cosminului, Bd. 21, Nr. 1, Suceava 2015, S. 115–124.

Änderung des internationalen volksrechtlichen Status des autonomen Fürstentums als Vasallenstaat der Osmanen. Das Problem musste und konnte konkret nur auf internationaler volksrechtlicher Ebene zwischen mehreren Verhandlungspartner reglementiert werden: a) zwischen den Habsburgern einerseits und dem Fürst und den Ständen Siebenbürgens als Staatsträger des autonomen Fürstentums andererseits, und b) zwischen den Habsburgern und dem Osmanischen Reich als die Suzeränemacht des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen.

a) *Die Änderung des internationalen volksrechtlichen Status Siebenbürgens durch die Verhandlungen zwischen den Habsburgern und dem Fürst und den Ständen des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgens*

Das Problem der Anerkennung der Hoheit der Habsburger als ungarische Könige über Siebenbürgen wurde im Laufe der Zeit zu einem strittigen Aspekt der Verhältnisse zwischen dem Wiener Hof und den siebenbürgischen Herrschern. Nur wenige von diesen erkannten die Hoheit der Habsburger als ungarische Könige über das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen an.² Der Status und gleichzeitig die Position der siebenbürgischen Herrschern in der Hierarchie des damaligen europäischen feudalen Staatsrechtswesen war schon von vornherein kompliziert, und das unabhängig von der Tatsache, ob die siebenbürgischen Herrschern die Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zu der ungarischen Krone anerkannt haben oder nicht, denn sie herrschen neben Siebenbürgen auch über andere Gebiete, die ohne Zweifel zu den Habsburgern als ungarischen Könige gehörten. Es geht um das Partium.

Der kaiserliche Delegierte Antidus Dunod versuchte im Jahr 1685 ohne Erfolg die Absage der osmanischen Oberhoheit durch die siebenbürgischen Stände und durch den Fürst Michael (Mihai) Apafi I. sowie die Annahme der

² Der ungarische König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Sigismund Szapolyais II., erkennt in dem Vertrag von Speyer (1570) den Kaiser Maximilian II. als „superior“ an. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, *Österreichische Staatsverträge. Fürstentum Siebenbürgen (1526–1690)*. In: *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs*, Bd. 9, Wien 1911, S. 188; Der siebenbürgische Woiwode und spätere Fürst von Siebenbürgen, Stephan Báthory, leistete am Anfang seiner Herrschaft im Jahr 1571 insgeheim den Treueid dem Kaiser Maximilian II. Vgl. BARTA Gábor, *Die Anfänge des Fürstentums und erste Krisen (1526–1606)*. In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 257; Im Jahr 1595 leistete der siebenbürgische Fürst Sigismund Báthory den Habsburgern einen Treueid, ohne aber deshalb lehenspflichtig zu sein. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 225.

königlichen Oberhoheit zu erreichen.³ Die habsburgischen Truppen spielten auch in diesem Fall eine wichtige Rolle. Sie übten Druck auf dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten und die Stände Siebenbürgens aus, die noch nicht dazu bereit waren, auf die osmanische Hoheit freiwillig zu verzichten.⁴ Mit dem Abschluss der Verträge von Wien (1686) und von Blaj (1687) zwischen den Habsburgern und dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten Michael (Mihai) Apafi I. und den siebenbürgischen Ständen kam der Wiener Hof einen Schritt weiter in Richtung Erreichung der Hoheit über Siebenbürgen.⁵

General Caraffa verhandelte im Frühjahr 1688 mit den Vertretern der siebenbürgischen Stände und verlangte die offizielle Absage der osmanischen Herrschaft und die Anerkennung der Protektion des habsburgischen Kaisers. Das passierte tatsächlich durch die Deklaration vom 9. Mai 1688 der Vertreter des Fürsten Michael (Mihai) Apafi I. und der siebenbürgischen Ständen sowie der wichtigen Würdenträger des Landes – die kurz danach am 13. Mai auch vom siebenbürgischen Landtag bestätigt wurde – durch die Siebenbürgen „aus freiwilligem Antrieb und christlichem Eifer die ottomanische Herrschaft“ zurücklegte und „sich unter den väterlichen und überaus mächtigen Schutz des allererhabensten Leopold I. [...]“ begab⁶ Die Reglementierung der Verhältnisse

³ Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 864.

⁴ Im Dezember 1687 schloss der Fürst Mihael (Mihai) Apafi I. sogar ein Verteidigungstraktat mit den Osmanen. Das Fürstentum entrichtete weiter Tribut an die Hohe Pforte. Vgl. PRODAN David, *Instaurarea regimului austriac în Transilvania [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen]* In: Oțetea A. u.a. (Hg.), *Istoria României. Feudalismul dezvoltat în secolul al XVII-lea și la începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Destrămarea feudalismului și formarea relațiilor capitaliste*. București 1964, Vol. 3, S. 229.

⁵ Der Historiker Ferdinand Zieglauer bezeichnete den Vertrag von Blaj (Blasendorf / Balázsfalva) als „jenen berühmten Vertrag“ [...], der nicht wenig dazu beitrug, den ersten Keim habsburgischer Landeshoheit dem siebenbürgischen Boden einzupflanzen.“ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand, *Die politische Reformbewegung in Siebenbürgen in der Zeit Josepfs II. und Leopolds II.* Wien 1881, S. 146.

⁶ KUTSCHERA Rolf, *Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbürgen 1688–1869*. In: Paul Philippi (Hg.), (= *Studia Transylvanica*, Ergänzungsbände des Siebenbürgischen Archivs, Bd. 11), Köln–Wien 1985, S. 322 f.; Diese Deklaration, die mit den Siegeln der drei ständischen Nationen Siebenbürgens versehen und gleichzeitig bekräftigt wurde (Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 321 und 324) ist gleichzeitig auch die Huldigungsurkunde. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 914; Über die Absage der osmanischen Oberhoheit durch Siebenbürgen und die Annahme der habsburgischen Oberhoheit, vgl. auch GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 914–921; PRODAN David, (1964), S. 226–229; WAGNER Ernst (Hg.), *Quellen zur Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen*

zwischen Siebenbürgen und der Hohen Pforte war für die Habsburger eine so wichtige Angelegenheit, dass der Wiener Hof noch im Jahr 1744 vom siebenbürgischen Landtag die „*Aufhebung aller Gesetze über das Verhältnis*“ zum Osmanischen Reich verlangte.⁷ Die siebenbürgischen Stände reagieren auf den Wunsch des Wiener Hofes: sie stimmen für die „*Abschaffung und Aufhebung jener Gesetze ab, die von dem Zusammenhange Siebenbürgens mit der Pforte*“ sprechen, zu.⁸

b) *Die Änderung des internationalen volksrechtlichen Status Siebenbürgen durch die Vereinbarungen zwischen den Habsburgern und dem Osmanischen Reich*

Letztendlich erfolgte die Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie auch durch Vereinbarungen auf internationaler volksrechtlicher Ebene. Die Diplomatie der Habsburger erreichte erst im dem Friedensvertrag von Karlowitz (1699) den Erfolg. Die Hohe Pforte musste auch „de jure“ eine Situation anerkennen, die schon „de facto“ existierte: Die Besetzung von Siebenbürgen durch die habsburgischen Truppen. Die Osmanen verzichteten im Friedensvertrag von Karlowitz auf ihre Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen und gaben ihre

1191–1975. In: Schriften zur Landeskunde Siebenbürgens. Ergänzungsreihe zum Siebenbürgischen Archiv, Bd. 1, Köln–Wien 1976, S. 159 f.; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 4 ff. und 319–324; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA AVRAM, *Transilvania în timpul lui Mihai I Apafi*. [Siebenbürgen in der Zeit der Herrschaft Mihai I. Apafis]. In: Virgil Căndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*, Bucureşti 2003, Vol. 5, S. 360; MAGYARI Andrei, *Începutul regimului habsburgic în Transilvania şi mişcarea adversă a lui Francisc Rákóczi al II - lea*. [Der Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen und der antihabsburgische Aufstand unter der Führung von Francisc Rákóczi II.]. In: Virgil Căndea (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. O epocă de înnoiri în spirit european (1601–1711/1716)*. Bucureşti 2003, Vol. 5, S. 371.

⁷ KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 155; Die wichtigsten Grundzüge der Verhältnisse Siebenbürgens zu den Osmanen wurden eigentlich schon in der Deklaration vom 9. Mai 1688 der Vertreter des Fürsten Michael (Mihai) Apafi I. und der siebenbürgischen Stände sowie der wichtigsten Würdenträger des Landes fixiert: Siebenbürgen verzichtete auf die Verbindungen und auf den Briefwechsel mit der Hohen Pforte und mit seinen Vasallstaaten. Das Fürstentum wird ebenfalls keinen Tribut an die Osmanen mehr entrichten. Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 323.

⁸ ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 337.

Zustimmung für die Eingliederung des Fürstentums in das Länderkonglomerat der Habsburger.⁹

2. Die Form der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie – durch die Vereinigung mit Ungarn oder als eigene Provinz

Ein weiteres wichtiges Problem, das erklärt werden soll, war die Frage der staatlichen – rechtlichen Form der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie. Soll Siebenbürgen als Teil der ungarischen Krone zuerst im Königreich Ungarn und auf diese Weise auch in der Habsburgischen Monarchie integriert werden, oder soll das Fürstentum als eigene Provinz, also von Ungarn getrennt, in die Monarchie eingegliedert werden? Die Habsburger waren schon immer nach 1541 bestrebt, durch die Herrscher des Fürstentums und durch die Stände des Landes eine vertragliche Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn zu erreichen. Das passiert tatsächlich in mehreren Verträgen, die in dem Laufe der Zeit zwischen den Habsburgern und manchen siebenbürgischen Herrschern geschlossen wurde.¹⁰ Aus pragmatischer Sicht gab es aber keine

⁹ Vgl. MORIZ Angeli v., *Feldzüge gegen die Türken 1697–1698 und der Karlowitzer Friede 1699*. In: Abtheilung für Kriegsgeschichte des k. k. Kriegs- Archives (Hg.), *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen. Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen*. Wien 1876, Serie I., Band II, S. 297 und 301 f.; MÜLLER GEORG, *Die Türkenherrschaft in Siebenbürgen. Verfassungsrechtliches Verhältnis Siebenbürgens zur Pforte 1541–1688*. In: „Südosteuropäisches Forschungsinstitut“. Hermannstadt–Sibiu 1923, S. 7; Die Hohe Pforte verzichtete aber nicht einfach so auf ihre Herrschaft über Siebenbürgen. Während der Verhandlungen von Karlowitz machten die Osmanen zwei Vorschläge in der folgenden Reihenfolge: Erstens: Siebenbürgen blieb weiter ein autonomes Fürstentum unter der Suzeränität der Hohen Pforte. Zweitens: Siebenbürgen wird an die Habsburgische Monarchie abgetreten. Dafür müssen die Habsburger den Osmanen aber einen jährlichen Tribut bezahlen. Beiden Vorschläge wurden aber von den christlichen Mächten nicht akzeptiert. Vgl. MORIZ Angeli v., (1876), S. 297 f.

¹⁰ Es geht um den Vertrag von Speyer (1570) zwischen dem ungarischen König Vasall der Osmanen, Johann Sigismund Szapolyai II., und dem Kaiser Maximilian II. (Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 188 f.; BARTA Gábor, (1990), S. 257; PAPP Sándor, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung*. In: Johannes Koder (Hg.), (= Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, Bd. 42), Wien 2003, S. 73) und um den Vertrag von Prag (Praha) (1595) zwischen dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten Sigismund Báthory und dem Kaiser Rudolf II. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 225; Im Vertrag von Wien

Auswirkungen, denn der Wiener Hof erreichte bis Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts nicht, was er beabsichtige: den dauerhaften Anschluss Siebenbürgens an die Habsburgische Monarchie. Die siebenbürgischen Herrscher mussten in der Frage der Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn sehr vorsichtig sein und auf die Reaktion der Suzeränmacht, das Osmanische Reich, aufpassen. Im Jahr 1620 betonte die Hohe Pforte z. B. vor den siebenbürgischen Gesandten, dass sie niemals zur „*Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit dem Königreich Ungarn einwilligen werde*“¹¹.

Durch die Absage der osmanischen und durch die Annahme der habsburgischen Oberhoheit am 9. Mai 1688 war es dann so weit: Siebenbürgen kehrte „*nun zum König von Ungarn zurück ...*“¹² – und indirekt zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn.

Auch die Autoren des „Einrichtungswerks“ Ungarn (1688) betrachteten Siebenbürgen und alle anderen ungarischen Territorien, die nach 1683 von den Osmanen befreiten wurden, als „*neüen Acquisten*“ und als Teile des Königreiches Ungarn.¹³

Obwohl Siebenbürgen im Leopoldinischen Diplom vom 4. Dezember 1691 als Land, welches „*schon seit Jahrhunderten Unserem Erlauchten Königreichs*

(1606) bekam der siebenbürgische Fürst Stephan Bocskay von der Seite des Kaisers Rudolf II. Siebenbürgen und Partium verliehen. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 333 f. Diese Tatsache könnte als Hinweis einer indirekten Anerkennung durch den Fürst Stephan Bocskay der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone interpretiert werden; In dem Vertrag von Tyrnau (Nagyszombat / Trnava), der im Jahr 1615 zwischen dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten Gabriel Béthlen und dem habsburgischen Kaiser Matthias geschlossen wurde, wurde bestimmt, dass die „*Oberhoheit Ungarns über Siebenbürgen*“ aufrechterhalten wird. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 439. In gleichem Vertrag wurde festgelegt, dass Siebenbürgen und Partium nach der Befreiung aus den Händen der Osmanen von Ofen (Buda) und Erlau (Eger) durch die habsburgischen Truppen an die ungarische Krone zurückfallen soll. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 439; Die Habsburger bemühen sich ohne Erfolg auch in dem Vertrag von Linz, der im Jahr 1645 zwischen dem Kaiser Ferdinand III. und dem siebenbürgischen Fürsten Georg I. Rákóczi geschlossen wurde, die Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone zu erreichen. Vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 735–796.

¹¹ MÜLLER Georg, (1923), S. 31.

¹² KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 322.

¹³ Vgl. KALMÁR János, VARGA J. János (Hg.), *Einrichtungswerk des Königreichs Hungarn (1688–1690)*. In: Winfried Eberhard u.a. (Hg.), (= Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropa, Bd. 39), Stuttgart 2010, S. 155 und 179 ff.

*Ungarn angegliedert ist*¹⁴, bezeichnet wird, liefert das Diplom in Wirklichkeit durch die Bestätigung der alten staatlichen Strukturen des Fürstentums und der herkömmlichen Rechte und Privilegien seiner Stände die Grundlage für den weiteren Bestand der politischen Separation Siebenbürgens von Ungarn. Die Eingliederung Siebenbürgen in der Habsburgischen Monarchie, getrennt von Ungarn, war in dem Friede von Satu Mare (Sathmar /Szatmárnémeti), 1711, – der Kompromiss zwischen den Habsburgern und den ungarischen und siebenbürgischen Ständen – „*endgültig entschieden*“.¹⁵ Diese Situation blieb auch weiter erhalten, und sie resultierte sowohl aus der getrennten Anerkennung der Pragmatischen Sanktion durch den siebenbürgischen Landtag (1722)¹⁶ und durch den ungarischen Reichstag (1722/1723)¹⁷ als auch die verschiedenen Maßnahmen des Wiener Hofes in den 60er Jahren des 18. Jahrhunderts Siebenbürgen betreffend.¹⁸

Nicht unbedeutend für das Thema der vorliegenden Arbeit ist auch die folgende Frage: Welche war die Position der Machtfaktoren, die über das Schicksal Siebenbürgens nach seinem Anschluss an die Habsburgische Monarchie – die habsburgischen Monarchen und die siebenbürgischen Stände – in dem Problem der Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn entscheidet hatten?

Das Problem der Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn trat nicht nur in der Zeit der habsburgischen Herrschaft, sondern auch in der Zeit des autonomen Fürstentums Siebenbürgen manchmal in Erscheinung. Ein Teil der ungarischen und der siebenbürgischen Stände hatte z. B. manchmal ihre Stimme für die

¹⁴ KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 334 f.

¹⁵ VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, *Die letzten Jahrzehnte des autonomen Fürstentums (1660–1711)*. In: Béla Köpeczi (Hg.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*. Budapest 1990, S. 379.

¹⁶ Vgl. BARUDIO Günter, *Das Zeitalter des Absolutismus und der Aufklärung 1648–1779*. In: *Fischer Weltgeschichte*, Bd. 25, Frankfurt am Main 1981, S. 289–292; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 342–348; ZÖLLNER Erich, *Geschichte Österreichs. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Wien–München 1990, S. 266; ANDEA Avram, *Transilvania. Instituțiile centrale ale Principatului Transilvaniei*. [Siebenbürgen. Die Zentralinstitutionen des Fürstentums Siebenbürgen]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Vol. 6, S. 352.

¹⁷ Vgl. BARUDIO Günter, (1981), S. 289–292; ZÖLLNER Erich, (1990), S. 266; ANDEA Avram, (2002), S. 352.

¹⁸ Vgl. SCHULLER Georg Adolf, *Samuel von Brukenthal*. In: Theodor Mayer (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 18. (München 1967, Bd. I.), S. 172–176.

Gründung einer Konföderation zwischen Siebenbürgen und Ungarn gegeben.¹⁹

Die habsburgischen Herrscher ihrerseits waren, beginnend mit dem Kaiser Leopold I. aus machtpolitischen Gründen (z.B. die Notwendigkeit der Beschränkung der Macht der ungarischen Stände), mit einer einzigen Ausnahme klare Befürworter der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie getrennt vom Ungarn. Die Position der siebenbürgischen Stände in dieser Problematik war auch am Beginn der habsburgischen Herrschaft in Siebenbürgen gespalten. Während die katholischen Stände Siebenbürgens, die zu den wichtigsten Unterstützern der habsburgischen Herrschaft im Fürstentum zählten, zusammen mit den ungarischen Ständen am Wiener Hof intervenieren, um die Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn zu erwirken, mobilisieren die protestantischen Stände Siebenbürgens ihre Kräfte und intervenieren ihrerseits am Wiener Hof, um die Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn zu verhindern. Kaiser Leopold II. entschied sich für die Integration Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie getrennt von Ungarn.²⁰

Das Problem der Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn trat in den Wirren der Kuruzzenkriege, die zwischen 1703 und 1711 in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen tobten, wieder in Erscheinung. Mit den Stimmen eines Teils der ungarischen und siebenbürgischen Stände wurde im Jahr 1705 eine Konföderation zwischen Ungarn und Siebenbürgen ins Leben gerufen.²¹ Nach

¹⁹ Durch die Wahl von Stephan Bocskay zum Fürsten von Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1605 durch die siebenbürgischen Stände gefolgt in selbem Jahr von seiner Wahl durch die ungarischen Stände zu einem Fürsten von Ungarn besteht „de facto“ bis zu seinem Tod im Jahr 1606 eine Art Konföderation in Form einer Personalunion zwischen den beiden Ländern. Diese Konföderation hatte als Zweck die gemeinsame Verteidigung der Rechte, der Privilegien und der Freiheiten der Stände von Ungarn und Siebenbürgen gegen die Angriffe der Habsburger. Über das Problem, vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 278–367; Eine neue Personalunion zwischen Ungarn und Siebenbürgen besteht für kürzere Zeit nach der Wahl durch die ungarischen Stände im Jahr 1620 des siebenbürgischen Fürsten Gabriel Bethlen zum „Fürsten“ des Königreichs Ungarn. Gabriel Bethlen wurde kurz danach auch zum König Ungarn ausgerufen. In dem Frieden von Nikolsburg (Mikulov) (1621) verzichtete Gabriel Bethlen auf seinen Königstitel und behielt nur den Titel eines Fürsten von Siebenbürgen. Über das Problem, vgl. GOOSS Roderich, (1911), S. 487–562.

²⁰ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 232–235.

²¹ Diese neue Konföderation zwischen Ungarn und Siebenbürgen, die in der Zeit von 1705 bis 1711 unter der Führung des Fürsten Franz. II. Rákóczi existierte, hatte als Zweck, genau wie die anderen erwähnten Konföderation der beiden Länder, die gemeinsame Verteidigung der Rechte, der Privilegien und der Freiheiten der Stände Ungarns und Siebenbürgens gegen die Angriffe der Habsburger. Vgl. VÁRKONYI R.

dem Ende der Kuruzzenkriege (1711) und bis am Anfang der Herrschaft Maria Theresias wurde das Problem der Union Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn nicht mehr diskutiert. Erst auf dem ungarischen Reichstag vom 1741 stand das Problem der Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn wieder zur Debatte. Maria Theresia wies aber entscheidend alle Versuche der ungarischen Stände zurück, die auf den Anschluss Siebenbürgens an Ungarn abzielten.²²

Die Ausnahme in der erwähnten Haltung der habsburgischen Herrscher in der Frage der Form der Integration Siebenbürgens in der Monarchie, getrennt oder in Vereinigung mit Ungarn, war die Position des Kaisers Joseph II. In seinen zentralistischen Bestrebungen und aus pragmatischen Gründen – die Verbesserung der Verwaltung und die Beseitigung der ethnischen Missverständnisse in Siebenbürgen – schlug Kaiser Joseph II. im Jahr 1773 die Zusammenlegung Siebenbürgens mit mehreren an das Fürstentum angrenzende Gebiete des Königreichs Ungarns vor.²³ Die auf diese Weise entstandene Provinz muss danach mit Ungarn vereinigt werden.²⁴ Joseph II. konnte damals seinen Plan nicht verwirklichen. Durch die Vereinigung im Jahr 1782 auf seine Anordnung der Ungarischen mit der Siebenbürgischen Hofkanzlei sind die Verbindungen zwischen Siebenbürgen und Ungarn enger geworden. Wie viele andere seiner Reformen und Erneuerungen fiel auch diese Maßnahme – Die Gründung der Vereinigten ungarisch-siebenbürgischen Hofkanzlei – nach 1790 unter die Kategorie der Restitution.

Auf dem siebenbürgischen Landtag der Jahren 1790/1791 passiert eine radikale Wende auch in der bisherigen Haltung der siebenbürgischen Stände betreffend die Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn. In diesem Problem teilen sich die siebenbürgischen Stände nicht mehr wie Früher nach dem religiösem

Ágnes, (1990), S. 375 und 378 f.; ZÖLLNER Erich, (1990), S. 262; VOCELKA Karl, (2001, 2004), S. 88.

²² Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 235 f; Die Argumentation Maria Theresias war die folgende: „[...] sie wisse, daß die Union Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn eine Ungerechtigkeit in sich schließe würde. Sie haben den Ungarn genug bewilligt und werde fernere Begehren nicht mehr anhören.“ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand, (1881), S. 236.

²³ Es geht um das Banat – damals, bis in das Jahr 1778, noch eine Domäne der habsburgischen Krone – und um die übrigen ungarischen Gebiete östlich der Theiss (Partium, Partes), von denen der Kaiser konkret Maramureş (Marmaros) erwähnte.

²⁴ Die staatsrechtlichen Verhältnisse dieser neu entstandenen Provinz mit Ungarn mussten in der Auffassung Josephs II. ähnlich mit den staatsrechtlichen Verhältnissen zwischen Ungarn und seinem Kronland Kroatien sein; Über das Projekt des Kaisers Joseph II., vgl. BOZAC Ileana, PAVEL Teodor, *Călătoria împăratului Josif al II - lea în Transilvania la 1773 (Die Reise Kaiser Josephs II. durch Siebenbürgen im Jahre 1773)*. Cluj-Napoca / Klausenburg 2006, Vol. / Bd. I., S. 748-757.

Kriterium in zwei Lager – das der protestantischen Stände als Gegner der Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn bzw. das der katholischen Stände als Befürworter der Union Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn –, sondern nach dem ethnischen Kriterium.²⁵

Während die absolute Mehrheit der ungarischen und ein Teil der szeklerischen Stände, die die Mehrheit der siebenbürgischen Stände ausmachen, sich für eine lockere Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn aussprechen²⁶, plädieren und setzen sich die Sachsen und der Großteil der Szekler für die Erhaltung der Trennung Siebenbürgens von Ungarn ein. Eine besondere und klare Position in dieser Frage haben die Delegierten der Verwaltungseinheiten aus Partium, die ethnisch angesehen zu der ungarischen ständischen Nation Siebenbürgens gehörten. Sie verlangen den Anschluss Partiums an Ungarn.²⁷

Der neuer Kaiser, Leopold II., sprach sich auf der Linie seiner Vorfahren, mit der Ausnahme von Joseph II., für die Erhaltung des Status Siebenbürgens in der Habsburgischen Monarchie als von Ungarn getrennte Provinz aus. Die Meinung des Kaisers gewann letztendlich die Oberhand: Siebenbürgen blieb als

²⁵ Schon im Vorfeld des siebenbürgischen Landtages der Jahre 1790/1791 schicken die Versammlungen von mehreren ungarischen Komitaten und szeklerischen Stühlen Siebenbürgens im Sommer 1790 Petitionen an den ungarischen Reichstag, in dem engere Verhältnisse zwischen Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, aber nicht eine echte Union der beiden Länder, angestrebt wurde. Diese Ansuchen wurden aber durch den ungarischen Reichstag abgewiesen. Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 237 f.; Die sächsische Nation Universität sprach sich auf ihrer Versammlung, die vor der Eröffnung des siebenbürgischen Landtages der Jahre 1790/1791 stattfand, klar für die Erhaltung der Trennung Siebenbürgens von Ungarn aus. Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 99, 112- 116 und 238.

²⁶ Selbst dieser Teil der siebenbürgischen Stände plädieren für die Vereinigung Siebenbürgens mit Ungarn nur in einer lockeren Form: Es geht in erster Linie um die Erhaltung der Vereinigung der ungarischen mit der siebenbürgischen Hofkanzlei. Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 299 f.; Die Vereinigung Siebenbürgen mit Ungarn musste in der Auffassung dieses Teils der siebenbürgischen Stände nach aus ihrer Sicht bittere Erfahrung aus der Zeit der Reformen Kaisers Joseph II. zur Koordination des Widerstandes der Stände aus den beiden Ländern gegen weitere mögliche Angriffe der Habsburger auf ihre Rechten, Privilegien und Freiheiten dienen.

²⁷ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 168; Über die Debatte auf dem Landtag der Jahre 1790/1791 betreffend die Union zwischen Siebenbürgen und Ungarn und über die Position der siebenbürgischen Stände in dieser Frage, vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 99–116; 165–168; 232–266; 296–303; 317–356; 370–399; 409–418; 569–597; PRODAN David, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române. [Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Aus der Geschichte der Entstehung der rumänischen Nation]*. București 1998, S. 74 f.

Teil der Habsburgischen Monarchie getrennt von Ungarn.²⁸ Erst in dem Sturm der Revolution der Jahren 1848/1849 wurde Siebenbürgen für kürzere Zeit mit Ungarn vereinigt²⁹ und dann im Jahr 1868 endgültig in der ungarischen Hälfte von Österreich – Ungarn integriert.³⁰

Die Habsburger gaben sich aber nicht zufrieden nur mit der Anerkennung durch die siebenbürgischen Stände der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn, sie wollen auch die Anerkennung der Zugehörigkeit des Fürstentums zu ihrem Länderkonglomerat, das die Habsburgische Monarchie war, erreichen. In dem Text der Annahme der Pragmatischen Sanktion durch die siebenbürgischen Stände (1722) ist es schon so weit. Hier ist die Rede von „*der immerwährende[n] Vereinigung der erblichen Königreiche und Provinzen seiner allerheiligsten Majestät*“, die „*für alle Zeit in einer unauflöslichen Verbindung zusammenzugewachsen und zusammenzuhängen*“ sind.³¹ Durch den Druck des Wiener Hofes wurde zusätzlich auch jener Gesetzartikel im Jahr 1744 auf dem siebenbürgischen Landtag verabschiedet, durch den „*Siebenbürgen in einen untrennbaren und unauflöslichen Verband mit den anderen Erbreichen und Provinzen [der Habsburgischen Monarchie] getreten ist*“.³²

Trotz der erwähnten diplomatischen Erfolge des Wiener Hofes betreffend die Anerkennung durch die siebenbürgischen Stände der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens nicht nur zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn sondern auch zum Länderkonglomerat der Habsburger gab es Widerstand. Die siebenbürgischen Stände akzeptieren die Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zur ungarischen Krone und zum Königreich Ungarn, ein bedeutender Teil von ihnen waren aber nicht zufrieden und nicht einverstanden und sie akzeptieren auch nicht die Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zum Länderkonglomerat der Habsburger. Diesen Teil der siebenbürgischen Stände stören sogar die subtilen Versuche der Habsburger, die mit der Hilfe der Sprache der Diplomatie in wichtigen Urkunden auf der Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zum Länderkonglomerat der Habsburger

²⁸ Über die Position des Kaisers Leopold II. betreffend die Frage der Union zwischen Siebenbürgen und Ungarn, vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 296–299; PRODAN David, (1998), S. 74 f.

²⁹ Vgl. GÜNDISCH Konrad, *Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen*. In: Wilfried Schlau (Hg.), (= Studienbuchreihe der Stiftung Ostdeutscher Kulturrat, Bd. 8), München 1998, S. 108 und 133–138; Über das Problem, vgl. auch ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 303.

³⁰ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 359–369; GÜNDISCH Konrad, (1998), S. 109 und 142.

³¹ KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 346 f.

³² ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 339.

hinweisen und suggerieren wollen bzw. beabsichtigen. Ein Beweis in diesem Sinn ist die Haltung eines Teils der ungarischen und der szeklerischen Stände auf dem Landtag der Jahren 1790/1791. Sie protestieren energisch gegen einen wörtlichen Ausdruck aus dem Text des Diploms, durch das Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1765 zum Großfürstentum erhoben wurde.³³ Es geht konkret um jenen Abschnitt des Diploms, in dem Siebenbürgen „*als einen Teil der österreichischen Monarchie*“ bezeichnet wird.³⁴

3. Wird der Status Siebenbürgens als Fürstentum erhalten bleiben soll oder nicht?

Von großer Bedeutung für Siebenbürgen war auch die Frage der Erhaltung des Status als Fürstentum bei dessen Integration in der Monarchie. Was passierte tatsächlich? blieb der Status erhalten oder nicht? Die Analyse zweier wichtiger Dokumente kann eine Antwort auf diese Frage geben. Während Siebenbürgen im Leopoldinischen Diplom (1691) mehrmals als „*Provinz*“ und nur ein einziges Mal als „*Fürstentum*“ und als „*Landschaft von Siebenbürgen*“³⁵ bezeichnet wird, ist das Land in der Urkunde der Annahme der Pragmatischen Sanktion durch den siebenbürgischen Landtag (1722) mehrmals als Fürstentum, aber auch als Provinz, erwähnt³⁶ Der Status

³³ Über das Problem, vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 254 ff., 344–356 und 370–399.

³⁴ ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 346; In dem Text des Diploms ist es in Wirklichkeit wörtlich nur die Rede von der „*österreichischen Monarchie*“, die „*aus so vielen Königreichen und Herrschaften*“ besteht. Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 356. Zu der Kategorie der „*Herrschaften*“ gehörte selbstverständlich auch Siebenbürgen. Der oben erwähnte Teil der siebenbürgischen Stände scheute aber auch jene wörtliche Anspielung auf eine mögliche Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zu der österreichischen Monarchie, in Wirklichkeit zum Haus Österreich, denn sie rufen nach der Lesung des Diploms auf einer Landtagssitzung laut: „*Siebenbürgen wolle nie zur österreichischen Monarchie, sondern nur zur Krone von Ungarn gehören.*“ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 346. Dass die Zugehörigkeit Siebenbürgens zum Haus Österreich in Wirklichkeit in den breiten Kreise der siebenbürgischen Stände nicht gewünscht ist, beweisen die Worte eines wichtigen siebenbürgischen Hohenbeamten, der Protonotärs Cserei, die ebenfalls auf dem Landtag der Jahren 1790/1791 ausgesprochen wurden. Er ist von der Auffassung, dass man „*verhindern müsse, dass Siebenbürgen je als „Patrimonial=Reich“ betrachtet werde.*“ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 256.

³⁵ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 334 f. und 340 f.

³⁶ Ebenda, S. 342–348.

Siebenbürgen als Fürstentum blieb also weiterhin erhalten. Das resultiert allerdings auch aus dem Titel eines siebenbürgischen Fürsten, den alle habsburgischen Herrscher seit 1722 und bis zum Jahr 1765 trugen. Maria Theresia erhob ohne die Mitwirkung der Stände das Fürstentum Siebenbürgen durch das Diplom vom 2. Dezember 1765 sogar zum Großfürstentum.³⁷ Dieser politische Akt musste zusammen mit der Symbolik des neuen Wappens Siebenbürgens³⁸ den weiteren Bestand der staatlichen Trennung Siebenbürgens von Ungarn zusätzlich betonen.³⁹ Die siebenbürgischen Stände konnten damals nicht protestieren, denn der Landtag wurde nach 1762 lange Zeit nicht mehr einberufen. Als der siebenbürgische Landtag im Jahr 1790 endlich wieder einberufen wurde, erhob ein Teil der ungarischen und der szeklerischen Stände ihre Stimme gegen das Diplom, durch das Siebenbürgen im Jahr 1765 zum Großfürstentum erhoben wurde, und gegen die Symbolik des Wappens des Großfürstentums Siebenbürgen.⁴⁰ Eine Folge der Erhebung Siebenbürgens im Jahr 1765 zum Großfürstentum war auch die Tatsache, dass alle habsburgischen Herrscher ab diesem Moment den Titel eines siebenbürgischen Großfürsten trugen.

³⁷ Ebenda, S. 351–358.

³⁸ Für eine partielle Beschreibung des Wappens des Großfürstentums Siebenbürgen, vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 356 f.

³⁹ Vgl. SCHULLER Georg A., (1967), Bd. I., S. 172–176; ANDEA Avram, *Absolutismul luminat în Transilvania. Politica iosefină der reforme* [Der Aufgeklärte Absolutismus in Siebenbürgen. Die josephinische Reformpolitik]. In: Paul Cernovodeanu, Nicolae Edroiu (Hg.), *Istoria Românilor. Românii între Europa Clasică și Europa Luminilor (1711–1821)*. București 2002, Vol. 6, S. 541; Sehr treffend in diesem Sinn ist auch die Aussage des Staatsrates Borié aus dem Jahr 1766: „Das Grossfürstenthumb Siebenbürgen“ ist „ein von anderen Reichen unabhängiger – und souverainer Staat [...], welcher einem Königreich gleich fortan ist geachtet worden.“ Vgl. MÜLLER Konrad, *Siebenbürgische Wirtschaftspolitik unter Maria Theresia*. In: Harold Steinacker (Hg.), (= Buchreihe der Südostdeutschen Historischen Kommission, Bd. 9), München 1961, S. 15, Fußnote 2.

⁴⁰ Über die Debatte auf dem siebenbürgischen Landtag der Jahren 1790/1791 betreffend das Diplom vom 1765, vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 344–356; Was die Symbolik der Wappen des Großfürstentums Siebenbürgen zu suggerieren bzw. zu beabsichtigte wollte, sind die Wörter eines anderen wichtigen siebenbürgischen Hohenbeamten, der Protonotär Türi, aus seiner Rede während einer Sitzung des Landtages der Jahren 1790/1791 betreffend: „[...] die im Wappen für Siebenbürgen angebrachte Krone habe mit der ungarischen keine Ähnlichkeit.“ Vgl. ZIEGLAUER Ferdinand v., (1881), S. 347.

Schlussfolgerungen

Alle bewaffneten Versuche von Emerich Tökoly (1690)⁴¹, von Franz. II. Rákóczi (1703–1711)⁴² und (1716–1718)⁴³ und von Josef Rákóczi (1737–1738)⁴⁴ für die Befreiung Siebenbürgens von der habsburgischen Herrschaft, die diplomatischen Bemühungen von Franz. II. Rákóczi an den westeuropäischen Höfen für die Erhaltung des Status Siebenbürgen als autonomes Fürstentum⁴⁵, oder das Projekt des siebenbürgischen Kanzler Nikolaus Bethlen aus dem Jahr 1704, „Columba Noae“, in dem die Neutralität von Siebenbürgen vorgeschlagen wurde⁴⁶, scheiterten letztendlich, und sie blieben nur eine Episode. Die Existenz der eigenen Staatlichkeit Siebenbürgens, wie es der Fall unter der osmanischen Herrschaft war, endete durch seine Eingliederung in der Habsburgischen Monarchie. Siebenbürgen ist als Fürstentum und dann als Großfürstentum zu einem Teil des Länderkonglomerats der Habsburger geworden.

⁴¹ Vgl. MORIZ Angeli v., (1876), S. 299 und 306 f.; KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 6 f.; VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 369 f.; ANDEA Susana, ANDEA Avram, (2003), S. 362; WINKELBAUER Thomas, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht. Länder und Untertanen des Hauses Habsburg im Konfessionellen Zeitalter*. In: Herwig Wolfram (Hg.), *Österreichische Geschichte 1522–1699*. Wien 2003, Teil I., S. 170.

⁴² Über den Aufstand der Kuruzzen unter der Führung von Franz. II. Rákóczi (1703–1711), vgl. PRODAN David, (1964), S. 244–252; Kutschera Rolf, (1985), S. 214 f.; VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 372–375 und 378 f.; MAGYARI Andrei, (2003), S. 375–387.

⁴³ Vgl. auch MATUSCHKA Ludwig, *Der Türken-Krieg 1716–18. Feldzug 1717/18. Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen*. Wien 1891, Serie II., Bd. VIII. *Der Friedensschluss von Požarevac (Passarowitz) am 21. Juli 1718*. In: Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des k. und k. Kriegs- Archivs (Hg.), *Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen (Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs)*. Bd. XVIII, Wien 1891, S. 354 f.; 372 f. und 472; KALLBRUNNER JOSEF, *Das kaiserliche Banat, I.: Einrichtung und Entwicklung des Banats bis 1739*. In: Schriftenreihe des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerks, Reihe B, Bd. 11, München, 1958, S. 12.

⁴⁴ Vgl. auch KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 223 f.

⁴⁵ Vgl. KÖPECZI Béla, *Restitutio Transylvaniae 1712. Kísérlet az Erdélyi Fejedelemség visszaállítására. Une tentative pour rétablir la Principauté des Transylvanie*. Budapest 1993.

⁴⁶ Vgl. KUTSCHERA Rolf, (1985), S. 86, Fußnote 8; VÁRKONYI R. Ágnes, (1990), S. 375.

CHANGE YOUR HABITS!
HEALTH AND HYGIENE ISSUES IN BUKOVINA
DURING THE 19TH CENTURY

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Rezumat: Schimbați-vă obiceiurile! Probleme de sănătate și igienă în Bucovina secolului al XIX-lea

Igiena și sănătatea publică în Bucovina secolului al XIX-lea îmbracă anumite caracteristici ale modernității, caracteristici care sunt mai mult sau mai puțin evidente, potrivit marilor schimbări socio-politice și economice ale vremii. De cele mai multe ori, sănătatea (sau lipsa ei) a fost pusă pe seama condițiilor naturale și biologice, în timp ce răspândirea bolilor era puternic influențată de statutul socio-economic al indivizilor, de credințele și tradițiile entice sau de alți factori culturali; cu toate acestea, câteva documente istorice preferau să pună vina îmbolnăvirilor mai mult pe seama individului decât pe cea a societății. Oricum, proiectele legislative și ordonanțele aplicate în Bucovina au ilustrat că transformările s-au produs nu numai la nivelul gândirii medicale, ci și în transferul modelelor de sănătate și igienă. Cu siguranță, doctorii au jucat un rol cheie – atât în orașe, cât și la sate – în explicarea strânsei legături dintre igiena personală și sănătatea comunității. Acest articol explorează modul în care discursurile despre sănătate construiesc sau rezistă identităților sociale, centrându-se pe impactul sfaturilor disciplinatorii asupra comportamentului de viață al populației în provincia austriacă Bucovina.

Abstract: *Hygiene and public health in Bukovina during the nineteenth century take on some characteristics of modernity, characteristics which are more or less evident, according to the major socio-political and economic changes of the epoch. Most of the time, health (or lack of health) was attributed to natural and biological conditions, while the spread of diseases was heavily influenced by the socio-economic status of individuals, ethnic traditions or beliefs, and other cultural factors; yet, some historical documents were more likely to blame health issues on the individual rather than society as a whole. However, the legislative projects and the ordinances applied in Bukovina illustrated that shifts occurred not only at the level of medical thought but also in transference of healthcare and hygiene patterns. Doctors were certainly key players – both in cities and villages – by explaining the close interrelationship between personal hygiene and community health. This article explores how the health discourses construct or resist social identities, focusing on the*

impact of disciplinary exhortations on the population lifestyle behavior in the Austrian province of Bukovina.

Résumé : Changez vos habitudes ! Problèmes de santé et hygiène dans la Bucovine du XIX-ème siècle

L'hygiène et la santé publique dans la Bucovine du XIX-ème siècle prit certains traits de la modernité, traits plus ou moins évidents, conformément aux changements majeurs sociopolitiques et économiques de l'époque. Plusieurs fois, on mit la santé (ou son manque) sur le compte des conditions naturelles ou biologiques, pendant que la propagation des maladies était puissamment influencée par le statut socioéconomique des individus, par les croyances et les traditions ethniques ou par des autres facteurs culturels; malgré cela, quelques documents historiques préféraient à blâmer plutôt l'individu que la société. En tout cas, les projets législatifs et les ordonnances appliqués dans la Bucovine illustrèrent que les transformations se sont produites pas seulement au niveau de la pensée médicale, mais aussi dans le transfert des modèles de santé et hygiène. Certainement, les médecins jouèrent un rôle clé – en ville, mais aussi à la campagne – dans l'explication de l'étroite liaison entre l'hygiène personnelle et la santé de la communauté. L'article ci-joint explore la manière dans laquelle les discours sur la santé construisent ou résistent aux identités sociales, étant centrés sur l'impact des conseils de discipline sur le comportement de vie de la population dans la province autrichienne de la Bucovine.

Keywords: *health, hygiene, Bukovina, behaviour, lifestyle, disease*

Introduction

The influence of medical authorities on privacy depends on the nature of the relationship established between the state and its subjects; it also depends on the historical period. In Bukovina, up to 1880, the physician's advice regarding the health care and hygiene was preceded by the cultural habits of a traditional way of life. The diseases were mostly considered a divine punishment because of people's sins or simply a fact of life. The people's mind was not occupied with negative thoughts and fears concerning the common health issues, with the exception of frightening epidemics and potential contagion. Yet there was a link between dirt, hygiene and disease, but it predated the second half of the 19th century. The traditional fatalism, poor food, nakedness, alcoholism, long fasts and other „curiosities religious”, the minuscule houses „without aeration” and garbage gathered for a long time in the yards or tossed on the streets remained a disagreeable reality of Bukovinian society, casting shadows over its idyllic image.

Soon after the annexation of Bukovina, the sanitary measures applied during the military administration were mostly driven by epidemics, while the sanitation and hygiene-related issues were neglected or treated as a secondary

matter. However, the behaviour of the severe epidemics of the time (the pest and cholera) had a special way of intensifying anxiety. In order to avoid the epidemics' outbreaks, some public health measures were implemented until 1850. As the official requirements could not be fully understood, the authorities turned their attention to church ministers and priests, asking them to help educate „the people of Bukovina”, shaping and adapting these measures to the local realities. The Bishops Dosoftei, Daniil Vlahovici, and Isaia Balosescu used the church pulpit to present the health risks caused by ignorance or disobedience, stressing over the danger of contamination¹. Afterwards, Simion Florea Marian taught his students to beware of „various epidemic or endemic diseases” (rheumatism, „shortness of vision”, „body's drowsiness”, or that illness „the name of which could not be pronounced because is too disgusting”) caused or facilitated by an unhealthy environment. The main reasons of illness among students from Suceava high school were, according to Marian, „the small, narrow, low, and dark houses in which they live”, and „the uncleanness and lack of concern about their bodies”². In other words, the public healthcare became not only a duty of the state, but equally a civic education and self-discipline³. The „top-down” interventions became an embodiment of the provincial and local authorities' healthcare policy and social discipline⁴.

Smell of unhealthiness: poverty and ignorance

By the late 19th century, the sanitary practices were explained by the *miasma theory of diseases*; as the word *miasma* came to be used as a term for the

¹ Ioan Iețcu, Vasile Demciuc, *Retrospectivă epidemiologică în Ducatul Bucovinei. Noi date în legătură cu situația epidemiologică din Bucovina la începutul secolului al XIX-lea*, [Epidemiological Retrospect in Duchy of Bukovina. New Data about the Epidemiological Situation in Bukovina in the Early Nineteenth Century], in "Revista de medicină și chirurgie", Iași, 1986, vol. 90, nr. 4, p. 747; Mihai-Ștefan Ceaușu, *Bucovina Habsburgică. De la anexare la Congresul de la Viena* [The Habsburg Bukovina. From Annexation to the Congress of Vienna], Iași, 1998, p. 140, 215.

² Paul Leu, *Simion Florea Marian*, Suceava, 1996, p. 220-221.

³ *Curățenia casei și a trupului omenesc – povește pentru popor date de Dr. O. G.* [House and Human Body Cleaning – Advice for People given by Dr. O. G.], "Calendar pe 1911", Cernăuți, 1910, p. 49.

⁴ Teodora Daniela Sechel, *Healthcare Policy and the Social Discipline Promoted by the Habsburgs in Transylvania (1740-1830)*, in Wolfgang Schmale (ed.), *Multiple kulturelle Referenzen in der Habsburgermonarchie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Gesellschaft zur Erforschung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*, vol 24, 2010, p. 240.

foul airs and atmospheres that were thought to cause disease⁵, the illnesses were thought to be provoked and spread to vulnerable people due to the inhalation of vapours emitted by rotting animal and vegetable materials⁶. Trying to improve the healthcare and living conditions, the so-called *miasmatists* stated that „all smell is disease”, consequently motivating both authorities and ordinary people to tackle malodor sources and thereby unintentionally improving sanitation⁷. In 1806, a gubernatorial decree demanded all the peasants of Bukovina to build (near their houses) „stables, chicken coops, and shelters for cattle, calves, horses, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry, and other domesticated animals”⁸. This legislative measure was necessary because during the winter the villagers used to share the same room with their calves, lambs or foals, this „habit” leading to „weaken bones” and causing „cough, dizziness, colds”⁹. Nevertheless in the early 20th century, an article published in a Romanian Calendar mentioned that the „stable and barn, then the pigsty are often too close to home, even joined with it or under the same roof”. As a result, the „manure and other refuse contaminate the surrounding air and the households are forced to breathe these stench”¹⁰.

According to the *Medical and Topographical Sketch of Bukovina*, published in the mid-19th century by the military physician of Czernowitz, Carl Hampeis, the „gastro nerve” and lymph system disorders (as well as the typhoid, tuberculosis, and even the cholera epidemic episodes) were caused not only by the temperature differences – especially in spring and autumn – or by the unbalanced diet – with an excessive consumption of grain-alcohol, but furthermore by „the miserable housing, supersaturated with the polluted air”¹¹. The unsanitary dwellings described by Hampeis were „small wooden huts, covered with straw”. Consisted of

⁵ Valerie A Curtis, *Dirt, disgust and disease: a natural history of hygiene*, "Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health", 2007, August 61(8), p. 662.

⁶ Patricia J. Bulsing, Monique A.M. Smeets, Marcel A. Van den Hout, *The Implicit Association between Odors and Illness*, "Chemical Senses", 2009, vol 34, issue 2, p. 117.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

⁸ Corneliu Grigorovici, *Unde sunt feciorii Bucovinei. Mușenița – studiu monografic* [Where are the Boys of Bukovina. Mușenița – Monographic Study], Cluj Napoca, 2012, p. 48.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Curățenia casei și a trupului omenesc...*, p. 51.

¹¹ Carl Hampeis, *Medizinische Topographische Skizze der Bukowina mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Jahres 1844*, in "Österreichische Medizinische Zeitschrift", 1846, 57 Band, apud Octavian Lupu, *Aspecte din istoria medicinei în Bucovina sub dominația habsburgică* [Aspects of the History of Medicine in Bukovina under Habsburg Domination], ms., Biblioteca Bucovinei "I.G. Sbiera", fond *Bucovina*, inv. 253.528, f. 43.

only one room¹², the houses had no light, and no fresh air supply; there was the bake-stone that allowed their modest food preparation, in some clay pots. That small room was quickly filled with smoke flue, which covered the human faces. By bringing small animals indoors, the fetid odour became breathable only for the indigenous, accustomed to such conditions.

In the same description, the highlanders' huts seemed even more meager: the walls were made of boards, and the roof was reinforced with stones, not to be blown away. Each house had a bench, called „divan”, placed along the walls, and covered with a tattered carpet, or a filthy pile of straw lying in a corner. The interior was also shared by the people with a few goats and sheep which represented their „only wealth”¹³. Consequently, the writings of Hampeis showed the image of rural Bukovina, a few decades after the imposing of the mentioned gubernatorial decree of 1806.

In 1854, in his *Visum et Repertum*, Dr. Eduard Exelbirth, the physician of Radautz district, described the house of Mr. Golembiowski¹⁴ of Shipot in the following terms: it „has two rooms and a pantry, with walls made of planks stacked horizontally one above the other, and not covered with clay plaster, nor with another shelter against the external atmosphere. Within the joints and cracks of these resinous wood bars, directly exposed to the internal heat, many insects built their nests, infecting the air and scattering the inhabitants sleep. The floors are not paved with planks or any other hard materials, but simply by battered clay, which spread moisture and dangerous exhalation”¹⁵. In such conditions, the Golembiowski's house was considered by Dr. Exelbirth „harmful to the health of its occupants”, all the more so as „the older members of the family were often suffering from disorders of the pectoral organs, and the younger – two children – were affected by eczema”¹⁶.

In less than three decades, another physician reviewed the serious health problems and grossly unsatisfactory living conditions in the the easternmost crown land of the Austrian Empire. The Provincial Sanitary Referent, Karl Denarowski explained why the „medical condition” of Bukovina was linked to the lack of concern for hygiene and nutrition. In his monograph, the physician mentioned that scrofula

¹² Ion Nandris, *Satul nostru Mahala din Bucovina* [Our Village Mahala of Bukovina], Sibiu, 2001, p. 72.

¹³ Octavian Lupu, *Aspecte din istoria medicinii...*, p. 44.

¹⁴ The Greek Orthodox priest Iralie Golembiovski was the father of Romanian composer, Ciprian Porumbescu.

¹⁵ Paul Leu, *Simion Florea Marian...*, p. 174.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

or tuberculosis of superficial lymph nodes was prevalent both in the cities and the villages, especially among the Jews and other poor people who had overcrowded, damp, mould, narrow and dirty houses¹⁷. Even if the epidemics were inevitable in Bukovina due to its geo-climatic and meteorological particularities, the doctor believed that their expansion could be „starved” with some simple hygiene measures and practices related to water and sanitation in housing settlements, and particularly in towns¹⁸. According to his observations, „the long and heavy epidemics were caused by the heavy neglect of *sanitary* politeness measures, as happened in Czernowitz where there were abundant, irregular latrines and full of garbage pits located near wells. The cemented cesspool almost did not exist in all towns. The yards were filled with heaps of rubbish that were often thrown into the street”. In many cases, the slops of houses were directed to the ditches of the streets. In addition – wrote Denarowski – no one seemed to be interested in sanitation and hygiene of the town. Public latrines did not exist, and people of the town's periphery kept many cattle in their yards, not in stables. The cemetery was situated in a swampy region and the water from there was drained to a public swimming pool”¹⁹. A survey conducted by the Czernowitz town hall, in 1877, showed that of 863 houses, located in the center of the town, 473 had latrines and cesspools with the walls made of planks, and 390 with masonry walls (but only 132 of these were appropriate); other 58 houses in downtown Czernowitz had no cesspools, and the same conditions were in the suburbs²⁰. As there was no regulation to stop these „demonstrations of libertinism” against hygiene, practices of stretching animal skins on fences occurred in smaller towns.

Living (un)healthy in fragile shelters

Denarowski believed that the precarious environmental health conditions in the rural area of Bukovina were caused by „pauperism” that became the most important impediment in achieving health reforms. The poverty was also a constant source for the emergence and spread of the epidemics²¹. That is why, the Provincial Sanitary Referent urged the people to improve their hygiene behaviour, and the officials to keep the principles stipulated by the „Imperial

¹⁷ Karl Denarowski, *Commentar zur Sanitätskarte der Bukowina*, Wien, 1880, apud Octavian Lupu, *Aspecte din istoria medicinii...*, p. 75.

¹⁸ Heinrich Rohlf, Gerhard Rohlf (eds.), *Deutsches Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und medizinische Geographie*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 362.

¹⁹ Octavian Lupu, *Aspecte din istoria medicinii...*, p. 76.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Karl Denarowski, *Commentar zur Sanitätskarte...*, p. 207.

Sanitary Act" (*Reichs-Sanitätsgesetz*). Conforming to the law of 1870, the Communes took „charge of the streets, roads, markets, places for public meetings, habitations, sewers and their cleansing, drinking-water, foods and the vessels which contain them, public baths"; they also had to „build and inspect mortuaries, places of burial, cattle markets [...], to carry out the measures prescribed by the administration for the prevention of infectious diseases, and to see that the sanitary regulations were enforced"²².

Some legislative measures were adopted in the 1880s as controlling tools with respect to the health conditions in the provinces of Austrian Empire. Although each province of the Crown had its general regulations regarding housing and health, the most general principles were as follows: „New houses, and houses which had undergone extensive repairs, could not be inhabited until they were inspected by competent persons, delegated by the communal authority, and declared satisfactory from the sanitary standpoint²³. Latrines had to be built so that it could give free access to air and light. The depots for manure had been placed at a safe distance from wells"²⁴. As for Bukovina, one of the contributors to the Romanian journal „*Revista Politică*" wrote in 1887: „it had to pass 17 years until the draft law on the organization of health service in the Communes of Duchy of Bukovina was born"²⁵. Through its provisions relating to the peasants' health, the law would have removed „all causes that dig at the root of people's health", only if it had been „severely applied"²⁶.

Despite the efforts of the Local Sanitary Commission (which was created to monitor the streets and wells cleanliness, to inspect the housing conditions, and to enforce the health rules and regulations)²⁷, the discipline of public health remained challenging, impacted by poverty and ignorance. Publishing an article in a Bukovinian periodical, the Romanian physician O. G.²⁸ observed many deficiencies and lifestyle risk factors; among them, he mentioned the unhealthy and stressing living conditions of the rural areas. The specific wood houses

²² Albert Palmberg, *A Treatise on Public Health: And Its Applications in Different European Countries*, London, 1893, p. 415.

²³ The damp houses have repeatedly been linked to a number of health outcomes, including "scrofula, festered bones, most ugly eye-diseases, rheumatism", cf. *Curățenia casei și a trupului omenesc...*, p. 50.

²⁴ Albert Palmberg, *A Treatise on Public Health...*, p. 419.

²⁵ *Legea sanitară în comunele rurale* [The Health Law in Rural Communes], "Revista Politică", II, nr. 16, 31 December 1887, p. 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁷ Corneliu Grigorovici, *Unde sunt feciorii Bucovinei...*, p. 48.

²⁸ Probably Dr. Octavian Gheorghian (1874-1929).

system was intended „to shield from the cold weather and chilly winds”, but not from the health problems and diseases. The entrance of the house, „placed to the south, is leading to a porch; on right side is the household room, low, with two windows to the south and one to the east, through which the daylight barely permeates. Towards the north is the windowless wall. Near the door are the bake-stone and the stove; from the stove to the east wall is a wider bed. There are benches and boxes for various things along the walls, and a table in the middle of the room. Most of the houses have no more than one room, and some other – inhabited by a large family, or even two families – have a small chamber, placed to the left of the porch [...] The plank floors are still rare, and the beaten earth floor is greased from time to time to time with perishable things, because the dry waste becomes dust, entering the most delicate parts of the body and bringing many diseases”²⁹.

The belief that poverty and habitual behaviour causes diseases was reflected by Dr. O. G. in the following lines: „Children, old women and old men lie on the top of the stove, for there is warmer in winter. About 5-8 souls have to spend the night in that heat and smell of so many people, on a 1½ meters oven, so high that sitting on it, you can reach the ceiling. There is concern about warmth, but not about the health; and fresh air is better than excessive heat. During any type of illness, the sick person sleeps next to others. None of the houses have a spare bed or a free place where the patient may rest. In this respect, when a householder is going to build a house, he should think about large windows, floors and enough room for bed”, thereby avoiding the „huddled nights” and „the bad air of a tiny chamber”. The avoidance of infectious threats was also motivated by the emotion of disgust: „On the stove are usually spread old tatters, some rugged woollen coat or a bad, old sheepskin coat. The bed has a sack of straw covered with a saddle blanket, then pillows and a duvet, or (as a substitute) a thick long woollen coat. There are no bedspread, neither duvet covers, which often can be washed. All filths, all impurities and sweats from healthy and sick stick to the beddings, that the oiled mattress and especially pillows – because of the hair soaked in rancid butter – can hardly be cleaned”³⁰.

What emerged from these observations was that the connection between housing and health was multi-faceted; yet, the house cleaning could have been easily improved if during the winter, the women „who deals daily with spinning and weaving, would make canvas pillow covers, bed sheets and duvet covers. This bed linen can be regularly undone and washed. The cleanliness would be

²⁹ *Curăţenia casei şi a trupului omenesc...*, p. 49-50.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

appreciable, the people much healthier, and the foul diseases not as wide as before”³¹. But beyond these general opinions that emphasized the housing risk factors in predisposing families and communities to different diseases, this approach indicates the transition from the *poisonous miasmas* to the tiny particles that can cause diseases.

Do I need to wash this? Cleaning clothes and bodies

The clear relationship between poverty, ignorance and disease reinforced the paradigm of *medical moralism*. The information or advices published in popular magazines and calendars contained warnings against poor personal hygiene and unsanitary practices. For example, in order to ameliorate the impact of diseases in the rural areas, the peasants had to be encouraged to live a good, decent, and industrious life. Women were charged with keeping their families healthy and clean. They had to ensure that members of their families had clean clothes to wear. Not just the poor, but peasants in general engaged in personal imprudence in their daily lives. Washing once a week became the established norm, so the laundry and clothes were changed only on Sunday³². Dr. G.O. mentioned one of the unhealthy habits of peasants: „During the summer, when a man works hard, he sweats, and when he comes home at night, his wife does not give him a clean shirt, so he sleeps in that coat, full of sweat and dust. The man gets up early in the morning, goes to the field and works up a sweat, wearing the same shirt. You can imagine how much dirt is gathered in the worker’s shirt, from Monday to Saturday”³³. New or old, the clothes should have been aired, because of their „stench”.

Customs and practices regarding headwear were also applied to the personal hygiene. The married women continued to wear oblong cotton scarves, square scarves, triangular scarves or bonnets. Sometimes, they were accused for wearing „half a dowry” on their heads, whether it was summer or winter: „first, a handkerchief or a cap, then a light fringed headscarf, then an ostentatious headscarf, and finally the oblong cotton scarf”³⁴. The heat caused by wearing these accessories could also affect the women’s comfort and health. Apart from this „unhealthy weirdness”, the footwear hygiene constituted another major problem

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Vasile Boca, *Monografia satului Botoșana* [Monograph on Botosana Village], Cluj Napoca, 2001, p. 125. Filimon Rusu, *Amintiri. Oameni și locuri din Țara Fagilor* [Memories. People and Places of the Land of Beech Trees], București, 2009, p. 73.

³³ *Curățenia casei și a trupului omenesc...*, p. 51.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

for the „disciplinary agents”. Even if the shoes were durable, the way they were worn was disgusting. The foot, „usually unwashed”, was wrapped in some cloths made from remnants of an apron or skirt. These foot-wraps, full of dirt and rigid as the bark of a tree, were worn until they fell to pieces, but rarely cleaned³⁵.

In the 19th century the hands, feet and face were regularly washed, and the rest of the body every few weeks or longer. Most people believed that hand washing represents „a sufficient measure of personal hygiene”. On one hand, at least three reasons turned it into a habit; the hand washing was necessary to remove the „dirt, smell or sticky residues”, and to give „a good appearance” before going to church, visiting or when visitors were coming. On the other hand, there were some guidelines sprang from the principles of health and safety. From simple admonitions to scientific explanations, the matters of healthy behaviour during meals included hand washing compliance: „More care must be given to hand washing and fingernails cleaning, because our people do not eat with fork and knife, but with fingers; especially polenta is hand kneaded. All the filths from the hand enter the stomach along with food, causing health damages”³⁶. The feet were also neglected, although they tend to get dirtier and sweatier than other parts of the body.

Rinsing hands and feet with cold water alone was more common than washing them with soap. But even the water could have been avoided; the lack of hair hygiene was often invoked as well as the belief that water is „injurious” to the hair. Many of the 19th century explanations of hair care habits have emerged from a social biology perspective. For some people, the hair represented an expression of their personal identity, acting as a surface barrier to protect them from social dangers, such as marginalization. Sometimes the management of men’s hair became an enactment of status control³⁷: shorter hair often signified servitude and peasantry, while long hair was often attributed to freemen³⁸. Besides, long hair symbolized strength and vitality since the Middle Ages, according to historical sources³⁹. Nonetheless, the long male hair has been denounced by many for being impractical and unhygienic. Without soaps or herbal ointments, people were forced to use common household products.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Joanne Finkelstein, *Fashion: An Introduction*, New York, 1998, pp. 14-15.

³⁸ Norman J. Cohen, *Masking and Unmasking Ourselves*, Woodstock, 2012, p. 38.

³⁹ Maria Holban (ed.), *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Foreign Travellers about the Romanian Countries], București, vol. I, 1968, p. 30. Dan A. Lăzărescu, *Imaginea României prin călători* [Image of Romania by Travellers], București, vol. I, 1985.

Butter or other kitchen fats were used to condition and soften the hair, prepare it for straightening and make it shine. The smell of rancid butter on the hair, along with that of sweat, was not only disgusting, but also sickening. Faced with scalp diseases and hard labour in the hot sun, the men were encouraged to cut their hair short: „How well it would be if men would change their shaggy, smelling hair with a suitable trimmed head, easily and daily tidied up; then the various headaches caused by heat on the shaggy head would disappear”⁴⁰. The same precautionary principle of hygiene and health justified the school regulation about the boys’ haircut. In spite of the legislative intrusions and administrative requirements, the boys’ mother felt compelled to express their objections since „only the recruits are forced to cut their hair”, arousing both laughter and sympathy⁴¹.

There was also a cultural resistance to warm baths – which was still around in the early 19th century – and a widespread belief that bathing in warm water could be harmful to health. Pores were seen as openings in the skin and many people thought that bathing made it possible for diseases to enter the body. As the century progressed, this idea has been corrected, but bathing was rarely mentioned simply for the sake of hygiene. However, by the end of the century, the Bukovina’s middle class had formed a pattern of cleanliness that ranked alongside typical modern concepts, such as respectability and social progress. The basins and pitchers represented the standard wash equipment all through the period and it was desirable to find it in every house, no matter how poor it was. Because it required little effort to arrange for a bowl of water, this sort of „general cleaning” could be done by all family members, one at a time, replacing the weird habit of spitting water into the hands to wash the face.⁴² Everyone was encouraged to bathe in warm water, in wooden tubs⁴³, as they could be found in rural areas and towns.

Even so, in rural areas, the mobilization of medical care was insufficient to remove the archaic mentality and the unhealthy conditions of hygiene. The rivers and streams were used as the villagers’ summer bathing place⁴⁴. Yet, in his work, Hampeis noted that children’s „skin was covered with thick crusts of

⁴⁰ *Curăţenia casei şi a trupului omenesc...*, p. 51.

⁴¹ Filimon Rusu, *Amintiri...*, p. 73.

⁴² *Curăţenia casei şi a trupului omenesc...*, p. 51.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴⁴ Iacob Felix, *Istoria igienei în România în secolul al XIX-lea şi starea ei la începutul secolului al XX-lea* [The History of Hygiene in Romania in the 19th Century and Its State at the Beginning of the 20th Century], I, Bucureşti, 1901, p. 236.

dirt”⁴⁵, and the scabies „spread in the whole circle of Bukovina, both in the cities and villages, in the mountains and lowland areas”⁴⁶. In addition, the head lice infestation was seen as a „plague”, becoming the butt of jokes, of sarcasm and bitterness on allegations of unhygienic behaviour: „When lice climb onto the wagon wheel, there's nothing to do but to get them into your bosom”, or „the lice walk with straws in their mouths”⁴⁷. The only way to get rid of them was giving up old clothes and washing the body with soap and warm water⁴⁸, even if the soap was generally reserved for cleaning laundry. Women were advised to wash with soap their body and their newborns’ scalp, protecting them of the „black crust” which was not a disease, but simply a soil or filth sticking on the skin⁴⁹.

Obvious, the advice on health and hygiene continued with new powers that were strengthened in the following decades. Yet this positive approach did not signify a categorical victory against ignorance, poverty and diseases. While the hygiene reclamations of physicians, priests, teachers, and other public officials confirmed that health care was taken seriously, two questions still remained: when ordinary people will understand that they have to change their habits in order to protect their health, and how long it will take them to achieve modernity?

Conclusions

The 19th century public health movement in Bukovina could be seen in terms of the drive to expand the state’s power to regulate the province environment. Initially focused on the unsanitary conditions of housing, the crusade against unhealthy practice and the beliefs about the importance of domestic and individual hygiene represented one of the instances in which the information (about the origins and prevention of diseases) led to widespread changes in popular behaviour through the medium of mass education.

The observations and statements of the civic-minded citizens underlined the causal link between poverty, ignorance and sickness, claiming that diseases are provoked by precarious environmental conditions and lack of hygiene. The legislative measures and educational works of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s laid the groundwork for the public health care of following decades, highlighting the growing influence of medical science on cultural habits of a traditional way of life.

⁴⁵ Octavian Lupu, *Aspecte din istoria medicinei...*, f. 45.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 43.

⁴⁷ Vasile Boca, *Monografia satului Botoșana*, p. 134.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Curățenia casei și a trupului omenesc...*, p. 52.

**ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-ПРОПАГАНДИСТСКАЯ ПОДДЕРЖКА
ПРОЦЕССОВ СОВЕТИЗАЦИИ В ЗАПАДНЫХ ОБЛАСТЯХ УССР
В 1939-1941 ГОДАХ**

**INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDIST SUPPORT OF
SOVIETISATION PROCESSES IN THE WESTERN REGIONS
OF UKSSR DURING 1939-41**

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Rezumat: *Suportul informațional și propagandistic al proceselor de sovietizare în regiunile de vest ale RSS Ucrainene în anii 1939-1941.*

Acest articol încearcă să arate dimensiunile arsenalului informațional și propagandistic care a susținut procesul de sovietizare a regiunilor de vest, încorporate RSS Ucrainene în urma anexării lor de către URSS. Pe baza surselor de arhivă și a informației din mass-media au fost identificate metodele și formele prin care puterea sovietică a urmărit atragerea simpatiei populației, impactul propagandei sovietice precum și particularitățile politicii informaționale în regiunile de vest ale Ucrainei. Este scoasă în evidență importanța factorului informațional în constituirea noii administrații, în realizarea proprietății publice prin naționalizarea industriei și colectivizarea agriculturii, în generarea mutațiilor în domeniul culturii și al educației.

Abstract: *This article attempts to show the dimension of information and propaganda arsenal which supported the Sovietisation processes of the Western Regions, incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR after their annexation by the USSR. On the basis of archival sources and Mass Media information, has been identified methods and forms by which the Soviet Power sought to attract the sympathy of the population, the Soviet propaganda impact, as well as the information peculiarities in the western regions of Ukraine. It is emphasized the importance of the information factor in establishing a new administration, in achieving public ownership through nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture, in generating mutations in the field of culture and education.*

Résumé : *Le soutien informationnel et de propagande des processus de soviétisation dans les régions occidentales de la République Socialiste Soviétique d'Ukraine pendant les années 1939-41.*

L'article ci-joint essaya de révéler les dimensions de l'arsenal informationnel et de propagande qui soutint le processus de soviétisation des régions occidentales, incluses dans la République Socialiste Soviétique d'Ukraine par conséquent de leur annexion par l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques. On y identifia sur la base de sources d'archives et des rapports des médias les méthodes et les formes par lesquels le pouvoir soviétique visa attirer la sympathie de la population, l'impact de la propagande soviétique, ainsi que les particularités informationnelles dans les régions de l'ouest de l'Ukraine. On y souligna, aussi, l'importance du facteur informationnel dans la constitution de la nouvelle administration, dans la réalisation de la propriété publique par la nationalisation de l'industrie et la collectivisation de l'agriculture, de la mise en œuvre des changements dans le domaine de la culture et de l'éducation.

Keywords: *information influence, Soviet Union, Mass Media, periodic press, the western regions of UkSSR, the Soviet Union Power.*

Предисловие

В истории Украины XX века важнейшее место занимают события, развернувшиеся накануне Второй мировой войны. В рамках Украинской ССР фактически консолидировались все украинские земли. Важнейшим шагом на этом пути было присоединение к СССР тех украинских территорий, которые на протяжении межвоенного периода находились в составе Польского государства и Румынии, а именно – Восточной Галиции, Западной Волыни и Северной Буковины, получивших в историографии составное название Западной Украины. Присоединение стало результатом сложной политической и дипломатической игры И. Сталина и А. Гитлера в начале Второй мировой войны. Не менее важную роль в этом процессе сыграла информационная политика государств, являющаяся одним из определяющих факторов противостояния.

В современный период отмеченная проблематика составляет предмет заинтересованности представителей различных общественных наук, поскольку значительная часть вопросов, связанных с информационным сопровождением становления и функционирования советского режима в западных областях УССР в 1939-1940 годах, еще остается малоисследованной. Кроме этого, в истории региона особое место занимает вступление Красной армии, поскольку оно означало открытие новой странички в его развитии. Не все слои населения одинаково восприняли установление правления большевиков. Поэтому новой власти пришлось использовать все свои методы влияния на сознание новых граждан.

Для региона характерны своеобразные исторические, национальные, религиозно-культурные традиции, и это требовало от власти СССР четких и продуманных действий по внедрению тут своей политики. Информационное влияние власть совершала административным путем, состоявшим в расширении цензуры, запрете печатных изданий, исключении и уничтожении публикаций и фильтрации поступлений литературы из-за границы, монополизации издательского дела. Поскольку именно местная периодика стала основным источником информации для населения, на нее возлагались основные задачи информационного сопровождения процессов советизации в довоенный период.

Для облегчения возможностей власти и максимального повышения уровня доверия населения к ней необходимо было провести широкую информационно-пропагандистскую кампанию по подготовке людей к изменениям в их жизни. В связи с этим руководство УССР использовало ряд приемов, методов и средств информационного влияния на население региона с целью ускорения процессов советизации. Беспристрастное освещение и анализ особенностей этих процессов является целью данного исследования. Отдельные аспекты процессов советизации в западных областях УССР исследовались такими авторами как Луцкий А.¹, Баран В., Токарский В.², Гуменюк О.³ и др. Информационный аспект процесса советизации мало исследован.

Управление настроениями населения в процессе национализации промышленности

Советизация Западной Украины с сентября 1939 г. до июня 1941 г. имела две стороны. Одна из них была связана с большими усилиями власти закрепить в общественном сознании легенду о «золотом сентябре». Они предусматривали внедрение мероприятий по ликвидации безрабо-

¹Луцкий О., *“Радянiзацiя” Львова: вересень 1939 – червень 1941* [“Sovietisation” of Lvov: September, 1939 - June, 1941], in *Львiв. Iсторичнi нариси* [Lviv. historical outlines.], Львiв, 1996, с. 448–450.

²Баран В. К., Токарський В. В., *Україна: західні землі: 1939-1941 pp.* [Ukraine: the western lands: 1939 - 1941], Львiв, 2009, 448 с.

³Гуменюк О. В., *Радянiзацiя захiдноукраїнських земель у 1939-1941 pp.: методи i напрями реалiзацiї та сприйняття мiсцевим населенням* [“Sovietisation” of western Ukraine in 1939 - 1941: methods, ways of realization and perception of it by the local population], Чернiвцi, 2009, 20 с.

тицы и повышение жизненного уровня населения. Немедленно удовлетворялись заявки предприятий на оборудование и сырье. Почти полмиллиона безземельных и малоземельных крестьян получили в пользование помещичьи земли. И, в то же время, внедрение государственного тоталитарного режима на присоединенных территориях, осуществляемое по схеме, отработанной в других регионах Советского Союза, провоцировало население к размышлениям.

Ускоренная интеграция западноукраинского региона в систему советского казарменного социализма сопровождалась широкомасштабными репрессиями, расстрелами, нарушениями законов и прав человека. Все это осуществлялось репрессивно-карательными органами. В первых эшелонах репрессированных шли священники, зажиточные крестьяне, высокообразованные специалисты, ученые, писатели. Карательная машина молола в своих жерновах цвет нации. Людей вывозили семьями, селами, улицами. Масштабы этих акций до нашего времени окончательно не установлены. У тех, кто оставался, отбирали дома, имущество, скот. Все проводилось под лозунгами национализации, социальной справедливости и ликвидации неравенства. Население региона, хотя и было лишено любой возможности исправить навязанное ему положение, все же оказывало отчаянное сопротивление⁴.

С декабря 1939 г. в западных областях УССР и с июня 1940 года в Северной Буковине и Бессарабии началась массовая национализация промышленных предприятий, в результате которой в собственность государства только во Львове было передано 178 объектов. Причем национализировались не только большие и средние заводы и фабрики, а и мелкие ремесленные мастерские, кустарные предприятия. Своеобразной особенностью национализации было и то, что она часто проводилась через общие собрания рабочих предприятий⁵. Поэтому внешне эта процедура иногда создавала видимость народного волеизъявления. А для большего убеждения пресса была переполнена сообщениями о долгожданном переходе предприятий к рабочим. «Большие и малые предприятия области стали всенародной социалистической собственностью. Хозяева этой собственности – трудящиеся, объединенные единым стремлением, соревнуются за то, чтобы развивать дальше свои фабрики, заводы, чтобы давать больше продукции. Производство на наших предприятиях

⁴ Оксана Гуменюк, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁵ Олександр Луцький, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

разворачивается на новой социалистической основе»⁶. Согласно ведомости по национализации предприятий и торговых заведений Львовской области по состоянию на декабрь 1939 г., количество предприятий, подлежащих национализации – 1355, национализировано – 1076⁷. Национализированные предприятия сразу включались в организационную структуру промышленности Советского Союза. Они подчинялись всесоюзным и республиканским наркоматам или ведомствам, некоторые – областному и районным исполнительным комитетам советов депутатов трудящихся. В управлении национализированной промышленностью воцарилась жесткая централизация, которая практически не оставляла пространства для самостоятельных решений хозяйственных руководителей, инженеров и техников. Вследствие этого непосредственные производители были отстранены от средств производства и превратились в разновидность наемных работников, к тому же лишенных серьезных материальных стимулов к высокопродуктивному труду. Соответственно это ограничивало проявление инициативы, порождало пассивность⁸. Тем не менее информационная поддержка процесса в СМИ помогала преодолеть любое недовольство людей.

Постоянно совершались попытки повысить производительность труда за счет организации социалистического соревнования. Начатое на основе принятия трудовыми коллективами и отдельными рабочими социалистических обязательств, оно со временем превратилось в идеологический лозунг, показательный элемент отчета перед высшими звеньями, в средство морально-административного принуждения к труду. Газеты писали: «Соревнуясь за достойную встречу XVIII Всесоюзной партийной конференции львовская кондитерская фабрика имени Кирова приняла на себя обязательство: до 15 февраля выполнить

⁶ *За дальше піднесення промисловості* [Further industrial increase], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 12 вересня 1940 р., № 214 (295), с. 1.

⁷ *Предложение партийной группы облисполкома о создании районов в городе Львове, справки обкома партии, ЦК КП(б)У об организационной, партийно-массовой и хозяйственной работе, обзоры состояния промышленности, сельского хозяйства, торговли, народного образования в области* [The supply of the party group of the regional executive authority in Lvov, information of regional communist party, CC KP(b)Uk about organization, mass party and business work, round – up positions of the industry, agriculture, trade, national education in the region], Державний архів Львівської області (ДАЛО), ф. 3, оп. 1, спр. 2, арк. 23.

⁸ Олександр Луцький, *op. cit.*, p. 449.

план двух месяцев, повысить производительность труда на 25 процентов, уменьшить простой агрегатов, экономить электроэнергию. Перевыполнение дневной нормы уже стало обычным явлением на фабрике. Сотни стахановцев ежедневно дают 2-3 нормы, улучшая качество продукции»⁹. Такими призывами были переполнены газетные колонки. Они должны были привлечь к соревнованию еще большее количество рабочих, кроме того повысить нормы выработки продукции, что могло бы стать весомым аргументом при увеличении плановых показателей. «Несложно представить себе, какое огромное количество дополнительной продукции получила бы наша страна, если бы как следует использовалось наше оборудование, наши производственные мощности, наша новая техника. Трудно подсчитать, сколько промышленность теряет от бесхозяйственности, от неэкономного расходования сырья, материалов, топлива, инструмента, от неравномерного выпуска продукции»¹⁰. Приводились и факты полной безответственности рабочих, что должно было вызывать осуждение общественности. В газете «Свободная Украина» приводились примеры, когда в Львовской промартели им. 24 марта к телогрейкам пришивали несоответственного размера рукава и кривые воротники, а к мужским костюмам – женские пуговицы. Ухудшение качества изготовленной продукции было настолько очевидным, что этот факт достал официальное подтверждение и в материалах первой областной партийной конференции 1940 г.: «Необходимо отметить, что в условиях капиталистической Польши ... конкурирующие предприятия выпускали продукцию значительно лучшую, чем выпускает наш облеглопром»¹¹.

Власть постоянно убеждала, что мероприятия по укреплению трудовой дисциплины и увеличению рабочего времени на предприятиях и учреждениях приводили к последующему росту производительности труда и создали условия для нового подъема промышленности, хотя очень часто это не соответствовало действительности¹². Трудящихся убеждали

⁹ Борисов М., *Уснїху ініціаторів* [Initiators and their successes], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 11 лютого 1941 р., № 34 (421), с. 2.

¹⁰ *Повернути партійні організації в сторону промисловості і транспорту* [Turn the party organizations in the side of industry and transport], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 18 лютого 1941 р., № 40 (427), с. 1.

¹¹ Бендерський С., *Працюємо по-новому* [Work in new ways], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 25 квітня 1941 р., № 97 (253).

¹² *Господарські підсумки 1940 року і план розвитку народного господарства СРСР на 1941 рік. Резолюція на доповідь тов. Вознесенського прийнята XXVIII Всесоюзною*

также, что нерушимым законом любого предприятия является график. И сразу приводились примеры его выполнения и перевыполнения, что звучало для рабочих сигналом к действиям. Например, «21 апреля Черновицкая обувная фабрика выполнила свой четырехмесячный производственный план на 104%. На фабрике выросли новые стахановцы»¹³. Или следующее: «Дни работы XXVIII Всесоюзной партийной конференции стахановцы фабрики № 8 отмечают значительным повышением производительности труда. 15 февраля фабрика дала рекордную выработку – 249% плана. Этим рекордом коллектив начал стахановскую вахту. Следующие дни также показали прекрасные результаты»¹⁴. Такие сообщения были призваны увеличить количество стахановцев и ударников производства и соответственно прибыли для государства. Стахановцев называли гордостью Родины, чтобы повлиять на чувства людей и вызвать желание пополнить их состав. Заместитель директора Львовского литейно-механического завода, А. Ковальский, заявлял, что именно в результате широкого размаха стахановского движения среди рабочих, завод «добился небывалых к этому показателей: к 23 годовщине Октября годовая производственная программа выполнена на 126 процентов»¹⁵.

Интересно, что информация, которую получало население, уверенно убеждала, что все достижения – это результат мудрой политики власти. «Первые шаги наших достижений стали результатом выполнения решений XVIII Всесоюзной партийной конференции, которая направила наше внимание на новых, более совершенные методы труда, работу за графиком и наведение технической культуры на предприятии»¹⁶. С другой стороны, любые неурядицы – это результат отхода от мудрого

конференцією ВКП(б). Частина I. Підсумки 1940 року [Economical summaries in 1940 and plan of the development in national economic USSR: 1941. Resolution to the report of Mr. Voznesensky was accepted by the Soviet Union conference VKP(b) Part I. Summaries 1940], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 25 лютого 1941 р. – № 46 (202), с. 1.

¹³ Петренко К., *Виконали квітневий план* [April plan was done], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 25 квітня 1941 р., № 97 (253).

¹⁴ *Стахановська вахта* [Stakhanovska Vakhta], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 21 лютого 1941 р. – № 43 (199).

¹⁵ Ковальський О., *Паростки нового* [New shoots], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 17 листопада 1940 р., № 269 (350) с. 3.

¹⁶ Бендерський С., *Працюємо по-новому* [Work in new ways], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 25 квітня 1941 р., № 97 (253).

руководства. «Слаженность работы предприятия, если не полностью, то в большой мере, зависит от культуры эксплуатации оборудования. Если за станком установлен хороший уход, он будет работать безотказно и будут отсутствовать факты частых перебоев в работе»¹⁷.

В начале 1941 года власть решила взять под свой полный контроль ситуацию на всех промышленных объектах с целью их последующей национализации. Однако возникали проблемы, связанные с нежеланием частных собственников допускать на предприятия представителей органов народнохозяйственного учета. С целью обеспечения доверия к органам власти была проведена широкая кампания информационной подготовки. В частности, сообщалось, что с 5 по 20 марта согласно постановлению Экономического совета при Совнаркоме СССР органами народнохозяйственного учета будет проводиться перепись всех промышленных предприятий – государственных, кооперативных и частных¹⁸.

Одним из направлений информационной политики было также ограничение доступа населения к определенной информации. В частности, РНК УССР 7 октября 1940 года тайно посылает запрос председателю Черновицкого облисполкома Калинову с целью получения информации о ходе национализации предприятий. В течение трех дней требовалось послать в РНК УССР докладную записку с данными об общем количестве предприятий области, количестве национализированных и тех, что еще предстоит национализировать¹⁹. Конечно, такую информацию не распространяли среди населения, поскольку для него все процессы советизации были исключительно добровольными.

Информационное влияние на процессы коллективизации

Не обошли в своей информационной деятельности советские власти и вопросы о получении земли. В каждом номере газет сообщалось

¹⁷ Черкаський Ф., *Прості розрахунки* [Simple accounts], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 7 березня 1941 р. – № 55 (211).

¹⁸ *Перепис промислових підприємств* [Rewriting of the industrial factories], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 21 лютого 1941 р. – № 43 (199).

¹⁹ *Постановление Центрального Комитета КП(б)У и Совета Народных Комиссаров УССР* [Central Committee KP(b)Uk resolution and Soviet of National Commissars of UkSSR], Державний архів Чернівецької області (ДАЧО), ф. Р-3, оп. 1, спр. 1, арк. 61.

о количестве земли, которая перешла из рук помещиков в руки бедняков и батраков²⁰.

«Батраки и беднота знали, чьим средством в поместье создавались роскоши. Они хорошо знают, что такое бедность, голод и темнота. После победы Красной Армии часто по вечерам собирались они по домам, расспрашивали красноармейцев о колхозах и решили твердо – от единоличного ведения хозяйства перейти к коллективному... Новые колхозники – хозяева земли первую годовщину освобождения встречают большими победами»²¹.

Также постоянно напоминались проблемы нерешенности аграрного вопроса прежними режимами. Причем положение дел в аграрном секторе в предыдущие периоды сознательно извращались и показывались в негативном свете. «Во все века крестьянин-труженик буковинского села бедствовал из-за малоземелья. Австрийские и румынские правители плодородными угодьями сами владели, а бедноте не позволяли даже пользоваться нераспаханными землями. За счет неиспользованных ранее земель в этом году посевная площадь в Черновицкой области увеличится на 6056 гектаров»²². «Колхоз им. Ворошилова Радеховского района организован в конце мая 1940 года. Сначала было у нас только 160 гектаров земли и 24 коня. Но прежние батраки и бедняки, уверенные в своих силах, дружно приступили к работе. Государство шло нам навстречу. Молодой колхоз бесплатно получил в свое пользование все хозяйственные помещения, сельскохозяйственный реманент и мельницу прежнего помещика Краинского. Из бывших осаднических земель нам добавили еще 240 гектаров. Это окрылило всех тружеников. Каждый почувствовал свою ответственность за успех большого дела. Каждой семье в среднем досталось у нас по 24 центнера хлеба и до 1600 рублей. Такие первые последствия коллективного ведения хозяйства»²³. Таким образом

²⁰ Романович Г., *Бідняки і батраки одержують землю і поміщицьку худобу* [Poor people and farm hands get land and landowner's cattle], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 19 липня 1940 р. – № 17.

²¹ Туз І., *Справжні господарі землі* [Real land owners], in «Вільна Україна» [Free Ukraine], 20 серпня 1940 р., № 194 (275), с. 3.

²² Черкаський М., *Збільшується посівна площа* [The increase of sowing areas], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 9 лютого 1941 р. – № 33 (189).

²³ Лотоцький В. Д., *Плоди колективної праці. Наше сьогодні і завтра* [The results of collective work. Our present and tomorrow], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 4 січня 1941 р., № 3 (390), с. 3.

противопоставлялись «высокие достижения» советской власти с «провалами» прежних режимов Западной Украины.

Однако в СМИ не сообщалось о предельных нормах землепользования. Зато Постановление №1267 Совета Народных комиссаров УССР и Центрального Комитета КП(б)У от 26 сентября 1940 года «Об установлении предельных норм землепользования на один крестьянский двор по Черновицкой области УССР» определяло, что с целью обеспечения земель безземельных и малоземельных крестьян необходимо установить такие максимально возможные нормы землепользования в гектарах на один крестьянский двор: Черновицкий и Сторожинецкий уезд – 10, Хотинский – 7. Избытки отрезать и передать в фонд надела земель безземельных и малоземельных крестьян²⁴. Это еще раз подтверждает тот факт, что население находилось в сурово ограниченном информационном поле, рамки которого определялись партией и идеологией. Зато для населения информация подавалась исключительно с позитивной стороны и, как правило, ее источником должны были становиться не партийные и государственные органы, а население. «Колхоз – дело общее и никого здесь не обманешь. Как кто будет работать, так и будут иметь осенью, а лентяи пусть сетуют на себя. Кулаки замолчали, потому что никакие «машины из города» колхозный урожай не забирали. Хлеб и паша лежали безопасно в сухих колхозных амбарах. Колхозник Василий Никлош с женой заработали 600 трудодней. Когда-то у помещика они оба зарабатывали на год 7 центнеров хлеба и 350 злотых деньгами. Кулаки же не платили и этого. Теперь семья получила 33 ц пшеницы, 15 ц паши и 2100 руб. деньгами. Долгие века трудящиеся галицкие крестьяне потом и кровью добывали хлеб. Они искали его даже в далекой Америке, Бразилии и Аргентине. И вот пришла такая власть, такое сказочное время, когда мысль о хлебе стала легкой, как песня»²⁵.

Зато существует значительное количество доказательств невосприятия населением западных областей новых советских порядков и, особенно, колхозной системы. Об этом не писали в газетах и не сообщали по радио, информация тщательно скрывалась, что также является вектором информационной политики власти. Например, 17 августа 1940

²⁴ Постановление Центрального Комитета КП(б)У и Совета Народных Комиссаров УССР [Central Committee KP(b)Uk resolution and Soviet of National Commissars of UkSSR], ДАЧО, ф. Р-3, оп. 1, спр. 1, арк. 44.

²⁵ Кошалюк П. *Колгоспний хліб* [The wheat «bread» of collective farms], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 4 січня 1941 р., № 3 (390), с. 3.

года Секретарю ЦК КП(б)У Н.С.Хрущеву пришла докладная записка наркома внутренних дел УССР И. Серова о массовом выходе из колхоза крестьян в Дрогобычской области. Документ удостоверяет, что лишь в указанном селе на протяжении двух дней (10-11 августа) 35 лиц подало заявления в канцелярию об исключении их из списков колхозников. Два человека были арестованы, с остальными была проведена «массово-разъяснительная работа», чем обеспечена дальнейшая работа большинства крестьян в колхозе. Такие случаи были неодинокими, хотя они тщательным образом скрывались властью. Об этом свидетельствует и гриф «совершенно секретно» на указанном документе²⁶.

В ответ советская власть в СМИ продолжала запланированную линию информационного влияния. Постоянно подчеркивалась радость крестьян, готовящихся собирать урожай со своих и бывших помещичьих участков. «Уже сегодня, не тратя попусту время, надо приложить все усилия и организовать косовицу, сноповязание, возовицу и молотьбу хлеба так, чтобы ни одного килограмма зерна не осталось на поле, чтобы весь хлеб был собран по-советски - быстро и без малейших потерь»²⁷.

И хотя внешне это выглядело заботой о населении, в действительности, только что созданная советская власть заботилась о своевременной и достаточной хлебозаготовке, не забывая напоминать об этом крестьянам. Часто «почетная» миссия напоминания крестьянам их обязанностей перед освободительницей предоставлялась местным «лидерам мысли» – людям, которым, как правило, доверяло население конкретно взятой местности. «Первую и священную свою обязанность – хлебопоставки крестьяне выполняют с честью», – сообщает голова Лужанского сельсовета Черновицкой области А. Кущов²⁸. Населению постоянно напоминали из разных источников, что «каждый упущенный день, каждый час угрожает большими потерями»²⁹. И одновременно освещались все ужасы прошлых и современных аграрных проблем

²⁶ Галузевий державний архів Служби безпеки України [The Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine], ф. 16, оп. 11 а, спр. 11, арк. 13-14.

²⁷ *Провести збирання врожаю дружно і організовано* [Gather harvest together and in an organized way], in «Радянська Буковина» [Soviet Bukovina], 25 липня 1940 р. – № 23.

²⁸ Кущов А., *Нове життя* [New Life], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 16 жовтня 1940. – № 93.

²⁹ *Краще організувати збирання і молотьбу врожаю* [Better organization of gathering and threshing crops], in «Радянська Буковина» [Soviet Bukovina], 10 серпня 1940 р. – № 39.

Румынии и Польши. В частности, в новогоднем 1941 г. выпуске газеты «Советская Буковина» сообщалось о трагедии, которая постигла молодежь Румынии. Речь шла о принятом законе об обязательном труде всех детей в сельском хозяйстве, согласно которому даже 11-летние дети должны были отработать у кулаков 10-15 дней. «На основе данного нечеловеческого закона румынское правительство мобилизует на работу до 4 миллионов детей»³⁰, – трубила советская пропаганда. Такая информация часто перекручивалась и не соответствовала действительности, зато вызывала негативные эмоции у населения, что и требовалось для большего убеждения в своей правоте. В постоянных рубриках газет западных областей (например, «на помощь пропагандисту и агитатору») отмечались высокие результаты колхозного труда, хотя действительность их не подтверждала. «Лозунг товарища Сталина о большевистских колхозах и состоятельной жизни колхозников успешно осуществляется. Трудно переоценить современную культурную и состоятельную жизнь колхозников, жизнь, окруженная действительно народным счастьем, созданным силами рабочих и крестьян под руководством Коммунистической партии»³¹.

Поскольку не все население однозначно воспринимало действия новой власти (были и такие, которые оказывали сопротивление), перед агитаторами и информаторами было поставлено задание подстрекать большинство против несогласных, призывая их таким образом к повиновению. «Сельсовет вместе с активом должен беречь общественное имущество, как свою собственность»³². Одновременно начинается пропаганда колхозного строительства. Крестьян призывали бороться за коллективизацию, поскольку само коллективное общество обработки земли является единственным путем к состоятельной жизни для безземельных и малоземельных крестьян. Подчеркивалось, что при условии государственной помощи и поддержки будет расти зажиточность колхозников, а также создадутся условия для роста культуры села в целом. На примере колхозов, которые уже существовали в центральных и восточных областях УССР, осуществлялось информационное давление на

³⁰ *Трагедія молоді* [The tragedy of young generation], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 1 січня 1941 р. – № 1 (157).

³¹ Сіганов А. В., *Ліквідація протилежностей між містом і селом* [Liquidation of the contrast between city and village], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 15 листопада 1940 р., № 267 (348), с. 3.

³² Романович Л., *Одержали землю* [Get the soil] in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 24 липня 1940 р., № 22.

население региона с целью быстрее развертывания колхозного строя в западных областях³³. Радость крестьян, получивших землю, становится информационным лозунгом для СМИ. «Пришло к нам счастье. Землей нас советская власть наделила»³⁴. Прочитав или прослушав такие сообщения, можно было действительно поверить в то, что крестьяне получили землю. Хотя реальные обстоятельства свидетельствовали о другом.

Необходимо отметить, что все чаще среди населения распространялась информация о колхозном строительстве, которое уже в ближайшее время должно было начать приносить прибыли власти. «Бедняки и середняки освобожденных земель советуются, как лучше встретить первую советскую весну на Буковине. У всех возникает одна мысль - соединяться в колхозах по примеру крестьян из восточных областей УССР»³⁵. Также, председатель Первой областной партийной конференции во Львове Козырев констатировал создание 31 колхоза. Это он называл началом работы. «Крестьянство настроено в основном неплохо. Мы не должны прекращать дальнейшей агитации за колхозное движение»³⁶.

Приводились примеры создания инициативных групп, а также заявления достаточно большого количества бедняцких и середняцких хозяйств о вступлении в колхоз (например, в селах Рукшин, Данкивцы и Ставчаны Черновицкой области). Одновременно сообщалось об улучшении бытовых условий жителей районов, повышении культурного развития³⁷. «Крестьяне села Задубровка Садагурского района проявили большое желание к организации колхоза. Здесь уже создана инициативная группа, в которую записано 18 бедняцко-крестьянских хозяйств. Агитаторы знакомят крестьян с уставом сельскохозяйственной артели, рассказывают

³³ Котенко М., *Радісне щасливе життя* [Happy and Merry Life], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 26 липня 1940 р., № 24.

³⁴ Яков Г., *До нас прийшло щастя* [We have got the happiness], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 1 січня 1941 р., № 1 (157).

³⁵ *Передача последних известий за декабрь 1940 – февраль 1941 г.* [The broadcast of the latest news for December 1940 - February 1941], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 2, спр. 1, арк. 154.

³⁶ *Протокол I областной партийной конференции* [The first protocol of the regional party conferens], ДАЛО, ф. 3, оп. 1, спр. 4, арк. 167-168.

³⁷ Виноградський Д., *Доб'ємося ще більших перемог* [Get more wins], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»] 9 лютого 1941 р., № 33 (189).

о жизни и работе в колхозах Советского Союза»³⁸. Коллективное ведение хозяйства называлось «единственным правильным путем», позволяющим «гордиться честной работой»³⁹.

Такие сообщения должны были призывать другие села и районы следовать примеру передовиков социалистического строительства. В сообщениях обязательно подчеркивалось, что «в правление были избраны бедняки и середняки села»⁴⁰. В целом призывы вместе с мерами административного воздействия давали свои результаты. Согласно справке по вопросам сельского хозяйства западных областей УССР, на 1 января в 1941 г. в западных областях численность крестьянских дворов составляла 1634800. С января по июнь был организован 561 колхоз. На июнь 1941 года колхозов в западных областях было уже 2866 (Львовская область - 296, Дрогобычская - 335, Волынская - 663, Станиславская - 295, Ровенская - 471, Тернопольская - 529, Черновицкая - 62)⁴¹.

Запрещались какие-либо замечания относительно колхозной системы, напротив, постоянно подчеркивалось, что абсолютно все крестьяне поддерживали политику власти в аграрном секторе. «Все колхозники работают дружно, честно, борются за то, чтобы уже в первом году ведения хозяйства собрать высокие урожаи»⁴². То есть, в

³⁸ *Передача последних известий за декабрь 1940 – февраль 1941 г.* [The broadcast of the latest news for December 1940 - February 1941], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 2, спр. 1, арк. 78.

³⁹ *Політична агітація на селі* [Political propaganda in villages], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 11 квітня 1941 р., № 85 (472), с. 1.

⁴⁰ *Передача последних известий за декабрь 1940 – февраль 1941 г.* [The broadcast of the latest news for December 1940 - February 1941], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 2, спр. 1, арк. 204.

⁴¹ *Матеріали про стан і відновлення сільського господарства в Українській РСР після звільнення України від німецької окупації. Відомості про кількість колгоспів в Українській РСР. Характеристика колгоспів західних областей УРСР (постанови уряду та облвиконкомів, накази, кошториси, довідки, відомості, листи тощо)* [The materials about the agricultural condition and renewal of it in UkSSR after Ukraine liberation from German occupation. Information about number of collective farms in western regions UkSSR (government resolution and regional executive authorities, orders, estimates, information, letters etc.)], Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (ЦДАВОУ), ф. Р2, оп. 7, т. 1, спр. 1295, арк. 73.

⁴² *Ляхович П., Боремось за високий урожай* [We fights for more crops], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 24 травня 1941 р., № 120 (276).

первую очередь, необходимо исполнить долг перед государством. Бывший батрак Георгий Рыхло в обращении к населению говорил: «До создания колхоза я был в числе инициативной группы, проводил среди крестьян беседы о преимуществах колхозного строя. Теперь члены нашего колхоза на деле начали в этом убеждаться. Колхозники заверяют, что с честью будут носить имя великого Сталина, который дал свободную радостную жизнь буковинскому народу»⁴³. Понятно, что такие заявления делались под давлением административных и карательных органов советской власти.

Постоянно населению предоставлялась информация о растущих количественных показателях колхозного строительства. Сообщалось, что на конец мая 1941 года в Черновицкой области, пока функционирует лишь 63 колхоза, но эта цифра постоянно растет, поскольку основная масса крестьян лишь становится на этот путь. Утверждалось, что крестьяне Львовской области уже убедились в преимуществах коллективного хозяйства над единоличным (в области на апрель 1941 года создано свыше 250 колхозов, объединивших свыше 13 тыс. крестьянских хозяйств). «Став на колхозный путь, трудовое крестьянство демонстрирует свое огромное доверие и любовь к своей родной власти, к партии, у которой никаких других интересов, кроме интересов народа, не существует»⁴⁴. Соответственно передовые позиции в весеннем севе принадлежали по сообщениям советской власти именно районам с процветающим колхозным строительством⁴⁵.

Высокий уровень продуманности информационного влияния на население в период колхозного строительства подтверждает также тот факт, что в сообщениях крестьянам доносилась и та реакция, которой ожидала от них власть после ознакомления с предоставленной информацией. То есть сообщение не должны были призывать к размышлениям, а лишь к конкретным, указанным в этих самых сообщениях, действиям. Для примера рассмотрим такое сообщение в прессе: "Недаром мы прочитали в газете рассказ о колхозе имени Ленина села Жерди Каменец-Подольской области. Мы были восхищены успехами

⁴³ *Передача последних известий на общественно-политические и научные темы* [The broadcast of the last news about general, political and scientific topics], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 1, т. 1, спр. 1, арк. 31.

⁴⁴ *Політична агітація на селі* [Political propaganda in villages], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 11 квітня 1941 р., № 85 (472), с. 1.

⁴⁵ *Напередодні весняної сівби* [Before spring sowing], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 22 березня 1941 р., № 68 (224).

этого колхоза. А потом и сказали друг другу: «А мы тоже колхозники артели имени Ленина. Будем же брать пример с передовых людей, чтобы стать передовыми»⁴⁶. То есть, в самом сообщении указано то, как на него необходимо реагировать. Сами крестьяне, убедившись из информационных сообщений, что колхоз несет им «состоятельную и радостную жизнь» стремятся стать колхозниками. Результат такой пропаганды не заставлял ожидать. «В селах Белка, Торгов и Поморяны (Львовская область) поданы десятки заявлений о желании организовать сельскохозяйственную артель. Но новых колхозов еще не организовано. Даже не создано инициативных групп. Надо, чтобы руководители Поморянского района глубже вникали в жизнь села и изучали процессы, происходящие там. Тогда, безусловно, до весны будем иметь несколько коллективных хозяйств»⁴⁷.

Именно на урожай первого колхозного года возлагались большие надежды власти, поскольку лишь высокие показатели урожайности погнали бы остальных крестьян в колхозы. Кроме того, закреплялись обязательные поставки мяса, шерсти, кукурузы, зерна, подсолнуха, сахарной свеклы государству крестьянскими хозяйствами западных областей⁴⁸. Население по-разному воспринимало эти поставки, поэтому необходимо было убеждать их в важности этого задания. Уполномоченный наркомата заготовок по Львовской области УССР, Т. Грищенко, отчитывался в 1941 году, что обязательные поставки сельскохозяйственных продуктов государству существуют уже второй год и население «освобожденного края с большим воодушевлением отозвалось на призывы советского правительства вовремя выполнить план поставок государству», поскольку это просто обязанность каждого колхозника⁴⁹.

На начало 1941 года в радиосообщениях звучала информация о готовности шести тысяч бедняцко-крестьянских хозяйств Северной

⁴⁶ Пульбер В., *Беремо приклад з передових* [We take a pattern by the best] in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 22 березня 1941 р., № 68 (224).

⁴⁷ Горбенко І., *Допомогти селянам об'єднатися в колгоспи* [Help farmers to unite into collective farms], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 15 січня 1941 р., № 12 (399), с. 2.

⁴⁸ *Постановление Центрального комитета КП(б)У и Совета Народных Комиссаров УССР* [Central Committee KP(b)Uk resolution and Soviet of National Commissars of UkSSR], ДАЧО, ф. Р-3, оп. 1, спр. 1, арк. 55.

⁴⁹ Грищенко Т., *Священный обов'язок* [Holy obligation], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 6 червня 1941 р., № 131 (518), с. 3.

Буковины стать на колхозный путь развития. Они выразили свои мнения и пожелания вступления в колхоз⁵⁰. «Мы, крестьяне, убедились, что колхоз - единственный правильный для нас путь. Лишь в колхозе крестьянин может получить состоятельную, светлую и радостную жизнь»⁵¹. Передовая «Правды» за 1 января в 1941 г. констатировала: «Колхозы Украины встречают новый год большими победами. Вооруженные решением Совнаркома СССР и ЦК ВКП(б) «О дополнительной оплате труда колхозников», колхозы добьются в 1941 году новых значительных успехов. Еще больше укрепят свое общественное хозяйство, увеличат производство всех сельскохозяйственных культур, повысят производительность скота для полного удовлетворения все растущих потребностей трудящихся Советского Союза. Колхозы Украины добьются дальнейшего повышения зажиточности колхозных масс»⁵².

Пропагандистское сопровождение советизации культурно-просветительной сферы

Постоянно подчеркивалась также забота власти об образовательно-культурном развитии людей. Отмечалось: «И не только дети у нас учатся. Сейчас работает 15 школ для взрослых. На ликвидацию неграмотности и малообразованности в Черновицкой области отпускается лишь на один год 740 тысяч карбованцев. 28 тысяч рабочих и крестьян ликвидируют в этом году свою неграмотность, 19 тысяч - малообразованность. Намного расширится работа с детьми дошкольного возраста. Значительно вырастет количество библиотек»⁵³. Еще 12 октября 1940 года Протоколом №22 «О работе с неграмотным и малограмотным населением и организации вечерних НСШ образования взрослых» на

⁵⁰ *Передачи последних известий за декабрь 1940 – февраль 1941 г.* [The broadcast of the latest news for December 1940 - February 1941], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 2, спр. 1, арк. 155. дек

⁵¹ *Передача последних известий и статей на общественно-политические и научные темы* [The broadcast of the last news about general, political and scientific topics], ДАЧО, ф. Р-2162, оп. 1, т. 1, спр. 1, арк. 26.

⁵² *Могутній стимул підвищення продуктивності праці в колгоспах* [Strong stimulation of increasing efficiency labour in collective farms], in «Вільна Україна» [«Free Ukraine»], 4 січня 1941 р., № 3 (390), с. 1.

⁵³ *Невпинний ріст народної освіти* [Unceasing growth of national education], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 9 лютого 1941 р., № 33 (189).

заседании исполкома Черновицкого городского совета была утверждена деятельность вечерней школы и групп ликвидации малограмотности и безграмотности на предприятиях⁵⁴.

Пропагандировалось и гарантированное Сталинской Конституцией право на образование. Поскольку вскоре после создания Черновицкой области УССР должен был начаться учебный год, была развернута работа по организации школьного процесса. Власть заявляла, что якобы с румынских времен им достались необорудованные школы, не удовлетворяющие потребности в образовании трудящихся. Этим самым они пытались подчеркнуть свою действенность в этом процессе⁵⁵. В конце 1940-41 учебного года в западных областях были созданы 284 средние школы, их общее количество стало 6766, в них училось 1184000 учеников.

Из общего количества 314 школ во Львовской области лишь 91 была украинской. После установления советской власти их количество выросло до 1224⁵⁶. Постоянно пропагандировались социальные блага: «В Советском Союзе созданы условия, ведущие к снижению смертности и росту рождаемости. Коренным образом изменились условия жизни трудящихся города и села. Повысился культурный уровень населения, выросла система здравоохранения»⁵⁷. В 1940 г. на развитие народного образования во Львове было выделено средств в 9 раз больше, чем это было во времена Польши⁵⁸. Отмена национальных ограничений для украинского населения, использование классовых принципов комплектования вузов, организация ускоренной общеобразовательной подготовки рабоче-крестьянской молодежи и другие мероприятия позволили в дальнейшем увеличить процент украинского населения среди студентов.

В самые короткие сроки на советских принципах была унифицирована система общего образования и воспитания. С января в

⁵⁴ *Протоколы №№ 1-34 заседаний горисполкома* [Protocols №№ 1 – 34 of the city executive authority sittings], ДАЧО, ф. Р-72, оп. 1, спр. 2, арк. 82.

⁵⁵ *Готуватись до нового навчального року* [Got ready for new study year], in «Радянська Буковина» [«Soviet Bukovina»], 19 липня 1940 р., № 17, с. 1.

⁵⁶ *Протокол I областної партійної конференції* [The protocol of the First regional party conference], ДАЛО, ф. 3, оп. 1, спр. 4, арк. 61.

⁵⁷ Рябічна В., *Нове життя* [New Life], in «Вільна праця» [«Free Labour»], 26 січня 1940 р., № 20 (94), с. 3.

⁵⁸ *Історія Львова* [History of Lviv], Київ, 1984, с. 242.

1940 г. все школы Западной Украины, перешли на учебные планы, программы, учебники советской школы. Вместе с родным, во всех школах обязательно изучался и русский язык. Преподавание религии запрещалось. Неотъемлемой частью учебного процесса постепенно становилась антирелигиозная пропаганда.

Поддержку власти получил лишь ограниченный круг авторов, принявших «советскую платформу», пытавшихся работать в русле канонов «социалистического реализма». Перед ними в первую очередь открывалась возможность печатать свои произведения в республиканских и всесоюзных газетах, журналах, издательствах, экспонировать свои произведения на выставках. В условиях, когда высокую оценку получало не художественное качество произведений, а их пропагандистская и идеологическая роль, ради актуальности темы на щит начали поднимать слабые, невыношенные, сырые по исполнению, однако, как правило, претензионные по названиям труды⁵⁹. Таким образом проводилась идеологизация общества, а также подавление инакомыслия на территории западных областей УССР.

Выводы

Ведущую роль в информационных процессах в западных областях УССР сыграли местные газеты и радиовещание. Именно они стали для населения источником информации и доверия, и именно потому их деятельность была сурово регламентированной и контролируемой. Население через СМИ получало только нужную власти информацию. И наоборот, ни одно известие, связанное с отрицательным освещением любых общественных процессов, не достигало народа. Власти удавалось ловко формировать новое политическое сознание граждан с учетом всех советских ценностей и стереотипов, а также совершать информационное сопровождение и поддержку нужных процессов советизации всех сфер жизни в регионе.

Таким образом, информационная политика советского руководства фактически выполнила свои основные задачи, связанные с формированием положительного имиджа новой власти в обществе. Зато дальнейшие шаги государства, несущие насильнический характер советизации края, перечеркнули все старания теоретиков

⁵⁹ Олександр Луцький, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

информационного влияния и пропаганды СССР. Население, увидев недостатки и просчеты «освободителей» и почувствовав определенный обман в их обещаниях, все менее стало подвергаться информационному влиянию на сознание, что привело к необходимости поиска властью новых форм влияния на местных жителей. В июне 1941 года направления, формы, задачи и методы информационной политики советской власти изменились в связи с началом немецко-советской войны.

**THE INFLUENCE OF WISHFUL THINKING IN DIPLOMACY,
INTERNAL CORRUPTION AND MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS
UPON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS¹**

The years 1938-1940 correspond in Romania's history with the final part of the reign of Carol II (1930-1940), ended abruptly by the abdication of the monarch on 6 September 1940, due to popular discontents caused by territorial concessions that have disintegrated Greater Romania (Rom. "România Mare"): Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina ceded to the Soviet Union (28 June 1940), north-western Transylvania ceded to Hungary (August 30, 1940) and southern Dobruja taken by Bulgaria (September 6, 1940).

This book, signed by an officer (colonel), highlights the complex causes, both external and internal, of these territorial concessions made without a fight: the lack of practical military viability of interwar Romania's alliances under the pressure of totalitarian regimes (Communist and Nazism) – the alliance with France and Great Britain, the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente; inadequate propaganda for putting forward before the international public opinion the Romanians' historical rights over the ceded regions; poor training and equipment of the Romanian army, neglected by a deeply corrupt political class.

The scientific approach of the author is presented in five chapters with suggestive titles: *Political-diplomatic actions to avoid external isolation of the Romanian state in the 1936-1940 period*; *Coordinates of National Defence in the 1938-1940 period*; *Romania's military policy between 1938-1940*; *Intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Romanian army between 1938-1940*; *Decisions to release parts of the national territory without fighting – between military resistance solution and the argument of "survival of the Romanian state"*. The book is accompanied by substantial personal

¹ Dan Prisăcaru, *În avanpostul luptei pentru supraviețuire. Apărarea națională a României și frontul secret în vâltoarea anilor 1938-1940* [In the outpost of the fight for survival. The national defence of Romania and secret front in the turmoil of the years 1938-1940], Preface by Cătălin Turliuc, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2014, 452 p.

conclusions, annexes (photocopies of epoch documents, which supplements and enhances its scientific information) and an useful general Index which facilitates its usage.

Since introduction, perspicacious reader realizes that he has to do with a study in which military elements and analyses are predominant and the correct deciphering of these analyses explains almost entirely the essence of Romania's territorial concessions in 1940. So, the US military attaché in Bucharest, J. P. Ratay, estimated in late September 1939 that although Romanians had 800,000 armed men, the supply with fighting means and ammo was very poor. Also, the US military expert concluded that the German army could reach Bucharest in approximately 4 days, from the Polish-Romanian border, even if the Romanians had resisted (p. 29). General Tenescu, Chief of the Headquarters of the Romanian army, was accusing the members of the Crown Council, on June 27, 1940, that they have neglected alliances and the country's military defence, concluding afterwards: "I will conduct four fights about which Europe will speak and in five days the Russians will be at Turnu Severin... I refuse to lead the country to the disaster" (p. 32).

In the first chapter, the author presents the main international events that have led to political and diplomatic isolation of Romania between 1936-1940: the entering of the German troops into the Rhineland's demilitarized zone (March 7th 1936), the incorporation of Austria to Germany – i.e. *Anschluss* (March 12th 1938), the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (September 29th 1938) and non-aggressive pact between Germany and the Soviet Union (August 23rd 1939). At the same time, this chapter presents Romania's main actions of preventing its diplomatic isolation and approaching to Germany and Italy, without giving up to France and Britain alliances. Subsequently, the author presents and analyzes the lack of strategic vision of Romanian leaders who relied too much on the alliance with France ended in 1926, regarded by France as "a simple means to maintain influence in south-eastern Europe" (p. 97) and did not take into consideration the new strategic realities that aroused in Europe after 1936. In the final part of the first chapter are presented serious deficiencies, both in quantity and quality, of interwar Romanian foreign propaganda, who did not know how to present efficiently its historical rights over Transylvania, Dobruja, Bukovina and Bessarabia to the international public opinion.

The second chapter firstly analyzes the interwar Romania's geopolitical position, with opening to Central and Eastern parts of the continent, as well

as to the Balkan Peninsula, with large resources (at that time) of oil, untapped by Romanian politicians on the international arena. Forwards, it is highlighted the idea that 3/4 of the extent of interwar Romania's borders were vulnerable: with Hungary in west, with Bulgaria in the south, with the USSR in the north and east and has not concluded agreements with its major military allies, France and Britain. The author further presents minutely the interwar Romania's war potential, with more data on demographic, economic and moral factors thereof. In this presentation, colonel Prisăcaru introduces into scientific circuit a lot of archival data and restores to public attention the excellent writings of interwar Romanian military theoreticians, today unjustly forgotten.

Forwards are presented the key data – most of them unpublished – about the “Line Carol II”, a permanent fortifications system built against Hungary in 1937-1940, on the western border of the country. Never used, these military works have consumed large financial and material resources and a part of military specialists considered even that they are poorly planned and executed, with scarce utility.

Subchapter regarding deficiencies related to the interwar Romanian army's weaponry and equipments is truly impressive, Romanian army having at that time almost the lowest percentage of the national budget assigned to defence in Europe (p. 169). Most amounts for the army were used to pay wages, too little money being put into service of equipping the army. At the beginning of the Second World War, the Romanian army was with great deficiencies of weaponry and ammo, due to the fact that France, England and Czechoslovakia did not entirely honoured Romanian state's requests and also because of insufficiencies of Romania's defence industry.

The chapter concludes with a review of disintegration of Romania's political-military alliances, without struggles, before the outbreak of World War II: the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania), the alliance with Poland, the Balkan Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey).

The third chapter examines the military policy of Romania in the period 1938-1940, from the legislative framework and military doctrine of “armed nation” to proper organization of the army: infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks, aviation, marine, transmissions. It is also examined the division of national territory on “fronts” (East, West and South) and highlighted – mainly with archival sources – the main preventive concentration of troops and partial or general mobilization of the Romanian army made under the pressure of

international events during 1938-1940. During the presentation, the author points out several times that, until August 1939 preventive concentrations troops were on west and south borders, against Hungary and Bulgaria, excluding the USSR, the Romanian authorities considering before 1940 that a war against the USSR is unlikely.

The author outlines afterwards, competently and professionally, the main changes of the Romanian strategic device on all boarders in order to counter possible threats. The chapter also shows that the mobilization and troop concentrations have created various material problems to civilians (mainly ascribed to requisitions) and emphasized the inadequate preparation for battle of the Romanian troops. In addition, it is showed that Romanian military doctrine does not provide definitive evacuation of some national territories, which has created great difficulties for Romanian troops' retreat from Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Transylvania and southern Dobruja in 1940.

The final part of the chapter deserves all reader's attention, by stating the military and geostrategic negative consequences of territorial concessions made in 1940; because of that, Romania became weaker in demographic, economic and military terms compared to USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The fourth chapter firstly presents the main intelligence and counterintelligence structures of the Internal Affairs and Defence Ministries which functioned during 1938-1940: General Directorate of the Police and State Security, Intelligence Service of the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie, the Gendarmes Legion CFR (i.e. related to Romanian Railways) in the frame of Internal Affairs Ministry and the Military Intelligence (Section II of the Headquarters) and Secret Romanian Army Intelligence Service (or the Special Intelligence Service), in the frame of the Defence Ministry. Later, it is produced a short but a very interesting history related to intelligence and counterintelligence structures of the Romanian army, from the second half of the 19th century until 1940. The subchapter dedicated to the organization and actions of the Secret (Special) military intelligence Service is carefully drafted and developed. The author managed to prove (although presents also some contrary opinions) that it was an efficient structure of intelligence of the Romanian state.

The final part of the chapter emphasizes limits and errors of the Secret Service (Special) Information – including those made by its legendary chief

Mihail Moruzov – in delivering of strategic information to political and military leadership of the Romanian state.

The fifth chapter firstly highlights the options of Romania in 1940: organize military resistance or accept territorial claims formulated by the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria. The conclusion, based on a good military analysis is that a successful military resistance of Romania against the combined efforts of the three countries was impossible.

The author demonstrates that this outcome was predictable because Romania could not count on the support of any foreign power in 1940 and, also, the political class of Greater Romania preferred to follow a policy of rapid personal enrichment in the detriment of training and equipping the army.

This chapter reveals that wishful thinking in diplomacy, internal corruption and lack of adequate training and equipments for the army explains why a country (Romania) lost in 1940 one third of the national territory without fight.

The reviewed paper has two strengths: introduces into scientific circuit many archival documents (from Pitești Romanian Military Archives, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Central Historical Archives in Bucharest); it provides an equidistant interpretation of historical events, strongly emphasizing the Romanians guilt in the catastrophic territorial concessions in 1940. This starkly contrasts with the traditional assessments of Romanian historians, who saw territorial concessions in 1940 solely owed to actions of Nazi and Communist imperialisms, combined with the policy of *appeasement* of the great Western democracies, completely exonerating the Romania's part of guilt: amateurish diplomacy influenced by *wishful thinking*; army's poor training and equipping due to the corruption of Romanian leading factors.

The book elaborated by Dan Prisăcaru lacks one thing to be complete: use of some representative works of national historiographies of the states involved in territorial concessions drama of Romania in the summer of 1940 (Hungary, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation). We propose the author to take into consideration this suggestion for a possible second edition of the book, which would be meant to provide a broader interpretive framework of the analyzed period.

Overall, however, we have a work of solid history, seeking to provide (and succeeding largely) the truth in classical Rankean spirit – to write and to present “how things actually were” (in German: *wie es eigentlich gewesen*). On

the one hand, the truth makes us free people, and on the other hand it can contribute to improve significantly the field of international relations.

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